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ABSTRACT
A high school Biology II classroom was observed daily in order to study
students' conceptual change in evolution of life. The conceptual frameworks of four
student participants were documented and the patterns of conceptual change were studied
closely throughout the full school year. Data collected included open-ended and
structured individual interviews, student journals, daily classroom observations, field
notes, and pre- and posttests. All 68 student interviews (17 per student) were recorded,
transcribed, coded, and sorted to find patterns of conceptual change. Additional
interviews were conducted with the teacher, parents, principal, and high school
counselor. The researchers' interpretations were shared with the student participants and
teacher to ensure that the voices o f all research participants were heard.
The finding of this multi-case study o f conceptual change include:
1. Conceptual change about evolution of life can occur in one of three patterns:
(a) holistic, (b) fragmented and gradual, and (c) dual constructions.
2. Conceptual change can occur with little corresponding change in belief. The
Darwinian theory o f the evolution of life, in its modern form, can be
understood but not accepted.
3. The most influential factor inhibiting conceptual change toward a more
scientific framework is not belief, but the learner's feelings o f disturbance
and conflict as learning occurs.
4. Certain critical issues, called threshold questions in this study, seem to be
central to conceptual change. An example threshold question is "How could
two different species stem from one original species?"
5. Conceptual change is often based upon the idiosyncratic, extra-logical
assessment o f competing conceptions.
6. Often, the change o f one conception allows a sequence o f changes to occur in
the learner's overall conceptual framework. Overall, this study demonstrates

ix

that many conceptions in this area are closely interwoven, so that a change in
one conception requires a gradual blending and modification of related
conceptions.
7. The actions of a learner's conceptual ecology are found to vary with each
individual. The participant’s orientation toward academic work,
epistemological approach to scientific knowledge, belief in evolutionary
theory, and approach to scientific topics play integrated roles in controlling
the learning that may occur.

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A student sitting in a biology class in rural Louisiana asks his teacher what he
perceives to be a simple question, "Tell me about alligators." The teacher stops and
looks out the classroom window furrowing her brows in puzzlement. W hat should she
tell the student? Should the question be approached taxonomically, and the student
informed about the classification o f the alligator as both a vertebrate and a reptile?
Should the question be approached physiologically, and the student informed about the
unique cardiovascular structure of the alligator? Or should a reproductive approach be
used, with an explanation o f the evidence for maternal care shown by these unique
reptiles and the insight this may provide a paleontologist in her studies o f dinosaur
artifacts? Given much reflection, the responses stretch out endlessly. The student
shakes his head muttering that the teacher is daydreaming.
In his collection o f essays entitled Toward a New Philosophy of Biology. Mayr
(1988) eloquently describes the cause o f the teacher's bemusement. Biology is an
inherently complex science. This complexity stems from the multiple layers of
explanation made possible by very different disciplines which exist under the umbrella of
biology. Reproductive biology, taxonomy, physiology, ethology, anatomy, eco lo g y these disciplines represent a small fraction of the many theoretical frames studied by
biologists. Faced with this fragmentation and complexity, it is not surprising that a
layperson approaching this field resorts to rote lists as a means o f acquiring a small
fraction o f knowledge. Unfortunately, such knowledge usually remains isolated and
fragmented as the student is unsuccessful in constructing links between diverse
knowledge claims. For such a student, biology is seen as a body of established facts to
be learned in class, having little application to the natural world. As has been argued by
a host of biologists (Dobzhansky, 1973; Mayr, 1976, 1988) and science educators
(Cummins & Remsin, 1992; Good et al., 1992; Settlage, in press), the theoretical
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framework provided by evolution provides a means o f tying together the many
disciplines found in biology to form a single, coherent, and fluid science. The respected
geneticist and theorist Dobzhansky aptly described the importance of the evolutionary
theory in his now-famous quote, "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of
evolution" (1973, p. 125). Biologists and biology educators think the understanding of
evolution is crucial for a student to synthesize and integrate diverse biological concepts.
It is widely recognized that the manner in which we teach science is in need of
revision. In 1989, the American Association for the Advancement of Science suggested
that the goal of science educators should be the preparation o f scientifically literate
students. Literacy in a science involves an understanding of a core of all-pervasive
principles of that discipline and the ability to apply these principles in situations in and
out of the science classroom (Wandersee, 1991). The core principles o f biology include
information (genetics), energy flow, organisms, and evolution (AAAS, 1989). Thus, a
biologically literate student is one who can apply these core concepts in the consideration
of any biological topic.
Unfortunately, despite the recognition o f the importance o f evolution in the goal
of biological literacy, Shankar and Skogg (1993) suggest that biology teachers do not
emphasize this topic in their classes and many even avoid mention of this unifying
theory. This core principle of biology is not being adequately taught in our nation's
schools. While my past work has investigated the means through which instruction can
be changed and directed to achieve the goal of biological literacy (Demastes &
W andersee, 1990), this study has a different focus. Given that a thorough
understanding of evolution is necessary in order to be biological literate, how does such
understanding come about? The purpose of this study is to investigate the manner in
which students construct a conceptual framework for the theory of evolution.
Many science educators now understand learning to involve the active
restructuring o f knowledge (Duschl & Gitomer, 1991). The conceptual change theory of

Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog (1982) represents an attempt to model this
restructuring process. This theory uses the model o f Kuhn’s (1970) scientific revolution
as a basis for understanding the process of holistic conceptual change within the learner.
Conceptual change is understood to be directed by the learner's rational evaluation o f the
new conception. Additionally, the learner's conceptual ecology (Toulmin, 1972), a
fundamentally organizing system of conceptions, is said to influence the change that
occurs.
Smith, Blakeslee, and Anderson (1993) explain that meaningful learning entails
the construction or reconstruction of a conceptual framework for a topic. A conceptual
framework includes all of the interlinked conceptions a learner has about a particular
topic. Thus, all new information is understood by the learner in terms of her/his pre
existing, overarching conceptual framework. In this theoretical framework, conceptual
change is seen as the structural adjustments the learner makes to the overarching
conceptual framework based upon new experiences, information, or concepts the learner
encounters. Unlike rote learning, the meaningful learning which results from conceptual
change will allow the learner to not only recall information, but also to describe, predict,
and explain natural occurrences (Smith et al., 1993). Using this understanding, how can
we measure if conceptual change has occurred? It would seem that simple information
questions would not provide educators an adequate measure. Instead students should be
asked to describe, predict, and explain natural situations.
I selected the conceptual change theory because o f its fruitfulness as a model of
the learning of major, organizing conceptions, and I perceive evolution to be such a
conception. However, as a theoretical base, the conceptual change theory is also in need
of further refinement, modification, and validation as has been suggested by Strike and
Posner (1992). Therefore, the overall purpose o f this work is twofold: to understand
how students construct a conceptual framework and to determine the particularities of
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this construction when evolution is the content investigated. (See Figure 1 for a
summary of the research.)
Research Questions
The research questions of this study include:
1. What is the nature o f the process of conceptual change of evolution?
2. W hat factors facilitate or prohibit conceptual change?
3. W hat is the nature o f the interface between students' conceptual frameworks
in evolution and their conceptual ecologies?
4. W hat are the limits o f the conceptual change theory in the description of
conceptual change in evolution?
Definitions
For the purposes of the study, the following definitions will be used:
1. Belief will be defined in its relationship to understanding. Belief and
understanding are both forms o f knowledge which may overlap. But when
these two types of knowledge differ, understanding includes knowledge
which has an academic component, and belief includes knowledge which is
taken on faith in a supernatural agent (Pajares, 1992).
2. Belief system is a set of organized and interconnected individual beliefs.
3. Biological evolution is a theoretical framework which describes the various
processes which can lead to the genetic change in a population o f organisms
over time.
4. Classroom discussion refers to any formal or informal oral treatment of a
topic by more than two participants.
5. Reflexivitv in research refers to the actions of the research participants
changing the methods and analysis of the research as well as the actions of
the research/researcher changing some state of the participants.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
W hat is the nature o f the process of
conceptual change in evolution?
W orld View
Nature is observable and
knowablc.
Science is one way of knowing
the world (Moore).
Human knowledge is tentative and
subject to change.
Theories
Biological evolution
Conceptual change theory (Posner ct al.)
Grounded theory
Alternative conceptions
Principles

What factors facilitate o r prohibit
conceptual change?
What is the nature o f the
interface between
conceptual frameworks
and conceptual
ecologies?

r Current conceptual change theory is limited in scope:
New descriptions o f actual patterns o f conceptual
change should be made for other content areas:
High school students can learn evolutionary theory:
B elief docs not assure or prohibit understanding
Knowlcdcc claims

W hat arc the limits o f the
conceptual change theory
is describing
conceptual change
in evolution?

Conceptual change in evolution follows wholesale, gradual,
and dual patterns: Reading, integrated instruction, and
interviews facilitate conceptual change:
Different aspects o f conceptual ecologies control
conceptual change
Data Transform ations

Interview transcription, coding, and analysis:
C-map analysts: Categorization o f student's
pre and posltcst exam responses: Comparisons of
interview participants' exam with whole class exam

•Think aloud interviewing, in-depth interviewing,
structured interviewing, and mode validity
arc qualitative research techniques
lis&QOl
•Variable species, selection pressure, and
Audio and video tape o f interview: Field notes and field
mutation arc aspects o f evolutionary theory
journal o f interviews and observations: Pre and
•Conceptual change theory (Posner ct al.) requires learner’s
posltcst responses: C-maps
perception o f intelligibility, plausibility, and
fruitfulness o f the new conception
Events
Participant’s self-descriptions: Participant's analysis o f evolutionary and genetic events:
Responses to pretest and posltcst questions and explanations o f answers: Oral and written
responses to interview questions: Instruction in evolution: Participant observation

Figure 1
Gowin's vee of research

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Base
Constructivism
Constructivism is understood to be a model o f learning by some science
educators and a doctrine of education by others (Suchting, 1992). Constructivism
involves the construction o f meaning by an active learner as newly formed concepts are
connected to the learner's prior knowledge in an attempt to understand her/his world.
The foundational understanding is that learners construct their knowledge from
experience with the world, with individuals, and within cultures. The child as an active
participant in construction of her/his own learning radically differs from the behaviorist
approach which proposes the learner as a relatively passive receiver o f information.
This is a very broad description, requiring constructivism to serve as the basis for
a wide range o f theories. This range was the focus o f Cobern's (1991) description of the
emergence o f the constructivist movement within science education. In Cobern's
account, constructivism can be divided into personal and contextual categories.
Cobern (1991) traces personal constructivism as an initial branch from Piaget's
work. This theory focuses on the actions of the learner during knowledge construction.
Cobern states that research using personal constructivism centers around the actual
construction process used by the learner. It asks: How does the learner construct
knowledge? One mechanism by which personal constructivism can be carried out is that
described by the conceptual change theory. This theory of learning forms the basis for
the my proposed research.
A second category Cobern names in his analysis o f constructivist research is
contextual constructivism. Contextual constructivism is bifocal; the focus is not solely
on the student's knowledge construction, but also on how that construction is affected by
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the learner's life situation. It asks: W hat is the social contribution to learning? Learning
is analyzed within the cultural context of the learner. Contextual constructivism also
influenced my research as I observed the participants in their classroom and as I studied
the influences behind the teaching which was carried on in this classroom. These
activities were carried out in an effort to understand the process through which learning
is negotiated within the Laboratory School setting.
Conceptual Change Theory
The proposed research also draws on the theory of conceptual change as
proposed by Posner et al. (1982). The authors view their theory as describing the
methods by which conceptual frameworks are constructed and modified. More
narrowly, the conceptual change theory describes the process by which a learner captures
new concepts, restructures existing concepts, or exchanges concepts from one set to
another. This theory uses the model of scientific theory construction as a basis for
understanding the process o f conceptual change within the learner. This theory deals
primarily with central, organizing concepts, and explains that conceptual change can be
elicited when learners recognize the shortcomings of their present understanding and are
shown a more intelligible, plausible, and fruitful alternative. Within this model, the
learner's conceptual ecology is of fundamental importance in controlling the process of
conceptual change. This ecology, as described by Toulmin (1972), includes the
learner's epistemological commitments, metaphysical beliefs, and knowledge outside the
field. In their original description (Posner et al., 1982), the actions o f the learner's
conceptual ecology are, at best, ambigous. Aspects of my research represent an attempt
to define the actions of the conceptual ecology on the process o f conceptual change.
The conceptual change theory as it defines the growth o f one learner's conception
is situated within the constructivist theoretical basis, initially extending from personal
constructivism. Despite its genealogy, contextual constructivism may eventually have
important insights for the conceptual change theory, introducing the impact of affective,

linguistic, and social domains in the production of conceptual change. Such an
introduction may serve to make the conceptual change theory a more descriptive theory
of learning.
Alternative Conceptions
The conceptual change theory emphasizes the importance of students' prior
knowledge in instruction decision making and implementation. Such emphasis was
begun with the work of Ausubel (1968) with his emphasis of prior knowledge in the
process of learning, and was continued by Driver and Easley (1978). This foundation
helped science education change from its exclusive focus on learners' cognitive and
logical structures to examining the content o f learners' understandings. In recent
decades, investigations into students' prior knowledge have flourished. W andersee,
Mintzes and Novak (in press) have identified 2,400 such studies in the field of science
education.
One obvious difficulty seen as a reader approaches this field is the tremendous
diversity of terms currently used in science education to describe students' prior
knowledge. These terms include misconceptions, alternative conceptions, prescientific
conceptions, naive conceptions, children's science, and intuitive beliefs (Hills, 1989).
As mentioned earlier, each term implies a slightly different epistemological base. Both
Good (1991) and Wandersee et al. (in press) express the need for a convergence in terms
within this area. The historically prominent and popular term, misconception, implies
that there is little heuristic value to students' conceptions and suggests that they exists
simply as something to be corrected. The importance conceptual change theory places on
students' knowledge precludes this choice. Good (1991) has suggested the term
prescientific conceptions because this term applies only to science, is appropriate to both
adults and children, and avoids the negative connotation o f misconception while
conveying the extra-scientific nature o f the conception. Unfortunately, prescientific
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conceptions, cannot reasonably be used to refer to conceptions constructed within a
science classroom. Therefore, this term is potentially very restrictive.
In a similar vein, in their review of research in this area, W andersee et al. (in
press) suggest use of the term alternative conceptions, justifying this choice based both
on its prominence in the literature and on its tacit meanings. Alternative conception
implies an experience and contextually based, rational explanation. The authors explain
that such a term potentially provides for more intellectual respect for the students'
learning and represents an attempt to better understand students' views and their
intellectual difficulties. In an extension, while alternative conception describes students'
understanding of a concept, alternative framework refers to a complex organization of
linked conceptions.
The issue of terminology for the understandings students have of scientific
phenom ena remains unresolved. For the purposes o f this study, terms which signify a
lack of emphasis on the instructional power o f these conceptions will not be used.
Instead, alternative conceptions will be used because o f the broad meaning embeded in
the term and its reference to the heuristic nature o f students' conceptions.
Findings from a survey of experts in the field of alternative conceptions suggest
that science education should integrate studies within a content area, and the field should
move forward to descriptions o f conceptual change. Additionally, these experts explain
that an understanding of the cultural dimensions of students' conceptions is now required
(Wandersee et al., in press). This proposed research will follow both suggested
pathways.
Studies on the Learning of Evolution
Mayr (1976) described six world views that were widely held by scientific circles
before Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection (1859). The conceptions
restructured by the requirements of Darwin's theory included: (a) a young earth, (b) an
earth undergoing both catastrophes and long periods of no change, (c) teleological
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change, (d) creationism, (e) view of species as individuals without variation
(essentialism), and (f) anthropocentrism. While many o f the original conceptions were
undergoing significant changes before Darwin's work, the formulation and acceptance of
the theory of evolution by natural selection eventually forced a widespread restructuring
and acceptance of different conceptions within the scientific community. The theory of
evolution as mechanized by natural selection requires conceptions of: a) an old earth, b)
an earth undergoing gradual changes, c) change o f a species through origin in a random
occurrence acted on by natural selection, d) common descent of organisms, e) a view of
species as a collection o f variable individuals, and f) a view o f humans as existing within
the biological realm. These modified conceptions are necessary components of a
scientific understanding of evolution and have been the focus o f much of the research
done in students' understandings of evolution.
Facets o f Students' Conceptions of Evolution
Adaptation
The conception of adaptation is one facet of a scientific understanding of
evolution. However, Lucas (1971) describes that the term adaptation can have several
meanings in biology, which often are not well articulated to students. Lucas explains
that adaptation can refer to immediate physiological changes in an individual, to
characteristics of an organism which suit it to the environment, and also to the process in
which a population is modified to greater fitness with respect to its environment. Rarely
do students have this metaknowledge, and so cannot differentiate between the various
uses o f the word adaptation. Lucas' ideas (1971) are supported by the work o f Kargbo,
Hobbs, and Erickson (1980) who explained that the students studied (ages 7-13) often
do not distinguish between non-heritable characteristics which are adaptive and
characteristics which are inherited in a population. The high school students in studies
by Renner, Brumby, and Shepherd (1981) and Hallden (1988), as well as medical
students in a study by Brumby (1984), used adaptation in an individual sense of
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proximate change in response to environmental changes. Earlier work by Brumby
(1979) demonstrated that medical students understood adaptation as a positive process
resulting from need rather than the end-result of a selection event.
Clough and Wood-Robinson (1985b) attempted to identify common belief
patterns of 12-16 year old students in the area of biological adaptation. Developmental
changes of students in the study were addressed by repeating the interview two years
after the initial encounter. This study documented an increase in the number of older
students who held a scientific conception o f adaptation. The authors attributed this
improvement to both teaching and students' development. However, the study further
supports the description o f adaptation as a difficult area in the study of biology and
documents a very strong trend toward teleological explanations o f adaptation. Students
viewed adaptations as caused by some purpose or design. Anthropomorphic
explanations were also given as the cause of many adaptations. In these cases
adaptations were cited as a conscious and deliberate response to need. The authors
emphasized that such anthropomorphic expressions may reflect semantic difficulties,
instead of difficulties in the underlying meaning. Finally, Clough and Wood-Robinson
(1985b) stressed that students seldom make links between intraspecific variation and
natural selection.
The research cited above is important in that the understanding students have of
adaptation is central to their overall conception o f evolution (Deadman & Kelly, 1978).
In fact, many students use adaptation as their sole explanation of evolution (Hallden,
1988). While it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between the various facets of
evolutionary thought, the findings o f Bishop and Anderson (1990), Greene (1990), and
Demastes, Good, Sundberg, and Dini (1992) show that the use of only a rapid form of
adaptation undergone by an individual will have serious ramifications for other portions
of the students’ understandings of evolution.
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Time Frame
Another facet of current evolutionary thought is the time interval in which
evolution occurs. This was explored in a study by Renner, Brumby, and Shepherd
(1981). In this study, the high school students studied could not differentiate between a
2 million year and a 200 million year time span, two radically different time periods.
Other findings included: less than 5% of the students had an adequate grasp of evolution
and could provide an adequate explanation for extinction, 44% attributed the death of the
dinosaurs to proximal causes o f water and food loss, and adaptation by the dinosaurs
was seen as a rapid change of an individual caused by a changing environment.
Teleology and Anthropomorphism
One of the world views undermined by Darwin, and one that hinders a
construction o f a scientific understanding o f evolution, is that o f teleology. The most
common usage o f teleology in relation to biological understandings is that o f evolution
being directed to an end or shaped by an ultimate purpose. In his investigation of
teleological explanations in biology, Jungwirth (1975a) found that even agricultural
majors in the third year o f their university education used teleological explanations of
evolutionary phenomena on a multiple choice exam. This finding is supported by other
researchers (Clough and W ood-Robinson, 1985b; Lawson & W eser, 1990). However,
Hallden (1988) reminds us that such statements are difficult to analyze from written
explanations.
Through highlights o f debates between science educators and philosophers of
science, Jungwirth (1975b) pointed out that the issue of teleology is not a
straightforward one for educators. He described the close relationships between
anthropomorphic and teleological explanations and between functional and teleological
interpretations. Jungwirth (1975b) explained that teleological explanations are common
in biology teaching because of their value as heuristic devices. This is supported by
Hallden (1988) who reports that intentionality is often seen in biology textbooks.
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While his earlier work suggested teleology and anthropomorphism as a problem
created by poor teacher education, Jungwirth (1977) provided empirical support for this
suggestion through comparisons o f science education researchers, scientists, teachers,
and preservice teachers. Science education researchers found teleological and
anthropomorphic statements to be undesirable for study by biology students, while the
teachers and scientists were less aware of the dangers of such statements. Preservice
teachers were absolutely unaware of the existence of the problems of teleological and
anthropomorphic statements. Each group had difficulties in distinguishing between these
two types of statements.
One o f the most comprehensive studies of teleology and anthropomorphism is
found in the work o f Tam ir and Zohar (1991). In this research, shortcomings o f the
previous studies were remedied through the use o f individual interviews with the 15-17
year old students studied. The authors determined that 30% of the students understood
plants in anthropomorphic terms while 62% o f the students understood animals in a
similar manner. A higher majority, 71%, used teleological reasoning with respect to
evolution. The authors explained that nonteleological statements were typically
combined with a rejection of anthropomorphism, and teleological explanations were used
to express a functional understanding of organism.
Teleology differs from many of the other conceptions discussed in that it could be
more applicable to many other situations than other aspects of the individual's declarative
knowledge. Teleology may have a great impact upon the construction of a scientific
conception o f evolution. This is a hypothesis that has yet to be supported or refuted by
empirical evidence. My study attempted to explore through the use of student
explanations teleology’s function in students' construction of an evolutionary
framework.
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Genetics
The logical structure of the discipline of biology would indicate that an
understanding o f evolution is based on an understanding of genetics. There have been a
number o f studies which investigated students' conceptions of genetics. An early study
based on interviews by Kargbo et al. (1980) indicated that a majority of the students,
regardless of age, understood that all environmentally induced characteristics are
heritable. The authors concluded that students' conceptions did not follow a
developmental pathway, but altered according to their experiences. However,
conceptions o f probability regarding phenotypes o f offspring were said to improve with
the age o f the students. The authors suggested that children develop two conceptual
frameworks regarding inheritance, one constructed in school, and the other constructed
in the course of everyday experiences. In novel situations, the students often use the
latter structure for understanding.
In a later study o f students' conceptions o f inheritance, Clough and WoodRobinson (1985a) used interviews involving prediction, explanation, and follow-up
questions. The researchers found that many first-year, secondary school students have
extensive conceptions of inheritance although they have not yet studied the subject.
Students in the study typically discussed the biological phenomenon on a phenotypic
level, excluding genetic explanations. Students viewed the timing of fertilization as
determining inherited features and equated genetic dominance with phenotypic
characters. O f most importance to conceptions of evolution, students viewed variation
within populations as stemming from developmental defects. Between 40% and 50% of
the students throughout the age range understood phenotypic changes as heritable.
Albaladejo and Lucas (1988) explained that the concept of mutation is
fundamental in both genetics and evolution. They describe the English use of mutation
as a technical term, while in the Catalan language, "mutacio" (mutation) has a wider
usage, including any sudden change. Albaladejo and Lucas (1988) determined that in
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Catalan, mutation is associated with many types o f change, including puberty and
metamorphosis.
Demastes et al. (1992) suggested that students' understandings o f Mendelian
genetics often fail to help them understand evolution. This echoes an earlier finding by
Hallden (1988) who explained that instruction into Mendelian genetics does not provide a
means o f understanding evolution's mechanisms. Like Clough and W ood-Robinson
(1985a), Demastes et al. (1992) documented a failure by university students to
incorporate genetics into explanations of how populations o f organisms change, even
though instruction into genetics lead the unit on evolution. Such an omission was
partially explained by Longden (1982). Using in-depth interviews with high school
students having difficulties in genetics, Longden (1982) found two factors which
inhibited understanding: (a) the precision of the language of genetics coupled with less
than explicit teaching techniques into this language, and (b) the use o f symbolic
representation and mathematics. He suggested that students are involved only with the
surface mechanics of genetics and so fail to understand the underlying significance of the
process.
The research demonstrates that students have well-developed conceptions of
inheritance which are formed from their out-of-school experiences. These conceptions
invariably conflict with scientific conceptions and are often used by students to
understand the world. Logically, one would think that a scientific conception of genetics
is fundamental to a construction o f a scientific conception of evolution, a judgm ent which
guides the sequence o f instruction in a large number of classrooms. Again, this logical
assessment is not well supported by the research. The position of genetics in the
student's conceptual ecology and its impact on an understanding o f evolution need to be
addressed.
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Natural Selection
Several studies have focused on students' conceptions of one mechanism of
evolution, natural selection. Brumby's w ork (1984) explored university students'
conceptions of natural selection at the university level using both written questions and
structured interviews. The results o f the Brumby study demonstrate that students
proficient in science leave school using the Lamarckian view o f evolution; that is,
evolution occurs because of need. Brumby (1984) explained that many students describe
adaptation as a loss of function through disuse. Others see a change as affected by the
environment, with change gradually unfolding in the offspring. Brumby (1984) reported
that students confused the various biological meanings o f adaptation by failing to
distinguish between those changes within the individual and those changes seen in a
population. This was described as "intuitive Lamarckism" (p. 499), and the author
explained that this conception was far more than a simple error to be corrected. After the
course in biology, these medical students still had their intuitive misconceptions, coupled
with a poor ability to communicate their conceptions about natural selection. These
results are supported by earlier work with a similar group o f students (Brumby, 1979).
Only 18% of these first year medical students who had previously studied biology could
correctly apply a process of selection to an example o f evolutionary change.
Summary
Students' alternative conceptions regarding the mechanisms o f evolutionary
change (i.e., genetics, adaptation, mutation) have been the most well studied aspect o f
evolution education. Many of these studies concentrated on a small facet of the entire
conceptual framework for evolution. However, no single study has attempted to
integrate these diverse findings in an attempt to understand the process through which
related conceptions are constructed. One o f the purposes of my research is to integrate
these findings in order to better understand the process o f conceptual change.

17
Entire Frameworks
A nother avenue to understanding students' conceptions is to look at the students'
conceptual framework for the whole of evolution, instead of focusing on a single facet of
evolutionary thought. Such a general approach has the potential for providing a means
of integration of previous research. An early example of this approach is seen in the
work o f Deadman and Kelly (1978). Longitudinal interviews were com pleted with boys
ranging from 11 to 14 years o f age. The interviews explored the students’ understanding
of evolution and heredity in a variety o f contexts. The data from these interviews were
used to provide a description o f the students' alternative conceptions of the various facets
o f evolution.
Deadman and Kelly (1978) explain that the students in this study typically
associated evolution with primitive life forms, but they did not use evolution to establish
relationships between different taxa of organisms. Adaptation was central to all the
boys' explanations of evolution. However, it is interesting to note that the students
explained that evolution was driven by naturalistic forces (driven by the needs or wants
of the animals) or environmentalistic forces (driven by physical changes in the
environment). None of the boys had a sound understanding of natural selection, and the
concept o f chance rarely was prominent in their explanations. Deadman and Kelly
(1978) concluded by stating the major difficulties in teaching evolution lie in the
students' naturalistic and Lamarckian interpretations and their inadequate understanding
of probability. Such conclusions may be unnecessarily pessimistic. The importance of
early research in the broad topic of evolution is the identification of areas for further
investigation (conceptions o f adaptation, natural selection, chance). But in these early
studies, extensive interpretation is not possible, as little supporting research evidence
exists. For these reasons, the Deadman and Kelly (1978) study is an important initial
investigation into students' conceptual frameworks of evolution, but the conclusions
were premature.
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In a later investigation of students' conceptions o f evolution, Hallden (1988)
used participant observations and verbal and written responses to assess high school
students' conceptions during instruction in genetics and evolution. She determined that it
was difficult to differentiate essays written before and after instruction, but upon close
examination, more students did use a Darwinian explanation o f evolution after
instruction. However, students offered these explanations along with other nonscientific
explanations. Hallden (1988) suggested that, instead of changing their conceptions,
students simply added another possible explanation to their repertoires. Students failed
to make a clear distinction between the individual and the species, therefore their use of
adaptation was ambiguous. Adaptation was used to explain virtually all evolution, and
single individuals were said to become better and better adapted. For these students,
individual adaptation was synonymous with species adaptation, and students showed
little understanding of variation within a species. Hallden (1988) further explained that
students found the instruction they received to be disjointed and fragmentary, in contrast
to the logical progression viewed by the researcher. The possibility o f this discrepancy
was suggested earlier by Driver (1981) when she reminded us that the logical order of a
topic may not correspond to the psychological order o f learning.
The Hallden (1988) study has important theoretical implications for the theory of
conceptual change. In this study, the author reports that students formed new conceptual
frameworks for evolution, but retained their former conceptions as well. Such
information becomes important as science education researchers attempt to describe the
process of conceptual change. Instead of a radical restructuring of presently existing
conceptual frameworks, the learner may construct alternative conceptions. Holland,
Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard (1986) suggest a default hierarchy model of cognition to
explain these alternative conceptions and how they are selected for use within a context.
The findings o f Greene (1990) are not so much a description of the components
of students' conceptual frameworks o f evolution, but more a description of how their
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conceptions are related. The focus of this study was to determine if university students'
written explanations follow a logical progression: not if their conceptions had a logical
basis, but if their conceptions had logical relations. The four conceptual issues analyzed
included (a) the use o f a population or typological focus, (b) the use o f an open or closed
change process, (c) the generation of one or many traits, and (d) the use of a selection
process. By a statistical analysis of the interaction o f these three categories within
students' answers, Greene (1990) found the alternative conceptions to be logical, if not
conforming to current scientific thought. Students using a population focus employed a
closed-change process, students viewing change as directed described little function for
the selection process, and students using acquired traits did not use a functional idea of
selection. While informative, the shortcomings of this study lie in the categorization of
students' responses. The categories were constructed at the outset o f the research and
thereby limited what could be found during the course of the study.
In a related study, Settlage (in press) investigated alternative conceptions of
evolution in an attempt to identify consistent patterns of conceptual change occurring
during instruction. Using the Bishop and Anderson (1990) testing instrument (described
in the following section), Settlage evaluated students' pre- and posttest conceptions of
the mechanism o f evolutionary change. In his analysis of examination responses of high
school students, need was the most common response category identified. Variation in
the population was the response category that underwent the greatest change; students'
use of this category increased in frequency after instruction. The category o f mutation
also underwent an increase o f only nine percent. This increase implies that the role of
random mutation is accessible to students of this age but is not readily constructed.
Students capable of this construction included those who had previously used the need or
use category to explain evolutionary events. Settlage (in press) explained that students in
his study understood evolution to be caused by deliberate intentions o f the organisms,
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although instruction did allow students to progress to a more scientific conception of
evolution.
Summary
While the research o f Hallden (1988), Greene (1990), and Settlage (in press) are
informative, these studies fall short o f actually helping researchers construct a better
model for learning. This shortfall is due to their omission of a strong theoretical base.
However, the findings o f this holistic approach to the mechanism of evolutionary change
did serve to shape my initial research methods and questions.
Conceptual Change Theory and Evolution
The work o f Bishop and Anderson (1990) is one o f the most important studies in
the history of research into college students' conceptions about natural selection. This
importance stems from its position as one of the first pieces o f research which
investigated students' conceptual frameworks, designed instructional materials to address
students' alternative conceptions, and then tested the effectiveness of such materials.
The students were pretested, using an exam of both open-ended questions and multiple
choice, during which the students were also asked about their belief in evolution and the
extent of their prior coursework in biology. The students were then involved in
instruction in natural selection. The teaching module used for this instruction was
constructed from earlier investigations into students' alternative conceptions concerning
natural selection. This model was based on the theory o f conceptual change and was
designed to allow students to confront their misconceptions in order to build a more
scientific understanding. After instruction, students were posttested to assess their
conceptual change.
Bishop and Anderson (1990) identified three areas in which students'
conceptions of natural selection differed radically from those o f biologists. The first
issue was the origin and survival o f new traits in populations. Students did not
recognize the processes of increasing variation in genetic material and the process of
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natural selection operating on that variation. Instead students described only one process
by which individuals o f a species change, a change caused by the environment.
According to the students, the environment exerts its influence on variation through
need, use and disuse, and adaptation. Bishop and Anderson (1990) explained that a
major hindrance in the construction of a scientific conception is the inability to
distinguish between the origin of a trait and selection upon that trait. Another issue
described by students' alternative conceptions was the role of variation within a
population. Students placed little importance on the role of variation amoung members
of a population; instead, evolution was seen to be a change in a trait in a homogeneous
population. The final issue o f students' conceptions of natural selection concerned
evolution as the changing proportion o f individuals with discrete traits. Students viewed
evolution as a gradual change in the traits themselves and not as an increase or decrease
in the number of individuals in the population with such a trait.
While most of the students involved in the Bishop and Anderson (1990) study
had completed at least one year of high school biology prior to the college course, this
experience had little effect on students' alternative conceptions for any of the issues of
natural selection. This study documents that university students have a poor
understanding of how change in a population comes about, o f the role o f variation, or of
evolution as genetically changing populations. After instruction, over half the students
understood these ideas. From these results, Bishop and Anderson (1990) remind us that
natural selection is far more difficult to understand than most instructors realize and that
students can change their conceptions when their instructors are made aware of students'
alternative conceptions and are prepared to confront them.
There have been several studies which built upon the base provided by the
pioneering work o f Bishop and Anderson (1990). The earliest o f these derived works
includes a set of replications carried out in order to focus on and define the limits of
Bishop's and Anderson's findings (Demastes, Settlage, & Good, in press). These

authors were successful in replicating several o f findings o f the original study. These
included: (a) a lack o f an association between beliefs and students' abilities to construct a
scientific conception during the course, (b) a lack o f an association between the amount
of prior instruction and students' abilities to construct a scientific conception during the
course, and (c) a very meager movement toward the use of scientific conceptions for
evolution during the course. However, the second component of this replication study
did reveal significant increases in students' use o f scientific conceptions. However, this
second replication used a more prolonged instructional strategy than that employed by
Bishop and Anderson (1990).
The report by Demastes and Good (1993) represents a second study which used
the Bishop and Anderson (1990) instructional method and testing instrument. This study
focused on the patterns o f conceptual change experienced by college students during a
nonmajor's biology course. These authors reported that three alternative conceptions
were found to be held by a large segment o f the students even after instruction. These
included: (a) a typological species concept, (b) evolution as a change in all individuals in
a population, and (c) the variation that is acted on by evolution is produced by need.
Three patterns of conceptual change were documented in this study, including (a)
movement toward the use of an scientific conception, (b) movement away from a
scientific conception, and (c) movement between various alternative conceptions.
Demastes and Good suggest that the various patterns of conceptual change seen
in this study lend support to Duschl's and Gitomer's (1991) criticism o f the holistic
process o f conceptual change described by Posner et al. (1982). However, as will be
discussed, Jimenez's (1992) work suggest that the process o f conceptual change in
evolution requires a very long time period. Therefore a major criticism of Demastes and
Good (1993) is the relatively brief period (one semester) in which the process of
conceptual change was studied.
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The final study building on the work of Bishop and Anderson is that o f Jensen
and Finley (1993). Using the Bishop and Anderson (1990) testing instrument, these
authors described and evaluated a new method o f teaching the mechanism of
evolutionary change. Termed an intervention, the authors devised instruction that
recapitulated the events in the development of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural
selection. While the instruction was not found to be very effective, the authors suggest
that their instruction should have included events even earlier than Lamarck's ideas of
evolution. Instead, Jensen and Finely argue, students' conceptions are more closely
related to the work of Cuvier and Paley than the relatively sophisticated conceptions of
Lamarck. A major source of criticism o f this work and its interpretations involves the
brief period o f instruction and evaluation. Instruction for Jensen and Finely (1993)
involved only one, two-hour laboratory period. The students' conception were evaluated
with a pre- and posttest instrument administered over a three week time frame. The work
of Jimenez suggests that this procedure introduces a very serious flaw into the work of
Jensen and Finley (1993).
Informed by both the previous descriptions o f alternative conceptions of
evolution and the importance of reasoning ability within a specific content, Jimenez
(1992) investigated the conditions necessary to promote conceptual change in evolution
within the secondary school science classroom. She compared instruction which
emphasized students' conceptions (the traditional group) with instruction which linked
students' conceptions with Darwinian and Lamarckian interpretations (the experimental
group).
Jimenez (1992) described many students' conceptions as relying on need. While
the results of the groups did not vary on tests of declarative knowledge, students in the
experimental group better differentiated between historical Darwinian and Lamarckian
interpretations. Results from posttests administered one year after instruction
demonstrated that students in the experimental group performed better on questions of
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declarative knowledge and on questions requiring application o f knowledge to a
situation. For this study, Jimenez (1992) explained that explicit discussion o f alternative
conceptions and theories used in school science are necessary to augment conceptual
change. Students need to be able to recognize differing interpretations o f the same
phenomenon in order to select the most plausible and fruitful conception.
Summary
The theory of conceptual change as proposed by Posner et al. (1982) has been
demonstrated to be an intelligible one when applied to the construction o f a scientific
conception of evolution. It has been shown to be mildly effective as a theoretical base
for instruction. This limited effectiveness may be more indicative of the nature of
alternative conceptions in evolution than a reflection of the utility o f the theory. Its
application to this content area is in need for further exploration, as the results found in
this area may be instructive for many other core concepts o f the sciences.
The research base which joined conceptual change theory with evolution
education played the greatest role in shaping my theoretical base, research questions,
methods, study duration and goals. The findings o f Bishop and Anderson (1990)
revealed the usefulness of the conceptual change theory as it is applied to the process of
learning evolution. At the same time, however, the questions left unanswered by their
study shaped the initial focus o f my work. Jimenez's (1992) work made clear the
expanded time frame required by investigations into conceptual change. Finally, while
so much is revealed by these studies, there was a need to unify these findings. But such
a study would require not only a longitudinal time frame, but also a very intensive focus,
thus necessitating a limited number o f participants. My research is an attempt to fill each
of these requirements.

The Interaction o f Conceptions o f Evolution, Reasoning Ability, and Students' Belief
Systems
Several researchers have attempted to isolate relationships between students'
conceptual frameworks in evolution with other aspects of their intellectual lives. Most
prominent in this vein is the work which attempts to correlate students' understanding to
students' ability to reason. In one o f the first such studies, Lawson and Thompson
(1988) worked with a group o f seventh grade students and determined that their
nonscientific beliefs were significantly correlated to reasoning skill. All naive students,
despite reasoning ability, tended to adopt a theory o f acquired characteristics. However,
nonscientific beliefs o f natural selection occurred more frequently in the students with
poor reasoning ability after instruction. Lawson and Thompson (1988) explained that
the students with poor reasoning ability did not reject nonscientific beliefs after
instruction because they lacked skill with reasoning patterns necessary to do so.
Students in the study were capable o f using both scientific and alternative conceptions,
the latter when phenomena were subtle, and the former when phenomena were explicit.
Less skilled reasoners were said to retain nonscientific beliefs, such as a Lamarckian
understanding o f evolution, because they failed to examine alternatives and failed to fully
comprehend conflicting evidence.
Lawson's and W eser's (1990) study o f university students, while supporting the
importance of reasoning ability, also included one o f the most extensive analyses of
nonscientific beliefs about life. The nonscientific beliefs examined included special
creation, orthogenesis, presence o f a soul, constitutive nonreductionism, vitalism,
teleology, and nonemergentism. Lawson and W eser (1990) concluded that less skilled
reasoners, as measured by the Classroom Test of Scientific Reasoning (Lawson, 1987),
were more likely to hold nonscientific beliefs about life during the pretest, and showed
the least modification during instruction. These less skilled reasoners were also
described as being more likely to be only loosely committed to their belief structure.
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The greatest significance of this study lies in the description of the students
nonscientific beliefs about life. Approximately 40% of the students expressed an initial
belief in evolution; belief in evolution was shown to increase during instruction. Thirty
percent of the students at the outset agreed with conceptions of orthogenesis, 70-80%
with vitalism, and 25% with a teleological expression. The course moved some students
away from vitalism, making the students more mechanistic, but moved them toward
orthogenesis.
A similar study was undertaken by Lawson and Worsnop (1992) with a group of
high school biology students. The authors found that reflective reasoning skills were
significantly related to initial scientific beliefs and to gains in declarative knowledge, but
not to changes in beliefs. Prior declarative knowledge was not found to be associated
with gains in declarative knowledge. Finally, the strength of religious commitment was
negatively correlated with initial belief in evolution and with change in belief toward
evolution. The instruction did not result in a group-wide shift toward a belief in
evolution. The authors state that reflective reasoning skills operate in the "acquisition of
domain specific knowledge" and that knowledge determines what one believes (p. 165).
This study is vulnerable to the same criticisms as those by Lawson and
Thompson (1988) and Lawson and W eser (1990) because of the use of the Classroom
Test o f Scientific Reasoning (Lawson, 1987) to assess reasoning ability. With this test,
learners who were labeled reflective reasoners used hypothetico-deductive reasoning to
answer questions from a variety of contexts. These reasoning abilities are understood to
operate in the same manner, regardless of the content. This assumption has failed to
withstand investigation (Linn, Clement, & Pulos, 1983), and content is now a central
issue in science education research (Linn, 1987). Because o f the difficulties in assessing
content-bound reasoning abilities, my present study does not include the issue of a
student's reasoning skills in the construction o f a conceptual framework for evolution.
However, the work by Lawson and Worsnop (1992) does provide some insight into the
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strength and importance o f the students' belief structures in their understanding of
evolution which was used to design my present research.
In an effort to refine earlier research in student reasoning, Cummins, Good,
Demastes, and Peebles (in press) analyzed student reasoning in a specific content area:
island biogeography. In interpretation of ambiguous biological data, students included
variables of size, distance, and food availability as determining factors for the number of
species found on various islands. Students in a twelfth grade class used the evolutionary
concepts of adaptation, extinction, and speciation as much or more than students in a
ninth grade class or students in a college zoology class. Students in the twelfth grade
class used the concept of speciation as a variable far more extensively than the previous
two groups by integrating their understanding o f evolution in their evaluation o f the
evidence. This use of evolution as a variable is striking when one considers that the
teacher of the twelfth grade class emphasized evolution throughout the year. From this,
Cummins et al. (in press) concluded that reasoning within a biological content is
improved by an increase in biological knowledge. Reasoning within the content area of
evolution was found to be enhanced by biological instruction which used evolution as an
organizing theme.
In an investigation of the relationship between students' use of scientific
conceptions and their belief systems, Eve and Dunn (1990) found high levels of
nonscientific and pseudoscientific beliefs in their study of high school biology and life
science teachers. Like the works cited earlier, (Lawson & Thompson, 1988; Lawson &
Weser, 1990), the authors explained this adherence to pseudoscientific beliefs, not based
on religious or regional factors, but based on poor scientific reasoning abilities.
Similarly, Eve and Harrold (1986) suggested that acceptance of pseudoscience occurs in
individuals with limited abilities to examine evidence and generate hypotheses. This
study found no statistical relationship between a student's use of a creationist explanation
of biological diversity and the student's gender, parental level of education, or
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rural/urban background. They did however find a strong relationship between religious
conservatism and creationist belief. Both studies, while informative in providing a
description o f extrascientific belief structure, did not measure reasoning skills in this
content area. Therefore, the authors association o f reasoning ability to acceptance o f
evolution can be no more than speculation.
Grose and Simpson (1982) investigated the relationship o f several variables with
university students' attitudes toward evolution. They found that 54% believed in
evolution, while 19% did not, and 22% were neutral toward the theory. Females scored
significantly higher on a scale measuring attitudes toward evolution, with a significant
interaction between gender, the influence of the high school biology teacher, and attitude
toward evolution. This interaction was due to the influence of the teachers on the female
students. The influence of the church was correlated inversely with attitude toward
evolution, but there was no correlation between denominations and students' attitudes
toward evolution. The biology majors did not score significantly higher than nonbiology
majors. Because this was the first biology course for 80% of the college students, these
results suggest that the students' attitudes toward evolution were formed prior to entering
this course.
The interaction of students' ability to reason and their construction o f a scientific
conception of evolution has been the focus o f many studies. Researchers in this area
report that students who are better reasoners are more apt to hold a scientific conception
in this area. Their conclusions should be considered, yet further studies in which
reasoning is considered in the content area o f evolution, or even biology, are required for
a better understanding of this interaction.
Interactions of Students' Conceptions o f Evolution
and the Nature of Science
Because of the volatile nature of the subject of evolution in American society,
many educators explain that the most appropriate means of introducing this topic is
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through an understanding of the nature of science (Nelson, 1986; Scott, 1987). This
position acknowledges the emotional concerns o f instruction. Such a justification goes
far in breaking the artificial dichotomy between cognitive and affective domains in
learning.
In an Australian study o f students' conceptions o f the nature o f science (Barnett,
Brown, & Caton, 1983), a set o f questions concerning evolution and the philosophy of
biology were given to third and fourth year undergraduates and graduate students.
Although all students were passing their biology courses, each performed poorly on
written, open-ended tests. These students had a very poor, uncritical understanding of
evolution; two thirds accepted natural selection uncritically, meaning they did not analyze
the value of the knowledge claims supporting this theory. Other findings demonstrated
that these students had a very poor understanding of biology as a science. A majority of
the students understood physics and biology to be basically similar sciences, with half of
the students explaining that all biological events could be reduced to physical science
(Barnett et al., 1983).
Through the use o f survey responses, Johnson and Peeples (1987) examined the
relationships o f students' understandings of the nature of science and their acceptance of
evolution. The responses demonstrated that biology students had a weak understanding
of the nature of science and were neutral in their acceptance o f evolution as a valid
scientific theory. Acceptance of evolution was found to be significantly related to
understanding the nature of science. Understandings o f the nature o f science were poor,
but did improve with grade level. The authors suggested that a comparison of the scope,
nature, and goals of science would aid the student in discriminating between science and
pseudoscience.
The work of Scharmann and Harris (1992) represents an effort to examine the
effects of a diversified instructional strategy on teachers' understandings of evolution and
the nature o f science, as well as their attitudes toward evolution. The instructional
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strategy tested was one that incorporated foundational content/context, allowed for
student discussion, resolved conflicts arising in those discussions, and required a
reflective summary o f the course. The group involved in this instruction showed a
significant increase in both their understanding o f evolution and the applied nature of
science. This was accompanied with an increased acceptance o f evolutionary theory by
the participants.
Scharmann and Harris (1992) confirms the earlier suggestion o f Johnson and
Peeples (1987) that an understanding of evolution can be associated with an
understanding of the nature of science. However, the relationship of attitudes to
achievement is still very unclear. The ability to differentiate between scientific ways of
knowing and those of other realms may allow the student to relate knowledge of
evolution to their belief framework, but this may not serve to lessen the difficulties
students have constructing an scientific understanding in this area. Because o f the
emphasis I placed on understanding the action of the learner's conceptual ecology on the
process of conceptual change, a large part o f my study concentrated on the relationships
between a learner's belief and academic understanding.
Complicating Factors in Descriptions o f Students' Understandings
A great deal o f the research carried out in the description of students'
understandings relies heavily on written or verbal explanation o f evolutionary
occurrences. This trend may be in response to both the complicated nature o f research
into conceptual frameworks and the intricate nature of evolutionary thought. Such
information is rich in detail and perhaps is a more effective way of providing an accurate
description; however, such methods are not without their drawbacks. One such
drawback lies in the nature of the discipline of biology. Biology is a science that requires
multiple layers of explanation to identify causes. Proximal causes are those that occur
during the life span o f the organism and do not produce a change in genetic information.
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Ultimate causes are those which do effect the genetic information o f the species (Mayr,
1961, 1988).
Cummins and Remsen (1992) stated that university students have very little
experience differentiating between proximal and ultimate levels of causation, and often
the students view these explanations as being competing hypotheses. Explanations of
proximate causes are much more frequent in students' explanations. Why? Biology is
unique among the sciences in having multiple levels o f causality (Mayr, 1961, 1988).
Even within biology, courses that stress biochemistry, cell structure, and physiology
often deal only with proximal causality. Because of the thrust of much o f their biology
coursework and their experiences in other sciences, students have little or no experience
with multiple levels of causality. In this situation, a student may answer a problem with
a familiar proximate cause without considering the ultimate causality inherent in the
problem. W ork by Hauslein, Good, and Cummins (1992) determined that college
students and teachers are less able to switch between levels of causality than scientists.
Future research must be sensitive to this situation and probe farther to determine if the
student has a poor understanding o f evolution or if the student fails to recognize the
necessity of responding to each of the levels of causality.

CHAPTER 3
METHODS
Rationale for Research Methods
The research questions should guide the choice o f methods used in their
investigation. The goals of my research included describing the process o f students'
conceptual change and achieving an understanding o f how students come to understand
evolution. These goals required that an ideographic approach be used. Such an
approach involves the exploration of students' conceptual frameworks on their own
terms and not in terms o f their congruence with some predetermined standard (Driver &
Easley, 1978). Additionally, a portion of my research was an investigation of the effects
of context (social and cultural) on the development of students' knowledge. Clearly
some form of interpretive research, focusing on complexity and context, was required
for this investigation. The holistic approach afforded by qualitative methods offered a
more probable opportunity of achieving an understanding o f conceptual frameworks of
evolution than the reductionism made necessary by quantitative methods.
Researcher
Because of my qualitative approach, researcher bias becomes an important factor
in consideration of the study. My biases shaped many aspects of this study including the
actual selection of the study content, the scope of the research questions and methods,
and data analysis.
Biological Bias
My earlier graduate training was in the study o f physiology at Auburn
University. While this previous study may be considered far displaced from the
consideration of evolution, Auburn's undergraduate and graduate courses in zoology
were often oriented around the theoretical framework o f evolution. Additionally, while
an undergraduate and master's student, I was required to take separate courses in this
area. These courses and my major professor shaped the selection of
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my master's thesis, which was a physiological ecology problem, one that investigated
the evolutionary and ecological significance o f various physiological adaptations.
Given this earlier training and my subsequent teaching experience on the post
secondary level, it is not surprising that I selected to study students' conceptual
frameworks in evolution. These experiences also shaped the manner in which I
approached this problem. W hile I had taught previously, I had not studied teaching.
Therefore, the process of learning was the focus for my study and teaching was included
only as it affected learning.
Most notably, this earlier training also shaped the manner in which I approached
the topic o f evolution. At the outset o f the study, I considered the conceptual framework
of evolution to primarily include evolutionary mechanisms. I consider the mechanisms
of evolution to include the biological processes of natural selection, genetic drift, nonrandom mating, and other similar theoretical constructs. My training as a biologist
ensured this approach. Secondary to the mechanisms, I considered the products of
evolutionary processes to also be included in this framework. These products include
biological adaptations, speciation patterns, and fossil records. My bias is shared by the
Biological Science Curriculum Study, as shown in their definition of the knowledge
required for biological literacy. In their list o f "essential biological knowledge," BSCS
(1992, p. 3) lists evolution, including genetic variation, natural selection, and patterns of
evolution as the components o f evolutionary knowledge required to become biological
literate.
I entered my study using this scientific, mechanistic approach to the theory of
evolution. However, my definitions for this theoretical construct expanded dramatically
during the course of the study. The concept map interviews introduced me to the varied
connections that are possible when the theory of evolution is approached with other than
a scientific orientation. The student participants illustrated how their conceptions of
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evolution interacted with other conceptions of human evolution, evidence for evolution,
and the historical development of the theory.
Educational Bias
When my research questions and research methods are compared, a tension
becomes obvious. While I proposed to use grounded theory to develop my findings, I
also proposed to investigate the boundaries of the conceptual change theory (Posner et
al., 1982). How can one use grounded theory when a theoretical com mitment has
already been established? My position within this debate is informed by Kuhn (1970)
and Toulmin (1972). These philosophers of science have described the actions of a
researcher's bias on the theories she selects. Even without the articulated bias of the
conceptual change theory, I would approach the issue of learning from some theoretical
framework. After all, theories allow us to make sense o f the world. It is my position
that it is far more illuminating to approach a study with firmly articulated biases; thus the
actions o f these biases can then be understood by the researcher as well as the reader.
Additionally, I have not accepted and applied the conceptual change theory (Posner et al.,
1982) uncritically. Instead, one of my research questions is to investigate the use and
limits of this theory. While the tension between grounded theory and my theoretical
background remains, my study represents a negotiation between these two extremes.
The Setting
My study took place in the University Laboratory School during the 1992-1993
school year. While the school is described in much more detail in Chapter 4, aspects of
my selection require further discussion. The selection of this school as a site for the
study has drawbacks. One could argue that I investigated conceptual change in a very
narrow segment of the population. The students attending this school cannot be
considered to be representative of the population of the public schools in our area due to
the requirement for both tuition and transportation. However, previous research
indicates that conceptual change seldom occurs during instruction on evolution (Bishop
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& Anderson, 1990; Brumby, 1984; Deadman & Kelly, 1978). My selection of a
research site was deliberate, based on the uniqueness of the instructor, the students, and
the curriculum of the class. This class was selected because it provided the best
opportunity to document conceptual change.
Participants
Many different terms have been used to designate the persons involved in
research. The choice of terms is important in that it signifies the researcher's intent in the
study and her relationship with the persons involved. Interviewee implies a passive role
for the participants. Subject has been selected by many researchers to avoid this
connotation (Patai, 1987); however, subject implies a structured hierarchy in the
researcher-researched relationship. The anthropological informant has many
commonplace negative connotations. Therefore I have chosen participant to reflect the
active position the teacher and students will have as they simultaneously participate in
and shape the research. Seidman (1991) suggests that this term signifies an active
involvement which occurs in extended interviewing and a sense o f equity in the
researcher-participant relationship.
Previous research into students' conceptual frameworks of evolution in which I
have been involved was carried out with a group o f college nonbiology majors. This
choice was made because of my attempt to replicate the earlier work of Bishop and
Anderson (1990). However, use o f this group for this research is problematic. On a
practical level, it would be difficult to work with a select group o f college students
throughout the semester as the attrition rate in these classes is considerable. More
importantly, my previous research describes a student population whose conceptual
frameworks o f evolution have remained relatively unchanged during instruction, similar
to the results of Bishop and Anderson (1990). Therefore, I could not be assured o f
identification o f conceptual change working with this group. For this study, the focus of
my research was a group o f high school students, their parents, and their teacher.
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The Teacher
My research was conducted in Ms. Hurston's Biology II class. The decision to
work with this group is based upon the characteristics o f its teacher: (a) she has been
involved in past biology education research (Cummins et al., in press); (b) she is a
national award winning teacher who is active in the National Association o f Biology
Teachers as well as the Louisiana Biology Educators Association; (c) she uses evolution
as the unifying theme of her biology classes and realizes the implications and benefits of
such an approach (Dobzhansky, 1973); and (d) she attended a workshop at Louisiana
State University during June, 1992 which dealt with the teaching of evolution.
In this Biology II course, evolution was taught both as a distinct unit and
integrated throughout the course. (See Chapter 5 for a description o f the course
curriculum.) This is not an advanced placement biology class, but is considered by the
teacher to be a capstone class which integrates the knowledge from many of the sciences
as suggested by the National Research Council (1990). The students in this class
typically were eleventh and twelfth graders who selected this class as an elective. The
work of Cummins et al. (in press) reports that past students in Hurston's classes were
capable of using evolution as an explanation o f ambiguous biological evidence. Based
on the results of this past study and the characteristics of this teacher, I felt it was likely
that 1 would be able to document conceptual change within selected students in her
classroom.
The Students
The selection of interview participants always introduces the element of self
selection as these individuals must be willing to participate in the study (Bogdan &
Biklen, 1992). The selection of individuals was based on principles of purposeful
sampling in which maximum variation was sought (Patton, 1989). During the first
month o f observations, the instructor and I were involved in assessing the maximum
range of individuals who constituted the class. However, we were purposefully
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sampling for five students we felt would undergo conceptual change. This sampling
technique served to limit my findings and this limitation will be further discussed in
Chapter 6 and 7. Based on Hurston's and my assessment, I invited nine selected
students to participate in the more in-depth aspects of the study. The assessment of the
maximum range of students included factors such as gender, family background,
educational background, religious beliefs, and familiarity with biology. While much of
this information was known by Hurston, I also administered a science relationship
questionnaire during the first week of my observations in order to elicit additional
information needed for this decision. (See Appendix A.)
While nine students were selected to discuss their possible involvement in the
study, only five had schedules which allowed their participation. Of these original five,
three were girls and two were boys. The initial interview sessions were conducted very
informally and held at any time the students found to be convenient. Later interviews
were conducted at an established time during the school week. Unfortunately, after
interviews had proceeded for over a month and a half, one of the male participants
withdrew from the study. His stated reason for withdrawal was due to the
inconvenience of the interview schedule. However, my own assessment was that he had
begun to find the interviews tiresome. Another participant was not selected to take this
position because of the time already elapsed. Therefore, I will report the data for four
interview participants. ^

1 While the fifth interview participant (Joe) contributed a great deal of data during
our working relationship, it is my judgment that little of this data was useful in
answering my initial research questions regarding conceptual change. Our interviews
seldom touched on my research topics and instead remained steadfastly focused on the
social aspects of student life at U High. Use of Joe's data, while illuminating in some
regards, would have significantly altered the scope of the my study and I chose to omit
this information.
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Other Participants
As a means of attaining a more defined understanding o f the students' lives as the
context for their conceptual frameworks, I interviewed the parents o f the four students
participating in the in-depth interviews. Information provided by the parents during our
discussion conducted in March o f 1993 provided valuable insight into how the students'
conceptions, personalities, and their attitudes toward science have been affected by their
families. The high school principal and high school counselor also participated in one
open-ended interviews. These hour-long interviews were informal, and were conducted
at a time and place at the participants' convenience.
Gaining Access
My first approach to gaining access into the classroom was through the
instructor. We were previously acquainted through graduate classes and joint
involvement in research. We had meetings in the spring before the beginning of the
school year in which I expressed my interests, and we discussed tentative plans for the
research. After gaining her consent, I approached the principal o f the laboratory school
in the summer before the research to gain administrative approval. This approval
required my completion o f a research request form and submission of my research
proposal, each returned to the principal o f the school.
Sources o f Data
Patton (1989) argues that having multiple sources of data is one of the intrinsic
characteristics of qualitative research. White and Gunstone (1992) discuss the limited
understanding resulting from only one means o f probing into students' conceptual
frameworks. Wandersee et al. (in press) and Brumby (1984) explain that much of the
previous work done in the area o f students' conceptions has relied solely on paper and
pencil tests which may produce a very slanted picture of the students' understanding of
science topics. To counter the problems o f previous research in this area and to provide
adequate means of triangulating the data, I employed multiple sources o f data for each of
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the four participants. While interviews were the predominant method of data collection,
these were augmented and shaped by participant observation within the classroom and
collection of artifacts.
Classroom Observations
A portion of my study included observations of daily class activities o f the entire
group throughout the year. My position in the classes and in the school was a
participant-observer. As discussed by Bogdan and Biklen (1992), this role is actually a
fluid continuum. This was also true in my study as my role as a participant observer
represented a constant balance between participation and observation. In some instances
I acted as a teacher. On two occasions when Ms. Hurston had to be away from the
classroom I was responsible for the class. I also presented two lessons, one on concept
mapping and another on speciation patterns. During laboratories students would
approach me for help when Hurston was otherwise engaged. I escorted students on field
trips and acted as an adult chaperon. I also acted as a student participant as the students
whispered humorous comments to me during or after class and during the laboratories
when I participated alongside students in their small groups.
The other side o f the continuum was the complete observer. This typified my
early observations in the classroom as I watched quietly from the back of the classroom
while taking constant notes. A t all times I strove to be nonjudgmental and
nonauthoritarian except in cases when the class was left expressly within my control.
However, it must be noted that even my most detached observations affected the
participants' behaviors. Often I knew students were making comments deliberately so
that I would hear them. Throughout the study, I was a source of interest to the students
as they asked me questions, looked over my notes for that week, and watched to see
what I would choose to write about.
I observed the class for the entire year for a variety of reasons. The first is that I
felt I needed lengthy observations to allow the establishment o f a comfortable rapport
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with the students needed for successful in-depth interviewing. Observations limited to
only the teaching of evolution could have distanced me from the students to such a
degree that they could not become comfortable during our interviews. By mid-year, I
felt I had established a comfortable relationship with almost every member of the class.
Students often made efforts to talk to me before, during, and after classes. These
students would bring to my attention things they thought I would be interested in, both
on a personal and research level.
In addition to the rapport established, understandings gained from the participant
observations were needed to answer research questions such as a description of the
activities which catalyze conceptual change and the degree of compartmentalization of
students' biological knowledge. My observations in the classroom also shaped the
selection o f the students to participate in the interview, the content of the interviews, and
selection o f artifacts for analysis.
Interviews
Interviewing was the most important means o f data collection used in my study.
W est and Pines (1985) describe interviews as one of the best approaches to use in
discovering students' conceptions. Seventeen interviews were conducted with each of
the four student participants. These numerous interviews were essential to the research
in that they allowed me the opportunity to describe and then verify and clarify my
descriptions of the students' understandings (Hutchinson, 1990).
The interviews conducted ranged from very structured to very open-ended, a
selection dictated by the specific content in question. Typically, interviews begin in a
very open-ended manner, with later sessions becoming more structured as the researcher
develops more specific questions from the data (Seidman, 1991). However, I conducted
interviews reminded of the suggestion of Lythcott and Duschl (1990) that the key to all
successful interviews is providing the participant as much freedom of expression as
possible.
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The open-ended interviews allowed me the opportunity to understand how
students negotiate meaning in the area of evolution. This is a very contextual, specific
understanding. The structured interviews allowed the opportunity to develop
descriptions of students’ conceptual frameworks with great mode validity; that is, the
descriptions generated are a reflection o f many modes o f investigation (White &
Gunstone, 1992). Additionally, these structured interviews provided an opportunity to
gather comparable data ffom all the students to allow comparison across individuals.
Thus, both types o f interviews were integral to the goals of my research. (See Figure 2
for a time line of the student participant interviews.)
The instructor, the four students, the parents o f these four students, the high
school principal, and high school counselor were interviewed. Interviews with the
individual students occurred about once a week, during a pre-established period within
the school day. Their lengths varied from as short as 20 minutes to as long as 45
minutes per session. The interviews with the teacher were conducted opportunistically
throughout the course o f the study. The parents were interviewed once toward the end
of the study. The principal and counselor were interviewed one time during the initial
months o f research. Insight from informal discussions with other students in the class,
the student teacher, and other science education teachers were also used to provide
another dimension to the description o f the teacher observed in this study.
Open-Ended Interviews
For the open-ended interviews, I used an interview guide for reference and
prompting, although I never strictly adhered to these guides (See Appendix B for specific
questions.) As suggested by Seidman (1991) the initial questions in the open-ended
interviews were very broad, and later questions narrowed as I attempted to describe and
verify the participants' conceptions. The research areas explored during open-ended
interviews ranged from areas as diverse as students' personal characteristics, attitudes
toward religion, and ideas of schooling, to the more science oriented such as conceptions
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of mutations, species, and patterns of evolution and students' attitudes toward
pseudosciences. (See Table 1 for a list of open-ended interview topics and Appendix B1 for a sample of interview questions.)
Year Beginning (August 14, 1992)
Pretest
Interview Num ber

Artifact Number

Artifact 1
4

-5

Initial C onceptual Fram ework

6

-7

8

Artifact 2

-9
Artifact 4
-

10

11

12

C onceptual Fram ework at Mid-Year

"13

14
-15
16
Artifact 6

C onceptual Fram ework at Y ear’s End
P osttest

' 17

Y ear en d (May 6, 1993)
Figure 2
Timeline of the student interviews and the interviews used for the three conceptual
frameworks

Table 1
Subject of open ended interview sessions with student interview
participants

In te rv ie w S y m b o l

S u b je c t

1-1

School: Personal Information: Teaching

1-2

Evolution: Mutation: Science/Biology

1-3

Animal Behavior: Pseudoscience

1-4

World View

1-5

Scientific Theories

1-6

Human Taxonomy

1-7

Holidays: Religion: Family Habits

1-8

Biology: Evolution as a Biological Theory:
Evidence for Evolution: Application for
Evolution

1-9

Age o f Earth: Successful Species: Comparison
of Species: Predictability of Evolution

I-10

Natural Selection

1-11

Boundaries o f Science, Religion, Philosophy

1-12

Biblical Interpretation

1-13

Species: Understanding of Evolution

1-14

Adaptation: Mutation

1-15

Personal Characteristics: View of Research
Process

1-16

Competition: Limits o f Evolutionary Theory:
Differential Reproduction

1-17

Biology Class
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The open-ended interviews with the parents of the four student participants were
conducted to better understand the family context o f the students. Questions asked of the
parents were selected to elicit their attitudes toward school and science. These interviews
were conducted towards the end of the study, after I had a well defined description of the
participant. Then, the parental interviews were used to verify and clarify my
conceptions. (See Appendix B-2 for a sample o f the parental interview questions.)
An open-ended interview with the school principal and counselor were conducted
to better understand the school's impact on the activities of the classroom and the types
of knowledge valued by the administration. The issues included (a) administration
standards, (b) the school's student body, (c) college trajectory o f students, (d) parental
involvement, (e) curricular issues, and (f) her/his views toward science education. (See
Appendix B-3 for a sample of the principal and counselor interview questions.)
Structured Interviews
Each of the four students participating in the interviews was involved in
structured interviews similar to the clinical interviews discussed by Lythcott and Duschl
(1990). Structured around the student's explanation or production o f a graphic, these
interviews were planned to enhance the description of the student's conceptual
framework of evolution and to document and describe instances of conceptual change.
Because understanding is too complex to be adequately described using any one
technique, a variety of techniques were used to probe students' understandings (White &
Gunstone, 1992). A list of the types of structured interviews and the subject of those
interviews can be found in Table 2.
Concept mapping
The most valuable set o f structured interviews involved the use of concept maps.
Concept maps were used to allow the student to express her/his understanding o f
evolution before, during, and after instruction. Concept mapping was particularly useful
for this study in that its use went beyond the expression o f information and allowed the
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students to express their knowledge, which W andersee (1989, p. 6) describes as an
"organized body of meaningful concepts which is a product of inquiry."
Table 2
Subjects and types of structured interview sessions with student interview participants

In te rv ie w T y p e

S u b je c t

Sym bol

Concept Map

Understanding o f Evolution

CM-1

Concept Map

Process of Evolution

CM-2

Concept Map

Process o f Evolution-Seed Terms

CM-3

Interviews about Instances

Biological Natural History-Recent

IAI-1

Interview about Instances

Evolutionary Patterns: Speciation

LAI-2

Interview About Instances

Patterns o f Evolutionary Changes

IAI-3

Prediction Interview

Mutation

PI-1

Prediction Interview

Genetics

PI-2

Sorting Task

Process of Evolution

ST

Word Sort

Description o f Evolution

WS

Drawing
Bishop and Anderson Test
(1985)

Natural History

D

Process of Evolution

T

Concept maps are the schematic representation of concepts situated in a
framework of propositions (Novak & Gowin, 1984). The graphic representation of a
concept map is based on a hierarchy of related concepts linked by propositions which
articulate the concepts' relationships. While this tool is a powerful way for students to
negotiate meaning, it also can be used to externalize the student’s thinking. Novak
(1990) explains that concept mapping is a very sensitive means of measuring changes in
a student's knowledge structure. The combination o f clinical interviews with concept
maps is a versatile and useful investigative technique into conceptual change (Wallace &
Mintzes, 1990). My selection of concept maps as an assessment tool was based on this
strength.
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The maps do not represent knowledge linearly which would limit expression to
the logical structure o f the knowledge. Instead, concept maps are organized
hierarchically and ideally fan out in a web-like fashion. Thus, concept mapping reflects
the psychological structure of the knowledge (Wandersee, 1990). It is this characteristic
that provides its power of expression.
Concept mapping is effective in displaying the student's understanding o f the
relation between the concepts o f a wider discipline by focusing on structure and linkages
etween concepts. This technique is also valuable in that it avoids much of the confusing
effects o f students' differing vocabulary and writing styles (Novak & Gowin, 1984).
The students in the biology class were involved in concept mapping early in the year
when a science education researcher, Jim Wandersee, presented a lesson on concept
mapping. Two additional day s were used for students to practice this technique under
my direction. Although this teaching tool was not heavily used by the teacher, Ms.
Hurston, each of my four interview participants indicated that they had used this study
technique in many of their previous science classes.
In my original proposal, I had suggested that the first mapping session would be
used to allow students to use any terms they felt were appropriate in mapping their
understanding o f evolution. In subsequent mapping sessions, I proposed the use o f five
seed terms dealing with the concept of evolution with the students adding any additional
concepts to their map (Trowbridge & Wandersee, in press). The five seed concepts to be
included in the later interviews were (a) evolution, (b) natural selection, (c) population,
(d) change, and (e) mutation. Seed terms were used to insure a common basis for the
maps which were useful in comparing understandings over the course o f the year and
comparing different students' understandings. Asking students to add their own terms
also served to add to concept mapping's inherent ability to allow for variation in the
expression o f students' knowledge.
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Thus, originally I proposed to have three maps from each student over the course
of the study. However, as is the case with qualitative work, my participants changed my
original plans. In my first concept mapping interview, I asked the participants to map
their "understanding of evolution." (This type of concept map was given the research
symbol CM-1.) After looking at these maps, I noticed that one o f my participants
mapped the historical development o f the theory and its anthropological considerations.
This map was far different from those o f the other three participants and also radically
different from the mechanistically oriented map I would draw. Based on this result, the
next week I asked the students to map "your understanding for how evolution works."
(This type of concept map was given the research symbol C M -2.) Additionally during
mid-year, I asked the students to construct a third type of map given the use of the five
seed terms. (This type of map was given the research symbol CM-3.) After completing
the map, the student was asked to explain her/his maps.
Students were asked to construct CM-1 at the beginning and close of the study.
They were asked to construct CM-2 at three times in the study- at the beginning, the mid
point, and end. Finally, the seed term map, CM-3, was used only once during the mid
point o f the study. Thus, I used a total of six maps for each student. (See Table 3 for a
summary of the interview schedule and the research tools used.) (See Appendix C -l for
a sample o f the interview questions used in the structured interviews.)
Interviews about instances
In the second type of structured interview, the students were presented a series of
pictures and asked questions. Such a technique is referred to by White and Gunstone
(1992) as an interview about instances. This technique was useful in providing a
description o f the student's ability to recognize or use a concept and has also been helpful
in detecting alternative conceptions o f students (Franklin, 1992; Osbom e & Freyberg,
1985).
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Table 3
Schedule of data collection and type of interview method

Interview Session

Date

Type o f Data Collection Used

1

10/6/93

1-1

2

10/13/93

1-2: T

3

10/20/93

1-3: CM-1

4

10/27/93

1-4: CM-2: ST

5

11/3/93

1-5: LA.I-1

6

11/10/93

1-6: IAI-1

7

11/17/93

1-7: PI-2

8

12/2/93

1-8

9

1/12/93

1-9: LAI-2

10

1/19/93

I-10: LAI-3: D

11

5/6/04

I- 11:

12

2/2/93

1-12: CM-2: CM-3: ST:

13

2/9/93

1-13: WS: PI-1

14

3/16/93

1-14: LAI-1: PI-1:

15

4/6/93

1-15

16

4/22/93

1-16: CM-1: ST: PI-1:

17

4/29/93

1-17: T: CM-2

Specific areas investigated with this technique included (a) the use of typological
species concepts, (b) the meanings students assign biological adaptation, (c) their
understandings o f phylogeny, (d) their use o f anthropomorphic and teleological
conceptions of evolution, (e) their species concept, and (f) their conceptions o f the
patterns of evolutionary change. The situations presented to the students in this aspect of
the study were, in part, suggested by Clough and Wood-Robinson (1985b) in their study
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of children's understandings o f biological adaptations. Students' application of
evolution to explain some of these phenomena was often used to measure the
participants' comfort with this theory. (See Appendix C-2 for a description of the
graphics and a sample of the interview protocol.)
Prediction interviews
A third type of structured interview, prediction interviews, assessed students'
abilities to predict the outcome o f an inheritance event (PI-2) (similar to the work of
Kargbo et al., 1980) and a mutation event (PI-1). W hite and Gunstone (1992) explain
that this technique is more direct than other structured interviews in revealing
understanding, because it distinguishes between rote and meaningful learning while
assessing the student's ability to apply the concept. A similar exercise was used by
Franklin (1992) in his investigation of students' understanding of electricity. However,
he administered this exercise in a written format, with the students selecting the most
appropriate answer and justification for that answer.
In this interview, the student was presented with a graphic and an explanation of
a situation. The student was then asked to form a prediction of the outcome and provide
a written and then verbal explanation of the prediction. Much of the value of this
technique was found in the student's explanations o f their prediction. The student was
shown a graphic detailing the outcome of the event and asked to describe what she/he
saw and to verbally reconcile this outcome with the prediction. This technique had the
added advantage of making obvious the effects o f theories and beliefs on the student's
observations of the graphics. (See Appendix C-3 for the graphics used in the prediction
interviews and a sample of the interview questions.)
Sorting interview
In this fourth form of structured interview, the student was shown a series of
graphics which displayed the various occurrences in an evolutionary event driven by
natural selection. The student was then asked to sort these cards in any order that
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expressed her/his understanding of the evolutionary process by using the think aloud
technique (Smith, 1983). This interview was repeated at the beginning, middle, and end
of the school year in an attempt to assess conceptual frameworks and to describe
instances of change. This technique had the advantage o f allowing me to investigate
instances o f anthropomorphic and teleological explanations formed by the participant as
well as investigating the factors the student viewed as necessary for evolution driven by
natural selection. (See Appendix C-4 for the graphics used in the sorting task as well as
a sample o f the interview protocol.)
Word sort interview
This technique is a derivation of a method used by Hauslein et al. (1992). For
this structured interview, the participants were presented with a series o f eight terms.
These included: design, drastic, success, need, random, chance, subtle, and order. The
students were then asked to sort the terms into two groups: terms which could be used
to describe evolution and terms which could not be used to describe evolution. As with
all the structured interviews, the participants were encouraged to think aloud as they
worked. In a derivation from Hauslein et al. (1992), the transcripts from the think
aloud, and not the actual sorted groups themselves, formed the data for this interview.
As described in Hauslein et al. (1992), these transcripts provided a means to determine
the basis from which the participant created categories. These terms were selected to
measure the participant's understanding of both the mechanism of evolutionary changes
and the patterns of those changes.
Drawing interview
As White and Gunstone (1992) have argued, there is a great dependence on
words for most instruments designed to study students' conceptions. To counter this
over reliance, White and Gunstone (1992) suggest the use of student produced
drawings. This technique has the advantage o f allowing students to express their
knowledge in a very unlimited manner; thus, the students reveal characteristics of their
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understanding that may be masked through more verbal means. Due to this freedom of
responses, drawings allow the researcher another mode through which to study students'
conceptions.
I chose the technique o f drawing to measure students' conceptions of the history
of life on earth. For this form o f structured interview, I asked the participants to "draw a
time line of the history of life on earth." Not only was this interview used to measure the
participant's knowledge of the long-term natural history, but this interview was intended
also to illustrate the taxa with which the participant was familiar. After the drawing was
complete, each participant was asked to explain her/his time line. (See Appendix C-6 for
sample interview questions.)
Written Examinations
While the descriptions of changing conceptual frameworks of evolution were
limited to the four students participating in the interview, the entire class was asked to
participate in an examination o f evolution by natural selection at the beginning and end of
the study. The exam was written by Bishop and Anderson (1985) and formed the basis
of my original study. This exam was selected because of the data base created through
its use in other studies in this area (Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Demastes, Settlage, &
Good, in press; Jensen & Finely, 1993; Settlage, in press).
The exam consists of multiple choice and essay questions regarding the process
of evolution by natural selection. (See Appendix C-7 for the exam and a sample of the
interview questions.) The purpose of this examination was to assess the degree of
conceptual change occurring within the general class population. Additionally, the four
interview participants were asked to verbally discuss their explanations in an interview.
This discussion helped in achieving an understanding of students' teleological,
anthropomorphic, and typological explanations of biological phenomena as compared to
their written explanations. Additionally, the students' verbal explanations of their written
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answers may be informative in interpreting other research which uses this same
instrument.
Artifacts
I used several artifacts from the classroom as additional data sources for the
description o f conceptual frameworks. These artifacts included:
1. Students’ journal entries discussing the evolution o f humans,
2. Students' journal entries discussing the evolution o f the human appendix in
comparison to the pig cecum,
3. Students' answers to an exam question on extinction theories,
4. Students' homework on the topic of physical patterns in nature,
5. Students journal entries on natural patterns,
6. Students' journal entries on anthropology, and
7. Students' final exam answer describing the theoretical framework o f biology.
These were materials assigned by the teacher for the purpose o f teaching; however, we
both felt that these materials were also valuable research data.
Other artifacts were studied to better describe the school setting and curriculum.
These artifacts included school notices, brochures, flyers, graduation announcements
and ceremony programs, and the school yearbook.
Data Collection Techniques
Each source of data previously discussed had to be transformed into actual data
for analysis. For several sources, such as the written examinations and classroom
artifacts, this conversion simply required making a photocopy. Other sources of data
required a more laborious conversion before formal analysis.
Transcripts
Transcripts from audio- and video-taped interviews formed the main body o f data
for my research. For the open-ended interviews which did not require graphics for
interpretation, the interviews were audio-taped. For the structured interviews, the

53
participants were both audio-taped and video-taped. While the audiotapes were used for
the bulk o f the transcriptions, the videotapes provided additional information detailing
the students' movements as they reacted to the material.
Transcripts were typed on a word processing program in the same manner as the
field notes, with the verbatim transcripts in the left hand column to leave space for
analytical comments made during analysis on the right hand side.
Field Notes
Descriptions o f each observation and interview were entered in my field notes.
These notes contained physical descriptions o f the research participants and their
behavior, my behavior, the activity in question (through verbal and graphic means),
along with a description of the verbal and nonverbal communication occurring during the
activity. Bogdan and Biklen (1992) refer to these notes as "the written account o f what
the researcher hears, sees, experiences, and thinks in the course of collecting and
reflecting on the data in a qualitative study" (p. 107).
The actual description in the field notes were made in one column on the left hand
side of the page. The right hand side o f the page was reserved for analytical comments
made at the time of observation, or later as data were continually analyzed. This
structure served as an attempt to isolate description from obvious interpretation, although
I acknowledge that the observations themselves were often influenced by my on-going
interpretations. While notes were made during the participant observations and the
interviews, the field notes were elaborated and entered into a word-processing program.
The field notes served to reconstruct events and to record as much detail as possible.
Field notes were particularly important for the study of the classroom as they
were the major source o f data for this aspect of the research. The field notes were also
kept for the interviews which served as another source o f data in addition to the
transcripts of the audio and video recordings.
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Field Journal
The field journal involved a narrative description of the activities o f the research
day. This narrative was more personal than the field notebook. Here the emphasis was
on my biases, feelings, ideas, and attitudes. Initial analyses were often recorded, as
were descriptions of events that went very well or very poorly. A picture o f my
subjectivity was formed from this narrative. This picture allowed me to reflect on the
effect o f my subjectivity on the data collection and analysis and thus allowed a clearer
understanding. Additionally, the journal provided an informal means o f reflection on the
method of data collection and analysis, my attitude toward the research and participants,
and any ethical problems that arise (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992). Because the data
collection was shaped by the on-going analysis, the insight gained from my field journal
was fundamentally important. The ongoing analytical comments made in these journals
were invaluable as I attempted to reconstruct my analysis during the latter stages o f the
study.
Analysis
The analysis of data was carried out in a manner described by Glaser and Strauss
(1967) in their discussion o f grounded theory. Development o f a grounded theory
includes an interpretive analysis accomplished by defining or isolating theories and
concepts directly from the detailed data centering on the participants. By using the
grounded theory approach to qualitative study, the intent is not to prove predetermined
theories, but to generate theories from the data and to provide supporting evidence. The
researcher attempts to analyze the data with a minimum of previous assumptions and
instead looks for trends and patterns to emerge from the data. Hutchinson (1990)
provides an excellent explanation of the strengths of analysis based on grounded theory:
Grounded theory offers a systematic method by which to study the richness and
diversity of human experience and to generate relevant, plausible theory which
can be used to understand the contextual reality of the social behavior, (p. 127)
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Because the researcher attempts to make inferences solely on the basis of trends
seen in the data, elaborate theories constructed by the researcher beforehand may well
interfere with the discovery process. To eliminate this problem, many researchers advise
a minimum of literature review by the researcher until the actual research process is
underway (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). However, as I have argued earlier, each researcher
carries a bias into a project and the data collection and analysis are influenced by those
biases. The researcher cannot avoid relying on common sense knowledge and prior
conceptions. With this in mind, Hammersley and Atkinson (1989) advise that biases be
explored and well documented so their effects can be understood and the data analyzed in
the best manner possible. Bogdan and Biklen (1992) suggest that "Good researchers are
aware of their theoretical base and use it to help collect and analyze data" (p. 33). I agree
more with the latter opinion, and, for that reason, I included a literature review and a
description of my initial areas of interest in the research proposal.
A fundamental requirement of the grounded theory approach is making inferences
from observations. Instead o f attempting to explain observations from a preestablished
governing law, an attempt is made to link observations into a pattern, to provide
explanations for the pattern, and then to construct an intelligible frame or theory.
Because of the nature o f inferences, the theories constructed need to remain closely tied
to the subject and generalizations for entire groups may not be possible (Geertz, 1973).
The benefits of basing analysis on grounded theory as described by Richer
(1975) and Glaser and Strauss (1967) is due to its inductive basis. Grounded theory has
the potential of moving beyond current theories or paradigms by producing theories
which may provide more useful insight into the situation studied (Stem, Allen, &
Moxley, 1982). Additionally, such analysis is ideally suited to form initial description
and explanations of complicated situations (Hutchinson, 1990). These characteristics
make grounded theory well suited for the case studies needed in science education (Stake
& Easley, 1978).
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My analysis began through the formulation o f substantive codes that described
pieces o f data. These substantive codes were often the actual terms the participants used
or were terms I felt were descripdve o f the pattern. Because o f this latter category, how I
make sense of the world influenced my selection o f items assigned to a particular code
(Bogdan & Biklen, 1992). All data were assigned a code in order to break the data into
small, understandable pieces, such as students' attention seeking behaviors. Afterwards,
I read the data many times and assigned the substantive codes to larger categorical codes,
such as classroom power relations. In turn, the data were read to assign substantive and
categorical codes into theoretical constructs, such as the extreme importance the students
placed on academic knowledge. These constructs were formed from the combination of
data, knowledge gained from the literature, and my knowledge from the outside world.
The process of coding began at the outset of data collection.
During coding, memos were attached to various codes offering my tentative
theoretical ideas concerning the particular code. Because coding occurred throughout
data collection, it shaped my opinions and so shaped the data collection. This reflexivity
allowed me to search for data that provided examples o f proposed codes and to check my
emerging understandings with the research participants. The process o f specified data
collection is referred to as theoretical sampling. These very directed questions insured
construct validity of the inferences made from the data. Additionally, this directed
process of data collection insured very dense data for each theoretical construct.
Toward the end o f the study, I began to sort all the data that supported or
explained the most prominent theoretical constructs. Glaser and Strauss (1967) refer to
these prominent theoretical constructs as basic social psychological process, and Glaser
(1978) refers to them as the main theme in the data. This sorting began the formal
process of theory generation as I attempted to apply meaning provided by these
prominent theoretical constructs to the larger body o f data. The process defined the data
which do and do not apply, thus establishing the limits of the emerging theory.
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Another essential part o f the analysis process involved participant verification of
my emerging theories. As I began identification o f themes, I discussed these theoretical
constructs with Hurston and each of the interview participants. Their ideas were used to
verify or modify my original analysis. In a small number of instances, my views could
not be aligned with that of the participants. In these cases, both the participants' and my
own analysis appears and the reasons for the possible discrepancies are discussed.
Analysis based on the grounded theory approach is concurrent with data
collection. This allows additional data to be gathered to answer research questions as
they arise and allows the researcher to establish the construct validity of her/his emerging
theories. However, data analysis continued months after the data collection ended and
far into the time of formal writing.
I analyzed the data from each student separately. However, at the outset of the
final reading, I summed each area mentioned by the students about the theoretical
framework for evolution. These conceptual areas were placed in a template describing
each participant's conceptual framework for evolution. In order to document conceptual
change, the participants' conceptions for each aspect of this framework were described at
three intervals during the research process. The interviews involved for each o f these
three intervals can be found in Figure 2.
I analyzed the data from each student separately, and then compared my
understandings of the individual students in a componential analysis. This procedure
allowed me to develop an understanding of each student on an individual basis.
Afterwards, the comparison o f individuals allowed identification of patterns that were
common throughout the individuals involved in the study. Thus, componential analysis
allowed the initial steps from contextual understanding toward generalization of insight
constructed from the study. We must recognize that this is only a tentative step toward
generalizability that must be further investigated through other research.
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Time Frame of Study
As shown in Figure 2 and Table 3, the data collection extended throughout the
1992-93 school year. This duration was necessary for me both to establish a close,
working relationship with the participants and to provide an opportunity for a
longitudinal study o f conception change. Arzi (1988) has critiqued current research in
science education and explained that short term studies do not relate a full understanding.
She calls for more longitudinal studies which follow the same subjects over an extended
time frame.
Ethical Issues
Stacey (1988) and Lather (1986) have illuminated the inherent difficulties in
traditional relationships between the researcher and the participants. They argue this
relationship as typically conceived is exploitative and serves to reproduce the power
relations of the larger society. While this reproduction is problematic on moral grounds,
the theoretical underpinnings o f qualitative research also make this traditional relationship
less than appropriate. Munro (1991) argues that the intersubjective process of meaning
making demands that this relationship be collaborative and reciprocal.
In an effort to make this a collaborative relationship, the participants in this study
shaped both the actual scope o f the study and the methods I used. Additionally, I shared
my analysis with each individual before dissemination o f the study and invited their
comments on the interpretations included in writing of the dissertation. Their comments,
although minor, were incorporated into the analysis. In very few instances did their
analyses firmly conflict with my own; although when this did happen, both views were
reported. (See Chapter 4.)
Seidman (1991) explains that the in-depth interviewing process has the potential
of being particularly damaging for the participants when the topic of inquiry is to be
situated in the life o f the participant. Such a process is likely to raise sensitive issues at
the same time that it provides a large body o f description. Such description may allow

59
identification of the participant, even though the identity o f the participant is to be
disguised. This last concern is particularly important, because the vulnerability of those
involved in the research cannot be discerned ahead o f time. Because o f these concerns, I
used informed consent forms for each of the participants to detail what their
responsibilities were in the research and to clarify their right to withdraw from the study
at any time. These forms were signed for the students by their parents or guardians.
Although University Laboratory School students have agreed to participate in all research
when they enrolled, I felt this additional step helped ensure the voluntary nature o f the
students' participation.
In an effort to maintain confidentiality, I used pseudonyms for each participant in
the study and masked the name of the school itself. The pseudonyms were used in all
my notes, journals, and transcriptions so even an outside reader o f the rough transcripts
would be unaware of the participants' identities. I was the only person involved in the
bulk of the transcriptions, although a professional transcriptionist was employed for a
small percentage of this work. Her participation was agreeable to the research
participants.
Reflexivitv
In the ethics section I discussed the issue of reflexivity. Because of the nature of
qualitative research, the voice o f the researcher cannot be separated from that o f the
participants. This point has been well documented in the literature in discussions by
M unro (1991), Roman (1989), and Stacey (1988). But in turn, the notion of reflexivity
also implies that the voice and actions of the participants cannot be separated from the
role typically held by the researcher. This relationship is easily seen in the methods used
in this research. Ms. Hurston, the teacher, suggested and provided many of the research
instruments used in this study. She also played a large role in the selection o f research
participants and in on-going data analysis. Hers were not the only efforts that changed
the focus and methods of my study. As has been described, the results of one concept
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mapping session with a student participant demonstrated for me the narrowness of my
understanding o f a scientific conceptual framework for evolution. Thus, this student
radically expanded my research scope.
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, this reflexivity is not limited to the
participants' alteration of my methods and analysis. As will be seen, my efforts
substantially changed the nature of the participants' learning, so that these students
experienced more conceptual change than their classmates. Thus, my actions as a
researcher changed the experiences of my participants. Given this relationship, it would
be difficult to defend a description o f this study as naturalistic, because, not only did I
observe, I also modified.

PREFACE TO
THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION CHAPTERS
The focus o f this study is the conceptual change which occurred in four Biology
II students in the topic o f biological evolution. However, it is important to know how
the learning of these four interview participants com pares with that o f their classmates.
In addition, to better understand the conceptual change that is described, the learning
of these students should be situated within the teaching practices of their Biology II
course as well as the culture o f the classroom in which this learning took place.
Toward these ends, the results and discussion are reported in three chapters. Chapter 4
is a description o f the classroom culture. Chapter 5 is a description of the teacher and
her teaching practices. This chapter also specifically addresses the means through
which evolution was taught. Finally, Chapter 6 is the most important for the purposes
of this study. Here, the conceptual change is described, both on a whole class basis and
on an individual basis with the four interview participants.
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CHAPTER 4
CLASSROOM CULTURE
No educational event exists in a vacuum. It is created and influenced by its
larger cultural context. Even though the focus o f my study was the process o f learning
of four particular students, much of their learning occurred in a classroom. And this
classroom has a culture. Culture is not a language, a style of dress, or a unique social
practice. Instead I understand culture to be the ever-changing context in which an
individual makes sense (Geertz, 1973). To describe a culture is, in part, to describe
how meaning is negotiated by the members o f a group. Thus, culture can be explicit
knowledge as well as tacit, nonverbal knowledge which is continually taught, learned,
and m odified by group members (Clifford, 1986). To understand culture is to
understand the knowledge that a group values. Therefore, it is important to provide for
the reader a description of the culture in which my study takes place.
My work focuses on the students of one biology class. The understandings I
have gained center on the culture o f this class as it is situated in the larger high school.
I have attempted to represent the themes through which I came to understand the
school. However, in an attempt to refine my understandings, I had the students of this
class com ment on a early draft of this chapter. My initial understandings have been
altered by the students' perceptions, and their comments are interwoven with my own.
Through this process o f description, reflection, and refinement, I hope to achieve a
richer description, one that reflects my views and those o f the participants.
This chapter begins with a description o f the school, both through physical and
administrative lenses. Afterwards, the biology classroom and the class participants are
described. These descriptions are designed to give the reader a basis from which to
understand the themes that follow. Finally, the themes that I found to be important are
iscussed along with the students' reactions to my descriptions. I came to recognize
three themes as important factors in the culture of this class. These are (a) Talking
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discussed along with the students' reactions to my descriptions. I came to recognize
three themes as important factors in the culture o f this class. These are (a) Talking
Academic, (b) A Small Town School in an Urban Setting, and (c) the Myth of
Uniformity. These three themes are interwoven and, as will be seen, the action o f one
theme often mediates the actions of another. I propose no sharp distinctions that would
be easily recognizable to a reader who visited my study site. But I hope through my
descriptions to provide the reader with an understanding of the contexts in which my
study took place.
The School
Physical Appearance
To any passerby, the University Laboratory School easily blends into the rest
o f the university campus. Situated beside the law school library and facing a row of
fraternity houses, the laboratory school lies on the fringes o f the university grounds.
The school is constructed of fam iliar beige bricks used in many cam pus structures,
several o f them showing some green algal growth in the face o f Louisiana's sub
tropical climate. There is a large yard surrounding the school, its grass uniform except
where it is shaded by the large, lush oaks similar to those found throughout this part of
the deep South.
A visitor can walk from the university campus and enter the side o f the school
by following a pathway in the grass trampled by innumerable College of Education
students over the years. The handrails lining this side entrance were yellow at one
time, but now metal peeks through, worn by the passage o f many hands. For a portion
of the school year, the glass side door leading to the high school wing was broken, and
the cracked glass was held in place with gray duct tape. W hen I first entered the school
in the fall semester, I was greeted with a fam iliar atmosphere o f schools-a building kept
a little too cold in the summer and a little too hot in the winter, floors typically free of
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debris but always in need o f a mop, lockers filled to overflowing at times with books,
papers, notes, and tennis shoes.
But as I look closer, I notice that this school hallway differs in several ways
from others I have walked. On any given day, backpacks line the walls with no one
present to guard their contents. Many times I notice official looking notes addressed to
specific students taped onto the lockers. Unattended students pour over exams in the
hallways.
These differences fade as I watch the activity between class periods. Then, just
like many high schools, the hallways are filled with talking, laughing, singing students.
I can hear students making contact before the next period-the seniors making plans for
lunch off campus, younger students darting in to buy an off limits candy bar from the
vending machine. Often younger students chase one another, falling short of actually
bolting through the hallways. Teachers, though not obvious in this short time of
student freedom, can be seen lingering near their doors and occasionally looking out at
the activity.
The majority o f the higher grade levels classes are held within the same two
story wing of the laboratory school. This allows maintenance of a distinction between
the upper and lower grade levels. The students refer to the ninth through the twelfth
grades as University H igh, or more casually, U H igh. This sense of a separate identity
is reinforced by the small num ber of younger children seen in the high school's
hallways, and the rule prohibiting the older students from using the younger hallways
as a passage out of the building.
History and Administration
The University Laboratory School was first opened in 1915, under the name of
the Demonstration High School. Its initial purpose was to provide teacher and college
student education in high school teaching methods and to provide facilities for teaching
practice. Throughout the intervening years, additional grade levels were added. The
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Laboratory School is a department in the College o f Education at the university.
Funding for the school comes from both student tuition and state "minimum foundation
funding" appropriated to the university. Thus, the laboratory school is a member of the
university system and is not formally associated with the parish school system. This
relationship is reflected by the Laboratory School's schedule, which corresponds to that
o f the university and not to that o f local public schools. In its current form, the
University Laboratory School has a m aximum population o f 760 students attending
kindergarten through grade 12. Each grade level has a constant num ber of 70 students,
composed of 35 males and 35 females. Approximately 10% of the student population
of the school includes members of minority groups.
Typically, anywhere from 600 to 1000 applications are received for the
estimated 85 to 100 openings. Most openings are for kindergarten and ninth grade.
Once students have applied, they are placed into established dem ographic and
educational categories. This information is then given to a central com mittee on the
university's campus, and this committee makes the decision as to which students to
accept. The student selection process is partially guided by a goal o f a diverse student
population. The school's enrollment at each grade level is held constant to maintain the
15:1 student teacher ratio.
Another attempt to maintain the greatest diversity within the student population
is that no entrance examination is given to students before admission. However,
several aspects o f the school make attaining this diversity problematic. Perhaps the
most limiting factor is the tuition, which approaches or surpasses (depending on the
grade level) two thousand dollars per school year. Additionally, the transportation
requirement also serves to narrow the population o f students who can attend. While the
Principal expressed a desire to have a population more congruent with the city's
population, constraints in operation prohibit such diversity. In spite o f the school's
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efforts, there remain fundamental differences between the students at the Laboratory
school and the city's population:

Principal: Now one difference in our population and and [sic] other
public school's population is that we have tuition and they [families] have
to provide their transportation. So that does make our population a little
bit different from [the] parish's. Ah, our students often come from
families who value education more and are out looking for an alternative.
So that is a built in factor we can't change b u t . . . we don't seek out just a
certain kind o f stu d en t.. . . Ah, we do tend to have a little bit higher level
o f motivation. (P 76)
The Laboratory School fills a number of formal roles. These include student
education, teacher education and preparation, educational research, in-service
presentations, and serving as a "model school" demonstration center. However, as the
principal points out:
P rin cip al: The goals o f this school include only one goal that relates to
the students that go here. We have, you know, we will do the best job
that we can educationally for the children that are here. . . . But that's only
one of the [roles] of the school. (P 75)
The Biology II Class
Physical Appearance
Ms. Hurston's Biology II class has helped to fulfill several o f these roles. In this
class Hurston simultaneously educates students in biology and one student teacher in
science teaching as she participates in educational research. This Biology II class is
held on the bottom floor o f the U High wing. When I first entered this class, I knew
immediately that this was a biology classroom. Encircling the room on three sides are
laboratory benches. Those benches and the walls beside them are covered with
biological educational materials-things that are alive, things that depict life, or things
that are remnants o f that life. Aquaria serving as cages for mice and other rodents line
one wall. Beside these cages are dried carapaces of horseshoe crabs. Across the room
1 can see bones from cows, shells from tortoises, a hornet's nest, microscopes, and
aquaria housing small fishes. An androgynous model o f a human torso stares at me, its
organs and musculature exposed. As I probe, I find one plastic container filled with
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debris and containing a colony o f meal worms-a favorite laboratory animal of biology
teachers everywhere. Toward the front o f the room is a large aquarium which until
recently had held an adult grouper and a plecostomus. (To the sad dismay of many of
the students who had grown up with them, these fishes died at mid-year.) The aerator
for this tank is somewhat loud. This constant gurgling and the sounds of mice and
gerbils moving in their cages are strangely soothing in this biology classroom.
Covering the walls of the room are posters. These posters advertise famous
zoos or depict endangered species and others explain animal classification systems (i.e.,
"The Animal Kingdom," "Protists"). I attended class for several days before I noticed
the alligator head hanging over the doorway to the teacher's office.
The rectangular room is lined on one side by windows overlooking the front
yard of the school. While these windows can let in a great deal o f light, they also allow
for long dreamy glances during Louisiana's massive thunderstorms. The desks,
arranged in four rows, face the teacher's desk and blackboard in the front of the room.
A television, overhead projector, and video recorder are in the front right comer. A
space in the back of the room bounded by a set of long collection drawers remains free
for lab preparation.
In many ways the classroom reflects much of the rest of U High. It is orderly,
but worn. The light green paint on the walls is somewhat faded, but little of it can be
seen because of all the classroom materials. Nothing in the class stands out as new
except for an occasional poster or graphic found along the walls. The wood on the
students' desks has uneven grooves etched by age, wear, and students' pens. However,
like the larger school, it holds the promise o f much activity. The obvious wear seen in
this room signifies that these materials have been used by hundreds o f other students.
For me, the combination o f biological materials, worn desks, mice, and blackboards is
immediately comforting. This room reminds me o f many other rooms in which I
learned to love biology.
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A Typical Class Period
On a typical school day, I enter this room just before fourth hour at 10:30 A.M.
Ms. Hurston is already here, walking about the room, and setting up laboratory
materials in the back. I speak to her quickly and take one o f my usual places behind of
the rows of seats. Hurston is a middle-aged woman, with short brown curly hair that is
graying at the temples. She is wearing jeans, a red checked shirt, brown leather flats,
and a large gold necklace. Often her jew elry takes the shape o f animals such dolphins,
salamanders, or frogs. The overall effect is of a casual neatness. Hurston is animated
as she speaks. When she is deeply involved in an explanation, she stands in front of the
class and takes off her brown reading glasses and waves them around her head as she
looks at a student. Her speech remains the same whether it is directed to a student, a
class, or an adult. She speaks rapidly, and her meanings are punctuated with humor,
cynicism, laughter, and quick smiles. She often can be seen placing a hand on top of
her head as she thinks through an answer to a student's question.
Joe Ellen sits beside Ms. Hurston who is reading over a calendar. She is
Hurston's education student. She is working on her Master's Degree in biology
education and is interning with Hurston for the year. Joe Ellen is a small woman in her
mid-twenties. She is the only member of the class who is o f African-American
descent. She typically wears her straight black hair pulled off her face. Joe Ellen's face
is very animated, and she both smiles and frowns quickly as she speaks surprisingly
fast given her Mississippi accent.
Just before the first bell rings, Ms. Hurston places a Farside cartoon on the
overhead. Then she sits behind the large front desk and looks over her reading or
quickly grades some papers. Students begin entering the room from the front door
soon after the first bell rings. The first students to enter are usually Bob, Calvin, and
Jean. These juniors place their books in their favorite seats in the back o f the room and
walk back up to the front to make friendly conversation with Ms. Hurston and Joe
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Ellen. As the other students enter, they walk toward their desks, but few o f them sit.
Instead, most stand and talk with their classmates. Day after day, most students return
to the same desks although no seating has been assigned.
Soon the second bell rings and the kids come closer to their desks, many o f
them sitting down. Hurston asks the students all to have a seat so that Joe Ellen can
take the roll. This movement is accomplished with a little talking. There are 12 juniors
and 11 seniors in this class. Ten of these students are boys and 13 are girls. There was
one more girl in the class who left at the end of the first semester, while explaining that
her academic schedule threatened to overwhelm her.
The formal class begins with Hurston reading the "What is it?" question that is
written on the side o f the front blackboard. Each day the question changes, and it is
accompanied by the answer to yesterday's question. After Hurston reads the question
loudly to the class, several of the students call out possible solutions. These
suggestions can range from comical to very well thought out.
A fter this brief discussion, Hurston launches into the topic for the day. The
topic for discussion is an article on dinosaur extinction that the students read yesterday.
Many students respond easily to Hurston's open-ended questions, often calling out
answers without being formally recognized by the teacher. During the class-wide
discussions, most students are attentive, even if they are not overtly participating.
There is little side talking between students, with the exception of a nucleus of
juniors who sit together in the back, left-hand side o f the room. This group includes
Bob, Jean, Philip, Raistlin, and Calvin. I came to refer to them as the "trio+2" in my
field notes because their actions so often drew my attention to their corner of the room.
Most side talking that occurs in this class can be traced back to this group. Listening to
their conversations, I could often hear them make references to the material the class
was discussing. However, these references are often tangential and laced with a great
deal o f humor.
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Cultural Themes
As my research focused entirely on this class, I considered the larger school
only as it affected the students of this class. In regard to some points, I view the two,
classroom culture and school culture, as synonymous. But I am sure this was not
always the case. Class culture and school culture are profoundly related, but they
should not be equated on a wholesale basis. In many ways, Ms. Hurston and this
particular group of students had their own means of negotiating meaning. These ways
were certainly affected by the school context, but my em phasis will be on the
classroom. The next section will explore the major themes I have come to recognize as
important in understanding the culture of this biology class.
Talking Academic
One o f the fundamental themes through which I understand this class is termed
Talking A cadem ic. Borrowing from Lemke's (1990) book, Talking Science. I use
Talking Academic to refer to the ease and frequency with which these students
assumed the mannerisms and implicit habits which characterize current academic
discourse. For me, these habits are best signified by the use o f academic language,
both in verbal and written communication. A nother characteristic of current academic
discourse is an acceptance juxtaposed with questions, that is, Talking Academic
includes an acceptance of the importance of the formalized knowledge of school along
with a questioning attitude toward this knowledge.
An example of Talking Academic is signified by an excerpt from a whole group
discussion held early in the school year during the unit on dinosaur extinction. Here,
the teacher asks the students to compare various aspects o f the natural sciences:

Hurston: So how does paleontology differ from the here and now of
biology?
[The students do not hold up their hands in response but rather they call
out answers from their seats.]
Jesus: It's a new science.
Calvin: Because they have more recent discoveries, with new technology.
Anne: No, but they discover new things in chem istry all the time though,
like new elements.
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Je a n : Yeah, like Calvin said, they get one piece of evidence and that
changes everything.
P hilip: It's not a new science but an evolving science.
G ra d y : They have to work on clues; they can't go out and test things.
It's more guesswork. They can't be sure o f what they know.
H : So they operate m ore like detectives?
Bob: It could be the m ost m isleading science. They can't check things.
O ther sciences have a a lot of facts behind it.
(F 62)
This is one o f dozens o f such discussions. These are characterized by the teacher
asking the students to draw from several areas o f their knowledge. The students'
participation is voluntary. A reading o f the transcript reveals that the students are
listening and thoughtfully responding to one another's comments. These students are
participating not in a closely directed dialogue, but they are learning to participate in an
academic conversation. They are Talking Academic.
I have identified three emergent codes students use in the process o f Talking
Academic: expectation, com petition, and innovation. The first o f these, expectation,
is readily apparent. U High is considered to be a "college prep school" by almost all of
its students. The large number of courses available providing advanced placement
credit in colleges and opportunities for concurrent enrollment with the university
signify the U High's role in preparing its students for college. The school is successful
in this regard. The guidance counselor explains that 95% of all seniors enter four-year
colleges or universities.
In a survey, each of these students in the Biology II class expressed their
expectation of attending a university after graduation. The majority indicated out-ofstate universities as possible choices. Sixteen o f the 24 students in this class indicated
in a survey that they wanted to become doctors, veterinarians, scientists, or engineers.
Others were planning for careers in law o r business. (These expectations may not
simply originate with the school, but also from these students' families.) Alm ost all
students com e from homes where at least one parent has a college education. These
students have an educational legacy to plan, prepare for, and expect a college
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education. One sign o f this preparation is the very regular daily attendance of students
in Ms. H urston’s class. These students expect to succeed in academics. O f the four
students I asked, not one had seriously considered what they would do for a living if
they did not attend college.
A second code in the them e o f Talking Academic is the code o f com petition.
Late in the school year I spoke with Tyler, one of my four interview participants, about
the ranking system for students:
SD: W hat's your class rank?
Tyler: I'm like . . . or something like that.
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes] A hm , it’s important to me I think to know that you all
know that. W hy do you think that you know that here?
T: 'Cause it's so com petitive here.
SD: Yeah?
T: 'Cause everybody's so s mar t . . . .
T: But my class number, it used to kind of matter, like when we first
started getting our transcripts and seeing what num ber we were. Yeah, it
matters. You want to be higher than your friends. [Small laugh]
SD: So you talked about it? Y'all actually sort o f talked about your class
rank?
T: Well you know you get your paper with it on it and, you know, you
say, "W hat’s yours? W hat's yours?"
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes]
T: You always wanted, well I do want to be higher than my friends. (C
252)
Tyler is not alone in her sense o f academic competition. Students in this class
constantly compare grades w hen papers are passed out, with some of the junior boys
gloating if they received a grade higher than their friends. Frequently I could hear
students sharing their overall grade point averages, ACT, or SAT scores with one
another. I was surprised as I listened to casual conversations to find that these students
knew the names of many students throughout the other schools in the parish who
excelled in a particular subject. Why is there such a strong sense of competition in
these matters? A nother interview participant expresses this:
M ered ith : Grades really, really mean a lot. Ahm, I found that out, that
stuff like, [if] I had a 4 point, instead of a 3 .9 7 7 ,1 probably would have a
[university] scholarship. (A 273)
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The code o f competition also surfaces in the actual form of classroom
discourse. Often discussions in Ms. Hurston's class become student debates. In these
"debates," as they are described by Lemke (1990), one student directly responds to a
comment made by another. These debates typically include the overt participation of
the boys in the class. While girls are not vocal in these sessions, several can be heard
participating from time to time. (For an expanded discussion of the effects o f gender in
the classroom, see the section on Discussion Participants in Chapter 5.) Here, one
student tries to discredit a statement made by another:
[Ron, a shy junior, has taken his turn in reading his critique o f a scientific
journal article standing in the front o f the class. As soon as he finished,
Philip, a junior boy sitting in the back of the class, raises his hand quickly,
wagging it in the air.]
Hurston: Yes, [addressing Philip] you have a comment?
Philip: Yes. This is for Ron. Did they use the sampling technique
described in the article o f yesterday, like the 1-10 technique?
Ron: (Long pause) I don't know.
Philip: [Long pause, with eyebrows raised and hand to chin] Did they
use anything?
H: [Looking at Philip] What were the other techniques, Philip?
[He hesitates, gives an exaggerated shrug, and the entire class erupts in
laughter.] (F 164)
I recall this as being a humorous exchange. Philip often initiates these sessions when
others are presenting their ideas to the class. Like this one, his comments are often
accompanied by exaggerated gestures-the raised eyebrows, hand to chin, a lowered
voice, and a dram atic pause before speaking. He not only has learned to participate in
academic discourse, but he also has learned this lesson so well he can mock its
characteristics. The teacher plays an essential role in this mockery by making Philip
the real brunt o f the humor. Over the school year, I came to anticipate such mocking
sessions during student debates whenever the students were festive. W hile these
sessions had a variety o f participants, none could carry them off with Philip’s comical
aplomb.
The final code in the theme of Talking Academic is innovation. The
administration, faculty, student body, and parents have come to anticipate innovative
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teaching to occur in this setting. This is provided structurally through the formal
requirements for a teaching position at the Laboratory School. These requirements
include a master's degree or higher, a state teaching certification, and at least three
years of teaching experience. In addition to these formal requirements, the current
principal has some specific characteristics in mind when selecting teachers:

Principal: I'm looking for people who I sense will work well with
students, and work well with parents, and will work well with the college.
I'm looking for people who are very creative. I'm looking for people who
want to be something else rather than just a good, average teachers. . . .
I’m looking for people who, who want to be le ad ers.. . .And very much so
people who are ah self su fficien t.. . . If I ever hire someone and the only
way that, that they will do their best work is if I'm checking on them
frequently or supervising them pretty closely, or visiting them frequently,
then I've hired the wrong person. I'm looking for self starters.. . . I don't
hire Indians, I hire Indian chiefs.
(P 77)
The result o f this selection process has formed a faculty that has received substantial
state and national recognition for excellence in teaching. Tw o teachers have been
named Presidential award winners for Excellence in Teaching Science. Three teachers
were named Presidential award winners for Excellence in Teaching Math. One teacher
was named Discover Magazine's Science Teacher o f the Year.
The codes of ex p ectation, com petition, and innovation each relate to the
theme o f Talking Academic. There is an interaction with each o f the cultural forces
underlying these codes. This interaction provides a synergy so that the education
received by any student is enhanced by the students around her/him. This is a complex
relationship: the same students who help one another academically are also in
competition academically. This is not a school where poor performance is a form of
cultural currency. As Ms. Hurston states, "It's not cool necessarily to be the dummy
that sits back in the back of the room." (P 66) Instead, excellence in education, the
ability to Talk Academic, is noticed, envied, and sought after. However, after reading
the first draft of this chapter, Grady a senior boy, provided some additional insight into
the theme of Talking Academic. He explained that at U High "there is a fine line we
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Istudents] walk between talking academic and talking 1 2 2 academic. There's this real
subtle line, a window. You can't be stupid, but you can't take yourself too seriously
either.” (5B 322)
Toward the end of the school year, the students became tired. This was
particularly true for the seniors.
Tyler: [Tonight] I have about 500, 000 physics problems to do and I
have a big unit English test on about 5 stories plus romanticism and
existentialism and all that. And I haven't looked at any o f it, any o f i t . . . .
And I'm not going to stay up late. I don't care. At this point I don't care.
Who cares? W hy even care? It doesn't make any difference. (C 244)
Even for these students, there are obvious emotional limitations to what they want to
accomplish in school. Like most social realities, the synergistic quality o f U High is
not a constant state.
A Small Town School in an Urban Setting
SD: Since I've been here I've gotten a real flavor, this [U High] is almost
like ah a neighborhood school used to b e . . . .
Principal: O r a small town school.
SD: Yeah, yeah.
Principal: W ell it is in some regards, and it's not in others. [Murmuring]
Well, I guess you could say that we're trying to be a small town school in
an urban setting. (P 72)
The previous conversation with the principal identifies the second theme
through which I understand U High. This theme, being a small town school in an urban
setting, allows me to understand much o f the social interactions o f the students and
teachers in this class. W hat is meant by "being a small town school?" For me, this
includes a strong sense o f community juxtaposed with a strong sense of the

independence.
With each of the four sets of parents I spoke with, community or a sense of
"family" was cited as an important attribute o f U High. Several students, one in
Hurston's class, have parents and grandparents who attended the school. Certainly, a
community atmosphere is enhanced by the small size of the school. Having so few
students, the principal knows them "by names and faces instead o f numbers" and this
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knowledge can be used for "keeping kids on track." (P 71) Teachers too are well
acquainted with their students by often having the same students for various courses
during their high school years. This year Ms. Hurston had previously taught the juniors
in their Biology 1 class. Brian discusses the positive results o f this relationship:

Brian: When you get to know the teachers b e tte r,. . . it is easier for
them to instruct you when they know what you're looking for." (B 3)
The stability of the student population has a considerable influence in creating a
sense of community. Students in Ms. Hurston's class know one another very well.
Many students have attended the same school since first grade. After reading the first
draft of this chapter, Jean, a junior girl in this class, suggested that I had omitted a key
aspect o f the school's community. She explained that there is a great deal o f interaction
between students o f various grade levels, "We (juniors and seniors] all get along and do
stuff together." (5B 322)
The school attempts to foster this relationship by arranging several school
events. These events include a retreat for the senior class held in the fall, a "spirit" day
when each grade works together with one other grade for a service project for the
school, and a winter formal which is held on the school grounds and includes all
members of the high school. This close relationship translates into different classroom
behaviors. Students in Hurston's class were often very tactile, touching one another on
the shoulder as they spoke and playing physical games before the beginning o f class.
Another result o f this sense of community is described:

Hurston: I think that in many cases they [the students] are very open to
kids com ing in. I don't think they necessarily shut them off. I don't, I
know I don't see it from the students' perspective, but I don’t think it's as
bad as a lot of people make it out to b e . . . . I don't see this school being
that cliquish. I see the kids as being basically pretty friendly. (H 66)
In part I agree with Hurston's assessment. In laboratory situations, while students had
favorite group members, these groups were fluid with group members often changing.
Students seem to talk with everyone, although to some class members with more
frequency than others. Students who didn't seem to be exceptionally close knew a lot
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about one another's personal lives. However, from the students' perspective, cliques are
an obvious part o f schooling:

Tyler: It [this school] focuses a lot on social, social things. If you are
not you know, if you are not in the cool group, then you are pretty much
nowhere.
SD: So it is cliquish?
T: Yes! (C 254)
A fter reading an early draft o f this chapter, the students initiated a discussion
about the cliques at U High. Some students, like Tyler, felt that cliques were a major
social force at U High. Other students disagreed. W hile the "strength" o f cliques is a
very relative judgm ent, I feel some meaning came be made from this conversation.
Grady pointed out that students who have attended U High all their lives, like Tyler,
felt that students in different social groups were very isolated from one another.
However, students who have transferred here, such as G inger and Stephanie, felt that
the cliques at U High were relative mild to others they had seen. G inger explains that
"The cliques interact with each other here a lot more than at other public schools." (5B
324) In the end of this discussion, we decided that it was probably true that the
students’ social groups at U High were not as strict an isolating mechanism as is true in
other schools. However, students had differing perceptions o f these groups based upon
their histories in other schools.
The com munity atmosphere o f the school is contrasted to the em phasis placed
on the independence o f the individual. Hurston explains that one factor she
particularly likes about U High is the independence it fosters in its teachers.

Hurston: I like that you have a lot o f control over w hat you teach.
You're allowed the freedom to do what needs to be done and teach the
way you need to teach. (P 42)
One parent explained to me that the school also attempts to foster this developm ent o f
the individual in its students. This was one of the reasons that all four of her children
attended the Laboratory school:
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Parent: I thought it [Laboratory school] gave a sense of self e stee m .. . .
I think this school is very good about giving children, all children who are
good at different things, a feeling of self esteem. (B 306)
Toward the end of developing the individual, the laboratory school has a "point
system" established. In this system, no one student can hold an inordinate number of
leadership roles in the school. While this system is controversial, even its opponents
agree that is has the attribute o f allowing all students the chance to develop leadership
skills.
There is an interesting tension between the community and independence aims
of the school. In this passage, Tyler explains that while she is part o f a community of
students, she feels she must be able to give something back, to reciprocate:
T yler: You ask your classmates to help you [with math homework] and
it's ju st kinda', "Can you help me please?" [Laughs.] I feel so guilty.
'Cause nobody wants to help people that don't know anything. You
know? (C 9)
One of the end results o f this "small town school" atmosphere is a feeling of
responsibility which develops in the students and their parents. While the recognition
o f responsibility is typically thought o f as a positive trait in a teenager, it also can take
the form of harsh criticism when the teaching does not meet the degree of innovation
the students expect.
SD: The seniors really feel like they can . . . have a hand in getting rid of
someone [a teacher they disapprove of]?
H u rsto n : Yeah. That's a perception that you know the administration
[strongly disagrees with] when they hear. . . . But the seniors really think
they do have that kind o f power and they will make every effort to do that
if they think the situation warrants it. (P 28)
So the theme of "being a small town school in an urban setting" is com posed of
the interrelated codes of community, independence, and responsibility. These themes
serve to describe many of the social and political actions of the participants in the class
and their orientation to the school.
The Myth o f Uniformity
SD: Do you still like it here [U High]? Or?
T yler: It's too small.
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SD: It's too small.
T: Yeah. So. [Pause]
SD: And that smallness bothers you because you don't get to meet
anybody new?
T: I don't know what it is. I don't know what it is. You don't get to see
what's really out there. . . .
SD: How do you think [other] schools would be different from this
school?
T: You get to be with so many different kinds o f people.
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes]
T: And to see what it's really like out there.
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes] D o you think it's kind o f left you ill-prepared for ?
T : Ah, I mean, it probably hasn't. It seems like I. You're just so
enclosed and you don’t experience the real world. So I don't know. It’s
just so sheltered. (C 3)
The final theme through which I understand this school is that of Uniformity.
Despite the stated goals of the administration, this uniformity is best reflected in the
student population in terms o f racial and class makeup, family background, appearance,
goals and classroom behavior. Most students in Ms. Hurston's class are Caucasian and
two girls are of Asian descent. This makeup is an accurate reflection of the student
population o f the high school. However, this racial makeup is far different from that
of the surrounding city. Additionally, there is a uniformity in class backgrounds of
the students. As Meredith explains, students at U High "come from, you know, middle
to upper class families." (A 274) This perception is echoed by Tyler who explained to
me, "there are no lower class families here." (C 258) It is obvious from the principal's
"Indian and Indian Chiefs" comment found in the Talking Academic section, that the
administration, like many o f the students here, is not overly familiar with working with
marginalized student populations.
But perhaps the most striking example of uniformity is in the appearance of
the students. Their styles o f dress are remarkably constant. For a large part o f the year,
most o f the class wears shorts, tee shirts, and tennis shoes. Only during the coldest part
of the winter does this uniform change to heavier clothes. Fall brought out black and
yellow U High letterman jackets. (Although these jackets seemed more for show as the
junior boys wore them in the already too warm building.) Some students always wear

80
long pants, typically jeans, but they are in a minority. On any given day the "look" of
the students in this class is extremely casual. Students who fall outside of the informal
"dress code” are "talked about." One example o f this is seen in Ms. Hurston's class,
When Brian and a classmate began to wear unusual leather sandals they were given the
nicknames o f Moses and Jesus. Tyler explains the social pressure that maintains the
uniform appearance of the students:
T yler: We all seem to be alike. That's because o f the pressure. If you
wear something different, if you wear something different, it's like
everybody talks about i t . . . . People notice that kind o f stuff. Anything a
little bit different. . . . Yeah, if you get, if you dress up, people are like
"What are you looking nice for today?" (C 260)
A fter they read the first draft of this chapter, several students expressed
dissatisfaction with the meaning they took away from this section. Priscilla, a
thoughtful junior girl, explained that the reason the students looked very similar was
due more to their shared middle-class backgrounds than the operation of some social
pressure. She reasoned, "I don't wear these polos [shirts] because somebody makes me.
I wear them because they’re comfortable. Nobody goes shopping and thinks about
what people are gonna' say." (5B 323) A brisk discussion followed her comments.
Grady explained that while Priscilla may not feel pressured, other students may. But he
went on to point out that the homecoming queen this year was a girl considered to be
the "strangest dresser in her class." (5B 323) There was no consensus drawn from this
debate, simply the notion that the social pressure operating in U High is not felt
universally.
Perhaps due to this relatively homogeneous student population, the day-to-day
activities o f the school are also characterized by uniformity. As Brian expresses, "It's
pretty much the same everyday." (B 266) While this aspect o f the school is
simultaneously bothersome to Tyler, as signified in her words which opened this
secrion, it is attractive to many of the parents which send their children here:
SD: Why did you send your children to the laboratory
school? . . .
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Brian's mother: Stability. Once a kid gets ah in there, it's like they're
part o f it and they are there as long as they chose to be. I wanted a
situation where my kids could get to feeling like they were knowing
where they were going and they had a future and it wasn't going to change
every three, four, five years or whatever. (B 306)
O ther parents remarked that they chose U High because it reminded them of the
schools of their past-small, familiar, and safe. Stephanie's parents chose to send her
here only after they were disturbed by the tall wire "cage" that surrounded a near-by
magnet school.
Perhaps it is the voice of the parents that provides the most insight into this
theme o f uniformity. The members o f U High's community are attracted to uniformity
in the face of what they perceive as the tumultuous conditions o f education found
elsewhere in the city. U High becomes to these parents a school where their children
can com plete a "top notch" education in safe, familiar surroundings. A s described by
Tyler's words:

Tyler: W e're sheltered here. I mean we have, it's like we have this one
way o f thinking. [Pause] And we're supposed to kinda' think that way.
(C 259)
Like Tyler, other students seem to struggle with the sense of Uniformity. It is
the struggle which makes the theme of Uniformity more myth than substance. When I
invited the students to select their pseudonyms that would be used in this study,
students replied with names such as Jesus, Juanita, Moses, Raistlin, and Ferde. Some
of these are the names the students used in their foreign language classes, and some
names are nicknames. But the students chose to be known in the study through these
names. I feel that this selection signifies an attempt to be seen as something other than
homogeneous and monolithic. These names are markers of the students' struggle to be
individuals.
Another marker of the students' desire to be individuals is seen in their
classroom efforts. A small group o f students does not always meet up to the standards
others expect. Meredith explains that not all students at U High are trying to obtain the
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best education possible for them. Many are willing to "come to school everyday and
you know, do nothing, or do the bare minimum." (A 273)
If some part o f my description fails to allow the reader a useful understanding
o f the students in Hurston's Biology II class, it is on the topic of student individuality.
In our discussion of an early draft o f this chapter the students' most serious concerns
had to do with this topic. As m ight be expected, they perceived the members o f their
class as being distinctly individualistic. Several students in the group pointed out that
my description failed to underscore that individuality. One student mentioned that they
each have very different personalities and personal interests. Priscilla reminded me
that while the students all have similar professional goals, they have different reasons
behind the quest for these goals. The discussion reawakened me to the knowledge that
while generalizations can be useful, they often do the analyzed group a disservice.
Summary

Principal: Ah, if you're going to be around here for a while, the kids
would pretty much look like regular kids. They’re not exceptionally
mature for their ages. . . . They don't all do the right things at the right
times. They're not all doing the best they can academically. We have a
good spread o f th a t. . . and an interesting group of kids. (P 71)
In some respects I now agree with the principal, I can see a great deal of
diversity in these students. But that recognition came only over time, after a great deal
o f study. Initially, I did view this Biology II class as a monolithic group o f smart,
ambitious, middle-class, and motivated students. But through watching the class and
talking with students, I did begin to recognize them as individuals. I can now see that
this group of individuals have some commonalties.
W hat does this group of students have in common? W hat is the culture o f this
class? Many practical im plications of that culture will be discussed in the next chapter.
But some o f the more universal characteristics include the value the students place
upon academic knowledge, academic practices, and the processes of education. Much
o f this value may actually be the result o f the students' goal o f obtaining a particular
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kind of profession as a result o f what they perceive as proper schooling. The students
value the individual in her/his attempt to gain academic knowledge, but that
individualism is tempered with a recognition of the need for the individual to make
contributions to the greater community. Students learn, but students should help others
to learn. Additionally, students are responsible for helping keep U High a place where
this optimal learning can occur.

CHAPTER 5
THE TEACHER AND HER TEACHING PRACTICES
The Teacher
The teacher's office is located off the front o f the classroom. The small office is
crowded with school material interspersed with more personal effects. The room
contains an enormous amount o f books stacked in piles on the floor, the desk, and
falling out o f over-crowded book shelves. These include a mixture o f practical biology
classroom texts and catalogues ( biological supply catalogues, G erbils. and Project
2061: Science for All Americans') interspersed with literature (such as Eco-Fiction. A
Sand Countv Almanack Then I notice the desk. It is difficult to see its surface because
of the volume o f papers it holds. On the walls surrounding the desk, pictures are
arranged showing Hurston's own children and many o f the children she has taught.
The office reflects much o f what I think of when I think o f Paula Hurston:
children, biology, entertainment, hustle. She is a woman o f diverse interests and
abilities. She feels that one of her strengths is her ability to "access a lot o f th in g s.. . . I
have the ability to pull from a lot o f different areas." (P 45) This ability to draw from
different disciplines stems, in part, from Ms. Hurston's wide educational experiences.
H er undergraduate degree was in biology and chemistry. Later, she became
simultaneously certified in science education and received her M aster's Degree in this
area. She is currently working on a second master's degree, this one in natural science,
by taking one evening course each semester.
Even while teaching and working toward a degree, Paula remains very involved
in professional organizations. She has been on the board o f the National Association o f
Biology Teachers. Associated with this organization, Paula has been the regional
coordinator and state representative for the Outstanding Biology Teaching Award and
has been involved with the long-range planning committee. She is also a member o f
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the Louisiana Science Teacher Association, and she was a founding m em ber for the
Louisiana Biological Educators. In additional to these organizations, Paula often
presents papers at professional conferences and workshops. She has participated in an
internship sponsored by the Howard Hughs M edical Institute by working with a
zoologist during the summer months. She was selected to attend an outstanding
biology teacher's symposium sponsored by National Science Foundation. She often
provides workshops in biology teaching techniques for other teachers in the parish.
More closely related to this study, she participated in an evolution education workshop,
and she attended the Evolution Education Research Conference during the year of the
study and published in the proceedings (Good et al., 1992).
When one considers all of these activities, a picture o f a very motivated, well
informed, and "driven" teacher emerges. (P 45) Ms. Hurston goes beyond the
minimum amount of work expected of her and seeks additional experiences because:

Hurston: I'm always learning something new. That's one o f the, the
exciting things, that I'm always provided the opportunity to learn about
new things, and the impetus to leam about new things, and the reason to
go and learn something new. . . . And that's what keeps me alive and
keeps my teaching from being [she moves her hand in a straight line].
(P 43)
Ms. Hurston acknowledges that she is simultaneously "laid back" and "driven."
In my observations in the classroom, she continually has a friendly demeanor. In her
discussions with students, she often sits on top of the front desk swinging her legs in a
carefree fashion. She decorates her classroom for almost all holidays, and she brings
small treats for the students, typically candy which they all quickly consume. At
Christmas she wore an elf hat and a red nose. In our many conversations, Paula is
talkative, helpful, and full o f am using stories.
It is difficult to adjust this leisurely picture with the other in which Paula is in
constant motion. But aspects o f both these portraits of Paula are there, intermingled:
the presence o f one feature making the other more effective in the classroom. How is
this constant pull sustained?
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Hurston: I’m busy enough in my own little com er o f the world that I, I
don't go out [of the classroom]. I don't sit in the lounge a lot. I just
never have got that kind o f time. . . . I have always read while I was
eating lunch. And maybe that is such an ingrained habit that I feel real
stressed out if I don't read something during the day. I do find I have to
have a little time by m yself during the day. Or I just, just really (sighs).
I love people, I like being around people, but I need a little bit of alone
time sometimes during the day to keep me mentally healthy. (P 29)
One way in which the dichotomy o f driven and being laid back asserts itself is
in Paula's fluid teaching style. She is always looking for:

Hurston: A better way to do it. I'm always changing things. So you
know, every time I leam something new, that means that goes in, and
other things get rearranged. (P 100)
All of my experiences watching Paula Hurston in the classroom made explicit
her love o f the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in the discipline o f biology:

Hurston: It's kinda neat to think that there are realms that we don't yet
understand and know about. (P 3)
She is also a woman who is firm ly com mitted to the project o f teaching:

Hurston: [Teaching] has an impact on a lot of people's lives, and you
can have a real positive influence on kids. You can impact their lives in a
lot o f ways. I like the challenge involved. There is a lot more challenge
to teaching than just about any other job I know of. (P 43)
Hurston: Teaching consumes me, it really does. I spend a tremendous
amout o f my time out of the classroom thinking about the classroom,
doing things related to the classroom, learning about things for the
classroom. (P 100)
Hurston's Teaching Philosophy
Paula Hurston's general views and beliefs about teaching are deeply rooted, and
she articulates them in a somewhat fragmented fashion. However, there are themes
which continually emerge as she talks about teaching. These themes reflect her beliefs
of effective teaching and theories of student learning.
Close Student Teacher Relationships
Ms. Hurston's first concern is maintaining a close relationship with her students.

Hurston: How do kids leam? . . . You know, I've always said that you
can't teach them anything unless you can get them on your side. That's
why I think teachers fail, because they do this big authoritarian, "You'll
learn this because I said you'll learn this." So you [the teacher] have to
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get out o f the adversary role [with the students]. W e're not adversaries,
we're on the same side. W e're working for the same thing. (P 61)
Building close relationships with her students is very important to Ms. Hurston, and
she feels that it is this skill, "the ability to see from their perspective," that she learned
from raising her own three children. (P 63)
Students' Interest
Intimately tied to this close relationship, Hurston explains that students m ust be
interested in what is studied in order to leam. Hurston feels that she too should be
interested in the topic in order to transmit that enthusiasm to the students. She "trades”
on her close relationships with students to introduce them to the topics of biology. (P
23) Additionally, she attempts to present topics in a manner that is relevant and
important to the students lives. She discusses real world applications o f biology so that
students can come to understand the value of information. Hurston understands that
real learning, "not just memorization," is fostered only in the presence o f students'
interest. (P 61)
Prior Knowledge and Developmental Level
Hurston views prior knowledge and student cognitive developm ent to be
important controlling factors o f learning.
H u rsto n : [Students] learn by experiencing it [the topic] and by tying it
to their own personal experience. They have to have a knowledge base
to base their learning on. (P 6 1 )
She adds a Piagetian twist to this Ausubelian explanation, "They learn it when they are
ready to learn it and not before." (P 61) Based on this hybrid learning theory, Hurston
explains that even for seniors, topics should be introduced from the "ground up."
H u rsto n : You've [the teacher] got to make connections for them [the students].
You can't get too simple. Labs and activities and experiences. I use the same
things with elementary school kids, middle school kids, and high school kids.
And they learn different things at different levels. I always feel like I'm judged
on how basic I can make [a topic 1. (P 61-62)
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Critical Thought
A fter watching a lesson on mitosis, Ms. Hurston spoke with the student teacher in
charge o f the presentation. She suggested that the student teacher would benefit from a
change in the focus and goals o f her teaching. Instead o f em phasizing 20 important
facts, Ms. Hurston suggested that she should em phasize a very small num ber of
important concepts, "because if you're lucky you m ight teach those two or three things."
(P 21) By decreasing her emphasis, Ms. Hurston believes this allows the students:

Hurston: to turn it around all different directions and look at
it. . . . Then they own it. Then they can do something with it. That's what
I consider to be critical thinking skills, the ability to look at it, turn it
around in all angles, and figure out what to do with it. (P 64)
Hurston's understanding o f critical thought as the goal o f instruction is very
sim ilar to the description of meaningful learning provided by Smith, Blakeslee, and
Anderson (1993). These authors define meaningful learning of science as "coming to
understand scientific ideas as they are used for their intended purposes, including
description, prediction, and explanation o f phenom ena in the natural world." ( Smith et
al., 1993, p. 111). Hurston's "figure out what to do with it" includes the applications o f
scientific knowledge as described by Smith et al. (1993). Such applications require that
the student go beyond the rote learning of material to application of that knowledge.
W hile Hurston does not use the specific term, she is teaching for meaningful learning in
her students.
Classroom Atmosphere
Toward these ends and in keeping with her close relationship with the students,
Ms. Hurston does not establish herself as the authority in her classroom. Instead she
views her role as "a facilitator, a motivator, a coach not a player." (P 49) She feels this
gives her students the greatest freedom to investigate different aspects o f a science topic.
It is through these investigations that she feels students come to "own" knowledge.
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Ms. Hurston believes that her equitable relationship with students places upon
them the responsibility for their own learning. She expects the students to be active
participants in class: she delights in a talkative, active class.
H u rsto n : I love it when they get to picking and arguing with each other
and challenging each other on a fairly serious level. (P 33)
Ms. Hurston fails to understand students who do not take part. She explains that student
side "talking doesn't bother me nearly as much as being quiet." (P 36) Because of this,
she constantly manufactures situations, laboratories, discussions, or debates that will
foster the participation o f more of her class.
Just as students are responsible for their own learning, they too are responsible
for their behavior in the classroom. Unlike many teachers, discipline is not a topic Ms.
Hurston dwells on.
H u rsto n : I guess I trade on my relationship with the kids for discipline.
Ah, they recognize that I am always fair with them, that I am always
sensitive to their problems or w h atev er.. . . And because o f that, I guess I
trade on it, in that I then expect for them to treat me fairly, and with respect.
(P 23)
She acknowledges that discipline is not a large factor for any classroom in U High. This
situation is magnified in her classroom where talking and movement are encouraged and
discipline is "not to be worried about." (P 21)
Hurston designs her classes to promote student participation. This participation
includes student interactions with materials, with the teacher, and with other students.
While such classroom activities are congruent with the conceptual change teaching
practices as described by Smith et al. (1993), the application o f the conceptual change
label to Hurston's teaching would be artificial. While fam iliar with the conceptual
change theory as described by Posner et al. (1982), Hurston did not consciously design
her teaching using this theoretical framework. But it is noteworthy to mention that
Hurston has an intuitive recognition o f the importance of student-student and studentteacher dialogues in the learning process. She recognizes that a student must relate
her/his new knowledge to pre-existing knowledge, and this relation at times requires a

90
wholesale change o f the student's prior conceptions. Hurston's teaching centers on the
effectiveness of student dialogue in this process o f change. While she does not cite
Vygotsky's social learning theory, she has a recognition that much "real” learning is a
social act. Thus, I am hesitant to label Hurston's teaching. However, many o f her
teaching practices can be understood when conceptual change is understood to be a
social construction.
Hurston's Conception o f a Good Teacher
H u rsto n : Uhm, a good teacher is just anyone who can inspire kids to care
about learning something. Ah, not necessarily in the classroom. I mean, a
good teacher is anybody who can forge the kind o f relationship with kids
that makes then either care about learning, or want to learn, or learn
something unwillingly even. You know, it's. [Sighs] It gets beyond, far,
far, far beyond content, into attitudes and you know the whole thing about
wanting to iruike people into life-long learners. Make them care about
things. Make them care about learning. Anybody who can accomplish that
is a good teacher. (P 99)
The Biology II Course
Teacher's Description of the Course
Ms. Hurston has been engaged in science education research in the past. A
portion of the students studied by Cummins (1991) were enrolled in Ms. Hurston's
Biology II course. For this earlier dissertation, Hurston wrote a description of her
course, and much of this description continues to hold true:
My major goal in planning my science course was to develop a
curriculum to meet my dual objectives o f preparing students for scientific
careers and o f developing scientific literacy in all stu d en ts.. . . The usual
Biology II course is a repeat o f biology I on a high level, an anatomy and
physiology course, or an AP biology course which is again biology I on a
higher level. They all em phasize very structured, fact-based content with
a lot o f rote memorization. A number o f researchers in science education
have decried this type o f teaching, stressing instead the need to teach
critical thinking skills, process skills, cross-disciplinary information, and
scientific literacy. The AAAS’s Project 2061 incorporates many o f the
goals which I had included in my classes, and I was very pleased to
discover the correlation. They stress understanding key concepts, being
familiar with the natural world and with technology, and having a
capacity for scientific thinking, knowing the strengths and weaknesses of
science as a human enterprise, and using scientific knowledge and way of
thinking in an interdisciplinary world. This fills the needs for both
science and non-science majors in college, and for those who don't want
to go to college as well. The National Research Council's Fulfilling the
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Promise states that "The time has com e to stop designing curricula by the
process o f serial dilution, in which the high-school course is a thin version
of the college course, and the middle-school course is a thin version of the
high school course" They suggest that the A P biology course "may not
the soundest educational experience for students" who take a second
biology course in high school. They recom mend either a course in
experimental science or what they call a "capstone" course. This course
would include several modules which would integrate science and society
issues and focus on current topics of interest. The students would brain
storm and research the problems and write reports giving alternatives,
conclusions, and recommendations. They see the benefit of this course as
"the educational reward to students in discovering interdependencies,
complexities, dilemm as, ambiguities, and the need to synthesize
information in designing solutions to society's problems" as well as
developing "skills in reading critically" and giving "understanding that
scientific inquiry is open-ended and that studying science is not simply
reading and memorizing." I was really thrilled to read this, because that
is exactly what my Biology II course is designed to do.
I began developing this course [seven] years ago. It has evolved
over the years and continues to do so, and I include some input from the
students on possible topics. The basic structure of the course includes an
exploration into what science really is and how it is carried on, including
experimental design, problem-solving activities, brainstorming, critical
reading and thinking skills, library and reference skills, and laboratory
skills and techniques. . ..
The class is rarely dull, and I'm not always sure which students
will respond to which experiences, but they all find something which
turns them on during the year. It's very important to set the tone from the
first that they can express themselves freely without fear o f being laughed
at or put down by the other students or more subtly put down by the
teacher. Sometimes the discussions get heated because they develop
rather passionate views on the issues but with little 'monitoring' hurt
feeling and anger can usually be avoided. I consider my students to be
well on their way to scientific literacy, and they love it! (Cummins, 1992,
pp. 165-172)
Hurston's Goals for the Biology II Course
Hurston explained that she used many different instructional methods because
she had several distinct goals for her students. She identified seven goals which
influenced both the scope o f her course and her teaching methods. These goals
include: (a) to expose the students to the methods and goals o f science, (b) to expose
the students to the relationship of science to other disciplines and to other aspects of
their lives, (c) to expose the students to topics o f biology they might not have
previously encountered, (d) to nurture students' interest and excitem ent in science, (e)
to make the students scientifically literate, (f) to enhance students' abilities to critically
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read, analyze, and question the findings of science, and (g) to familiarize the students
with common laboratory techniques.
Which of these goals were more important in Ms. Hurston's course? The
answer to this question varied with the unit being studied. Perhaps the two most
influential goals of this course were the development o f a sound understanding o f the
nature of science and the development of the students' abilities to think critically about
methods and findings o f science. Hurston was very concerned with helping students
construct a firm understanding of the nature o f science; that is, "the realities of how it
| science] really does work and fit into their worlds." (P 15) She also fashioned much
of her teaching around the goal of critical thought.
H urston: That's what the whole course is designed to do anyway is to
teach them how to look at things and think about them. (P 18)
Instructional Units
The course stretched over 151 days from the beginning o f school until the
seniors began their final examinations. (The course extended one week past this time
for the juniors, but this period of instruction was not included in the analysis as the
posttesting for the research had been completed.) O f the 151 days, the class was
engaged in testing during seven days. The remaining 144 days were set aside for
instruction. Approximately one and a half o f these 144 days were used in testing for
my research and student discussion o f my research.
As shown on Figure 3, there were nine m ajor instructional units in Ms.
Hurston's Biology II course. However, Hurston's instruction did not proceed directly
from one o f these major units to another. Instead, these nine units formed the skeleton
of the course, and total instruction devoted to these units included only 103 days of
instruction. The remaining instructional time was directed toward topics outside of the
instructional skeleton. These tangential topics were typically addressed through
means of a laboratory or an outside speaker. Instruction in these topics seldom

T eaching Units

Instructional E p iso d es in

Evolution
Year beginning (August 14, 1992)

Pretest

Nature of s c ie n c e

2

D inosaurs

9

Animal behavior

Animal rights

2

G en etic tech n iq u es

0

Anatom y

4

Evolution

15

Microbiology

0

Anthropology

13

Y ear end (May 6, 1993)

P osttest

Figure 3
Teaching time line: The amount o f class time spent in each m ajor teaching unit and
number o f instructional episodes in evolution
extended more than one or two days in succession. Additionally, Ms. H urston often
revisited topics weeks or months after the students' first introduction to the unit.
Figure 3 also oversim plifies Hurston's class in another way. Close
consideration of the instructional topics reveals the blending o f units. For example,
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while several days were devoted to the discussion o f the current conception o f the
nature o f science, the unit devoted to dinosaurs and theories o f dinosaur extinctions
represented another means of dem onstrating how science works. Therefore, the first
two units o f instruction were closely interwoven, and it is difficult to separate precisely
where one unit ended and the second began. With this in mind, Figure 3 can be seen as
a rough generalization o f the instructional topics o f the course and their relative time
spans. (Appendix D includes an outline o f the actual teaching materials used
throughout the school year.)
The first unit focused on the nature o f science. For five days, the students
participated in laboratories, read news articles, and watched videos. Hurston's
intention for this unit was to acquaint students with the procedures o f science, both in
experimentation and argumentation. Additionally, an analysis of pseudoscientific
topics was designed to help students begin to recognize the range and limits o f
scientific explanations.
The second unit focused on dinosaurs-their behaviors, their evolutionary
beginnings and descendants, and the various theories o f their extinction. For 10 days
the students studied dinosaurs through class discussions, videos, and readings taken
from an assortment o f books, newspapers, and science magazines. During this unit
students saw how scientific theories currently in use have undergone revisions and
modifications. This unit stressed the tentative nature of scientific theories. By the end
of the dinosaur unit, students were discussing the merits and disadvantages of many
theories still currently under debate within scientific circles. In Lemke's (1990) words,
the student were learning to "talk science." Hurston designed this section to allow
students to understand the implicit rules o f science and scientific argumentation. So
while the focus o f the unit was dinosaurs, this material provided an excellent medium
though which students could get a glimpse o f science currently "under construction."
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The material selected for this unit stressed that science is a human endeavor, often
accomplished by ordinary people who are intensely interested in a particular subject.
Throughout the year, portraying the current conception o f the nature o f science
was a guide post o f Ms. Hurston’s class. W ithin each unit, the m ethods of inquiry and
the products of that inquiry were analyzed by the class. This focal point was more
obvious in the beginning two units, but later units clearly em phasized the nature of
scientific inquiry as well (anthropology and evolution). So while the description of the
following units will not stress this focal point, the emphasis o f the nature of science
was never omitted in Hurston's teaching.
One of the last aspects of the unit on dinosaurs included readings on dinosaur
behavior. Hurston introduced students to the means scientists use to study behavior
through fossilized remains, tracks, and traces. This discussion led easily into methods
em ployed to study the behavior of living organisms. Through the use o f many videos,
journal readings, and laboratory experiences (both in the classroom, at home, and at the
local zoo), students became familiar with the practices o f the study o f animal behavior.
This unit occupied 19 days o f instructional time. While the unit on animal behavior
stressed the different methods through which primate behaviors are described, the
various theoretical bases behind the behaviors were not emphasized. Much of the
research the students studied included the voluminous work o f Jane Goodall with the
chimpanzees in Africa. Because o f the nature o f this and related research, many
students became keenly fam iliar with the basis o f primate behaviors and with humans'
relationships to the other primates.
During the animal behavior unit, class-wide discussions established that most
of the students had begun to recognize the striking parallels between the behavior of all
primates, including humans. From this common recognition, Hurston launched into
discussions of animal rights and animal conservation. This short unit lasted seven days
and was begun with a discussion of the value o f zoological parks. Several videos were
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used to portray the benefits and drawbacks o f the use of animals in experimentation.
The bulk of the unit centered on student preparation for a two-day debate in which they
had to argue for or against the use o f animals in experimentation, education, industry,
entertainment, and trapping.
The following two units were designed to prepare the students who were
planning on pre-medical college educations. The first was a unit on genetic
techniques. This six-day unit was centered on a three-day laboratory exercise in DNA
electrophoresis. Students were given prepared DNA samples which they differentiated
using gel electrophoresis. The materials for this laboratory were provided through the
university, and the students were videotaped by the local public television station as
they com pleted the laboratory exercise. Hurston related this technique to the concept
o f DNA cloning by the use of another exercise which had students participate in
"mock" preparation o f DNA clones for viral vaccines.
The anatomy unit was also designed explicitly for the many pre-medical
students. For this 10-day unit, the students participated in dissection o f a fetal pig led
by Joe Ellen, the student teacher under Hurston's instruction. Hurston explained that
this exercise allows students to gain experience in dissection and to decide if they
enjoy this type of activity. Although the students were not required to dissect, each
chose to do so. Students worked in groups of three as they dissected several organ
systems. The students were responsible for the anatomy o f these organ systems but not
their physiology. The unit culminated in a laboratory practical and journal entry.
Evolution was the next unit following anatomy. Because Hurston's instruction
in evolution is a focus of this study, this unit will be described in much greater detail in
a following section.
The unit of microbiology techniques required 21 instructional days and was the
longest unit of the course. Although this was a fairly com prehensive laboratory
treatment of microbiology, only laboratory techniques were stressed; other aspects of
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the discipline were not addressed. During this unit students gained many o f the
laboratory skills they would need in a college course in microbiology, including media
preparation, sterile transfer technique, slide preparation and staining, and bacterial
culturing practices. They also complete a series o f tests on a group o f stock cultures.
These data were used by each laboratory group in the identification o f a bacterial
unknown which was the culmination of this unit. Hurston views this as an important
unit because college microbiology courses often do not allow students ample time to
refine their laboratory skills. She has designed this unit to allow her students a "head
start" in this area. The identification of the unknown required the students to use
reasoning skills to determine one answer based on their voluminous data.
The unit on anthropology comprised the final 15 days o f instruction. Again,
this was a laboratory intensive unit, focusing on the methods o f physical anthropology
as they are used to explain tentative evolutionary relationships o f early humans.
Students learned techniques which enabled them to determine the gender, age, and
approximate size of an individual based upon measurements taken from skull and
skeleton. The students also learned the applications physical anthropology has for
forensic science, and they visited two forensic laboratories in the area. The unit
culminated with the students proposing a human lineage based on four skulls by using
both the techniques and theories they learned throughout this section.
As m entioned previously, while Figure 3 shows the nine major units of
instruction, many other topics were addressed in the class. A scientist from the
university visited for three days and helped the students with a neurophysiology
laboratory. The students learned the basics of the physiology of vision through another
laboratory experience. The topic o f human behavior was addressed through a set of
readings, and the students were responsible for com pleting their own experiments in
this area. Throughout the year, the Ms. Hurston continued to emphasize the methods
used in science through a series of laboratories designed to explain the fundamental
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principles o f scientific sampling, control groups, and data analysis. Even though nine
major units of instruction were identified, many more topics were addressed in a more
limited or fragmented fashion.
Instructional Methods
Ms. Hurston's instruction is very student centered, with the students expected to
take an active role in the instruction on an almost daily basis. In a randomly selected
sample o f 20 instructional days, the main lesson activity relied on small group work for
55% of the days, the main lesson activity relied on individual group work for 30% of
the days, and the main lesson activity relied on whole group work for 15% o f the days.
These statistics are congruent with Hurston’s description o f the course as "an
exploration into what science is and how it is carried on." (Cummins, 1992, p. 172)
While she emphasized small group work, Hurston used several methods of
teaching in her Biology II course. On any given day, typically two or three teaching
methods were employed.
H urston: I’ve got so many different goals and things that I want to, to
accomplish with the kids that I bounce around from thing to thing just
trying to accomplish different goals. You know, I don't see anything
wrong with being somebody different everyday. (P 49)
However, some methods were used more frequently than others, and the most
common or prominent teaching methods will be discussed in this section. Table
4 compares the most prominent instructional methods and their frequency of use.
Class Discussions
If we consider discussions to include any oral treatment of a topic, whole class
discussions were used virtually every class day. This frequency is not reflected in the
statistics for the main lesson activity because these statistics reflect only the main
activity for a day. While discussions were rarely the main lesson activity for an
instructional day, they were frequently employed by Hurston. The average whole class
discussion was eight minutes in length and typically five or six short, whole class
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discussions were held per week. Occasionally discussions were omitted from class
activities, but only when an activity was continued from a previous day.
Table 4
Type and amount o f use o f the most prominent instructional methods in the
Biology II course

Instructional Method

Number o f Uses

Audio-visual Presentations

20

Discussions

5 or 6/week

Examinations

4

Journal Entries

10

Laboratories

47

Readings

18

The most common discussions held in Ms. Hurston's room included teacher
exposition, structured triadic dialogue, loose triadic dialogue, and student cross
discussions. These categories are taken from Lemke's (1990) analysis o f science
classroom discourse. In this analysis, Lemke (1990) describes teacher expositions as
an explanation given in the form of a monologue. In a triadic dialogue, the teacher
asks a question, calls on a student to answer the question, and then proceeds to
evaluate the
student's answer. For the purposes o f Ms. Hurston's class, I have further divided
triadic dialogue into structured and loose categories. A structured triadic dialogue has
several steps:
(a) the teacher asks a question,
(b) the student gains the teacher's attention either through raising hands or
calling out,
(c) the teacher recognizes the student,
(d) the student calls out the answer, and
(e) the teacher com ments/evaluates the student's answer.
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For the purposes o f my study, a loose triadic dialogue may have only steps a and b.
The more formal steps are omitted in this type o f discussion. The final common
discussion in Ms. Hurston's classroom was a student cross discussion. In this
exchange, the students speak directly to one another in reference to the class material
with the teacher acting as a moderator or as an equal participant in the discussion.
The most commonly used type o f discussion was a loose triadic dialogue.
Although this type o f discussion is informal, these discussions were often very
successful in providing a comprehensive treatment of the topic The success o f these
discussion was due to a high degree of student participation and engagement. Hurston
felt her classes were very active in this type of discussion because of the friendly
classroom atmosphere in which students could "express themselves freely without fear
o f being laughed at or put down" by the teacher (Cummins, 1992, p. 172).
The structured triadic dialogue was used less frequently by Ms. Hurston. This
more formal activity type was used infrequently, normally during periods o f low
student engagement, (e.g., on the Friday of Homecoming). Hurston used this activity
in an effort to focus students on the material under discussion. On the occasions when
Hurston felt constrained into using this formal structure, she explicitly asked the class
the source o f their distraction. They would talk briefly about this, (e.g., a very difficult
test in another class), and then the discussion would revert back to biology.
Hurston used a teacher exposition format of discussion to present procedural
information for a laboratory or other exercise in the beginning of a class period.
However, even within these guarded conditions, Hurston’s monologue often changed
rapidly into a structured triadic dialogue. An exam ple of this change was seen in her
presentation of the working o f an autoclave in the microbiology laboratory. Hurston
began the explanation using straight exposition which required no input from the
students. Within three minutes o f this presentation, Hurston soon changed the format
asking questions such as:
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W here would I put the water?
What's the water for?
W hat’s the steam for? (F 504)
Once again, we see Hurston's attempts to remove herself from a position o f extreme
authority in the classroom while she engages the students in the classroom
presentation.
The final commonly used discussion strategy was student cross discussions.
These cross discussions involved students responding directly to another student in a
whole class discussion. Often, these cross discussions would take the form of one
student arguing with a point made by another student. These debates have been
described in the earlier section on classroom culture. In the cross discussions, Hurston
served as a moderator, ensuring that the participants' comments could be heard by the
entire class. The following is an example o f a student cross discussion/debate:

Hurston: W hat did you think o f Jane Goodall's video ["So Like Us"]?
Grady: It was a side show. She choreographed the whole thing to fit her
little script.

Calvin: Yeah, she did that a little. But she also showed that the chimps
can feel what we feel.
Bob: But can they? Can they feel what we feel?
Philip: I don't think we should be [slowly] anthropomorpholizing [sic]
them.
Hurston: What?
Philip: I don't think we should be [slowly] anthropomorphizing them.
Calvin: I wonder if they can think ahead? Can they plan things like?
Priscilla: Yeah, we say that. I mean they showed that the gorilla could.
(F 197)
The significance of this discussion is that students were addressing one another, not
Hurston. This was a true cross discussion, with the students in an equal position of
authority as the teacher. Lemke (1990) remarks that teachers "often will tolerate
student cross discussion, but they do not encourage it." (Lemke, 1990, p. 56) This
statement is not true o f Hurston class. Instead, she designs her teaching to nurture
these moments.
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Hurston's use o f discussions reflect her goal o f nurturing critical thought in her
students, her emphasis o f the procedures o f science, and her reluctance to be the "class
authority" on a topic. Loose triadic dialogues allow students to quickly suggest
answers and remove Hurston as the focus o f the classroom. The prominence of student
cross discussion reflects the same tendency toward a student centered/controlled
approach to dealing with course material.
Types o f discussion questions
The most frequent type o f question asked by Hurston during discussions was
open-ended questions which could have many correct answers. Some examples of
Hurston's questions include:
W hat does the first article tell you about how scientists work?
(F 40)
W hat does paleontology tell us about science? (F 61)
W hat evidence is used for classifying organisms? W hat about DNA? (F 96)
Should we institute a genetic screening program at our hospital?
(F 359)
If I want to know how many meal worms I have in this pan, how do I find out?
(F 312)
The reliance on open-ended questions differentiates Hurston's class from many
other science classrooms w here students are required to recite definitions and factual
information. Like her reliance on loose triadic dialogues, the use of this questioning
strategy also allows Hurston's students a greater control o f classroom material. These
questions also allow students a greater freedom to use reasoning strategies instead of
rote learning strategies in the formation of their answers. However, Smith et al. (1993)
describe open-ended questions as improbable vehicles for eliciting conceptual change.
These authors argue that open-ended questions do not provide an opportunity for
students to contrast their alternative conceptions with a more scientifically accurate
counterpart.
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Discussion participants
Discussions in Hurston's class had a core o f diligent participants. Four of the
junior boys, Calvin, Philip, Bob, and Raistlin, could always be relied upon to
participate in a discussion. Two additional boys, Brian and Jesus, would volunteer
information if the correct answer was not immediately forthcoming or if the discussion
began to grow tiresome for the rest of the class. These six boys carried the bulk of all
class-wide discussions. If the topic was particularly interesting, another group would
offer responses or ask additional questions. This small group included junior and
senior boys and girls. While discussion were active in Hurston's class, not all students
participated in the conversations. However, most students appeared to be engaged in
the material as it was discussed; they turned their heads to watch the speaker and
occasionally nodding in approval.
During a sampling of 18 different class discussions, 68% o f the total class
comments were offered by boys, and 3% of the total class com ments were offered by
girls.^ These comments took the form of answers or questions offered in whole class
discussions. These figures correspond to my preliminary assessm ent that the boys,
particularly the juniors, were much more active in whole class discussions. The
differential participation becomes more striking when one considers that there were
more girls in the class than boys. When I asked Tyler, a senior girl, about my
observations, she commented:
SD: I've noticed that typically girls just don't talk a lot in [Ms. Hurston’s
class].

2 My analysis of the effects o f gender in the classroom is both superficial and
brief. This state is regrettable in light of the pronounced effects gender had in
classroom participation. After my initial observations, data collection, and interviews
focusing on this topic, however, it became obvious that I was ill-equipped to tease out
the meaning classroom participation, student power structures, and gender relations had
for my participants. Therefore, I chose to report my initial findings while
acknowledging that the gender of my participants played a role in learning I have not
yet come to understand.
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Tyler: Uh, uh. [Yes] It's cause the guys overpower everybody in that
class.
SD: Is that really what you think?
Tyler: Yes. Because they don't give you a chance. I've, I've, I used to
want to say a lot of stuff. And I would start saying and every time one of
those guys would ju st blurt out
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes]
Tyler: and I just give up. I don't talk anymore. (C 187)
Tyler's comments should be compared to comments made by Brian (a junior
boy) and Stephanie (a senior girl). Both o f these students had noticed that most o f the
questions were answered by a nucleus of boys, but they explained that this differential
participation had to do more with the different personalities o f the class members than
any action of gender. Stephanie went on to explain that she will offer answers when
she has something "new" to offer to the class. Other than this, however, she will
remain quiet in all o f her classes.
Differences in class participation between genders has been researched by
many science educators. I was unable to investigate the hypothesis offered by Brian
and Stephanie that students talked more or less frequently because of their personalities
and not because of their genders. However, I did attend an English class taken by
many of these same students, to see if the differential participation was due more to the
subject than some other factor. The same trend held true in English; more boys
volunteered information than girls. Based on the stable cross discipline results, the
differential participation may be due more to general cultural influences than the action
of a subject area.
Linn (1987) suggests that many aspects of the gender differences seen in
science classes are due to the varied experiences of girls and boys both in and out of
the science classroom. She explains that many girls have fewer experiences dealing
with science-related topics out of school, and this differential experience accounts for
the acceleration of boys in science. However, during my observations it became
obvious that many girls knew the correct answers during whole class discussions, but
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chose not to give voice to their knowledge. W hat is at issue is not a difference in the
declarative knowledge of boys and girls, but a difference in their willingness to
participate in whole group activities. It is here that past experiences may play a role in
shaping the discussion behaviors of girls.
Laboratories
An analysis of the class reveals that it is heavily laboratory oriented. During
the year, Hurston used 47 laboratories in her class. For the purposes o f this study, a
biological laboratory exercise is defined as an opportunity for experimentation and
observations o f some aspect o f living organisms or practice o f a experimental
technique. (A list of the laboratories can be found in section 1 o f Appendix D.)
Hurston selected the laboratories based on the "extended discretion” approach
(Leonard, 1980). Using this approach, the laboratories assigned early in the school
year have pre-established procedures. Laboratories assigned later require the students
to make more and more decisions in the structure of the laboratory. Hurston's goal was
to have the students become able to plan and carry out their own laboratory
investigations. She used the extended discretion approach as a means o f "getting way
from the cook-book lab. You give them less and less guidance, and they have to figure
things out for them selves.” (P 2)
Virtually all of these laboratory exercises were completed by the students in
small groups during class hours. However, during the unit on animal behavior, three of
the laboratories were com pleted by individual students after school hours, and another
exercise was completed by the students a field trip to a local zoo. Only three units
were not accompanied by laboratories; these included units on dinosaurs, evolution,
and animal rights. But it m ust be remembered that these three units only accounted for
only 26 of the total 143 instructional days.
The typical laboratory exercise would begin with the students being assigned to
read the laboratory instructions the night before the exercise. The next day there would
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be a short teacher exposition/triadic dialogue which would further explain the
laboratory procedures. Afterwards, the students would divide into small groups of three
to four members. The small groups, selected by the students, typically consisted of
students o f both genders, and the group members remained relatively constant
throughout the school year. During the laboratory, Hurston and Joe Ellen remained
available for students' questions. Laboratory questions were predominately of a
procedural nature as the students attempted to carry out the exercise. Students were
required to turn in a set o f questions or a laboratory report completed individually at
the beginning o f the next class day. Afterwards, the exercise would be discussed in the
form o f a loose triadic dialogue.
H urston’s reliance on laboratories as a teaching method is congruent with her
course goals o f developing (a) a sound understanding o f the nature o f science, (b) the
ability to think critically about methods and findings o f science, and (c) a familiarity
with common laboratory techniques. Hurston also describes the laboratory experience
as an ideal method in capturing students' interest in the practice of biology.
Videos and Associated M edia
Hurston's teaching during several units was dependent on the use o f videos and
other audio-visual media. Hurston used 20 audio-visual presentations as the main
lesson activities throughout the school year. (A list o f the audio-visual presentation
can be found in section 3 o f Appendix D.)
Typically the audio-visual presentation would be preceded by a short teacher
monologue. Often, Hurston would stop the presentation to ask the whole class a
question. Hurston expected students to pay attention during these presentations. For
example, if she found a particular student's attention to be wavering, she would lightly
touch the student on the shoulder or whisper in her/his ear. The following day the
video would be discussed in a whole class setting. On three occasions, the students
were asked to write a short essay related to the contents o f a video presentation.
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Several units were structured heavily around audio-visual activities. These
units included dinosaurs, animal behavior, animal rights, and evolution. Hurston found
videos to be an effective means o f presenting a great deal o f very current information
to her students. She explained that students can often leam a great deal from such
presentations as long as appropriate means are selected to ensure their attention. It is
her opinion that this method has the additional advantage of capturing students'
attention in a generation that is heavily influenced by the media.
Readings
Because there was not a traditional text used in H urston's course, much o f the
material was presented in the form o f laboratory exercises, audio-visual presentations,
and student readings. Most the 18 articles the students were assigned to read were
taken from scientific publications designed for the public, such as D iscover. Other
articles were taken from science teaching journals, such as The Science Teacher, and
selected essays on natural history, such as Natural A cts. A small number of articles
were selected from newspapers and tabloids. (For a list o f the readings, see section 2
in Appendix D.)
M ost articles were assigned to be read as homework. The following day
Hurston would lead a whole class discussion o f the article or the students would be
asked to respond to the topic in the form of a journal entry. Other class periods
consisted o f students selecting articles from publications such as National G eographic.
Discover, and O m ni. The students were to read articles they found interesting and to
give a summary of these to the entire class. In this way, Hurston found students could
be exposed both to many different types o f current scientific research and their co
worker's interest in such topics. In other cases, Hurston would read a particularly
compelling article aloud to the class. She took this approach with some of the passages
from Jane Goodall's book, Though a W indow, and a short story by Isaac Asimov, "The
W innowing." Almost all readings were discussed in a whole group setting. These
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discussions often became detailed and combative, with students arguing different
points made by the authors.
Hurston relied upon these outside readings because, unlike a text-book, they
provided her the freedom to select topics not previously addressed in the students' prior
biology classes. This freedom allowed her to select interesting topics and to address
these topics with articles that she had found to be personally useful. Hurston also
selected articles based upon their degree of difficulty and sophistication. Student
readings were selected to achieve the goals o f understanding the science content,
enhancing interest, understanding the nature o f scientific processes, and perfecting
critical reading skills.
Student Journals
Ten student journal writing assignments were made during the school year.
(For a list o f these assignments, see section 4 in Appendix D.) Each assignments was
designed to aid students’ skills in written communication. Hurston explained that
journal entries require that the students go beyond simple rote learning to critically
analyze or apply scientific theories. Additionally, journal entries require students to
integrate information from several different sources.
Additional Activities
After Christmas break, the students were required to turn in a report o f a
science fiction book. In the report, the students were expected to summarize the book
and analyze the science in the book in terms o f its accuracy, plausibility, and scientific
authenticity. Students also were to describe the social or moral implications of the
book.
Hurston had several ideas in mind as she assigned the book report. She hoped
to spark some students' interest in science through their pre-established love of reading.
She wanted to provide an opportunity for students to integrate and apply their
knowledge of science in an unusual setting. M ost importantly, Hurston hoped her
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students would see the connection science has to other disciplines, such as English,
politics, mathematics, and economics. This teaching practice thus satisfied one of her
course goals.
In relation to the goal o f recognizing the relationship o f science to other aspects
o f students’ lives, Hurston placed a Farside cartoon on the overhead at the beginning of
each day. While this cartoon served as an "attention getter" and provided a light
hearted topic with which to begin class, she also felt that these cartoons allowed
student to begin to recognize "the science in common, ordinary, everyday things." (P
48)
Assessment
The students received many grades in Hurston's Biology II course, many more
than they received in most of their other classes. Semester grades were determined
from journal entries, laboratory reports, class presentations, laboratory and class
participation, and examinations. There were only four examinations administered in
this course. The first semester had an exam given after the first quarter o f classes, an
examination on the pig dissection, and a semester final examination. The second
semester had only the final exam.
The examination questions reflect much of Hurston's teaching philosophy and
goals. (See Appendix E for a summary of examination questions.) Hurston's felt that a
student's performance on a test should not radically alter her/his course grade. Instead,
the student's grade was mainly determined by the student's daily performance in class.
Hurston's questions did not require students to respond with factual information;
instead they required applications of known laboratory procedures, synthesis of
theories learned during the course, and critical reflection on the content and methods of
scientific inquiry. The sole exception to this trend was seen in the anatomy laboratory
practical prepared by the student teacher.

Teaching Evolution
Hurston views evolution to be the m ajor theoretical framework of biology. As
such, the theory o f evolution was a fundamental theme o f her Biology II course. This
prominence is reflected in her choice o f instructional units for the course. The theory
of evolution is the essential com ponent of the instructional topics o f dinosaurs and
anthropology. Further, only two units, genetic techniques and microbiology, had no
specific mention of evolution in their instruction. With the exception o f these two
units, instruction in evolution was integral to all course instruction. (See Appendix F
for specific details of the instruction in evolution.)
Evolution was taught as a distinct teaching unit at the beginning o f the second
semester. This unit was taught intermittently during 10 days, and a large portion of this
time included instruction into the various forms of evidence which supports
evolutionary theory as well as the patterns of evolution seen in the natural world. The
forms o f evidence stressed by Hurston included microfossils, fossils, and the
explanation of physical processes as the source of recurring, natural patterns.
As mentioned previously, other units relied heavily on evolution as their
theoretical basis or in their application. These instructional units included dinosaurs,
animal behavior, and anthropology. The theory of evolution is inherent to the study of
dinosaurs. The dinosaur unit required the students to analyze the various theories of
dinosaur extinction, as well as the proposed relationships o f dinosaurs with the reptiles
and birds. Likewise, evolution is inherent in the study o f anthropology as human
relationships with other primates are investigated. The evolutionary relationship of
humans to other primates was also investigated by the students in the unit on animal
behavior. It should be pointed out that this emphasis is not necessarily implicit in the
study o f ethology. Instead, Hurston's selection of primates as her class' main study
group made evolution a fundamental aspect o f this instructional unit as students sought
to apply the results of research.
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As suggested by the National Research Council (1990), instruction in evolution
was interwoven throughout the course. Aside from the formal unit, there were 36
instructional episodes in evolution. An instructional episode in evolution is used to
refer to any instructional event which focused on or referred to some aspect of
evolutionary theory. The Biology II course had a total o f 51 instructional episodes in
evolution. O f these 51, 36 episodes were designed specifically to address some aspect
o f evolutionary theory. The remaining episodes simply mentioned some aspect of
evolutionaiy theory during the instruction o f another biological topic. Figure 3
represents the position of each instructional episode o f evolution during the semester.
(See Appendix F for a detailed chart o f each instructional episode.)
Aspects o f Evolutionary Theory Addressed
Figure 4 represents the most common aspects o f evolutionary theory addressed
in the course. As shown in Figure 4, many segments o f the broad theory o f evolution
were the subject o f instruction, including: (a) historical aspects, (b) evidence for
evolution, (c) evolutionary relationships, (d) patterns o f evolution, and (e) aspects of
evolutionary explanations. An analysis o f the instructional topics revealed that no
single segment stands out as the most prominent focus of instruction.
Hurston's instructional approach to evolution is o f particular interest. As seen
in Appendix F, the mechanisms of evolution were not em phasized by Hurston.
Traditional biology classes stress knowledge o f mechanisms and om it other aspects of
evolutionary theory. Instead, Hurston taught evolution much like she taught the rest
o f her class by stressing knowledge about the theory instead o f the actual mechanism
o f the theory. Hurston's course emphasized the (a) application of evolutionary theory
to diverse biological realms (including an emphasis on humans as evolving
organisms), (b) the plethora o f evidence found in the natural world for evolution, and

•H istorical aspects o f present evolutionary theory
Darwin
Galapagos
Lamarck
•Scientific evidence for evolution
Fossil evidence
G eological changes
Natural patterns
•Processes o f evolution
Mechanisms
Natural selection

G enetic D rift

Sexual selection

Rate o f evolution
Gradualism

Punctuated equilibrium

Saltation

•Patterns o f evolution
A daptive radiation
C onvergence
D ivergence
Human (primate) evolution
•Evolutionary relationships
D inosaurs and reptiles
D inosaurs and birds
Humans and other primates
Species concepts
T axonom y
•A spects o f evolutionary explanations
Anthropom orphism
How versus W hy questions
Limits o f scientific explanations
T eleology

Figure 4
Aspects o f evolutionary theory addressed in instruction
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(c) the means through which evolutionary explanations (as well as all scientific
theories) can be applied.
Hurston devoted only four instructional episodes toward an examination of
evolutionary processes. Three o f these episodes were discussions, and the fourth was a
student reading of "Evolution since Darwin" (Rensberger, 1982). One o f the three
discussions centered on this article and occupied an entire class session.
Instructional Methods Used in Evolution Instruction
Table 5 shows the various instructional methods em ployed by Ms.
Hurston in teaching evolution. O f interest here is the prominence of discussion
as an instructional method. Evolution (emphasizing the mechanisms o f
evolutionary processes) is the sole topic in which Ms. Hurston devoted an entire
class session to discussion. There were com monalities between the three
instructional episodes in which evolutionary processes were addressed. Each was
a triadic dialogue, in which Hurston asked very specific questions of her
students and commented on their answers. As Smith et al. (1993) explain, a narrowly
defined question is a more appropriate method for eliciting conceptual change.
Through these dialogues, students are more likely to compare their conceptions with
those o f science than they would be in Hurston's loosely structured dialogues based on
open-ended questions. The following is an example of the discussions held during the
unit of evolution:

Hurston: Do we normally have nonrandom mating?
[No answ er from the class)
H: In any population, not just humans? Any population, animals or
whatever? Is there normally random mating?
Joe: Yes.
H: You think animals mate randomly?
J: Yes.
H: Then why do we have sexual dimorphism?
J: W hat's that?
H: Sexual dim orphism is when there is a different characteristic between
male and female, and we have sexual selection on the basis of those
characteristics.
J: Not many things do that.
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H: Why do we have all brightly colored birds and big peacock tails and
all
J:
P:
J:
P:
J:
P:

this sort o f things?
Reproduction.
Reproduction. Random mating?
W ell, mammals don't do that.
Do what?
Have big feathers and all.
Ah, I see. How about the big antlers and all? (F 458)

The com parison o f students' conceptions with scientific conceptions is a necessary
condition for promoting conceptual change. It is significant that
Table 5
The number of instances in which instructional methods were used in teaching
evolution

Instructional Method

Number o f Instances

Audio-visual Presentation

6

Cartoon

2

Discussions

21

Examinations

3

Journal Entry

5

Laboratory

3

Reading

6

Student Presentation

1

W orksheet/Questions

5

triadic dialogues allowing such comparisons were most prominent when the actual
mechanisms o f evolutionary change were addressed.
Other means through which the mechanisms o f evolution were addressed was
through student reading and a whole class discussion o f a reading. Hurston assigned
the Science 82 article entitled, "Evolution since Darwin," early in the second semester
(Rensberger, 1982). In this article, Rensberger compares the basic tenants with
Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection to the theories currently
employed by science. He also provides a very general explanation for the new
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synthesis created by the linkage of genetics and evolutionary theory. This article is
brief and written in very informal terms. However, in the four pages, the author
provides a historical view o f the changes o f evolutionary theory, discusses current
controversies that exist within this framework, and describes various theories o f the
scientists working within this framework.
Four days after the reading assignment, the whole class discussed this article.
Discussion took the form of a structured triadic dialogue. Through her questioning,
Hurston em phasized both the mechanisms described in the article and the newer
theories that exist within the theoretical framework of evolution. This discussion
included the mechanisms of natural selection and genetic isolation in their relation to
speciation. This discussion also included the broader evolutionary theories of
gradualism, saltation, and punctuated equilibrium. The new synthesis was also
explained by the students under the direction of Hurston's questions.
(For more detailed information on the instructional methods used for instruction
in evolution, see Appendixes D and F.)
Student Evaluation
As Tobias (1990) points out, students often interpret the material em phasized on
an examination to be the material actually valued by the instructor. When Hurston's
examinations are reviewed, it becomes evident that Hurston understands evolution to
be the major theoretical basis for biology. On each o f the three major exam inations, at
least one question dealt with some aspect of evolution. (One question typically carried
25% of the grade.) (See Appendix E for a list o f the exam questions.)
Sum m arv-'Thinking Skills in the Context of Biology"
In our casual discussions, Hurston often described a difference she perceives
between memorizing science and learning science. She explained that, "if you cannot
apply information, then it is useless." (P 65) She explains that her course is designed
to:
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Hurston: teach them how to look at things and think about them. I
[stress] thinking skills in the context of biology. Hopefully at the end of
[this course] they will be interested enough in biology to want to continue
learning about the content o f biology. And ah, they will know how to do
that on their own if necessary. So that, whatever com es up that involves a
biology issue, they will be literate enough to understand, appreciate, make
commitments or choices. (P 19)
Hurston's course stressed what Dushl (1990) refers to as "knowledge about science"that is "knowledge of both why science believes what it does and how science has
com e to think that way- instead o f "scientific knowledge"-that is the factual
information which results from the process o f science (p. 10). Looking over Hurston’s
course, one might argue that often the knowledge about science was stressed to the
partial exclusion o f scientific knowledge. To this, Hurston has argued that this course
is designed to be a capstone course, one which allows students an opportunity to leam
the procedural knowledge of science. Knowledge of the scientific procedures allows
them the opportunities to apply their declarative knowledge o f the discipline.
While the strong laboratory com ponent dem onstrated in Hurston's course might
invite the label of the course as a "hands-on" approach, I would use Duschl's term of
"minds-on." Hurston's Biology II course allowed her students to construct the
procedural knowledge the students need to fully understand the discipline o f biology.
Toward the end o f the school year, a senior girl gave this assessment o f the course:

Meredith: I've enjoyed it [the course], and I think the things we've done
were will certainly benefit ah help me
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes]
M: in the future. You know it's not, it's not like some classes where you
forget everything you've learned you know?
SD: Okay, so ahm you don't think that’s gonna happen with this?
M: Na, ah. [No]
SD: I wonder why?
M: I just, I think it's the way, ah the way she teaches. A lot, you know
that you don't, you don't do ah writing down definitions from the book and
memorize them and spit them back out on a test.
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes]
M: It's not that kind of course. (A 302)
As suggested by Lemke (1990), Hurston structured her class to provide ample
opportunity for students to talk and write about science. Although she used triadic
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dialogues frequently, in her class these were informal affairs requiring student
participation and allowing for more student control over the material being presented.
Her course included many laboratory experiences for the students. Like her
discussions, the laboratory experiences were designed, not to transmit large amounts of
information, but to foster student questioning o f course material.
As reflected by her instructional methods, Hurston informally recognizes
learning to be a social process, and her classes are designed to nurture student
interaction and participation in the language and processes o f science. A close
examination of her instructional methods reveals that many do not conform to the
description of conceptual change teaching strategies as described by Smith et al.
(1993). Hurston depended heavily upon open-ended questions which could have many
correct answers during the initiation o f class discussions. She also fostered student
debate in her classrooms. Smith et al. (1993) suggest that such questioning strategies
do not promote conceptual change because students are not required to compare their
prior conceptions with those o f science.
In her effort to elicit student participation and to foster students' interest,
Hurston stressed participation in scientific conversations over the declarative
knowledge of science. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to label Hurston's teaching as
based on the theoretical base o f conceptual change. Hurston's teaching stressed the
application of biological theories. In her class, students were expected to apply
theories they had studied during the present and previous classes. While students were
not drilled on the content o f theories, they were expected to apply these theories to
diverse biological phenomena. The application o f theories for explanation and
prediction is a necessary com ponent of the development of a greater scientific
understanding (Anderson & Roth, 1989).
If Hurston's class did not explicitly stress the comparison o f students' theories
with those o f science, her teaching methods did provide a climate in which students felt

comfortable in voicing and exploring their personal understandings of biological
phenomena. Once again, it becom es evident that Hurston's class is designed around
promoting the social construction o f knowledge. Like the conceptual change programs
designed by science educators, Hurston understands learning to occur in an open,
interactive classroom community.
In teaching evolution, as in her course as a whole, Hurston's teaching required
students to (a) apply aspects o f evolutionary theory, (b) compare and com ment on the
merits o f various theories within the framework of evolution, and (c) reflect upon the
links o f evolutionary theory to other aspects o f biology. Hurston did not stress the
mechanisms o f evolution as much as she did their application. Students were expected
to discuss implications of evolutionary theory in whole group discussions, small group
work, and written reports. This socially based approach answers Settlage's (1992) call
for application o f instructional conversations in the instruction o f evolution. While she
did not use conceptual change teaching techniques when teaching evolution, the
instructional conversations which occurred in classroom discussions were necessary
tools in promoting the conceptual growth o f her students.

CHAPTER 6
DESCRIPTION OF CONCEPTUAL CHANGE IN EVOLUTION
Introduction
In Chapter 6, the final results and discussion chapter, the patterns o f conceptual
change are reported. This description proceeds in an individual fashion as the
conceptual change o f the class and each o f the four interview participants is
independently detailed. Data for each of these five sources are reported, and individual
trends are tied into the literature. Not until the summary for this chapter are cross
participant patterns outlined and discussed in light of current conceptual change
literature and the teaching practices of the participating teacher. This comparison may
be the most interesting to the reader as the more salient aspects o f the findings are
discussed. The summary section begins on page 272 and is continued in the
conclusions and implications chapter (Chapter 7).
The Class
The conceptions of members of the entire class are reported as a reference for
the results o f the four interview participants; they provide some insight as to the normal
patterns of conceptual change of students who were not interviewed on a semi-weekly
basis. Because the conceptual change o f the class is not a m ajor research focus, these
data are reported briefly, and their implications for teaching are fully discussed at the
end of this chapter.
The Use o f Scientific Conceptions for Evolution
The pre- and posttest conceptions o f all o f the students were measured using the
Bishop and Anderson exam (1985). When the results o f this instrum ent are scored
using the criteria developed by Bishop and Anderson (1985), the number of students
who hold a scientific conception are determined. Three conceptual issues central to an
understanding of the process of evolution by natural selection are examined in this
scoring method. These issues include:
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(a) the origin and survival of new traits,
(b) the role of variation within the population, and
(c) the nature of evolutionary changes within a population.
O f the three conceptual issues, fewer students used the scientific conception for
the origin o f variation than the other two conceptual issues.
(Table 6 is a comparison o f the pre- and posttest findings.) In comparison to a study
conducted on the neighboring university campus by Demastes et al. (in press), a greater
percentage of students in Hurston's biology class used the scientific conception of
mutations as the source o f new variation upon entering a nonmajor's biology course
than college students.
Table 6
Comparison o f the percentage of students holding a scientific conception on pre- and
posttest
Pretest
(N=22)
14

Posttest
(N=21)
43

Role of variation within the
population

63

42

Nature of evolutionary change
in a population

45

38

Conceptual Issue
Origin and survival of
new traits

When the second and third conceptual issues are examined, a relatively high
percentage of Hurston's students were found to use a scientific conception for these
issues during pretesting. These figures are surprising when they are compared to
similar figures from the Demastes et al. (in press) study where no more than 17% of the
college students used a scientific conception for either conceptual issue. Bishop and
Anderson (1990) report that no more than 31% o f their students exhibited the use of
any scientific conception for these three issues. These findings demonstrate that many
students in Ms. Hurston's biology class had a sound understanding o f one or more of
these issues as they entered the class even though they did not understand all the central
issues in how evolution is mechanized.

121
As Table 6 demonstrates, the early promise of these students was not retained
upon posttesting. While there was a large gain in the num ber of students using a
scientific conception for the origin o f variation, the percentages decreased for the other
two conceptual issues. Although each of these posttest figures is higher than those
reported for the college students in Demastes et al. (in press), this study documents an
overall declining percentage o f students using a scientific conception for two o f the
conceptual issues. Such a declining percentage has not been reported in other similar
studies.
Patterns o f Conceptual Change
One of the drawbacks of using the Bishop and Anderson (1985) method of
scoring is that only students' use o f scientific conceptions is measured; it does not
reflect their use of alternative conceptions for a conceptual issue. Because of this,
many patterns of conceptual change which may be occurring are masked. In order to
learn more from the pre- and posttest, a scoring method described by Demastes and
Good (1993) was employed. In this method, students' conceptions are categorized and
analogous pre- and posttest conceptions are compared so the pathway of conceptual
change can be described. The scoring system documents the most prominently-used
conceptions for three conceptual groups in a conceptual framework of evolution. (A
conceptual group refers to all of the conceptions which refer to the same phenomenon.)
Students' Conceptual Frameworks
When the students' conceptions were categorized using the Demastes and Good
(1993) scoring method, these conceptions were found to be very similar to those
described in a variety o f similar studies (Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Demastes & Good,
1993; Settlage, in press).

Similar to Bishop's and Anderson's (1990) evolutionary

issues, the three conceptual groups described in this study included (a) the species
concept, (b) the unit o f evolutionary change, and (c) the origin o f variation.

Comparisons of the students holding conceptions in each o f these groups are shown in
Figures 5, 6, and 7.
Conceptual group 1-species concept
The most frequently used conception in this group was the typological species
concept. A large percentage o f the students failed to recognize the variation that exists
within a population o f organisms. Instead, these students understood a species to be a
large group o f organisms which have similar traits (the typological species concept):
Je a n : [In reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs] As their prey
became more specialized, all of the cheetahs may have needed to run
faster to catCi food or escape. (Pretest #7)
Tom Ian: [In reference to the evolution o f blindness in cave
salamanders ] Because of their living in caves with no light their eyes
were not necessary and they gradually stopped working in all of the
salamanders. (Pretest #8)
This conception becomes more clearly defined when one looks at its scientific
counterpart, the variable species concept:
Bob: [In reference to the evolution o f speed in cheetahs] There were
probably a few cheetahs which could run extremely faster than the
others. These faster ones could catch prey easier than the others,
therefore allowing them to survive. The slower ones would die off
leaving only the fast ones to breed. (Pretest #7)
(For a comparison o f the pre- and posttest percentages o f students holding conceptions
in this area, see figure 5.)
The trend for students to use the alternative conception of a typological species
concept has been docum ented by other researchers (Bishop & Anderson, 1990;
Hallden, 1988). Its prominence, both in this study and the literature, indicates that this
is a fundamental conception that prevents construction of a scientific conception of
natural selection. As shown in Figure 5, more students used the typological species
concept during posttesting. However, many students did use the scientific
understanding of the variable species concept.
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Distribution o f students' pre- and posttest conceptions for
conceptual group 1-species concept
Note. The percentages do not always equal 100 because alternative conceptions
that were not held by a large percentage o f the class were not reported.
Conceptual group 2-unit o f evolutionary change
The unit o f evolutionary change contains the second major alternative
conception seen in the students, the conception that evolution o f a trait occurs in all
members o f a population. This conception is closely related to the typological species
concept. Students using the typological species concept to discuss evolution are
constrained into explaining that all members of the homogeneous population evolve.
Because of the close relation of these two concepts, the same data sources were used to
identify the conception that all members of a population evolve and the typological
species concept.

Susan: [In reference to the evolution o f speed in cheetahs] As time
went on the cheetahs began to have shorter mucles [sic] in their legs
which made them better runners. A lso the land may have changed and
they could have better conditions to run in. (Pretest #7)

Stephanie: [In reference to the evolution o f speed in cheetahs]
Gradually the cheetahs developed stronger legs. Having food as an
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incentive, the cheetahs ran faster and gained stronger m uscles in their
legs that were passed on to the offspring. (Pretest #7)
Two other conceptions were identified that are related to the one described
above. The first of these is the idea that evolution is the change o f a trait found in one
individual. The population or species is not considered by students using this
conception. This was not a common conception in the group o f students and the
number of students using this conception dropped noticeably during posttesting:
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Figure 6
Distribution o f students' pre- and posttest conceptions for conceptual group 2unit of evolutionary change
Note. The percentages do not always equal 100 because alternative conceptions
that were not held by a large percentage of the class were not reported.

Calvin: In reference to the evolution of blindness in cave salamanders]
Since it was dark, there was no need for sight, so he lost this sight and
probably developed more enhanced smell and hearing. (Pretest #8)
The conception of evolution as a change within all members o f a population and
the failure to consider the population as involved in evolution can be contrasted with
the scientific conception for this conceptual group. The scientific conception for the
unit o f evolutionary change explains that evolution changes the percentage o f the
members of a population with a specific characteristic:
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Amanda: [In reference to the evolution o f speed in cheetahs] As the
population of cheetahs grew the ones who ran the fastest got the food.
So eventually this trait evolved. (Pretest #7)
Brian: [In reference to the evolution o f speed in cheetahs] The slower
cheetahs would die because o f starvation and leave only the fastest.
This would happen generation after generation until the very fastest
could run 60 mph and his offspring would be the surviving species.
(Pretest #7)
The use o f this scientific conception was much more common in this study than in
Demastes and Good (1993). However, there was not a dramatic increase in the use of
this conception during posttesting. (For a comparison o f the pre- and posttest
percentages of students holding conceptions in this area, see Figure 6.)
Conceptual group 3-origin of variation
The third most prominent alternative conception used during pretests was need
as the origin of variation.

Meredith: [In reference to the evolution o f speed in cheetahs]
Obviously, cheetahs needed to run faster. Perhaps it was necessary for
them to catch their prey and to survive. This occurred because o f a need
for adaptation. (Pretest #7)
Meredith: [In reference to the evolution o f blindness in cave
salamanders] Cave salamanders, living in a dark environment, did not
need to see. O ver the years they evolved to loose [sic] this unnecessary
function. (Pretest #8)
The prominent use of need in students' conceptual frameworks for evolution has
been documented by several other researchers (Clough & W ood-Robinson, 1985b;
Deadman & Kelly, 1978; Setdage, in press). The use of need was particularly resistant
to instruction in our students, evidenced by some students' incorporation of the
explanation of mutation into their pre-existing conception of need:

Juanita: [In reference to the evolution o f webbed feet in ducks] The
mutation was made because they [the ducks] need to swim in water.
(Pretest #4)
A nother conception o f the source o f variation is found in the students who used
anthropomorphic answers, explaining that variation is produced through a conscious
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decision by the organism. Several students reported that mosquitoes had to "learn" to
become resistant to DDT. Tyler explains her answer:
SD: I’m just trying to figure out what you mean by learned. You know.
Sometimes
Tyler: They [the mosquitoes] figured out what, what was going to kill
them I guess.
SD: Okay.
T: And what they had to do to not die.
SD: Okay.
T : W hat they had to do for themselves.
SD: Do you think a lot o f animals do that?
T: I think probably so. [C 19]
The use o f anthropomorphism to explain the source o f variation is closely
related to the need conception. Its use simply places another step in the sequence of the
need explanation. Many researchers in this area have identified anthropomorphism in
students' answers (Clough & W ood-Robinson, 1985b). Brumby (1984) and Hallden
(1988) indicate that anthropomorphism may be an artifact of habits used in written and
verbal communication on this topic. Tyler's comments demonstrate that the use of
learn is not always an artifact of communication. She understood insects to be able to
consciously modify their behaviors. She was not alone in this conception. At one
point during the school year, Philip and Calvin came back in the room after class to ask
Ms. Hurston if ptarmigan's "could decide to change their feathers" from the summer
brown to the winter white. A segment o f students understood organisms to be able to
consciously change physiological processes. Many students did undergo conceptual
change away from this conception, but its use was retained by a number o f students.
The use/disuse explanation contrasts with the conceptions o f need and
conscious decisions:

Tyler: [In reference to the evolution of blindness in cave salamanders]
From living in caves the salamanders used very little o f their sight.
From not using their eyes they became nonfunctional. This trait was
passed down to other generations. (Pretest #8)
The use/disuse explanation may be an artifact o f the use o f commonplace
expressions to solve problems, but its use is closely related to the conception of need
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(or lack o f need) as the source for new variation. Lamarckian explanations have been
described by other researchers as a prominent aspect of students' explanations of
evolution (Brumby, 1984; Jimenez, 1992). Few students used this explanation during
either pre- or posttesting.
Each of the three alternative conceptions for the production o f variation can be
compared to the scientific conception o f mutation. The use of mutation is
fundamentally opposed to the prominent conception of need as the factor in producing
variation. However, a small number o f the students did use this scientific conception
during the pretest:
Peggy Sue: [In reference to the evolution o f speed in cheetahs] A
mutation occurred in one cheetah and he had an advantage over others.
He passed on this mutation, and finally it became prevalent. (Pretest
#8 ) '

In the comparison of the need and mutation conceptions, it should be noted that
the use of mutation as the source of variation allows the student to separate the process
o f the production o f variation from the process o f natural selection. In contrast, the use
of need as an explanation blends these two processes and prohibits the construction of a
more complex, scientific conception of evolution. The conception o f mutation as the
source for variation demonstrated the greatest increase in student usage from pretest to
posttest. This contrasts sharply with the findings o f other researchers using this test
instrument (Demastes et al., in press) However, in his work with high school students,
Settlage (in press) also documents an increase in students' use o f mutations as the
origin of variation. But the gains described in his research were much more modest
than those seen here. Work by Lawson and Thompson (1988) explains that students in
high school are not prepared to understand mutation because it is such an abstract
concept and most students are capable o f only concrete reasoning patterns. However,
the findings of this study dem onstrate that the conception o f mutation is accessible to
high school students. (For a comparison o f the pre- and posttest percentages of
students holding conceptions in this area, see Figure 7.)
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Distribution of students' pre- and posttest conceptions for
conceptual group 3-origin o f variation
Note. The percentages do not always equal 100 because alternative conceptions
that were not held by a large percentage o f the class were not reported.
Pathways of Conceptual Change
Figure 8 shows the most prominent pathways o f conceptual change experienced by
the students in this study. (The conceptual change reported here is limited to the major
conceptions identified in this study. Therefore, Figure 8 shows only the major
pathways o f conceptual change, but does not report all instances.) In order to interpret
Figure 8, the direction o f the arrows should be noted. For instance, for the Group 1
Species concept, two o f the students that used the homogenous conception of the
species during the pretest experienced conceptual change during the span o f the study
and used the variable species conception at the end of the study.
Even with the relatively low degree of conceptual change experienced by the
students, some patterns emerge. Individual students experienced conceptual change (a)
away from an alternative conception toward a scientific conception, (b) away from one
alternative conception within a group of alternative conceptions to another, and (c)
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away from a scientific conception, toward an alternative conception for a group. These
patterns of conceptual change are similar to those described for college students in a
non-major biology course (Demastes & Good, 1993).
Some students holding each of the prominent alternative conceptions did
experience conceptual change toward the scientific conception. Thus, for each of the
groupings identified, a small group o f students learned to use the scientifically accepted
conception. However, none o f the students holding the alternative conception o f
use/disuse as the origin o f variation group moved toward the scientific conception.
Instead, students using this conception experienced no conceptual change or moved
toward another conception.
The second type of conceptual change, from one alternative conception to
another, was the most common. Some students represented in all conceptual groups
experienced this type o f conceptual change. The third type of conceptual change, away
from a scientific conception toward an alternative conception, was experienced by
students in all conceptual groupings. This striking pattern of conceptual change has
been documented in an earlier study (Demastes & Good, 1993) and will be discussed in
in the summary of this chapter
O ther Aspects o f Students' Conceptual Frameworks
The description o f conceptual frameworks and conceptual change deals only
with students' conceptions o f the process through which evolution operates. Another
aspect of students' frameworks for this area is their acceptance of the validity of the
theory. As students' acceptance of evolution is discussed, it is im portant to remember
that there were 12 juniors in this class of 22 students, and each had successfully
completed Ms. Hurston’s Biology I course the previous year. Hurston describes her
Biology I course as a thematic approach to biology with evolution as a central unifying
theme. The seniors, however, had taken biology two years prior to this course and did
not have Hurston as their teacher. The seniors could recall little of the material this
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past course addressed, and not one of the five seniors I spoke with could recall the topic
of evolution being addressed in any fashion.
One o f the questions on both the pre- and posttest asked, "What is your opinion
of the theory of evolution." The vast majority of the students wrote on their belief of
the theory. O f the group describing their acceptance or belief, 92% o f the juniors and
50% of the seniors expressed a belief in evolution at the outset o f the course. At the
end o f the course, 91% o f the juniors and 80% of the seniors expressed their belief in
the theory. Simply the number of students responding with a discussion of belief to a
question which asked about their opinion is important. This response signifies students'
perceptions o f evolution as being an area o f intense personal conflicts for many people,
as shown in this passage:
Peggy Sue: My opinion of evolution is basically undecided. I believe
in God, but I do not know enough about the Bible to explain why.
When I hear about people evolving from apes-the facts seem believableso I do not know what to believe!! (Pretest #9)
Also, many more juniors expressed a belief in evolution than did seniors; however, it
must be remembered that these students were a biased sample as they had recently
completed a biology course based upon the topic o f evolution and had elected to take
another course from Hurston.
In response to the same question, "What is your personal opinion of the theory
o f evolution?," 32% of the students mentioned the issue of human evolution in their
answers during the posttest. This percentage increased on the posttest to 52%. Clearly,
for many of these students, human evolution is an important aspect of their acceptance
of evolutionary theory.
Finally, regarding the same question, several students equated evolution with
the initial creation of the universe/earth. In response to the same question, 14% cited
problems with the validity o f the "big bang" as a limitation of evolutionary theory.
This number increased to 33% on the posttest. Just as Fisher (1992) suggests, students
are unaware of the scientific boundaries o f evolutionary theory.
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Peggy Sue: I feel that it [evolution] has happened, but I don't believe in
big bang or anything like that. (Pretest #9)
For many o f these students, the over-application o f biological evolution caused a
degree of learner dissatisfaction with the theory.
Summary o f Class Conceptual Framework
Many of the students entered this Biology II course using scientific conceptions
of several aspects o f evolution. In this regard, this is a much different student
population than the college students described in earlier studies (Bishop & Anderson,
1990; Demastes et al., in press). But it should be remembered that the students o f this
class selected this course as an elective, and the great majority o f these students were
interested in professions closely related to biology or another natural science.
O f all three patterns o f conceptual change docum ented for this class, the one
which holds the greatest theoretical and methodological implications is the change
away from a scientific conception. W hile the sample size was relatively small, a
marked number of students underwent conceptual change away from the use of a
scientific conception in each o f the three conceptual groups. These findings support the
other description of the students' conceptions provided by the Bishop and Anderson
(1985) coding system. Many students in Hurston's class experienced conceptual
change away from the scientifically acceptable explanation. While this movement has
been documented in a similar study (Demastes & Good, 1993, conceptual change away
from a scientific conception has not often been described. As a result, many
researchers fail to consider such a pattern when designing data analysis methods. Such
patterns indicate that conceptual change may be a much more piece-meal process than
Posner et al. (1982) indicate. As suggested by Duschl and Gitom er (1991) and
Nussbaum (1989), conceptual change may often be a fragmented process in which
conceptions are selected and rejected for reasons other than a rational assessment of
evidence.
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The three most prominent conceptions held by students before instruction in the
area o f evolution were (a) populations o f organisms are homogeneous (typological
species concept), (b) change in a trait occurs in all individuals o f a population, and (c)
variation in a population is produced by need. The use o f these conceptions changed
slightly after instruction; most prominent was the substitution o f mutation for need as
the source o f variation.
The Interview Participants
The conceptual change o f the four interview participants will be described in
this section. For each participant, this description will include:
(a) approaches the content area o f biology,
(b) personal characteristics,
(c) conceptual ecology for evolution,
(d) conceptual framework for evolution at three m ajor points in the year, and
(e) the changes in conceptual framework.
O f these five categories of description, only (c) and (d) require further explanation.
Conceptual Ecology
A conceptual ecology, as suggested by Toulmin (1972) and elaborated by
Posner et al. (1982), includes the learner's fundamental organizing knowledge which
controls and modifies further conceptual change. This fundamental knowledge can
include conceptions, metaphysical beliefs, epistemological commitments, analogies,
anomalies, and knowledge from areas other than that studied. Knowledge included in a
learner's conceptual ecology is not easily modified. Aspects o f the conceptual ecology
bear strong resemblance to what Cobem (1993) refers to as a learner's world view .
However, I will use the term conceptual ecology because o f the theoretical basis of my
study. The conceptual ecology is the aspect of knowledge most heavily influenced by
the learner's culture. So it is here that the strongest theoretical ties are found between
culture and what can be learned.
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The portions o f the learner's conceptual ecology that will be described include:
(a) religious orientation,
(b) acceptance or rejection o f evolution,
(c) scientific orientation,
(d) scientific epistemology,
(e) view of the biological world.
These were selected because o f their prominence during the course o f the
interviews and during data analysis. Data analysis indicated that these specific aspects
o f a learner's conceptual ecology can be very influential in the process o f conceptual
change for the topic of biological evolution.
The first two aspects o f the learner's conceptual ecology listed above clearly
involve belief systems, while the others may not. Belief is a very difficult area to
study, as no one definition has enjoyed wide acceptance. As Pajares (1992) has
commented, "It is difficult to know where knowledge has ended and belief began." For
the purposes of this study, belief will be defined in the following manner. Belief and
understanding are both forms o f knowledge which may overlap. However, when these
two types of knowledge differ, understanding includes knowledge which has an
academic component, and belief includes knowledge which is taken on faith.
The learner's religious orientation reflects the degree to which the learner
organizes her/his life around religious activities, understands the natural world through
theism, or interprets personal and natural events through a religious lens. This aspect
of the learner's conceptual ecology can be closely tied to the learner's acceptance or
rejection of evolution. Acceptance is used here instead o f belief so that both
knowledge systems, belief and understanding, can be included. Students' conceptions
will be classified in a system described by Nelson (1986). This system describes the
conceptions o f the origin o f the earth and biological species as being expressions o f (a)
quick creationism (the earth and all species were created by God a few thousand years
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ago), (b) progressive creationism (lineages have undergone subtle changes after being
placed on the old earth), (c) gradual creationism (evolution is God's means of creating
species on an old earth), (d) non-theistic evolution (the issue o f God and religion
should not be included within the limits o f scientific discussions), and (e) atheistic
evolution (there was no God involved in the creation o f the universe).
A nother portion of students' conceptual ecology includes learners' orientation
toward science. This reflects the degree to which the learner organizes her/his life
around scientific activities, understands the natural world through physical and material
causation, or interprets personal and natural events through a scientific lens (Cobern,
1993). The learner's scientific orientation is also very closely tied to the learner's
acceptance or rejection of evolution.
Tied to the learner's scientific orientation is the issue of her/his scientific
epistemology. How does the student view the nature of scientific knowledge? Does
this view (i.e., realist, relativist, pragmatist) change with the type of knowledge
considered? W hat does the student recognize as the boundaries of scientific
knowledge? How does scientific knowledge intersect with their other means of
understanding? And more specifically, how does the student view the applications of
biological knowledge?
The final aspect o f the student's conceptual ecology considered is her/his view
o f the biological world. Does the student view nature as fundamentally competitive or
harmonious?
Framework for Participants' Conceptions
There are many conceptions tied into any conceptual framework, and
this situation is magnified for evolution. The theory of evolution is both
internally com plex and interconnected with the learner's belief systems. In an
effort to systematize the description of conceptual frameworks, the categories
o f conceptions that surfaced in the study are displayed on Figure 9. (As
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Figure 9
A template for the summary o f participants' conceptual framework for evolution
m entioned in Chapter 3, these categories were derived from the participants' interview
data and were not pre-established at the outset o f the study.) These categories contain
both instances of academic knowledge and belief. The descriptions on these figures are
brief and are provided for the purpose o f comparison within each participant over time
and for comparison between each of the participants.
Brian: Biologist as Scientific Theorist
Brian was the only male interview participant and the only junior. Brian was
not one o f my original choices for interview participants because he demonstrated a
reasonably coherent and scientifically accurate conceptual framework for the process of
evolution at the outset of the course. But after several weeks of effort, it became clear
that he would be the only male in the class who could fully participate. However, after
the interviews began, my reservations dissipated. It soon became clear that not only
did Brian not fully understand all aspects o f the process of evolutionary theory, he was
also very different from my other participants. I came to value the differences between
my participants as a means of more fully understanding the process of conceptual
change.
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Brian was a quiet boy who continually had to push his long hair from his eyes
as he spoke. Each week I had to "draw" him out in order to gain his full participation
in the interviews. But, his shy demeanor did not signify a lack of engagement. Several
times during the interviews Brian would draw on our past conversations in order to
answer a question I asked. Often, he would return to questions asked 30 minutes
earlier and rephrase his answers. As he "warmed up" to a topic of discussion, he would
push his hair back more frequently and talk in a very animated
fashion. Based on these behaviors, I felt I had Brian's full engagem ent during our
interviews. The behavior was similar in class. W hile not talkative, he would volunteer
answers only if he felt the answer "was not too obvious" and if no one else had
previously offered the answer. Although he seldom spoke in class, many students
would ask for his help while studying for an exam.
The most helpful description of Brian's approach biology is as a scientific
theo rist. Brian searched for an overview o f what was being studied soon after he
constructed an understanding of how the process worked. An exam ple o f Brian's
frequent use of theories is seen in this discussion o f the exam taken at the end of the
year:

B: [Reading] What's your personal opinion of the theory of evolution?
You mean, do I like it or?
SD: Ah, an opinion could be virtually anything. Do you think it's
useful? Do you like it? Ahm, does it have problems?
B: Ahm, it's not fullv understood.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: But we know it happens. Pretty much. Some people still say is
doesn't, didn't, but.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Most people think that it happened. Ahm, there are a lot o f good
ideas out there. Like people have all these theories.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: That go into the theory of evolution. But nobody knows exactly
what happens every time something changed. You know?
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: But ahm, Gould and Eldredge.
SD: Right.
B: Could explain maybe half o f evolutionary changes. And then like,
what's the latest thing? One of the articles related to the theory.
SD: Ah the Gia theory?
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B: I mean that could explain the unicelluar evolution.
SD: Yeah.
B: O r most of it. I mean because it could also be part o f Gould's and
Eldredge's theory.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Because that didn’t really explain that much. They just explained
how one organism goes to another one. Not how two could combine.
(...) So it’s not fully understood. Nobody knows exactly what
happened every time. But I mean we have a pretty good idea.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) (B 201-203)
In our discussions and his infrequent class comments, Brian seemed to enjoy
talking and thinking about biology on a theoretical level. He often discussed the merits
of various scientific theories, and in more unstructured interviews his comments would
continually come back to an analysis of theories. He explained that he liked biology
"because it lets you think." (B 43)
Brian's approach to biology, and more specifically, evolution, was to try to
understand the b ro ad processes. This approach may have been aided by his substantial
knowledge o f the working of the processes of each theory. As demonstrated above,
Brian would examine, modify, and replace theories in an effort to explain broad natural
patterns. He searched for answers to large-scale questions. This approach is not
surprising when Brian's background is considered. His favorite subject was
mathematics, and he also enjoyed a university com puter programm ing course. For two
consecutive years, a mathematics teacher has allowed Brian to work through a text
book at his own pace, since he found the class too slow and uninteresting. During the
past four summers, Brian attended a university course designed to continue the interest
of students gifted in science and mathematics. Brian explained, "I'm happiest solving
an equation or plugging in numbers to a program." He elected to take Biology II only
because Ms. Hurston "gives you a chance to think" and it represented one of the few
advanced science or mathematics courses at U High.
Out o f school Brian studied Latin along with his brother. At the beginning of
the year, Brian hoped to study civil engineering in college, because he wanted to build
"large things.” But this interest changed to architecture. During the study, Brian was
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continually involved in some type of project, such as preparing a cat skeleton, teaching
him self origami, or repairing his very old car. He loved puzzles and often would turn
the illustrated portions upside down in order to make them more challenging.
This view of Brian is somewhat misleading. His mother and Ms. Hurston
explained that Brian worked with great effort only on topics or projects that interested
him. Because he hated to write, he continually procrastinated in finishing English
assignments. He liked group work, "because there's less for me to do." Ginger
explained, "He's a genius, but he's so lazy." His grades were less than impressive in
Hurston's class because he often failed to complete assignments. O f the four interview
participants, Brian was the only one who was not anxious about school, "school is not
one of the things that worries me." (B 148) His only regular pleasure reading included
Discover and Popular M echanics.
Brian's Conceptual Ecology
The most influential aspect o f Brian's conceptual ecology was his distinct
scientific orientation. Brian used traditional rational criteria in his understanding of
science. In our discussion of the pseudoscientific topics,
(Loch Ness Monster, ghosts, and aliens), Brian explained he didn't "buy into" these
things. He accepted the occurrence o f natural phenomena based on the plausibility of
the event and not based on the opinions of authorities.
B: I can look at it and actually see what they say and logically if it can
be done, or was done. I don't usually look into real formal texts or
whatever. Like those journals or whatever?
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: I don't look for those but just usually I can look at it and actually see
what they're saying and logically if it can be done. (B 59)
Brian viewed much of the world in this rational manner and looked for the coherence
and causality o f phenomenon. Rationality was a major criterion through which Brian
understood natural phenomena and the events of his personal life.
B: Like my sister said, everything happens for a reason. (...) but I
don't really believe that. I mean, if something happens, it's, it's because
you either weren't ready for it or say I mean, there's not a plan ah
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SD: Okay.
B: for the future. I mean, what happens happens and not for any
reason. Well, for a reason, but not for anything, not for the future of
anything. (B 7 1 )
Brian's scientific orientation was in congruence with his realist epistemology of
scientific knowledge. As shown in the quote from the previous section for Brian, to
know something scientifically was to "know what happened every time." Brian viewed
science as an attempt to provide answers that are different from those achieved in other
disciplines. "Scientists look to prove something. Not just to give any answer, but to
give the answer." (B 78) Brian viewed scientific knowledge as striving to describe
reality. However, Brain was not a naive realist as described by Grosslight et al. (1991).
He readily conceded that "There's always a possibility that science is wrong." (B 69)
Brian described theories as an explanation that is well supported by the scientific
community but can always be disproven.
B: Like I think it was Einstein, he said it, "It'd take a million
experiments to prove my theory but only one to prove it wrong." We
can’t ever be a 100% sure [of a theory] but we can always be relatively
certain. (B 76)
Brian, like many scientists, simultaneously understood science as an attempt to
understand reality and realized that scientific theories are not a sure reflection o f this
reality, but valued theories none-the-less. He recognized that science needs both
theories and facts to operate. But he used the conception that a "theory could become a
fact if you collected enough, amount [sic] of information. To prove it, without a
doubt." (B 81) When Brian explained that he believed in a theory, he actually meant
that he viewed theories as very probable in occurrence. Facts, on the other hand, were
true, authentic reflections of reality. This realist epistemology was also used in his
approach to many other aspects of his life.
At one level o f consideration, Brian recognized a distinct boundary between
science and religion.
B: Science really talks about what happens and what causes it to
happen. And philosophy is more for what reason it happens.
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SD: And how about religion?
B: Religion? Uhm. That, it tries to answer, religion is a, a sort o f
philosophy but like it has, usually has, it usually points toward a greater
being. (B 203)
However, at some levels, he saw science and religion as overlapping.

B: Twas reading somewhere about, it was about astronom y and stuff
and that how there were a lot of views about the nature of heavenly
bodies....Like if you consider our solar system as needing to be order
that, that if you look at it even close, it’s not as ordered as it looks....This
article was explaining how most of the theories do not support a Divine
Being or Divine Plan. (B 203)
He viewed the intersection o f the two ways o f knowing as essential to scientific
progress.

B: 1 mean if you kept them [science and religion] totally separate you
wouldn't need, you wouldn't learn about either of 'em....I mean, if
nobody, if everybody ju st believe in what was written down in the
Bible....centuries ago, nobody would even try to think about that
[evolution], (B 204)
W hile Brian was not a religiously oriented person, he did not reject the
existence of a "greater being." His personal life and knowledge was not interpreted
through a religious framework. Along these lines, Brian did not interpret the writings
of the Bible literally: "the Gospel according to John may be just a novel for what
anybody know s.” (B 201)
At the outset of the course, Brian ascribed to what Nelson (1986) refers to as a
non-theistic evolution. For Brian, scientific truths were independent o f religious
assumptions. Additionally, scientific arguments for or against God were logically
flawed. The existence of God is not something Brian would set out to prove. He
accepted the plausibility and probability o f evolution's operation in the natural world.
Because of this acceptance and its connections to Brian's scientific orientation, the
issue of understanding versus belief did not surface during the analysis o f Brian's
interview data. However, this issue will become important for the other interview
participants.
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Brian's Conceptual Framework for Evolution
Initial framework
Brian's scientific understanding of the process of evolution and his uses of the
broader theories o f evolution immediately serve to distinguish him from the other
research participants.
Mechanism.
An understanding o f the mechanism o f evolutionary change is central to Brian's
conceptual framework. When Brian was asked to concept map his "understanding o f
evolution" at the outset of the research, (CM-1, initial), his entire map consisted of an
explanation for the mechanisms through which evolution operates. (See Appendix G
for his concept maps.) This initial map closely resembled his map drawn one week
later in response to the question "How does evolution work?" (CM-2, initial).
Knowledge of the process of evolution was also the most differentiated aspect of
Brian's conceptual framework. The focusing on process is well suited to Brian's
rational, scientific orientation. For Brian to understand a topic, it was very important
for him to understand how it works.
Brian had a firm, foundational understanding of the neo-Darwinian explanation of
evolution through natural selection. Major aspects of Brian's understanding o f the
process o f evolution were: (a) mutation as the source o f variation, (b) variable species
concept, and (c) evolution as a change in the proportion o f a population with a trait.
While Brian used a scientific conception for these aspects of evolutionary change, there
were some subtle differences between his conceptions and those of science.
Mutation as the source of variation is significant in Brian's understanding of
process. In the two concepts maps forevolution, mutation is the second (CM-2, initial)
and third (CM-1, initial) highest concept in the Brian's hierarchy. Brian's
understanding of the various aspects of this conception is demonstrated by his
comments during the sorting task:
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B: You got, your all white. [Selects picture o f white rabbits.]
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: And to get any change in color you have to have a change in your
DNA. [Selects picture o f DNA strand.]
SD: O kay So, what is that?
B: This is ah, it's either some m atter or some foreign...
SD: W hat's another name for that?
B: Chromosome, gene.
SD: Okay.
B: And then, this is your changed ones.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: And then you have, do I use these all?
SD: Only if you w ant to. Use anything you want to.
B: W ell, you have your introduction of the predator right here. [Selects
picture o f predominantly white, few er brown group o f rabbits with
hawk.]
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Which thrives on the white one.
SD: Why?
B: Because the brown ones are more camouflaged.
SD: Okay
B: I guess that’s w hat it's supposed to mean with a brown background.
[Selects picture o f half white, half brown population of rabbits with
hawk.] And then, as the predators get more and more white ones, the
brown ones reproduce more.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: So you get this one. And then finally, you get m ost brown ones and
hardly any white ones. [Selects picture with predominantly brown
population of rabbits with hawk.]
SD: Okay Are you happy with that explanation? [He nods "Yes."]
Pretty happy. Ahm, could any o f those things happen at the same time?
O r does it happen kinda in that progression, like you have it?
B: Well, these pretty much happen. This could happen, this part right
here could happen hundreds of years before this.
SD: Okay So the production of, o f this change in the chromosomes
B: That, that could've been just been a freak thing.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: That didn't com pletely die off.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: And then it, it only came to their advantage when there was a
predator that it gave a disadvantage to.
SD: So, two things are pretty separate in your mind? The production of
the change and then the action on the change?
B: Right.
SD: Okay.
B: 1 mean it's not like this the hawk or whatever cam e and changed the
DNA.
SD: Okay. O r the bunnies did it in response to the hawk?
B: Right.
SD: Could they have done it in response to the hawk?
B: No. (B 65-67)
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This segment of interview demonstrates Brian's use of mutation as the source of
variation for a population. It also demonstrates Brian's scientifically accurate
conception of the separation o f the production of variation from the action of natural
selection. Bishop and Anderson (1990) explain this separation as being an essential
step in constructing a scientific conception for evolution.
Brian's understanding o f mutations was scientifically oriented but very
fundamental. While Brian understood mutations to be "some know o f damage
or some kind o f freak gene put in the something in the chromosome" [B 37], he
had an alternative conception that inbreeding could cause mutation. [B 37]
This alternative conception was also seen in Brian's written answers to the
journal entry for the evolution o f humans [Artifact 2], and the answers he
offered in class. Brian realized that not all mutations were beneficial, "nothing
comes of them," but he failed to recognize that many are harmful to organisms.

B: (W riting in reference to the evolution o f speed in cheetahs) The
slower cheetahs would die because o f starvation and leave only the
fastest. This would happen generation after generation until the very
fastest could run 60 mph and his offspring would be the [species that
survives]. (Pretest #7)
As demonstrated by this pretest answer, Brian recognized the importance of
variation in a population to the process o f evolution. As he explained, "Diversity is a
big part of evolution." [B 123]. However, this recognition was not represented in either
o f the concept maps he constructed at the outset o f the study. (See Appendix G for
these concept maps.) This view is in stark contrast to his own species concept which
will described in a later section.
The third aspect of Brian's understanding of the process o f evolution is his
conception of evolution as initially involving a small number of individuals in a
population.
SD: So what's natural selection?
B: Natural selection is what keeps mutated organisms around.
SD: Okay.
B: and also keeps them from being extinct and dying out.
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SD: Okay, and how does that work?
B: It's ah, the mutation, if it's one that works in the environm ent or
ecosystem, or whatever, it goes to the whole community. The change
occurs in the organism itself.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Like, either a single organism or a couple organisms. (B 50)
Brian recognized that natural selection operates on variation originally present in a
small proportion of the population. He further explained that natural selection worked
through causing the death o f unfit individuals:
B: [Explaining a pretest answer] Population o f ducks evolve webbed
feet because most successful ducks without offspring. I mean,
unsuccessful died without offspring. It's, that's natural selection and the
ones that couldn't swim couldn’t get the fish under water. So they just,
ah, died off. (B 28)
This conception is slightly different from the more scientific conception of natural
selection operating through the differential reproduction of members o f a population.
Finally, Brian recognized evolution as changes in a population as opposed to changes
within an individual:
SD: Okay. So when we talk about evolution do we say that an
individual evolved?
B: Well, we all, like we change individually but we evolve together. (B
50)
B: An individual can change, but he's not actually evolving. (B 36)
Another conception related to the process o f evolutionary change was Brian's
collage understanding o f fitness:
[In reference to the pretest question o f the most fit lion]
B: Okay, C, Spot [the lion]. He had an adequate number o f offspring
and was able to change. He was good sized and had no apparent
vulnerability to infection.
SD: Okay, so ahm, what does a biologist mean when she or he says fit?
Like something is fit...
BR: I mean, if he can cope with what's around it and they can carry
on....It has to have a number of offspring....They have to be healthy. I
mean, you can't have it can't have ah vulnerability to little mosquitoes or
something like that....It has to be able to live a long time. [B 29]
This collage conception of fitness differs from the scientific conception of fitness as
having a high number of successful offspring. The collage conception was used by a
large number of students in the class (54% on the pretest and 38% on the posttest).
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This alternative conception has not been documented in the evolution education
literature and it differs from the adaptive conception o f fitness described by Bishop and
Anderson (1990).
Brian was different from the other interview participants in that he understood the
importance of geographic isolation in the process of evolution. This knowledge was
reflected in his journal entry concerning the evolution o f humans:
B: 1 believe the im portant change in our evolution is the tendency to
stay in a group or tribe, rather than stray to find new females. This
caused tribes to develop separately, creating probably slight differences.
(Artifact 1)
The final conception to be discussed under the heading of process is Brian's
understanding of genetic drift as a mechanism of evolutionary change. Genetic drift is
a relatively advanced topic which is not often discussed in the classroom. Despite this,
Brain experienced a conceptual change concerning this topic during the seven
interviews used to describe his initial conceptions. At the outset of our interviews,
Brian had no knowledge of genetic drift:
[In reference to the evolution o f blindness in cave salamanders] B:
Okay, salamanders could have been accidentally placed in a cave
somewhere, some freak blind ones were bom and stayed while the
sighted ones left, leaving behind the blinded ones to reproduce.
SD: Okay, so that in your scenario, the sighted ones just walked away?
B: I man, I, I, that's the only way I could see it happening, the sighted
ones just leaving. (B 33)
However, just 14 days later, Brian's comments while drawing a concept map revealed
the initial construction o f a conception o f genetic drift [CM-2, initial).
SD: Okay, could you just read that [concept map] to me? Oh, we,
we’re missing one. [The term environm ent was not on his map,
although he wrote it down in his initial list.]
B: All right. That's one that doesn't always affect it [evolution.]
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: So I'm just gonna' leave it out.
SD: Okay, so you, you put in environm ent but it doesn't always affect
it. What do you mean by that?
B: Well there are instances when it doesn't.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: It's just, just by chance.
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SD: Okay, Ahm, so evolution could occur just because o f the
mutations?
B: Right. (B 64)
The passage illustrates that Brian was beginning to understand that evolution could
occur by chance, without the force o f a selection pressure. This is a necessary
conception in the construction of a scientific conception of evolution through genetic
drift. W hile Brian did not yet have a name for this process, he was constructing the
basis for this conception.
The second m ajor group of conceptions that were evident in the initial interviews
was Brian's knowledge o f the broad theories o f evolutionary changes. This
characteristic has been alluded to earlier in the initial description o f Brian's approach to
biology. During our discussion o f his pretest answers, Brian referred to theories of
gradualism and punctuated equilibrium. He explained that these theories were useful
because they helped explain the patterns o f how the more narrow processes (e.g.,
natural selection) operate.
In Brian's initial conceptual framework, evolutionary theory was understood to
explain natural phenomena that occurred after formation o f "primordial soup." [B 158]
He understood this "soup" to form when "little molecules got together and just
happened to be able to function." [B 35] Brian did not understand biological evolution
*

to describe the original formation of the earth, but instead the formation o f life and
subsequent changes in organisms.
Even in the beginning o f the course, Brian had an appreciation of the importance
of evolution in the study of biology:
SD: Ahm, so you think evolution is an important part o f biology?
B: Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: Why?
B: Just because, if you want to study biology, you have to understand
why it's that way.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: And to understand why, you have to understand how it became that
way. (B 155)
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In exam ining these data, the means of data collection should be remembered. The
student participants and I discussed evolution on a regular basis, so it is not surprising
to see Brian’s answer to this question, as my presence may have prejudiced his
response.
History of evolutionary theory.
While Brian had a skeletal knowledge o f the construction o f Darwinian theory
and the structural theories which came after (punctuated equilibrium, gradualism), the
history of science was not a m ajor com ponent of his conceptual framework. None of
the historical hall-marks of evolution found a place in Brian's map or in his discussions.
The omission o f the historical aspect of the theory is not in conflict with Brian's
scientific orientation. For Brian, knowledge of how natural phenom ena works is
fundamentally more important than knowledge of how that explanation was
constructed.
Evidence for evolution.
Like the history of evolutionary theory, Brian's conceptions o f the evidence for
evolution were minimally used:
SD: Do you know any evidence that supports evolution?
B: Ahm, well, we know there were other life forms because their bones
are everywhere.
SD: Do you know any evidence that refutes it?
B: The Bible.
SD: The Bible.
B: Well, the, I don't know. Er, some religions don't believe it.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) (B 155)
Unlike many of his answers to other questions, Brian's comments on supporting or
refuting evidence were brief. It was difficult to gauge his conceptions on this matter,
simply because it was so difficult to engage his participation in these discussions. It is
significant that this scientifically, mechanistically oriented student would list the Bible
as a source of refuting evidence. But because he resolved any difficulties he might
have had with evolutionary theory long ago, evidence for the theory was not a major
portion in Brian's framework.
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Nature o f evolutionary changes.
Because Brian had a largely mechanistic view of evolution, his conceptions of the
nature of evolutionary changes are closely tied to his conceptions o f process. A t this
point in the year, Brian understood that evolutionary changes in a population require a
great deal of time to become apparent. However, time did not appear in the first two
concept maps that Brian constructed (CM-1 & CM-2, initial) so this notion was not
prominent in his conceptual framework.
During the initial interviews, Brian was constructing a conception o f the random
aspect of evolutionary changes. This change, described in the section on process, was a
tentative one. As evidenced by his inability to account for a loss o f a trait (blindness in
salamanders), at the outset Brian understood evolution to occur only through natural
selection driving a population toward the presence o f a trait. This conception
underwent a change during the fourth and fifth weeks o f interviews. (See data in the
mechanism section, p. 164)
Related to his initial conception o f evolution as directional, Brian understood
evolution as a process that "drives" organisms to a "higher level." [B 38] Brian had a
vague definition for "higher" as being "more quality." [B 51] In Brian's conceptual
framework, the notion of "higher" was equated to the role of the scientific conception
of fitness. Brian was using an Aristotelian view o f natural organism s at this point. But
this conception is so poorly differentiated and loosely tied to Brian's greater conceptual
framework, it is difficult to classify. In any case, this notion o f "higher" is present,
although not prominent, in Brian's conceptions o f the patterns o f evolutionary changes.
Human evolution.
Conceptions o f human evolution are often closely tied to the students'
conceptions o f natural history. However, for some o f the participants, issues o f human
evolution are so prominent in their conceptual framework, that these two groups have
been separated. But in Brian's case, the issues of human evolution and his
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understanding of natural history are inseparable simply because Brian viewed humans
as being animals.
B: Like if we died off, there would be some other organisms that would
move up in our place.
SD: Live in our place, what does that mean?
B: Well, we've, we could pick this, we could say dominate the planet
right now.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: So, something else has to dominate the planet, just like the dinosaurs
did.
SD: Okay. So you kind of see us (humans) in the dinosaurs' place?
B: Uh, uh. (Yes) (B 40)
Not only did Brian have the declarative knowledge o f humans as animals, he used that
knowledge in explanations. In the quote above, Brian equated the ecological position
of humans with that o f other organisms. This quote also dem onstrates that he viewed
humans as being a species bounded by time and susceptible to natural forces, like
dinosaurs. During a structured interview using a chart showing the pathways of
primate evolution, Brian theorized about various selection pressures operating to make
evolutionary changes within humans. [IAI-1, initial] Because Brian viewed humans as
animals, Brian understood humans to be undergoing evolutionary changes through
natural processes.
Natural history.
Brian had the greatest wealth o f knowledge of natural history of the four
interview participants. He explained that before taking Ms. Hurston's biology class the
year before, all he really knew of the history of organisms on the earth was "just that
dinosaurs existed." [B 34] Brian had a vague but scientific understanding of the
historical record of biological organisms. He had some conception about the great age
of the earth and knowledge that the physical characteristics o f the earth have undergone
radical changes during that long time span.
Brian's knowledge of the natural history of recent organisms underwent a change
during the animal behavior section of the course:
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SD: If you could sum up what you've learned from the animal behavior
section, what would it be?
B: It's made me see animals as organisms rather than magic.
SD: Oh, that's nice. Okay, so what does it mean?
B: That they're actually living things.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: It's not something you can hurl around like a baseball.
SD: Yeah. You've felt about 'em that way before or ?
B: I don't know. The most contact I've ever had with a real animal was
probably a dog.... I ju st think of it as it as my pet.
SD: So this whole section has helped you see them more as?
B: More like a dog for itself. (B 46-47)
I understand this passage to signify that the animal behavior section opened up for
Brian an entire framework through which animals are organisms that can be studied
and understood through scientific terms. This knowledge is relatively new and
undifferentiated, however, as evidenced by his response to the interview about
instances using animal graphics.
Brian demonstrated the greatest am ount of animal lore o f all the student
participants in the interview about instances, but he often failed to draw many
conclusions about the organism s shown [IAI-1, initial]. M ost of his responses
consisted of some article o f knowledge about the animal pictured or a related animal.
At the outset of the study, Brian was not prone to interpret organisms as assemblages of
adaptations which could be explained or understood. However, he did use the notion of
adaptation in an effort to explain the graphic depicting three species o f bears and mused
on why certain color adaptations would be beneficial for the animals' differing
environments. Brian also applied his knowledge o f evolution to attempt to understand
the wing structure o f a fruit eating bat.
B: I can't tell if that's four or five fingers on the wing.
SD: I don't know where the fourth one is. Does it m atter if it has five
digits?
B: Uh, uh. (Yes) So that it would make it split off later down the line
than the birds.
SD: Okay. Split off later from what line?
B: W hat ever it's split off from. (B 114)
Clearly while his knowledge of the bat wing structure is limited, Brian was trying to
interpret characteristics within an evolutionary framework.
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Evolutionary relationships.
In contrast to the importance Brian placed on the presence o f variation in a
population when discussing evolutionary changes, he used a somewhat typological
species concept in discussions that explicitly addressed species concepts:
SD: And what about dogs, are they the same genus or same family or
what?
B: Dogs are the same species.
SD: Same species? W hat does that mean?
B: That means they're just different breeds.
SD: Different breeds?
B: Like races and stuff.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) So what does it mean to be a species.
B: It means that they have real, they all have to be really similar. Ahm,
and they all have four legs that they walk on. They have ears, eyes, nose,
mouth, tongue. (B 85)
Brian simultaneously held two incompatible conceptions, variable and typological
species concepts. But these conceptions were elicited by different cues. Questions
concerning evolution revealed a variable species concept, and questions of other
biological phenom ena elicited use o f a typological species concept.
Compatible with his typological species concept, Brian did not recognize that
different species could not interbreed. Because the Darwinian species concept was not
used by Brian, in several instances he tentatively suggested that hybridization between
species could account for the origin o f variation. He was not alone in the use o f this
conception. However, when Brian posed hybridization as an answer, it was always in a
tentative and speculative m anner unlike many of his classmates during whole class
discussions.
Other biological processes.
Brian had a very firm knowledge of M endelian genetics. He understood DNA to
be the fundamental "blue print" for a species and this genetic material was usually
passed in M endelian terms. In the prediction interviews, he answered in a scientific
manner, describing the independent inheritance o f the characteristics between
generations. He even had a sound knowledge of the action o f sex-linked
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characteristics. However, Brian's strict M endelian conception o f genetics can be
contrasted with the more scientific view o f the action o f both blended and
independently inherited traits.
Brian also displayed a functional knowledge o f animal taxonomy. He could
classify animals shown during the interviews about instances as well as explain the
reasoning behind such classification. This functional knowledge was com bined with an
understanding that such classification should be linked to the organisms' evolutionary
relationships.
Keeping with his mechanistic view of the natural world, Brian was not
anthropomorphic in his explanations o f biological phenomena. Additionally, he would
reject anthropomorphic answers when they were presented to him
SD: Can population make any changes in response to a selection pressure
just by themselves?
B: No, you can't change the DNA. (B 67)
Related to anthropom orphism, Brian understood there to be a difference between
behavioral characteristics o f organisms and genetic characteristics. In discussions for
the sorting task, Brain explained that the rabbits could change their behaviors, but they
could not change their genetic makeup.
See Figure 10 for a summary o f Brian's conceptual framework at the outset of the
study.
M id-year framework
Mechanism.
Brian's understanding o f the mechanism of evolutionary change continued to be
the most prominent aspect o f his conceptual framework for evolution, and many
aspects o f his initial framework were retained through the m id-year period. He retained
use of conceptions of (a) mutation as the source of variation, (b) variable species
concept, and (c) evolution as being a change in the proportion o f a population with a
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trait. The concept maps he drew at the beginning o f the year were not substantially
different from those he drew at m id-year (CM-2 & CM-3, mid year).
H um an Evolution
Humans are animals which evolve
Humans are primates

______

C haracteristics o f Evolutionary
Changes
Random aspect o f evolution
Long time required
Drive toward higher organisms

Evidence for Evolution
Fossils are supporting evidence

M echanism

Biblical evidence is refuting evidence

Mutation as the origin of variatior

Broad E volutionary Theories
Evolution includes changes since
primordial soup
Punctuated equilibrium
Gradualism
Evolution important in biology

Historical A spects o f Theory

Variable species concept
Related B iological K now ledge

Evolution as a change in
proportion of population

Mendelian genetics

Collage concept for fitness

Rejection o f anthropomorphism

Genetic drift___________________

Evolutionary R elationships
Populational and typological species
concept

Natural H istory
Knowlege of recent natural
Old, changing earth
Knowledge o f animal taxonomy

Note. Italics indicate instances of conceptual change.
Solid block indicates academic conception.

Figure 10
Summary o f Brian's initial conceptual framework for evolution
However, there were some subtle changes seen in the conceptions in the
mechanism category. The first o f these changes was seen in Brian's recognition of the
prospect o f harmful mutations. The first concept map he drew during m id-year
demonstrates that Brian's tentative knowledge o f the existence o f harmful mutations
became enm eshed into his conceptual framework for this aspect of evolution. (See
Appendix G for Brian's concept maps.)
B rian : Some mutations can have real disadvantages to it. And, if it is a
bad mutation, natural selection will make that individual die. Ahm,
which would make it not have any offspring which, if it was a separate
species o f whatever, then it would be extinction. (B 213)
Related to this, Brian formed a more structured knowledge of the random aspect
of mutation, "mutations and all that are just by chance, they just happen to fit." (B
169) Through introducing a greater importance of the random aspect of mutations,
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Brian further separated the actions o f mutations and natural selection, "Natural
selection doesn't cause mutations." (B 213) This separation is further demonstrated in
his answer to the interview about instances session which concerned the production of
a mutations in bears (P I-1, mid year). In this question, Brian explained that both
beneficial and harmful mutations were equally likely to occur, even in the face of a
strong selection pressure.
Brian's collage conception o f fitness also underwent a subtle change during mid
year. In response to the sorting task, Brian explained that the operation o f natural
selection increased the "survivability" of members o f a population. [B 214] However,
it is important to remember that while Brian had an operational understanding of the
scientific conception o f fitness, he did not associate the term "fitness" with this
scientific conception.
Brian began to question his initial conception of inbreeding as a source of new
variation during the m id-year period. In a discussion of factors which may affect the
mutation rate o f a population Brian asked, "Does inbreeding actually cause mutations,
or is does it just allow for recessive traits to appear?" Inbreeding had not been brought
up in our conversation, although it had been offered by a student as a possibility in a
whole class discussion that occurred five days earlier. The m anner in which this
question was asked dem onstrates that Brian had already begun to answ er this question
for himself.
Evolutionary changes.
The group of conceptions related to the nature o f evolutionary changes was the
second most prominent category o f Brian's conceptual framework during the mid-year
period. The first change seen in this category was his strong emphasis of the random
aspect of evolution. This change was described in the preceding section on the process
of evolution. The em ploym ent of the random aspect of mutation resulted in substantial
changes in Brian's conceptions of the nature o f evolutionary changes. W hile Brian had
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tentatively considered the random aspect of evolution earlier in the year, at mid-year
this became a very prominent aspect o f Brian's understanding o f the nature of
evolutionary changes. The following quote from a discussion of word sort
demonstrates that Brian had a well defined understanding o f the nature of evolutionary
changes (WS, mid-year):
B: All evolutionary changes are random.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: It goes with chance.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Random and chance, but the end result can show order. (B 226)
Brian’s conception of the random aspect of evolutionary changes was also
demonstrated by his selection in the interview about instances o f evolutionary patterns
(IAI-3, mid-year). In this exercise, Brian selected the phylogenetic tree which had the
most irregular branching pattern. (B 185)
Related to this conception o f randomness, Brian understood evolution to operate
without a grand, overarching design. Following the class activity in which natural
patterns were discussed, Brian explicitly rejected the existence o f a design or plan
behind the action of evolution. His rejection fits well with the random aspect he had so
recently begun to use.
But by saying that evolution followed no plan or design, Brian was not
suggesting that evolution did not have a purpose (i.e., function). In the questions Brian
completed for the class discussion of natural patterns he explained, "evolution has a
purpose, but not intentionally." (Artifact 5) Purpose was understood to be
"progressions" in an organism from less to more complex, and "moving organisms
higher on the evolutionary tree." (B 167-168) Supporting this movement, Brian
explained, "To go from a paramecium to a human being, I call that progress." (B 167)
Brian's Aristotelian understanding o f biological diversity was tempered by his
recognition of evolution as being a tree (as opposed to a ladder o f life).
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While Brian understood evolution as making groups o f organism s more complex,
this complexity was interpreted as how well they are adapted for their particular niche,
"parameciums [sic] are pretty perfect for what they have to do." (B 168) There is a
tension here between Brian's understanding o f evolutionary progression and his
understanding o f evolutionary adaptations. At this point in the interviews, this tension
was not resolved.
Brian understood evolution to be a natural process through which species change
in response to ever changing natural conditions.

SD: W ould you say extinction is a failure of a species?
B: Uhm, no, the species didn't fail. The species just wasn't capable, I
mean it wasn't like a test....But, I don't know, it's just the changing o f the
stuff around 'em.

SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: So it’s not really a failure, it's just like a change in time. (B 166)
Natural history.
The third m ost prom inent category of conceptions during the m id-year period
was Brian's knowledge of natural history. W hen asked about the history o f biological
organism s on the earth, Brian drew a very elaborate, detailed time line. He explained
(a) the earth was 4.5 billion years old, (b) life required water accumulation, and (c) the
chance organization of the first organic molecules into simple systems such as
plasmids. His time line included formation of the first multicellular organism, the
formation o f of the first plants and animals, and the exploration o f land by the first
semi-terrestrial vertebrates. He ended the time line with further development of both
animals and plants. (B 176)
Related to his conception of evolution being the natural result o f organisms living
in a changing environment, Brian understood the earth to be undergoing continual,
slow change, explaining how plate tectonic theory would account for many of these
changes.
Another aspect o f Brian's natural history knowledge was the distinction he drew
between instinctive and learned behaviors. He realized that many o f the behaviors of
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organisms are genetically determined (instinct), but these could also affect how
organisms learn. This issue became important as he considered which traits were
viable options for evolutionary changes.
Evolutionary relationships.
The most definitive change seen in this category o f conception was a change in
Brian's species concept.
SD: Do you think that a species is something that really exists whether
we put a name to it or not?
B: Well, there's [sic] always organisms that are similar, but they're
different. And the ones that are similar stay together.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: Well, depending on their nature. But they reproduce together.
SD: They reproduce together? Is that something really important when
we talk about a species, that they reproduce together?
B: Um. Yes. Cause if it didn't reproduce together, you wouldn't have a
species. (B 218)
From his formal, typological species concept seen in early interviews with Brian, this
modified version has emerged. Brian introduced the lack o f breeding barriers as an
essential characteristic of a species. His last com ment in the above quote demonstrates
that this was a substantial change, with Brian rejecting his earlier conception.
O ther biological processes.
Brian's knowledge o f genetics underwent a change that may be related to the
modifications o f his conception o f process and the nature o f evolutionary changes.
While his early conceptions represented a sound, scientific understanding, these
underwent a further reorganization that allowed for a more sophisticated understanding
of both the random and constrained aspects of inheritance:
SD: Do you think the way you look, is it random or is it ordered?
B: Ahm, I mean, there's, I mean there may be millions of combinations
that they could have had.
SD: Yeah.
B: Between my mom and my dad. But, they're just specific like if you
could put 'em all, I mean, you wouldn't be able to list 'em all.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: And they're just random what way. I mean, was the one that grew or
whatever.
SD: Okay, so it's a combination of
B: I mean there's a set number.
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SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: But it's random the one they chose out o f that. (B 196-197)
O ther categories.
The conceptual categories o f the evidence for evolution, broad evolutionary
theories, human evolution, and the historical aspects of evolutionary theory underwent
no revisions during this period.
See Figure 11 for a summary of Brian's m id-year conceptual framework.
Year-end framework
Natural history.
Conceptions related to natural history were the most prom inent group in Brian's
year-end conceptual framework. As shown in the previous two descriptions, Brian
retained a well differentiated knowledge o f many aspects o f natural history. But in the
interviews conducted toward year's end, not only did Brian have a wealth of knowledge
of natural history, there were also signs of a growing interest in this area as well.
While Brian continually asked questions during our 17 interviews, toward the end of
the year most of his questions concentrated on information about various animals.
Some examples of his questions include:
Do female (elephants) have tusks? Do the males? (B 241)
Do African elephants have the bigger ears? (B 241)
Why don't the females have tusks? (B 242)
Can bears move their ears like dogs? (B 250)
These questions not only demonstrate an interest in natural history, I feel they
signify Brian's expectation that there are causes and results for various
adaptations. Use o f evolution as a unifying theory base allows for such an
expectation.
Other signs that Brian had begun to use evolution as a means of understanding
natural history cam e from a discussion of the graphic depicting three species o f beta's:
SD: So do you think they are the same species?
B: Ahm, I don't know. They're related.
SD: Yeah?
B: Uh, uh. (Yes)

160
SD: You say that based on just their looks? They look the same?
B: W ell it's like the bottom two [a grizzly and black bear] are more
related than the polar bear.
SD: Is that ju st because of the size difference or ah the color
difference?
B: Well their snout and stuff are different....Ahm, probably these two
separated after both o f these ones separated from the polar bear. (B
249)
H um an Evolution
Humans are animals which evolve*
Humans are primates*____________
E vidence for E volution
Fossils are supporting evidence*
Biblical evidence is refuting
evidence*

Characteristics o f E volutionary
Changes
Conceptual change fo r random
aspect o f evolution
Long time required*
Lack o f design fo r evolution
Evolutionary progression vs
further adaptation
Evolutionary R elationships

Broad Evolutionary T heories
Evolution includes changes since
primordial soup*
Punctuated equilibrium*
Gradualism*
Evolution important in biology*

H istorical Aspects o f Theory

Darwinian species concept
R elated Biological K now ledge
Mendelian genetics*
Rejection o f anthropomorphism*
G enetic inheritence is a random
proccess operating within
constraints

M echanism
Mutation as the origin o f
variation*
Variable species concept*

N atural History
Connection o f learned and
instinctive behaviors
Elaborate knowledge o f history of
life on earth

Evolution as a change in
porportion of population*

Old, changing earth*

Genetic drift*

Knowlege of recent natural
history o f animals*
Knowledge o f animal taxonomy’

Recognition o f harmful
mutations
Fitness as an increased
"survivability" o f organisms
Note. Italics indicate instances o f conceptual change.
* indicates retention o f conception from previous description.
Solid block indicates academic conception.

Figure 11
Summary o f Brian's m id-year conceptual framework for evolution
A nother aspect o f Brian's conception of natural history was his conception of the
com petitive basis of biological systems. He explained that organism s com pete for a
limited amount o f natural resources, "to stay alive and reproduce they need to have
certain things. They have certain requirements." (B 274) The conception that there
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are natural limits to the number of organisms a system can sustain is an absolutely
essential one to understanding the process through which evolution works (Fisher,
1992).
M echanism .
Like the previous descriptions, Brian's conceptions o f the mechanism of
evolutionary change were prominent. He continued to use conceptions o f (a) mutations
as the source of variation, (b) a variable species concept, and (c) evolution as being a
change in the proportion o f a population with a trait.
W hile these three portions were retained, Brian's conception of natural selection
underwent subtle revisions during this period. Previously, Brian understood natural
selection to operate through the death of less "survivable" individuals. As he
elaborated on his posttest answers, Brian explained how natural selection operated on a
population o f ducks:
B: Less successful ducks just died without offspring.. Well. (Pause)
They didn't, they didn't, like the less successful ducks didn't just all die
one year because all the more successful ducks just took over.
SD: Okay.
B: They, they just eventually got weeded out. (B 295)
W hile this conception was expressed in very informal terms, there is evidence that
Brian was beginning to recognize natural selection as a more subtle force than he
previously had described.
Brian's conception o f fitness was still under transition at this point of the year.
He understood that high survivability was important in evolutionary terms, but he had
difficulty weighing the importance o f this characteristics against their "adaptability."
(B 297) Brian explained that if a lion with a higher survivability but low adaptability
continued to reproduce and the environment of this population changed, the entire
population could be eliminated. Brian used a population approach to fitness which
remained at odds with the scientific understanding o f this conception.
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On the posttest, Brian remained unable to use a scientific conception o f genetic
drift to explain the elimination of sighted salamanders from the cave population.
While this conception was undergoing changes during the school year, by the end of
the research Brian had not yet constructed a meaningful scientific conception for this
topic.
During previous descriptions, geographic isolation played a role in Brain's
understanding o f the process o f evolutionary changes. He retained the use of this
conception as signified by its inclusion in Brian's list o f terms for a conception map,
but this concept did not appear in the formal map. Brian could not find a way to easily
include this term in his map, so it was omitted. This action represents an important
research consideration. As can be seen here and in later examples, concept maps
include only a portion of a student’s conceptual framework for a topic.
The third most prominent aspect of Brian's year-end conceptual framework was
the group of conceptions describing the nature o f evolutionary changes. All the
conceptions described previously were retained, with one major change in this
category. Brian began to apply the conception o f adaptation much more frequently in
the final series of interviews than he had previously. By year-end, Brian used a fairly
scientific conception o f adaptations.
SD: W hat is an adaptation?
B: [Pause] Ahm, an adaptation is a change
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: in the gene structure allowing the organism to be better fit for what
it needs to do.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes). W hat causes an adaptation?
B: A gene change.
SD: A gene change.
B: A mutation.
SD: A mutation. So an adaptation is caused by a mutation.
B: [Shakes his head yes. ]
SD: But they are not the same thing? You wouldn't use a mutation and
an adaptation the same way?
B: No.
SD: No?
B: M utations happen all the time.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) And adaptations?
B: Adaptations are mutations that worked. (B 254)
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Brian used two of the three formally accepted explanation for adaptations (Lucas,
1971), and he recognized the subtle difference between the meanings between these
terms.
B: Well there are two different kinds of adaptations....The way that I
was talking about it, is one o f them is an actual change in the organism.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: O r you can change your behavior. (B 254)
A nother sign that adaptation had become an important aspect o f Brian's
understanding of evolutionary change was the concept map that he drew which focused
solely on adaptation. This adaptation map was drawn in response to the request "map
your understanding of how evolution works" [CM-2, year end]. (See Appendix G for
this concept map.)
Evolutionary relationships.
By the end o f the year, the tentative use o f the Darwinian species concept had
become fairly well established in Brian's conceptual framework.
B: How is a species defined? Is it like organisms can ah recognize each
other and mate with each other? (B 290)
The manner in which this question was asked signifies that Brian was already
convinced o f the answer representing a shift from the far more tentative usage
o f this conception seen at mid-year.
Broad evolutionary theories.
Brian's responses during the final series o f interviews further demonstrate his
fondness of broad theories. However, his conception for what is included in the scope
o f evolutionary theory was under revision at this point.
SD: So when we're talking about organic or biological evolution, do
you think, what does that term encompass?
B: Ahm, well we know it includes the change in a species.
SD: Okay.
B: I haven’t thought about that before. I guess, if you take the literal
meaning o f the word evolve, you'd have to go from one state to another.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
B: So, [pause] I guess [pause] I don't know if it would include the
creation o f species or not. (B 278)
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The actual limits of evolutionary theory were not a topic Brian had invested much time
or energy in considering. Because of this, one question was capable o f causing a
change in his conception for this topic.
The conceptual groups o f the historical aspects o f evolutionary theory, human
evolution, evidence for evolution, and knowledge o f outside biological areas
underwent no substantial changes from the previous description.
See Figure 12 for a summary o f Brian's year-end conceptual framework.
Summary o f year long conceptual change
As shown in Brian's maps, his emphasis has shifted at year-end to a more holistic
view of the evolution. While his maps constructed at year-end heavily stress the
mechanism of evolutionary change, this is not their sole component. Brian
experienced several instances of conceptual change between this last description and
that made at mid-year. He began to recognize that adaptations o f organisms can be
understood through the application of evolutionary theory. His view of natural
selection changed from a somewhat simplistic conception o f survival of the fittest
toward an understanding of differential reproduction. The final series of interviews
elicited expression of a somewhat sophisticated understanding of the various forms of
adaptation. While Brian had a firm, basic understanding of evolution at the outset of
the study, several facets o f this conceptual framework became refined during the
school year. Overall, the pattern o f Brian's conceptual change was toward a more
scientifically acceptable understanding o f evolution.
Stephanie: Biologist as M ulti-disciplinary Realist
I selected Stephanie as one of the first of choices for interview participants based
on her critical attitude and interest in biology. From the outset of the interview
process, Stephanie made clear to me her skepticism o f evolutionary theory. At the
same time, she demonstrated great interest in the research process, and she offered to
participate long before I asked for volunteers. Her skepticism and interest were also
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com bined with the use of several alternative conceptions in her explanations of
evolutionary process. Stephanie's case is particularly useful in its im plications for the
actions o f a learner’s conceptual ecology on the process o f conceptual change.
H um an Evolution

Characteristics of Evolutionary
Changes

B road E volutionary T heories

Humans are animals which evolve*

Evolution involves random
changes within constraints*
Long time required*

Evolution includes changes since
primordial soup*
Punctuated equilibrium*

Lack o f design for evolution*

Gradualism*

A more complex, scientific
conception o f adaptation

Evolution important in biology*

Evolutionary Relationships

H istorical A spects o f T heory

Humans are primates*

E vidence for E volution
Fossils are supporting evidence*
Biblical evidence as refuting
evidence*

Darwinian species concept

Mechanism
R elated B iological K now ledge
Mendelian genetics*

Mutation as the origin of
variation*
Variable species concept*

N atural History
Connection o f learned and
instinctive behaviors
Elaborate knowledge o f history ol
life on earth

Rejection o f anthropomorphism*

Evolution as a change in
proportion o f population*

Old, changing earth*

Genetic inheritence as a random
process operating within constraints*

Genetic drift*
Harmful and beneficial mutations

Knowledge o f animal taxonomy*

Fitness as an increased
"survivability" o f organisms

K nowlege of recent natural
history o f animals*

N atural selection operates on
differential reproduction

A daptations as explanable
phenomena

Note. Italics indicate instances o f conceptual change.
* indicates retention o f conception from previous description.
Solid block indicates academic conception.

Figure 12
Summary o f Brian’s year-end conceptual framework for evolution
Stephanie was a senior girl who sat in the back o f H urston’s Biology II class.
While she spoke only occasionally to the entire class, I often watched her whisper
comments to fellow students during whole-class discussions. Like Brian, Stephanie
volunteered responses in whole-class discussions only if the answer wasn't
immediately forthcom ing from an other student. O ur first interviews were difficult
because o f Stephanie’s very direct mode of communication. She offered to answer
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only to the specific questions that were asked: she did not follow tangents arising from
our conversations. But as the interviews continued, I learned to use Stephanie as a
valuable resource. Being very precise in her choice of words, she could react in many
different ways to one question depending on how the question was worded. More than
once, I found m yself correcting my interview protocols for the next week based upon
Stephanie's tutelage.
The most insightful descriptor of Stephanie's approach to biology is as a m ulti
disciplinary realist. Her approach is demonstrated by her comments made before
drawing a concept map for "her understanding of evolution" (CM-1, initial):
SD: W rite down some key concepts that you think you need to explain
[evolution]....
ST: Okay, I'd put down ah I think this is the name o f it, Origin of
Species....Okav. let's see, probably the Galapagos islands.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: Let's see ah. Neanderthal. [Long pause] I can't rem em ber any of
the scientists' names, but I ju st know there's some guy
SD: Yeah
ST: That, the primordial soup thing....[W hispering] Ah, I don't know
what else to put down. [Long pause] I guess I can put down
CroM agnon also.
SD: Okay.
S T : And then, the Leakey family. I guess I'm more into archeology
than biology. [Laughs.]
SD: Yeah, I can see that....
S T : All right. I don't know the term for it, but you know how ah, the
embryos from the different animals look the same.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : I know there's a term for it.
SD: Ah, ah. Uhm, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny?
ST: That's it.
SD: O kay....Y ou’ve made facial gestures and stuff when you talk about
primordial soup.
S T : I just don’t think that's right.
SD: You just don't think that's right. W hat do you think is right?
ST: Well, I'm sort of creationist evolutionist. I'm kinda' both.
SD: Okay.
S T : So, but I just don't think that life could start from a bunch of
chemical mixing together.
SD: Okay. (Yes)
ST: And, ah, what I once told my friends, then who put all the soup
together?
SD: Yeah?
ST: [Small laugh] That's just one thing that I've thought of. So I think
that it's possible that life was created from God and then evolved from
there. I just don't think that life was created from primordial soup.
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SD: Uh, uh. Is that's something you came up with on your own? . . .
ST: Yeah.
SD: Yeah, you know we've talked about this in some ways before. Ah,
how do you feel about this, the continuation of the Galapagos and
Darwin . . . ?
S T : Oh, well I think that Charles Darwin probably had a lot o f good
points
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : Because I think it's possible that some species developed from
others or whatever. W hatever it said in his book. But ah, the ontogeny
recapitulates phylogeny thing, ah, I mean that's interesting. M aybe it's
meant to be that the development starts the same.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : I don't know if that's right or not. I haven't made up my mind,
whether they have truth in that or not. (D 37-45)
When asked to map her understanding of evolution, Stephanie did not approach
the task as a mechanistic biologist with a dissection of the process, or even as a
functional biologist with an explanation of patterns which result from evolution.
Instead, she provided an account o f what she felt were the important stages of
evolutionary theory and the scientists responsible for them -Darwin and the original
theory, the primordial soup "guy" and his explanation o f the origins of life, and the
Leakey family and their theories of human evolution. Stephanie did not use just one
way of understanding of world; she used many. Her concept map demonstrates a
historical/sociological approach to biological knowledge. As she explained, "I don't
really see any importance to just knowing something just purely scientific." (D 283)
When I refer to Stephanie as "multi-disciplinary," I mean to say she used the
knowledge from a variety of disciplines to understand biology.
The second part of Stephanie's descriptor, realist, may be considered problematic
by many science educators, but I feel the appropriateness o f this term is also
demonstrated in the interview segment shown above. When I asked about the facial
expression she made while writing about primordial soup, she responded, "I just don't
think that's right." Stephanie recognized the existence o f a external, physical reality
that could be described and understood. While Stephanie was a realist, she was not a
scientific realist: she did not always choose to understand the reality in scientific terms.
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Instead, she referred to the knowledge o f many disciplines and ways o f knowing in
order to construct her understanding of reality. This is represented by Stephanie's
reaction to the graphics depicting biological organisms (IAI-1, initial). During these
interviews she explained, "I'm giving you scientific answers. I think that's what you
want." This passage indicates that Stephanie understood that there are many ways to
interpret nature. (D 239)
As suggested by her approach to biology, Stephanie has a wide scope o f
academic interest. She enjoyed studying most disciplines, although English and history
were her favorites. Mathematics was the only subject Stephanie rejected as being
difficult, uninspiring, and inapplicable to her own life. Stephanie particularly enjoyed
biology and planned to pursue a profession in biomedical technology. However,
Stephanie's most ardent interest was in archeology. She studied the subject for several
years, and had been a docent in the archeology section of the neighboring university.
However, she decided not to pursue this avenue professionally as she recognized the
limited positions available in this area.
Stephanie was a responsible student, completing assignments long before they
were due. Out o f school, Stephanie spent much of her time reading. Stephanie's father
described her as a "voracious reader." [D 307] He explained that, like her mother, she
would begin one novel soon after finishing another. Some of the titles she read during
the study included Fountainhead. Jurassic Park. The Kitchen God's W ife. Notes from
the U nderground. Clan of the Cave Bear, and Brothers Karamasov. Her father
explained that she never limited herself to one area and she her reading always spanned
a broad area.
In our interviews, I was struck both by Stephanie's literary sophistication and her
self-assurance. As described by her parents, Stephanie spent a great deal of her life in
the company o f adults, and she was very comfortable participating in conversations
with adults. In our interviews, Stephanie was open, interested, and critical. She was
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very comfortable in taking a position and defending it as she looked for the flaws in her
own and other's arguments.
Stephanie's Conceptual Ecology
The most influential aspect o f Stephanie's conceptual ecology o f evolution was
her distinct religious orientation. Activities at a M ethodist church consumed much of
her free time. Consistently she found the weekly Bible study to be a highlight of her
week. In this Bible study, students came together with a knowledgeable adult for very
in-depth religious discussions. Often Stephanie would recall for me with vivid detail
the discussions of the previous week. This is not to imply that Stephanie's religious
understanding subsumed all other types o f knowledge:
ST: If there's a discussion in one o f my classes, I kinda', I'll think about
it after class, or something will trigger it when I'm walking down the
street or something, and I'll just think about it. I think a lot o f the
philosophy that I’ve found just by doing reports for my W orld History
class I think about a lot.
SD: Oh, do you?
ST: Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: You like that sort of thing?
S T : Yeah. I have Bible study once a week, and so that kind sometimes,
it contradicts what I'm learning.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) W hat do you do about that then?
ST: I just think about it. I don't know. It's kind hard to, hard to chose
you know, which is right. (D 151)
When evolution was discussed, Stephanie placed the highest value on knowledge
stemming from her belief system. Stephanie acknowledged that subtle forms of
evolution could occur, but she rejected the conception that humans are the result of
evolution from a ancestral primate. Instead, Stephanie was a biblical literalist in this
regard:
ST: Oh, ah, in church, when they say well God created man, and I think,
well it's probably true. (D 28)
Stephanie could be classified as a progressive creationist using Nelson's (1986)
classification system because she understood each biological group to be a result of
special creation, although she understood that each group could undergo a progressive

170
form o f evolution. There is an additional facet to Stephanie’s understanding in this
regard:
S T : I think that maybe things that are similar, like Neanderthal man, kind
o f evolved into us supposedly. I think, I can see how that could happen.
Just they’re just subtle changes. (D 25)
At the outset of the study, there is evidence o f Stephanie's multi-disciplinary
approach to a phenomenon. Here she was blending knowledge from religion,
anthropology, and biology to construct a foundation for her acceptance o f evolutionary
process. I found her views to be similar to her parents, as they too understood much of
nature through a religious framework. However, Stephanie's conception o f human
evolution differed drastically from her father's who used a more traditional, biblical
understanding. As the study progressed, the scientific phenom ena that Stephanie
would accept underwent subtle modifications. These modifications will be discussed
as her frameworks are described.
Related to her strong religious orientation, Stephanie understood the human life
to have a fundamental theistic component:

Stephanie: I think everything happens for a re a so n .. . . I think, there's
probably something I'm supposed to learn from this. (D 56)
But unlike the students described by Cobern (1992), Stephanie did not hold this theistic
or religious view for all o f nature, only that which directly im pacted humans. For the
majority of the natural world, Stephanie used a mechanistic or naturalistic
understanding.
Stephanie's positive scientific orientation may have provided for her partial use of
the naturalist world view. She enjoyed studying biology, saying "I think it's fascinating
to figure out why things are."([D 31) She particularly enjoyed studying the aspects of
biology that helped her understand the humans, and "What's more important than
learning about yourself?" (D 32) For Stephanie, for knowledge to be important it had
to impact on her life, "I don't really see any importance to knowing something just
purely scientific." (D 283)
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Stephanie approached most of the areas o f biology as a scientific realist. She
rejected the existence o f many pseudoscientific topics (Lock Ness Monster, aliens)
immediately. In response to questions that clearly have a scientific basis, Stephanie
reacted as rational, scientific realist. However, she was not always a scientific realist:
SD: For something to be true it has to have a scientific basis for you?
ST: Not necessarily. . . .
SD: How do you make that flip flop? How do you know whether to
analyze things scientifically or through some other means?
ST: Well scientifically if I read about it and there's a fact and they have
proof on a microscope slide.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : I can go in and look at it. That's different then having somebody say
"Well this m ight be the way things are." Then I can just think about it and
think about what the possibilities might be for accepting something. Or
ah, what I , what I believe personally. W hether I'm Buddhist or Lutheran
or whatever. (D 57)
When Stephanie was formally asked about the boundaries between science and
religion, the definitions seemed clear. She explained:
S T : See religion works on faith and science works on fact.
SD: Okay, so what is faith?
S T : Faith is the belief in something even if you can't see it or hear it.
You just have to know that it is. W hereas science doesn't know anything
until it's proven and written down and made a theory o f or something. (D
201 )
But Stephanie perceived many intersections between the two ways of knowing.
Stephanie's case study is an important one as it provides an opportunity to describe the
nature o f the intersection between academic and belief based conceptions.
Within science, Stephanie's epistemology was much like Brian's. She was
typically a scientific realist, understanding the goal o f science to find out the "truth."
(D 80) But like Brian, Stephanie did not always use a realist understanding of
knowledge. When she was com paring theories which did not have great personal
relevance, she had a distinctly relativistic approach. In these conditions, she discussed
the tentative and contextual nature o f knowledge. But also like Brian, when she
discussed theories with great personal relevance or universally accepted theories,
Stephanie approached this knowledge as a realist with the understanding that this
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knowledge somehow approximated nature. This fluid epistemological approach, while
it may be incoherent to those who study philosophy or logic, has been documented
previously in a group of biologists (Abrams & Wandersee, in press).
For Stephanie, a scientific theory is much like a hypothesis that has been "proven
and you think that's the truth." (D 80) She explained that if "everyone agreed on a
theory," it would become a fact. (D 81) This alternative conception fits well with her
use o f the realist epistemology, in that she views science as a search for universal
truths.
One attribute of Stephanie's fluid epistemological stance was that it allowed her
to recognize the attributes o f theories she did not personally accept. The division
between what Stephanie accepted and what she understood became a large factor in the
conceptual change that was documented.
S T : My personal view is that I kind o f go with creationism. But I can
see how the theory o f the developm ent from one cell could come to be,
but I just don't really think it would work. (D 71)
Stephanie did not accept scientific knowledge simply because it was presented by
an authority. This position made Stephanie very aware of the ways in which her
knowledge differed from scientific knowledge. She expected to understand scientific
explanations, but she did not always expect to accept these explanations as personal
truths. She drew clear distinctions between personal and academic knowledge, and
therefore these distinctions were relatively easy to document. This is not be the case
for the other participants. While she realized that her understanding of biology was
limited, she was not aware that her academic conceptions differed those of science.
Stephanie's Conceptual Framework for Evolution
Initial framework
S T : I believe evolution is a possibility because o f all of the evidence
that supports the theory, such as Lucy and finding the ancestral bones.
But I don't think, I don't com pletely believe that man crawled out o f the
sea a million years ago. [Soft laugh] Man may have evolved fully from
Neanderthals, but not fish or one celled organisms. I don't think just

173
because I would decide to live in the ocean that my great grand children
would have gills. That's pushing the evolution thing too far. (D 24-25)
The above quote is Stephanie's answer to the pretest question, "What is your personal
opinion of the theory of evolution?" This answer signifies Stephanie's (a) recognition
o f viable scientific evidence supporting evolution, (b) conception that a scientific
description of evolution includes large scale morphological changes dependent upon a
Lamarckian mechanism, and (c) personal conception that human evolution includes
only subtle changes within hominids. Each one o f these individual conceptions are
important in describing Stephanie's initial conceptual framework, however, her
conception of the nature of evolutionary changes was particularly influential and will
be discussed first.
Evolutionary changes.
As dem onstrated in her second concept map (CM-2, initial) and the preceding
quote, Stephanie had two conceptions o f evolution. The one that she personally
accepted was that evolution was a process of gradual, subtle changes that occurred
within a kind of organism after the initial act o f creation. As Stephanie explained, "I
could see how that could happen. Just because they’re subtle changes. Just adaptation
to your environment." (D 25)
Stephanie understood that the scientific explanation for evolution to involve a
process o f drastic changes that accounted for the original production o f life and a
subsequent series of large scale morphological alterations which forced organisms to
"totally change into other creatures." (D 94) Stephanie rejected this group of
conceptions as being implausible:
ST: I think a species can e v o lv e .. . . Cheetahs, that a species that just
kind o f grew, evolved into something better. But that whole things
about the amoeba [evolving into h u m an s].. . .
SD: W hat would you think an evolutionist would say happened to an
amoeba?
ST: I think that's really pushing the point. You know, when somebody
says that. But you know they say it happened over millions o f years.
But even then, something had to just make something happen. If I
didn't have it, I couldn't just grow into something myself. And I don't
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think the amoeba group could have evolved either. They don't, they
don't have the traits to do that with. I don't see how it could happen. (D
28)
Stephanie had two systems o f conceptions of the nature o f evolutionary changes,
the one that she accepted and personally applied, and the one that she understood
science to hold but she personally rejected. But, as shown in the concept map drawn
early in the study, Stephanie did understand these two conceptual systems for evolution
as having a common com ponent o f natural selection. Stephanie personally accepted and
applied natural selection in her explanations of change in a population. Stephanie's
conception of natural selection included a driving force in the form o f 'the drive for
survival of a species.'" (D 29) This alternative conception will be further discussed in
the following section.
W ithin both systems of conceptions for evolutionary changes, Stephanie had
several alternative conceptions. Like Brian, she used an Aristotelian concept of
evolution as a progression to a "superior" organism:
SD: Do what do you think evolution is? W hen we say something
evolved, what does that mean?
S T : It turns into something better. (D 26)
Within her system for the scientific explanation, Stephanie understood evolutionary
changes to involve the progressive changes within a group o f organisms, a change that
should logically end with the production of only humans:
[In reference to a graphic depicting a gorilla]
S T : So why did [scientific] evolution stop with that particular gorilla?
Why didn't he evolve all the way up into humans?
SD: Okay.
ST: So I think if this was right [pointing to graphic o f hominid
evolution], then there would only be humans. (D 96)
Stephanie rejected the scientific explanation for evolutionary changes because of
what she perceived as several weaknesses of the explanation. One o f these weaknesses
described in the quote above was the existence o f other forms of life other than humans.
A nother area of weakness was the inability o f science to reproduce the initial production
of multicelluar life:
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S T : But see development from one cell, I just don't see 'cause if that
happened once then maybe that could happen again. So maybe we
could see evolution happening over a period o f a hundred years or
something.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: and we haven't. It's only happened once, and that's why I just don't
believe that. (D 72)
Stephanie also had difficulties understanding how the scientific explanation of
evolution could account for such "drastic changes" as "how scales changed to feathers.
That's such a difference. I don't see that." (D 95)
A nother conception that Stephanie had for this group concerned adaptations.
Stephanie understood adaptations to be a behavioral or genetic change which occurs
within a group of organism over many generations. This conception represents an
instance in which Stephanie's personal understandings coincided with her scientific
conceptions. While Stephanie used the scientifically accurate conception of adaptations
as occurring within a population and requiring long time periods, she failed to
differentiate the many different scientific meanings o f the term "adaptation."
M echanism.
Stephanie had several alternative conceptions related to the mechanism of
evolutionary changes at the outset of the study. Once again, the analysis is complicated
as we consider the two explanations in Stephanie's conceptual framework, her personal
conceptions and her conceptions of the scientific explanation.
Conceptions related to the origin o f variation are the most difficult to understand.
Within her personal explanation for the origin o f variation, Stephanie understood
"interbreeding for dominance" to account for variation. (See CM-1, initial, in Appendix
G.) She was unclear on this point, explaining that "interbreeding" allows for dominance
to arise in a population, and "that dominance lead[s] to evolution." (D 70) W hile one
might understand her "interbreeding" as a version o f in-breeding of a population,
Stephanie's conception o f interbreeding was more like the scientific conception of
hybridization:
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ST: Isn't there such a thing like selective breeding? Like if one species
breeds with another one, then like all the good traits com e out? I like
th a t.. . . Like if one species has something and the other one doesn't and
all the ones that have it breed together, eventually the ones that don't, if
they don't breed enough, then they'll sort o f die out. (D 66)
Stephanie's personal conception for the origin o f variation signifies her use of an
alternative conception o f a species concept. This conception will be discussed in a
later section.
Stephanie felt obligated to personally use a self-taught conception because she
continually questioned the scientific explanations for the origin o f variation:
S T : I don't think the amoeba group could have evolved either. They
don’t, they don't have the traits to do that with. I don't see how it could
happen. (D 28)
Such questioning becomes understandable when we consider that Stephanie had a basic
misunderstanding o f the conceptions suggested by science. During the pretest,
Stephanie offered the alternative conception o f use/disuse as the origin of variation:
[In reference to the evolution of blindness in cave salamanders]
S T : I said that because the salamanders live in com plete darkness, light
is not a necessity. A fter many generations o f salamanders that became
blind, the offspring were eventually born without sight.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: Ah actually, maybe that’s not right. M aybe the ones that originally
went into the cave became blind and their offspring were bom without
sight and they became blind and maybe the process ju st happened
quicker because they could function without s ig h t.. . . So maybe
because they don’t use it, they lose it. (D 23)
However, this use/disuse explanation was tentatively suggested and within five minutes,
she voiced her discomfort:
ST: I don’t know. [Pause] I guess they became blind just because the
didn't need their sight. But I don't see how that could be passed on. (D
24)
So while the use/disuse explanation was offered by Stephanie she clearly
recognized that it was not a plausible explanation.
Stephanie also suggested need as a source o f variation:
[Written answer reference to the evolution o f speed in cheetahs]
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S T : Gradually, the cheetahs developed stronger legs. Having food as a
incentive, the cheetahs ran faster and gained stronger muscles in their
legs that were passed on to their offspring. (Pretest #7)
However, in her oral com ments given in the second week of the study, there was
evidence of her discom fort with this explanation:
S T : I have a hard time forming opinions about this. I really don't think
we can form something just because we need it. (D 15)
It is important to consider that although Stephanie did not find the conception of need
as a plausible mechanism for the production o f variation, she understood that to be the
scientific explanation for this phenomena. A t this point in the study, Stephanie did not
have another conception to account for the origin o f variation within the scientific
explanation for evolution.
In an interview conducted two weeks later, there was evidence for conceptual
change. In her concept map drawn to explain "how evolution works" Stephanie
included mutation as a mechanism to account for the production o f variation [CM-2,
initial].
S T : (Reading her concept map) D evelopm ent from one cell leads to
mutation, or the possibility of mutation. M utation requires necessity. ..
SD: Now what's the function o f mutation on that side [of your concept
map]?
S T : Okay, ah, maybe something developed, like an animal developed
from one cell and then
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : M utated into something that could survive e a s ie r.. . .
SD: Could you describe that a little bit?
ST: Right, okay, ahm if something mutates maybe it's because it needs
to. For survival. (D 71)
By this point in the year, Stephanie had begun to explore mutation as the source o f
variation for the scientific explanation of evolution. However, as was just shown, the
use of mutation was integrated with the pre-existing conception of need as the source
o f variation. With this integration, the source o f variation and the actual action o f
natural selection has been joined (the selection pressure causes the production o f the
trait). The use of mutation makes this previously im plausible explanation more
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attractive, possibly because the introduction of mutation makes the explanation more
mechanistic, and therefore more scientific.
It is clear that for both the scientific explanation and Stephanie's personal
explanation for evolutionary change, variation in the original population is an
important component. In her answer given during the interview, Stephanie explained
that cheetahs evolved because:
S T : The ones that could run faster were the ones that were able to eat,
and the ones that were slow maybe weren't able to catch as much food.
(D 22)
While she was still forming conceptions o f how that variation became present,
Stephanie realized that to evolve a population must be variable. But I hesitate to call
this a populational species concept, simply because Stephanie seems to have such a
vague conception of a species. This was demonstrated by her personal explanation for
the production of variation as relying upon hybridization between species. While
Stephanie recognized the importance of variation, this variation was not linked
specifically linked to a species concept. Stephanie's species concept will be discussed
in more detail in a later section.
In Stephanie's explanation o f the mechanism o f evolution as expressed through a
concept map, need was used as an essential component o f evolutionary change. In
both her scientific explanation and personal explanation, need served to link the origin
of variation (either through mutation or "interbreeding") into the process of natural
selection. Stephanie understood natural selection to be the most im portant com ponent
of the process of evolutionary change in both her personal explanation and her
scientific explanation. Like Brian, Stephanie used the alternative conception of natural
selection as:
ST: Well the ones that survive the best are the ones that are going to
survive eventually. (D 22)
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Stephanie understood natural selection as operating through the death o f unfit
individuals, instead o f the more scientifically acceptable conception o f natural selection
as operating on differential reproduction within population.
Many of Stephanie's alternative conceptions about the mechanism o f evolution
applied to both her personal explanation and her understanding of the scientific
explanation for evolutionary change. This intersection is dem onstrated by Stephanie's
conception o f evolution as changes in the quality o f a trait in an entire population, as
opposed the more scientific conception of evolution being a gradual increase in the
number of individuals in a population with a trait. Stephanie also used the alternative
conception o f biological fitness as "being able to change, to adapt to any changes." (D
21) This conception can be contrasted with the scientific understanding o f fitness as
having the greatest number of viable offspring.
The final aspect of Stephanie's understanding of the process o f evolution was her
lack of familiarity with geographic isolation as a means of providing for speciation:
S T : If humans were evolved from ah chimpanzees, then all the
chimpanzees would have evolved into h u m an s.. . . So I think if this [a
graphic o f primate evolution) is right, then there would only be humans.
(D 93)
ST: I just don't think that we evolved from fish. Because then there
wouldn't be any fish. They would all be evolved. (D 26)
These comments signify that Stephanie was only fam iliar with veitical patterns of
evolution. Such evolution occurs when one species changes over a great span of time
so that the original species is much different from the most recent species. She had no
conception of evolution as a speciation event caused by geographic isolation and
resulting in reproductive isolation. Because her perplexity with branching patterns of
evolution surfaced during several interviews, it is clear that this was an important issue
for Stephanie as she approached scientific explanations o f evolutionary change.
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Human evolution.
The issue o f human evolution was a very important aspect of Stephanie's
conceptual ecology of evolution. When asked about her opinion of the theory of
evolution, part o f Stephanie's response was:
S T : I believe that man was created by God. There is a possibility that
God created Neanderthal man and we evolved from them. I definitely
do not think that my ancestry is from the mud. (D 25)
This response is not surprising when one considers Stephanie's conception of the
patterns o f evolutionary change. A t this point in the semester, she understood the
scientific conception of evolutionary change as a drive toward "being better"something she interpreted as being human. For evolution to be a viable concept for
Stephanie, it must explain human evolution.
Human evolution was Stephanie's testing ground for the theory of evolution, and
it is not surprising that she gave this aspect o f evolutionary thought much
consideration. She studied anthropology a great deal when she was younger and this
becomes evident as her first concept map is examined (C M -1, initial). While she
understood the scientific conception of anthropology as including the evolution of man
from an ancestral primate, Stephanie personally accepted an altered version o f this
explanation. (See Appendix G for CM-1, initial.)
Similar to the explanation for evolutionary change seen described in a previous
section, Stephanie's personal conception o f human evolution was that God created the
initial prehistoric hominid, and this hominid underwent subtle evolutionary changes.
This is an unusual stance for a self described "creationist." This is a case where an
individual's theoretical commitments (interest in anthropology) allowed for changes
within conceptions stemming from a belief system (evolution o f humans).
O ther conceptions of human evolution included Stephanie's understanding of
humans as "related" to primates and other animals. During the interviews about
instances (IAI-1, initial), Stephanie readily agreed that humans could be classified as
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animals and as primates. However, it became evident that Stephanie had an alternative
conception o f what was implied by biological "relation."
Evolutionary relationships.
SD:
ST:
SD:
ST:

Do you know what the term species means?
Well it's just an order o f classification. (D 88)
W hat would be the purpose o f classification? Why do we do that?
To differentiate between animals? (D 117)

Stephanie used the term species and recognized that the evolving populations
must be variable, but it is not clear if she used a conception of a species that could be
applied to nature. Stephanie's conception of a species was a taxonomic group
established by scientists in order to better study natural organisms. I could find no
evidence that she tried to apply this taxonomic unit to nature or expected this unit to
apply to nature. W hile biology teachers may find this to be a troubling alternative
conception, this "artificial" species concept fits well with Stephanie's personal
conception of evolution. Because she recognized only small changes within a species,
she had no expectations that species would be "related" in the same manner as a
biologist understands organisms are "related." Although Stephanie used the term
"related" in reference to groups of animals, she meant that these groups, such as
primates, had groups of sim ilar characteristics. She did not understand this to mean
that they shared some evolutionary ancestor. Stephanie did not recognize a species as
being the sole taxonomic group capable o f successful reproduction as evidenced by her
use o f "interbreeding" between groups (hybridization). Her conceptions in this area
become more complex when we consider that Stephanie had an awareness that "real
distantly" related species could not interbreed.
Evidence for evolution.
Despite the fact that Stephanie often referred to herself as a "creationist," she
recognized the presence of strong evidence to support scientific evolutionary theory.
Not surprisingly, the evidence o f most importance to Stephanie came from
anthropology:
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ST: I believe evolution is a possibility because o f all the evidence that
supports the theory. Such as Lucy and finding the ancestral bones. (D
24)
Stephanie also explained how the species on the Galapagos islands could be considered
to be evidence for evolution. If Stephanie used a constant scientific realist
epistemology, based upon her wide prior knowledge I would expect her to react
favorably to the theory o f evolution. However, given her multi-disciplinary approach to
epistemology and because this aspect o f science clashed with a very important aspect
of her life, religion, Stephanie was in the very unique position o f recognizing the
strengths o f evolutionary theory while rejecting the "truthfulness" o f it.
Historical aspects o f evolutionary theory.
As discussed at the outset of Stephanie's description, her initial concept map
contained some historical information. (See Appendix G for CM-1, initial). The
inclusion o f Darwin, the Galapagos islands, Origin o f the Species, and the Leakey
family signifies Stephanie's historical/ sociological approach to the theory. It is
difficult to establish if Stephanie used this historical/sociological approach to other
biological topics, or if this approach was somehow unique to this theoretical
framework. But as shown in the previous section, the orientation o f her first map does
not signify a lack o f knowledge o f the more process oriented aspect of the theory
content of this theory.
Broad evolutionary theories.
When asked about her opinion concerning evolutionary theory on the pretest, part
of Stephanie's response included:
S T : Some people say that you know, primordial soup and all that kind
o f stuff. I just don't see that happening. (D 25)
At this point in the year, Stephanie equated the theory of evolution with the formation
of the original organism as well as all other changes that occurred within groups of
organisms. But, as mention previously, her personal opinion o f evolution included
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only the very subtle changes that occur within groups o f organisms. Stephanie
understood that the act of formation of the original organisms to be dependent upon
God. From a biological educators' perspective, it is unfortunate that Stephanie
expected the scientific conception of evolution to account for original creation, as
traditionally this field is considered to be outside the boundaries o f evolutionary theory
and within the realm o f biochemistry. As such, this topic is seldom addressed in
biology classes and it is poorly understood by even expert biologists. Because she
expected tevolutionary theory to make creation understandable in biological terms, she
was continually disappointed.
It is not surprising to see that Stephanie did not understand evolutionary to be a
m ajor aspect of biology. Instead her vision o f the important theories of biology were
"anything that has to do with humans, just because that helps us directly." (D 148)
Because of this expectation o f biology, Stephanie failed to understand why the study of
evolution is important in understanding all life forms.
Natural history.
Stephanie did not have a wealth of knowledge o f historical or recent natural
history. While she recognized the extreme age of the earth, she did not have a
conception of the vast changes that have occurred during the course of geological
history. She viewed the earth as a very old, but somewhat stable place. While she did
display a deeper understanding o f the natural history of dinosaurs and early humans,
she failed to apply the knowledge of dinosaurs in many situations. However, issues of
human descent were applied continually during our discussions.
Other biological processes.
Like Brian, Stephanie had a firm understanding o f the genetic basis of physical
characteristics. She answered the prediction interviews in a scientific manner which
described the independent inheritance of the characteristics between generations. Also
like Brian, she even had a sound knowledge of the action of sex-linked characteristics.
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However, Stephanie's M endelian conception of genetics can be contrasted with the
more scientific view o f the action o f both blended and independently inherited traits.
Stephanie's firm framework for genetics was also dem onstrated by her
introduction of genetic terms into several interviews. In the first discussion o f the
sorting task (ST, initial), she explained that the rabbits' brown trait was recessive and
the white was dom inant at the outset. However, as the task progressed and number of
brown rabbits increased in the population, Stephanie explained:
ST: But because the brown ones (rabbits) were surviving, they became
dominant m ore and more.
SD: Uh, uh. W hen you say dominant, is that like a genetic kind of
dominance or?
ST: Right. (D 76)
Based on this response, Stephanie used the alternative conception that ecological
dominance is synonymous with genetic dominance.
Given her fundamentally sound usage of M endelian genetics, her awareness that
physical characteristics have a genetic basis, and her tendency to apply this knowledge,
the early interviews with Stephanie become more confusing. W hen she discussed the
evolution of webbed feet in ducks, Stephanie explained:
ST: Maybe because they [ducks] are not swimming at all, maybe their
bones would form differently [without webbing] and that would be
passed on. I don't think that after you are adult that you can alter it and
then have it passed on.
SD: But m aybe if it’s a juvenile?
ST: Yeah, maybe. (D 18)
This almost Larmarckian explanation for the evolution of the trait of
nonwebbed in ducks, is incongruent with the Stephanie's knowledge
of genetics. This altered explanation, that traits acquired early in life can be passed on,
is not unique to Stephanie and has been docum ented in high school students in other
studies (Cough & W ood-Robinson, 1985a). But why Stephanie would offer this
explanation is an important question. It suggests that she did not fully apply her
knowledge o f genetics to a question that has to do with evolution.
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Stephanie was remarkably anti-anthropomorphic in her answers to interview
questions, as shown in her explanation, "I don’t think mosquitoes learn anything.” This
rejection o f anthropom orphism implies a certain biological sophistication that was
absent from many other students in the class.
Like Brian, Stephanie had a functional knowledge of animal taxonomy. She
could categorize organisms shown during the interviews about instances (IAI-1, initial)
and explain her reasoning behind this categorization. But, unlike Brian, Stephanie did
not recognize taxonomic relationships as reflecting evolutionary relationships.
See Figure 13 for a summary of Stephanie's initial conceptual framework for
evolution.
M id-year framework
M echanism .
The most substantial changes occurring between initial to mid-year
interviews were found in the conceptions that describe the mechanism
of evolutionary change. Stephanie's concept map (CM-3, mid-year) and
her explanation o f the sorting task (ST, mid-year) dem onstrate that she
was capable of using several scientific conceptions o f process.
S T : ( Reading her concept map] Evolution is caused by mutation,
which created change in the population, through natural selection which
is a theory of Darwin, which is
survival o f the fittest. Darwin coined that, where desired traits are
passed on. (D 217)
(See Appendix G for CM-3, mid-year.)
Stephanie's conceptions about the origin of variation underwent the greatest
amount of change. As described previously, by the end of the initial interviews,
Stephanie had tentatively proposed mutations as the source o f variation. By mid-year,
this conception had become more deeply embedded as demonstrated by her
explanation that evolution "is caused by mutation." (D 217) "I think it's [evolution] all
mutation." (D 186)

However, her understanding o f mutation was not completely

scientific. Early in the m id-year interviews, she used a conception of mutation that was
inextricably linked to need:
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Human Evolution

Characteristics of Evolutionary
Changes

Broad Evolutionary Theories

Humans are animals

Evolution includes drastic
changes between groups (R)

Evolution includes creation of
first life and subsequent changes

Humans are primates

Evolutionary changes are
predictable and reproducable (R)

(R)
Evolution Includes only small
changes within a group

Humans are product "primoridal
soup" and subsequent drastic
evolution (R)

Evolution as progression to
superior organisms

Humans as product of ssparate
creation and subsequent subtie
evolution

Evolntioniadudss small,
gradual changes twftirin a group

Evidence for Evolution

Evolutionary Relationships

H istorical A spects o f Theory

Anthropological fossils

Species is as taxonomic group

Darwin's writings

Biblical evtdence Is refuting
evidence

Relation describes physical
similarities

Leakeys and anthropology

Related Biological Knowledge

Evolution unimportant in biology

M echanism

Natural History

Mendelian genetics

Variation stems from
Interbreediisgfor dominance

Old, relatively stable earth

Rejection o f anthropomorphism
Genetic inheritence as a random
proccess operating within
constraints

Variation stems from a need (R)
Tentative recognition o f
mutation as source o f variation

Limited knowlege o f historical or
Knowledge o f animal taxonomy

Evolving populations are variable
Natural selection works through
death of unfit individuals
Evolution is a series o f vertical
changes in a population________
Note. Italics indicate instances o f conceptual change.
Shaded block indicates c m a a y ti& ll jte&ed m fodHafi
Solid block indicates academic conception.
(R) indicates rejection o f conception.

Figure 13
Summary of Stephanie's initial conceptual framework for evolution
ST: It just seems that all the evolutionary changes take place because
there was a need for it. I just don't think we grow something for
nothing. (D 186)
Just three weeks later during an interview with the bear mutation graphic (PI-1),
Stephanie began to recognize mutations as a being a random force in evolutionary
process:
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S T : W ell mutations doesn't [sicj just happen because you want it too.
It just sort o f happens. . . And so it it's, if it's beneficial, it's gonna'
survive and help the species. If it's not, that one's going to die out real
quick and not reproduce. (D 226)
This represents a massive change from her initial conceptions. Not only did mutations
represent a scientific conception o f the origin o f variation, but her recognition of their
random aspect served to fundamentally restructure her understanding o f the nature of
evolutionary changes. However, the acceptance of the random aspect was not
wholesale, as shown by Stephanie's recognition of the beneficial com ponents o f most
mutations. This conception becomes even more complex as we consider that while
Stephanie recognized most mutations as being beneficial, she realized that their
external cause was random, "they just happen." (D 219) Even with the tentative
introduction of the random aspect to evolution, at this point Stephanie had no
conception for genetic drift as a mechanism o f evolutionary change.
It is important to note that the conceptual change toward a scientific usage of
mutation initially began with a link to Stephanie's prior existing conception o f need as
a com ponent of evolutionary change.
By mid-year, Stephanie completely isolated the origin of variation from the
action o f natural selection. (See CM-1, mid-year, in Appendix G.) She used the
scientific conception of natural selection as operating on the variation already present
in a population of organisms. However, Stephanie continued to understand that natural
selection operates through the death o f unfit individuals.
Nature of evolutionary changes.
Stephanie retained the use of many of her initial conceptions about the nature of
evolutionary changes. W hile Stephanie understood perfection in terms o f human
characteristics, interviews conducted at mid-year revealed her understanding o f success
for a species. She explained that a successful species was one that "survived a long
time." (D 167) Curiously, she defined failure of a species to include extinction
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without "giving rise to something else." (D 169) She used this conception when
discussing dinosaurs, explaining that dinosaurs did not fail, because "they say birds
evolved from them. They just sort of changed." (D 169) This com ment is an
important one. It signifies a broadening in the scope of Stephanie's personal
conception of evolutionary change.
Previously, Stephanie rejected the drastic changes she understood to be described
by scientific evolutionary theory. Formally, she continued to reject this conception
during the mid-year period. However, she continued to explain that her personal
understanding of evolution included gradual, subtle changes within a group. This was
more that just a rote answer as demonstrated by the graphics Stephanie selected in an
interview about instances (IAI-3, mid-year). When asked to pick the graphic which
best depicted her understanding o f evolutionary change, Stephanie selected graphics
that depicted subtle changes within similar organisms. (See graphics 9A and 9D in
Appendix C-2). However, her dinosaur com ment indicates a change in what
Stephanie understood to be a "subtle change" and "within a group." Stephanie's
conception of their terms expanded so that she could use and apply the various theories
of dinosaur evolution.
S T : I think maybe crocodiles came from dinosaurs and birds maybe
came from dinosaurs. I mean, I can kinda' see the connection there.
But I can't see a connection between bacteria and an elephant. (D 182)
In an interview two weeks later, Stephanie began to incorporate this change in her
formal description of evolutionary change:
S T : I guess it [evolutionary change] could be drastic over time if you
compare the changes between something over 10 million years ago and
something today. That's a big, drastic change.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : And over a couple of years, there's not drastic change. (D 223)
Stephanie retained use o f the conception of evolutionary changes as being
predictable, but there are signs that this conception was also undergoing modest
changes during the mid-year period. In a prediction question, Stephanie explained that
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if conditions were constant, a scientist could accurately predict the outcom e o f an
evolutionary event. However, in the same interview Stephanie explained:
ST: I'd definitely go with random [as being a characteristic of
evolution],
SD: Random? Why?
S T : Because mutations are random. I think it ju st affects certain ones,
just kinda' random. That's also change, it's kind the same thing. . . . Ah,
I don't think there's a real order to it either. I think it's just a way things
happen. (D 223)
Logically, Stephanie's conception o f evolutionary changes as being predictable and
random are incompatible, but each conception was not only explained by Stephanie but
also applied in interview situations.
The final conceptual change which occurred for this group of conceptions was
seen in Stephanie's conception o f adaptations. During the interviews conducted for the
m id-year conceptual framework, she began to recognize the difference between learned
(proximal) adaptations and genetic (ultimate) adaptations. In response to the bear
graphic concerning possible mutations (PI-1, mid-year), Stephanie explained that
adaptation o f burrowing was learned:
ST: I don’t think something in his [the bear's] chem istry mutates and
makes him do that [burrow],
SD: All right, so?
ST: That's just a behavioral adaptation. (D 225)
Natural history.
Stephanie's conceptions of natural history demonstrate the nature of the interface
between her scientific knowledge and knowledge based upon belief. W hen asked to
graphically depict the "time line of life on earth," Stephanie explained that the earth
was 4.5 million or billion years old, "but I don't know if it really makes a difference.
It's hard for me to distinguish." (D 179) The only other occurrences she depicted
were the existence of dinosaurs, the extinction of dinosaurs, and the creation of
humans. Stephanie's comment, "And that's all you want, just life on earth?" signifies
that she understood these three events to be the only noteworthy historic biological
occurrences. We then discussed her graphic:
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SD: W hat do you think went on in that big hole [between creation of
the earth and dinosaurs]?
S T : Oh, all the scientist say it was all that primordial soup mess. And
all like that. And we were formed by a bunch of chem ical and little
cells coming out of the sea.
SD: Uh, uh. (Y e s ). . . So what would you say. W hat do you think
happened?. . .
ST: It's hard to say.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: I mean, because we weren't there. And there's no real guarantee to
find out.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) Uh, but if you had to lay money on it?
S T : But, but judging from the dating o f the dinosaur skeletons and the
estimation of when the earth started, I guess that would be about true.
SD: Yeah?
S T : But we might have an error in finding out the dates.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: 1,1 think it's probably true. I go with it.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
ST: Until something else disproves me. (D 180)
Stephanie was beginning to view more favorably the scientific explanation of the
origin of biological organisms. However, based upon the nature of her responses, this
remained an abstract and tentative acceptance. M inutes after this conversation,
Stephanie explained:
S T : Ahm, I sort of think that with evolution and all I think that maybe
ahm, man was created like how anthropologist say in Homo erectus. in
walking on all fours.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : And then evolution took place from there. But I don't think that
everything started with one cell. (D 181)
Stephanie rejected her tentative exploration o f a scientific explanation o f the origin of
life. This rejection took the form of a common pattern. Because hum ans were the
product o f a theistic creation, life could not arise in the m anner described by science.
Stephanie's conception o f the age o f the earth illustrates again the interface
between scientific knowledge and knowledge based on belief:
SD:
ST:
SD:
ST:
only
SD:
ST:

How old do you think the earth is?
Oh, I've heard so many different things in books I can't remember.
Uh, uh. (Yes)
I think somebody said 4 billion, and then according to the bible it's
like, I don't know, like 5, 6, or 10 thousand, something like that.
Uh, uh. (Yes)
I can't really remember.
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SD: So if you
S T : I'd say closer to the 4 billion.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) W hy, why, why would you say closer to 4 billion?
ST: I think it's 4 million, I don't remember.
SD: Why would you
S T : Just because ah, it just seems like well the dinosaur excavations
and stuff. It just seems a lot older. (D 164)
Stephanie understood the earth to be extremely old because she accepted the past
existence o f dinosaurs. This relationship is more illustrative when it is compared to its
logical counterpoint. Logically, the one might say the earth is old, therefore dinosaurs
have existed. Instead, the biological information (dinosaurs) is more influential (more
authentic) to Stephanie than the physical information o f the extrem e age o f the earth.
The relative weight Stephanie attributes to biological and physical evidence may be an
artifact of the complex interface between scientific accounts o f evolution and her own
personal understanding, or this may be a common occurrence.
Also illustrated by the previous quote is Stephanie's inability to distinguish
between billion and millions. This failure has been docum ented in other students in a
study by Renner et al. (1981). It is a relatively common situation for a student to be
unable to recognize the vastness represented by such time scales. As explained by
Dawkins (1986), this inability may be a large factor in Stephanie's failure to completely
understand the generation of vast biological diversity through the process of evolution.
Broad evolutionary theories.
Stephanie's use o f the broad scientific theories o f evolution increased during the
mid-year interviews. She began to recognize her personal conception of gradual,
subtle evolution in terms of Darwin's gradualism. She lum ped her conceptions of the
scientific explanation o f drastic evolutionary changes with saltation - an idea she still
fundamentally rejected as implausible. While she included the theory of punctuated
equilibrium in her concept map constructed in response to "map your understanding of
evolution," Stephanie could never explain what was meant by this term, simply stating
that it contrasted gradualism (CM-2, mid-year).
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Other biological know ledge.
Within her conceptual framework for genetics, Stephanie began to use a
conception o f genetic inheritance as being a combination o f randomness and
constraints, what she referred to as a "random pattern." This relatively sophisticated
understanding of inheritance signifies a further em bedding of the conception of
randomness into Stephanie's understanding of broad biological processes - a change
that also occurred within her conceptual framework o f evolution.
Other conceptual groups.
The other groups of conceptions, including the evidence o f evolution, the
historical aspects of evolutionary theory, and human evolution, underwent no obvious
changes from the initial framework. Stephanie's understanding o f evolutionary
relationships also remained relatively stable except for her inclusion o f possible
dinosaur phylogenetic relationships. This assortment o f theories concerning dinosaur
lineage continued to surface in Stephanie's interviews, and she used these theories to
illustrate many of her comments.
Belief system.
Despite the many changes which occurred in Stephanie's conceptual framework
for evolution, her self-characterization remained stable. For a homework assignment
completed during this period, Stephanie referred to herself as a "creationist." (Artifact
4) Stephanie recognized the uniqueness of her situation in her comments on a concept
map she constructed:
S T : I say some things that are contradictory. Because we have facts in
this area [evolution] , then it kind of refutes this theory or idea
[creationism], Ahm, it's kind o f weird to have all my theories or ideas
on this side [toward evolution], when actually I believe this side [toward
creatio n ],. . . I'm kind o f a combination o f both. (D 215-216)
The considerable conceptual change described for this period occurred without a
wholesale change in belief structure. This section provides evidence that academic
conceptual change may occur without a corresponding change in belief.
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See Figure 14 for a summary o f Stephanie's m id-year conceptual framework for
evolution.
Year-end framework
The most prominent com ponents o f Stephanie's year-end conceptual
framework for evolution can be found in the concept map she drew in response
to the request, "map your understanding of evolution." [See Appendix G for
Stephanie's concept map (CM -1, year-end).] This map demonstrates that while
Stephanie could apply a scientific conception for the mechanism of evolution,
she still found the historical aspects of the theory to be of importance.
M echanism.
Conceptions of the mechanism of evolutionary change underwent the greatest
degree of conceptual change. By the end o f the year, Stephanie was capable of using a
very scientifically acceptable explanation o f the process of evolutionary change:
S T : | W riting in reference to the evolution of speed in cheetahs] A
mutation occurred that allowed a [cheetah] to run faster, and this trait
was passed on. Since these animals could run faster than others, they
were able to catch more prey, mates, etc. [Posttest #7]
In this answer there is evidence for conceptions o f (a) mutation as the source of
variation, (b) the importance o f variation , (c) the action o f natural selection. While
many of these conceptions were present during the mid-year period, conceptual change
did continue to occur during this period. The most influential o f these changes was
Stephanie's recognition o f mutation as a fundamentally random process.
SD: [In reference to the bear mutation graphic] Which one of them
1mutations] is more likely to happen?
ST: I think all of them is [sic] equally as likely to happen.
SD: All o f them, why?
ST: Because it's a mutation, it's random! (Her em p h asis). . . So, I mean,
a mutation doesn't think about what it's going to do.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : It just son of happens. So any of these could happen.
(D 269)
One o f the conceptions that was used by Stephanie initially, her understanding
that variation originated from "interbreeding for dominance," was not used in the
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H um an Evolution
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C hanges

Broad Evolutionary T heories

Humans are animals*

Evolution includes drastic
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Evolution includes creation of
first life and subsequent changes
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H um ans are primates*
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gradual changes within a
group*

Evolution unim portant in
biology*

Hum ans are product "primoridal
soup" and subsequent drastic
evoludon (R)*

Evolution as progression tow ard
superior organisms*

G radualism

H um ans are product o f seperate
creation and subsequent subtle
evolution*

Evolutionary changes are
predictable and reproducable (R)*

E vidence fo r E volu tio n
Anthropological fossils*
Biblical evidence is refuting
evidence*

Related B iological K nowledge
M endelian genetics*

E volutionary changes are
random in their origin

H istorical A spects o f Theory

Two m eanings attributed to
biological adaptations

Darwin's writing
Leakeys and anthropology*

E volutionary Relationships
Species is a taxonom ic group*

Natural History

R elation describes physical
sim ilarities*
D inosaurs gave rise to birds and
crocodiles

Old, changing earth

K now ledge o f anim al taxonomy*

Rejection o f anthropom orphism *
G enetic inheritence as a random
process operating within constraints

Lim ited know lege o f historical or
recent natural history

M echanism

V ariation stem s from
Interbreeding for dom inance*
M utation is source o f variation
Evolving populations are
variable*
N atural selection works through
death of unfit individuals*
Evolution is a series o f vertical
changes in a population*_______
Note. Italics indicate instances o f conceptual change.
* indicates retention of conception from previous description.
Shaded block indicates conceptions based on belief.
Solid block indicates academ ic conception.
(R) indicates rejection o f conception.

Figure 14
Summary of Stephanie’s mid-year conceptual framework for evolution
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posttest interview period. This conception was replaced by the scientific conception of
mutation as the origin of variation.
Despite the conceptual change described above, there was still no evidence of
Stephanie's recognition of the action o f genetic drift by year-end. On the posttest exam
question that would have the highest probability of eliciting a conception of genetic
drift, Stephanie gave a vague and uninformative answer:
S T : [W riting in reference to the evolution o f blindness in cave
salamanders] I guess through a mutation in one salam ander that may
have caused lesser sight that evolved to blindness in several generations.
(Posttest #8)
Stephanie understood that all changes that become established as a means o f fulfilling
the population's need. She had no conception o f evolutionary changes that could
become established by chance.
As suggested by the om ission o f neutralist change, need continued to be a
com ponent o f Stephanie's understanding o f process. However, by the end o f the year
she had completely detached the need for a variation from the process responsible for
the origin o f variation:
[In response the the sorting task]
SD: W ould the mutation have happened without the hawk showing up?
ST: Yeah.
SD: Okay.
S T : It would have happened regardless. Well, see I think it's like, it
happens and then it's needed.
SD: Yeah?
S T : Rather than it's needed and it happens. (D 272)
During the last interview, there was evidence that Stephanie did not have a
conception of the pattern of horizontal evolutionary changes or the process that might
be responsible for these changes:
S T : I don't really see how people came from monkeys.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
S T : Because I don't think there would be any monkeys left.
SD: Okay.
S T : It just seems like when something adapts, then the w eaker thing
that it adapted from dies out and gets re p la c e d .. . I mean, it's like, if an
animal is improved, if it evolved into something to help it out. (D 294)
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W hile she recognized that the scientific community discussed such changes, she could
not understand the mechanisms through which such evolution could come about. The
form of evolution personally accepted and explained by Stephanie continued to be
subtle, vertical changes within a group.
The posttest exam also identified another alternative conception. Stephanie
explained that an evolutionary change within a population o f ducks would result in
most of the population having a little more webbing than their parents but other ducks
having the same amount o f webbing. This is an alternative conception not previously
described in the literature. W hile Stephanie acknowledged that evolutionary changes
involve an increase in the proportion o f the population with a trait, she also recognized
that the quality o f this trait gradually increases in the population.
Nature of evolutionary changes.
The following passage from Stephanie's posttest exam sums up much of her
personal understanding o f evolutionary change:
S T : I believe that evolution occurs in small beneficial doses to help a
species survive, such as the DDT and the mosquitoes, but I am still not
convinced that humans evolved from one-celled organism s that evolved
out of the sea. I'm still a creationist, but I also believe that small
changes that occur in a species through mutation helps that species to
"evolve and survive." (Posttest #9)
Conceptions shown in this answ er include:
(a) her personal understanding o f evolution to include small, subtle changes
within a species,
(b) evolutionary changes in a species are beneficial, thus the random aspect of
evolutionary changes were not included,
(c) that the scientific explanation for evolution describes vast changes within
human lineage
O f these three conceptions, the one that may be the most misleading is Stephanie's
personal understanding o f evolution to include small, subtle changes within a species.
Her use of this formal statem ent remained constant throughout the scope o f the study.
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but the conception it represented underwent many changes. By small changes,
Stephanie meant over a short period o f time a species would undergo very subtle
changes. These changes may be accretionary over a long period o f time. The phrase,
within a species, is misleading. (Her use of species has changed over the year, initially
she used group.) As described in the mid-year framework, Stephanie understood her
personal explanation for evolution to be congruent with the scientific conception of
dinosaurs giving rise to birds, and the vertical changes within hominid lineages. But
she understood these changes to initially occur within a group.
The final change seen in Stephanie's conception o f the nature of evolutionary
changes was seen in her understanding o f adaptation. Stephanie explained that "chill
bumps" were not a form of adaptation. Instead, she explained, "I was thinking more of
a larger scale adaptation" with a genetic basis. (D 248) Her understanding of an
adaptation at year end included only evolutionary adaptations, and not the proximal
changes which occur within an individual organism in response to sudden
environmental change.
Natural history.
There were few changes in Stephanie's understanding o f natural history during
the year-end period. However, another feature revealed in this period was Stephanie's
conception of the natural world as being fundamentally competitive:
SD: When you think about nature, do you think o f it as being very
competitive?
S T : Yes. Ah, like the survival of the fittest and the food chain and that
kind o f thing, all com peting to live.
SD: W hat are things competing for? W hat do organisms compete for?
ST: Compete for food. Ah, they compete for mates. Every thing that it
necessary to live, they compete for. (D 267)
As was mentioned with Brian, this conception is an essential one for a construction of a
scientific understanding of evolution through natural selection.
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Broad evolutionary theories.
Stephanie's understanding of the scope o f scientific evolutionary theory remained
unchanged during the study. She understood evolutionary theory to include both the
origin of life and the changes which occurred within organisms after that creation.
However, her use of other broad theories changed after the m id-year period.
During the mid-year period, Stephanie compared theories o f punctuated equilibrium
and gradualism, and characterized her own personal views as being more congruent
with gradualism. But during the interviews at the end o f the year Stephanie explained,
"I just rem em ber the details o f [those theories]. I don't feel com fortable enough putting
them down." (D 274) Even after those theories were explored and applied by
Stephanie, she did not continue to use them. These theories did not become a part of
her conceptual framework for evolution.
Previously, Stephanie did not understand evolutionary theory to be an important
aspect of biology. However, on her final exam, Stephanie voiced a different
conception:
S T : There are three extremely important concepts that I think are
critical in biology: evolution, the study o f DNA and genetic
engineering, and the discussion o f scientific ethics. Evolution is
important because students should be taught the theories o f where they
came from and how they cam e to be the way they are. It gives a
strong, firm basis o f com paring animals to one another and
demonstrates that nature is dynamic, not static. Evolution gives the
student food for thought, and it is easily discussed in combination
w/other ideas, such as zoology, anthropology, archeology, and even
geology. It encompasses several scientific ideas. (Artifact 7)
This passage signifies that Stephanie understood evolutionary theory to play an
important role in synthesizing several areas of scientific knowledge. Because this
answ er was given in response to an exam question, there is the strong possibility that
Stephanie was expressing her understanding of scientific knowledge, and not the
understanding that she personally accepted and used. But this answ er demonstrates
that Stephanie did recognize the broad academic importance o f evolutionary theory.
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O ther conceptual groups.
The other aspects of a conceptual framework for evolution underwent no
substantial changes over the year-end period. H er recognition o f the evidence for
evolution, her stress of the historical aspects o f evolutionary theory, and other aspects
of related biological knowledge were retained.
B elief system .
S T : [Written in response to question about her "opinion of the theory of
the evolution"] I still believe in Creationism, however, I also agree
w/evolution to the degree that an animals' mutated traits that is [sic] a
benefit to the animal will aid its survival and be passed on to offspring
and allow it to dominate the population though survival of the fittest. I
still do not agree w/the notion that man crawled out o f the sea millions
of years ago as an amoeba. I think God created man, and man then
evolved to his present state. (Second posttest answer #9)
While several aspects o f her conceptual framework for biology are represented in this
answer, this quote also speaks to Stephanie's beliefs o f evolution. This belief remained
constant throughout the course. She continued to reject what she perceived as the
scientific explanation of the origin of life and of biological diversity. Instead, she used
a progressive creationist understanding by viewing major groups to be a result of
special creation and acted on by a progressive form o f evolution. Also reflected in this
quote, Stephanie's belief structure remained oriented around her understanding of
human evolution.
See Figure 15 for a summary of Stephanie's year end conceptual framework for
evolution.
Summary of year long conceptual change
A noteworthy feature o f Stephanie's conceptual framework for evolution was her
recognition of the conflict between scientific knowledge and knowledge based on a
belief framework. Stephanie was very concerned with the actuality o f evolution and its
implications for the other aspects of her life. During the scope of this study, Stephanie
underwent considerable conceptual change in evolution without a corresponding
magnitude of change in her belief structure. M inor aspects o f her belief framework
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Figure 15
Summary of Stephanie's year-end conceptual fram ework for evolution
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altered allowing for large scale academic conceptual change. In this regard, Stephanie
may be unique. While Stephanie would be considered to be a progressive creationist,
she also used a multi-disciplinary approach to science. This approach allowed her to
recognize the attributes o f evolutionary theory apart from her perception o f its flaws.
As a result of her consideration o f the theory, while she continued to personally reject
the theory, she began to incorporate many aspects o f this theory into her own personal
understanding of subtle evolutionary change.
Tyler: Biologist as Authority Seeker
Tyler, a senior girl, was one of the original interview participants. This selection
was based on her use o f several alternative conceptions about the process o f evolution
as well as her perception o f a conflict between scientific knowledge and religious
beliefs. Like Stephanie, interviews with Tyler presented an ideal opportunity to study
the interface between scientific and religious knowledge.
Tyler was a small, athletic, friendly girl who laughed quickly in all conversations.
Like Stephanie and Brian, Tyler's interview behaviors were much different than her
classroom behaviors. During interviews, Tyler was talkative and speculative, and she
followed any tangential topic that arose in conversation. O ur talks were comfortable,
and often she completed my statements or questions. But in class discussions Tyler
seldom spoke unless called on. I have only three recorded instances in which Tyler
volunteered an answer in class. Tyler explained that while she was engaged during
class discussions, she did not enjoy the competitive nature o f whole class participation.
However, this classroom behavior differed when she was in small group situations.
Here she spoke readily, gave directions to her group mates, and often approached the
teacher with questions.
In our interviews, Tyler often compartmentalized her knowledge; she did not
commonly attempt to relate different frames of reference. But this process of
com partmentalization broke down in our interviews as she began to com pare her
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personal and biological knowledge. Such comparisons continually resulted in personal
confusion for Tyler. The following passages demonstrates an instance in which Tyler
began to synthesize different forms o f knowledge about the age, origin of the earth, and
early natural history. Also prominent in this passage is confusion resulting from this
synthesis.
SD: How long ago do you think that was [since the existence of
dinosaurs]?
T : I should know that.
SD: Oh no, not necessarily.
T : Oh gosh! I'm sure I've been told and I've read b o o k s.. . .
SD: Ohm, how long do you think it was between when the earth was first
created and then the
T : and then dinosaurs?
SD: Yeah.
T : I think it's probably like [pause] probably like half a million years or
something.
SD: So like a half a million years? Could you like draw that on a line or
something? . . .
T : Okay. I want to. Ahm, [pause] and I think there were, I think there
were bird kinda' dinosaurs.
SD: Okay.
T : [Looking at her drawing] Okay, that's not an airplane, that is a bird.
Ahm. And then dinosaurs pretty much died.
SD: Okay. Make or you can put that on another piece of paper, put
dinosaurs died. Died. Okay.
T : Okay. And then I think it's like and now it gets confusing. [Laughs] I
guess, see what I'm thinking o f right now is the ah like what I've learned
like in church.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : and what I've learned in b io lo g y .. . . I don't know. . . . I would tell you
that. [Long pause] I don't know what came before man except there were
dinosaurs and then I know man was created by God and stuff
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : That's what I’ve always thought in my h e a rt.. . . I would say God
created us.
SD: Okay.
T : [Laughs] Uh, uh. (Yes) Because I don't know about all this other
stuff.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : That's just what I've always felt that God put Adam and Eve on this
earth
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : and then from there, all of us.
SD: So all right, where would Adam and Eve come in relation to
dinosaurs?
T : Well they’re way after them.
SD: Okay. Put a big line.
T : But I don't know about all the evolution stuff now.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)

20 3
T: I ju st don't know what, what to think. I don't know what to put. If
there were other creatures
SD: After the dinosaurs?
T : I'm sure there were. . . .
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) Now so how did those other creatures, you know so
how did the dinosaurs
T : Come about?
SD: Yeah. And all those other creatures.
(Long pause)
T : Golly! W ell, when I think about, man was the first creature created by
God, so I don't know where they came from. [Laughs]
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : They don't ju st form.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : Oh Goah! I need to get things straight, don’t I? [Small laugh]
SD: Well, no, you know. This is the time you're working things out. So .
. . man was the first creature created by God, that's from the Bible?
T : That's well yeah, that's what I've always thought.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : I guess I never even thought about where dinosaurs came from. It
didn't cross my mind.
SD: 'Cause you don't think about dinosaurs in church?
T : No, that's true,
SD: And you don't think about Church when you're in science class?
T : [Shakes her head yes]
SD: O r looking over a book.
[Both laugh]
T : D o you understand what I mean?
SD: Yes, I know. You've never had to put those two kind of different
ways o f thinking together.
T: Together. Exactly.
SD: Do you think they should go together?
T : Yeah. ( . . . ) I do, they, there has to be some kind of explanation for
them to fit together.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) [Pause]
T : [Whispers] I don't know. (C 171-175)
Tyler explained one cause o f her confusion when considering evolutionary
theory:
T: No one's ever asked me what I thought. I was ju st taught about that
no matter what I thought was right. [Small laugh] But I don't know.
(C 87)
It seems that she had never attempted to integrate her differing conceptions because
this was not expected o f her.
Tyler's approached biology as an authority seeker. W hen confused, she would
rely on knowledge already constructed by an outside authority (i.e., texts, the
researcher) rather than attempt to resolve the conflict on her own. After one mapping
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session on the process o f evolution, Tyler became aware both of her lack of knowledge
and the conflicts between her religious and scientific knowledge and commented, "I'd
wish I’d like read something on evolution. I'm sorry." (C 71) After one interview in
which she discussed her confusion about the difference between her scientific and
religious knowledge, she asked:
T: Can I ask you something?
SD: Yeah.
T : Do you know the answers to all these questions?
SD: Well, you know, there's no
T: Does anybody? ( C 177]
Like the students described by Lawson and W eser (1990), Tyler was easily swayed by
external opinions and less assured of her own abilities to construct a solution.
Tyler hoped to become a physical therapist, and this is the reason she enrolled in
the Biology II course. She chose this profession because of her interest in the human
body. Tyler explained that her favorite academic subject was science, because she
enjoyed learning about anatomy and physiology. She exercised on a daily basis,
playing tennis, running on the track team, and working out at a health club.
Other than exercise, Tyler's main activities centered on school work and pleasure
reading. W hile she applied herself, Tyler had a pragmatic approach to school work,
"I'll do what I can." (C 3) Given any free time, Tyler exercised frequently and read
fiction, explaining, "I like real life, good books." (C 5) Tyler got little enjoyment from
school based reading, and English was one of her least favorite subjects.
Despite her friendly, easy going demeanor, Tyler's mother characterized her as
being independent and competitive. I think of Tyler as more mature than her
classmates in that (a) she could examine U High in a manner in which few of
classmates could, (b) she had firm professional goals, and (c) her approach to school
was designed to achieve those goals. It is evident to me that Tyler's approach to the
discipline of biology did not characterize all aspects of her academic or personal life.
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Tyler's Conceptual Ecology
The most influential aspect of Tyler's conceptual ecology was her orientation
toward science. While Tyler was interested in science, she was m ost interested in its
medical aspects:
T : I love to learn about the body and stuff. If I could do anything, I
would just learn more about h u m an s.. . . W hat they're made o f and how
diseases, and just how they work.
(C 37)
At the outset o f the study, Tyler viewed biology as the "study o f the human body" but
this conception broadened during the course o f the study. The rem ainder o f science,
and specifically biology, held less o f Tyler's interest. This was reflected in Tyler's
scant knowledge o f biological organisms. In the interview about instances (LA.I-1,
initial), Tyler had no knowledge of the function o f flowers in angiosperms:
SD: Ahm, do you know that function o f flowers for the plant? . . .
T : I sure don't. I never even thought about it (a flower) doing anything
for the plant. . . . Honestly, I’ve always just thought flowers are there
because they're p re tty .. .. That may sound real stupid but I've never
thought about a flow er having a function. (C 104)
At the outset of the study, while Tyler was more mechanistic in her approach to
physiology, she had a largely aesthetic view o f the natural world (Cobern, 1993). She
did not view biological organisms in terms of cause and effect but in terms of
aesthetics qualities such as beauty, order, and symmetry. Tyler was capable of
mechanist thought, but this was not her first approach to making sense o f the natural
world. Many o f Tyler's conceptions of nature changed during the course o f the study,
and these changes will be addressed in later sections.
Tyler understood there to be distinctions between the operations o f natural world
and the world of humans. For humans:
T : I think that things happen because they're m eant to happen. And I
think that no m atter what happens, everything, like, no m atter what
happens to me, everything is going to turn out f in e .. . . I'm talking just
like with humans. With people. (C 70)
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But for the "natural world things are more scientific." (C 70) Clearly, this aspect o f
Tyler’s view o f the human/natural world has close ties to her religious belief
framework.
Like Brian and Stephanie, Tyler was a realist, and she understood science as an
attempt to "talk about what happens in the world." (C 33) But hers was a contextual
realism, as she explained:
T: It's [science] a bunch o f knowledge that's all linked together
somehow, but it's also a process o f learning. 'Cause there's never an end
in science. There's never a final answer. You can always discover
something new or take a new aspect of it. (C 33)
This conception o f science is contrasted with Tyler's conception o f scientific theories
and facts. She acknowledged that theories are "just an idea that somebody gets," a
conception that describes theories as tentative but also makes them equivalent to a
scientific hypothesis. But Tyler understood scientific facts to be a reflection of reality:
SD: Okay, which one has higher standing? You know, what we should
value? A theory or a fact?
T: Ah, probably a fact.
SD: Why?
T : Because they're true.
SD: Okay, so theories aren't true?
T : Not that they can't be, they might be.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : But not n ecessarily .. . .
SD: So when you say that something is true, what does that mean?
[Pause]
T : It means that it does happen. It is real.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) It is real. So that, it means that's what really happens
in the world?
T: Right.
SD: Okay, and you think that we can measure what really happens?
T : Uh, uh. (Yes) (C 84-85)
W hile she understood some aspects o f science to be tentative, its basis is a static truth.
At the outset the study, Tyler understood there to be many conflicts between
scientific knowledge and religious beliefs. She understood them both o f them to
represent ways to understand the world, and she was very aware of the conflict
between evolutionary thought and many religious beliefs. This was a conflict that
Tyler had encountered before the beginning of the study:
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T: [Reading her pretest answer] W hat is your personal opinion of the
theory o f evolution? And I said, I believe in evolution to a certain
extent. I also believe in creationism. I believe they cam e together, but
I'm not sure o f how. So the only reason that I believe in evolution some
is because many o f its points are proven facts.
SD: Okay. Like what points are proven facts?
T: Just, ah, about [pause] how animals have become m ore d ev elo p ed ..
. . I don't know. I don't know much about evolution.
SD: Okay.
T: But it's all confused with what I believe in the Bible.
SD: Can you talk a little bit about that confusion?
T : Yeah. Ah, ah I've heard some evolution theory that like animals,
monkeys, and apes and stuff were put on the earth and that's how we've
evolved. From them.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: But then I've also believed that God put us on the earth as man.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: So. But it seems like all these cr, evolution things have, they just
seem so right. [Laughs] And so scientifically just right that
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : How can I believe that just man was put on the earth? I don't know.
I believe that evolution did occur. But God had something to do with it.
[L au g h s]. ..
T : Yeah, I've always wondered about evolution.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) Like what have you wondered?
T : I've just wondered what's right. [Laughs] I mean I don't think I'll
ever know what really, really happened when the earth was created. I
don't know.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : Just because there are so many questions to be answered. (C 26-27)
Tyler had achieved a partial resolution o f her science/religious conflict by
explaining that evolution occurred, but God had a hand in it. However, the passage
above contains signs o f her continued discomfort. A t this point she used a theistic
understanding of a process o f gradual creation (Nelson, 1986), meaning that she
understood evolution to occur but as a process controlled by God. However, she still
remained unsure concerning human evolution. She explained that before this class she
used to think all species except humans underwent evolution, and humans were placed
on earth by God as an act o f special creation. Her dissatisfaction with this explanation
is seen in her question, "How can I believe that just man was put on the earth?" Early
in the study, human evolution remained an im portant unresolved question for Tyler.
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Aside from our discussions o f evoludon, Tyler seldom volunteered insight into
her religious understandings. She attended church on a weekly basis, but because her
parents were divorced, she attended a variety of denominations. She did not perceive
her family to be particularly religious, instead she characterized them as very "moral.”
Tyler explained that she did not use a literal interpretation o f the Bible because she did
not accept the implications o f a literal interpretation for the status o f women and other
minorities within society. W hile Tyler was not aware o f her parents' views of
evolution, it was clear that her mother had great reservations with this topic. In our
interview, Tyler's mother voiced surprise when I described the scope o f my study as
she explained, "you don’t want to hear what I think about evolution." (C 297)
Unlike Stephanie, Tyler was not explicit about the differences between her
personal understandings and those of science, because she had less confidence in her
scientific understandings and because she recognized scientific knowledge as a source
o f final authority. "The problem is I don't know anything about evolution." (C 48) In
the description of her conceptual framework, I have attempted to separate Tyler's
personal and scientific conceptions, but the differences were not as polarized as I had
come to expect from Stephanie's interviews.
Tyler's Conceptual Framework for Evolution
Initial framework
SD: W hen I say something evolved, what does that mean in a science
class?
T: It means that, I think it means that something was put on the earth
real crude like, I don't know what the word it.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: And that, through the years, and being in different settings and
having to deal with different things in the environment, it became more
advanced. (C 29)
Tyler's early explanation o f evolution characterized many aspects o f her
conceptual framework for this topic. In keeping with her largely aesthetic view of
nature, this explanation provided no explanation for a mechanism and instead
em phasized the broad nature of evolutionary changes.
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Nature of evolutionary changes.
As dem onstrated by her comments above, Tyler understood evolution to include a
slow process o f change tow ard a "more advanced" organism. By more advanced, Tyler
meant an evolutionary change makes the organism uniquely suited "according to their
needs.” (C 30) This conception of evolution describes production o f many different
organisms.
Tyler also understood evolutionary changes to be slowly and constantly occurring
through "multiple acts." W hile Tyler could not fully explain what she meant by this
phrase, she indicated that evolution occurred "several times" during the lineage of a
group.
In the early interviews, it was difficult to persuade Tyler to express the
conceptions she personally used to understand evolutionary changes. But during the
third interview, she explained that the scientific explanation would account for the
evolution o f all organism s from some original biological progenitor. However, the
conception she personally used was outlined in her concept map. She personally
understood God to place the original "creatures" on the earth and change the organism
through multiple acts o f evolution, a process which eventually lead to the evolution of
humans.
As implied in Tyler's description o f evolution as an advancement, "change toward
their needs," Tyler recognized much of evolutionary change to occur in response to the
needs of an organism. The use o f need was accompanied by a rejection o f randomness
or chance as a descriptor for evolutionary change.
T : [Discussing the evolution o f webbed feet in ducks on the pretest]
Well it just doesn't seem that webbed feet would just be a change
mutation. I mean, that's kind o f a big thing to have in an animal. You
know what I'm saying?
SD: Big, yeah.
T: It's just, it's one o f their major qualities, it just doesn't seem like it
would be a chance that they got that. (C 18)
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Finally, she had a vague conception o f adaptation during the early interviews,
explaining that "Adapt means to find things to do, so you can live better in that
setting." She drew no distinction between genetic, behavioral, or proximal adaptations,
but understood all o f these to be forms of adaptations.
M echanism .
As has been described, Tyler used only a very vague conception o f the
mechanism o f evolutionary change in the early interviews. Explaining that, "I don't
know how it happens," Tyler would describe the nature o f the changes when asked
about mechanisms. (C 26) However, when asked to "map specifically how you think
it works," Tyler explained that:
T : The creatures were put on the earth.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : And the fittest creatures survived and advanced and the ones that
were m ost fit in the environm ent kept surviving and the other ones
pretty much died out and eventually ah, ah, more advanced creatures
were developed. (C 72)
This answ er dem onstrates that Tyler used a conception of evolutionary change
operating through the process of natural selection. But for Tyler, this was an implicit,
tacit knowledge, and her conception of natural selection was the most important
com ponent of her understanding of the process of natural selection. This conception is
different from the scientific conception of natural selection as operating on differential
reproduction. Instead, Tyler understood natural selection to operate through the death
o f unfit individuals.
Tyler used a collage conception of fitness, like Brian, but she em phasized the age
of the individual:
T y ler: [Explaining her pretest response to the most fit lion] I put that
the fittest lion is Ben. . . . Because first of all his size was just normal. ..
. He was just average and he had the most cubs, and he lived the
longest. [Pause] And let's see 14 o f his children liv e d .. . . Not 19 or 15,
but its a good number I guess. . . . And especially because he lived the
longest. (C 2)
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This collage conception o f fitness changed in a later interview to one based on an
organism's ability to survive. Any animal that could survive is fit, and the most
"average" animal has the greatest potential to survive.
Congruent with her conception of natural selection as the major process of
evolution, Tyler had an appreciation of the variation that must be present in an
evolving populations. While her conception o f a species was a group of animals that
"share the same qualities" she understood this in a moderate fashion, "some o f the same
qualities." (C 90) She also had a conception o f species as a variable phenomena,
"There are a lot of different varieties in a species." (C 91) Despite her scientific
populational understanding o f a species, Tyler remained unsure o f the taxonomic
group in which evolution proceeds:
SD: W hat unit does evolution work on?
T : I would say not necessarily just individuals, but groups of things that
arealike. (C 3 1 )
Evidenced by her pretest responses, Tyler understood evolutionary changes to
essential to the improvement of the quality of a trait in a population. She explained
that evolutionary changes appear as slow increases in an organism's "ability" to meet
their "needs."
[Pretest answer to the evolution of webbed feet in ducks]
T : I think they probably got more and more webbing, just like they had
to a d a p t.. . . So they had to get more and more webbing on their feet.
(C 18)
Despite the extent o f Tyler's implicit knowledge o f evolutionary process, she
recognized there to be a large gap in her understanding. W hen discussing the evolution
of webbed feet in ducks, Tyler murmured, "I don’t know how they produce something
in themselves." (C 20) But with additional questions, Tyler expressed some of her
tentatively used conception for the origin o f a trait:
T: [Reading her response to the evolution of speed in cheetahs] Okay,
the earlier, slower cheetahs had to learn to run faster in order to survive.
Those that couldn't change any, did not survive, but those that did
became faster. Oh this is goofy! [Laughs] But those that became faster
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mated with other healthy cheetahs and eventually through the mating
cycles, cheetahs have become fast animals.
SD: So explain to me how it happens that cheetahs get so fast.
T: Because they had to learn to catch their prey.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: And they, I guess they had to push themselves to go faster in order
to get food. . . . But I don't know if mating with an animal that's also fast
will make you have a fast a n im al.. . . I don't know if a cheetah that
learned to run fast to catch its prey, I don't' know if it would have an
offspring that was faster too.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: I don't know if that's how evolution happens. You know? (C 23-24)
W hen pressed, Tyler used learning as a source o f new variation in the population that
produced the variation needed for natural selection. However, she was skeptical about
the possibility of such variation becoming em bedded in the genetic basis of the
population.
When Tyler used learning as a process through which populations evolve, she
was aware of all the connotations of that term:
T : [Reading her response to the pretest question about the evolution of
immunity in mosquitoes] I put mosquitoes learned to adapt to their
environment.
SD: Okay.
T : I guess it's like they learned that they had to adapt to D D T because
in order to live. Then those that survive were, the fittest, the survival of
the fittest.
SD: Okay, you picked the one that said they learned. What, what does
that mean when you say that?
T : They, that they figured out what they had to do ah to live.
SD: I 'm ju st trying to figure out what you mean by learned. You know,
sometimes
T: They figured out what, what was going to kill them I guess. (C 1920 )
Hallden (1988) suggests that students use of learn is an artifact o f communication.
Tyler's comments do not suggest that she was framing a more complex conception with
a familiar phrase. Instead, she understood that animals, both insects and mammals, can
learn to change behaviors or physical reactions in order to survive. Learn was an
accurate reflection o f her understanding. However, while she offered this explanation,
Tyler recognized the deficiencies of this explanation in terms o f the genetic basis of
evolution.
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A nother tentatively used conception for the origin o f variation seen in Tyler's
response was the use/disuse explanation.
T : [Reading her answer on the pretest concerning the evolution of
blindness in cave salamanders] I said from living in caves, salamanders
use very little of their sight. From not using their eyes they became
nonfunctional and this trait was passed down to other generations.. . . I
guess if you don't use something it does becom e dysfunctional.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) W here do you get that idea from?
T : Ah, from us! Just like if you don't use certain parts of you brain,
you forget all about it. (C 25)
Tyler understood variation to occur because of the need for it, and this accounts
for her rejection o f the random aspect o f evolution that is introduced through the use of
mutation as the mechanism o f variation:
T: [Reading a pretest answer] I put that they [webbed feet] appeared in
ancestral ducks because they lived in the w ater and needed to swim. (C
17)
T: They [cheetahs] developed in their own ways, according to their
needs. (C 30)
After Tyler discussed each o f the possibilities for the origin o f variation, she
dismissed their use as a mechanism:
SD: So how did it [sight] go away [in the cave salamanders]? Do you
have any idea?
T : No, not really. Just from not using it. I don't see, I don't
understand the real science of how it goes away.
SD: Okay.
T : I don't know how to explain that. I just know from not using it.
[Pause] The function went away and I guess when they had their
offspring it just didn't work. See, I don't know! [Laughs] I don't
know, I don't know how it happens! (C 25-26)
Tyler referred to "the real science" o f the origin o f a trait signifying that she recognized
that her explanations were not scientifically valid. But at this point, she had no other
viable conception, explaining "I really don't know what causes people or things to
change." (C 31)
Before the fourth interview, Tyler was aware o f the shortcomings o f her
knowledge. She realized that she could not scientifically explain the origin of variation
in a population. But when Tyler was asked to com plete the sorting task (ST, initial),
she began to construct a scientific conception for this phenomenon. (These data are
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reported in detail as this represents the initial construction o f an important conception
in evolutionary theory.)
SD: Okay, ah, and each one o f these cards represents a different
generation. Like this is one generation who would have offspring maybe
and produce another generation. So each one o f the cards represents a
generation of ra b b its.. . .
T : W hat is that [pointing toward card of DNA model]?
SD: Ahm, this is ahm genetic m aterial. . . and here's a piece breaking off
it. . . .
T : Is that a rabbit? [Pointing to a graphic with a rabbit in a hawk's mouth]
SD: That's a rabbit, a dead rabbit.
T : Okay. [Laughs] . . .
SD: W hat 'cha thinkin'?
T : I'm thinking, "I don't know what to do."
SD: Okay. Now you don't have to use all o f them.
T : I don't know where to put that in. [Pointing to the DNA card]
SD: Okay. Then we'll ju st put this one to the side. And if you don't want
to use it, don't use it. I just want you to explain how you understand it.
T : Okay. W ell I guess you could put it in here [before the first brown
rabbit card]. So.
SD: W ould you put it in there?
T : Because something had to happen genetically for a brown rabbit to
h a p p e n .. . .
SD: Okay. So you put this here, so that's where the brown rabbits came
from?
T : Right. . . . Uhm, uhm, do you want me to go through it?
SD: Yeah. Would you?
T : Yeah, okay. So all white rabbits up here and no hawk. And
something happens genetically
SD: Do you know a word for that?
T : Ahm, like a mutation?
SD: Yeah, that m ight explain it, yeah.
T : Uhm, cross breeding? I don't k n o w .. .. But a brown rabbit occurs.
And here the hawk discovers the white rabbits. He likes to eat them more
than the brown rabbits, well there's just a couple of them n o w .. . . Well
let's see. He's eating more white rabbits. And the white rabbits are
diminishing and the brown rabbits, there's more o f them.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : 'Cause it's easier for them to survive because there is more o f their
kind and less of the white rabbits.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : And here's he's eaten all of the white ones but one.
SD: So if you could predict what would happen the next generation what
do you think it would look like?
T : It'd be all brown.
SD: Yeah? Ah.
T : 'Cause obviously they can't survive with the hawk around.
SD: Yeah. So would you call that evolution ?
T : Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: Uh, uh? (Yes) Here's a question. You have something happening to
make the first brown rabbit that's here. Ahm, do you think this happening
has anything to do with the hawk?
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T : Ahm, (long pause), not really.
SD: Okay.
T : W ell I guess yes. 'Cause somehow the genes were mixed up and more
brown rabbits were produced
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : while the hawk was eating the white ones.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : And then more brown rabbits became dominant. It's because the
hawk ate the white rabbits that probably the brown rabbits started
becoming dominant.
SD: Dominant, okay. W hen you use that word dominant, are you talking
like ah you know you talk about genetics?
T : Genetics, yeah.
SD: Genetics, yeah? Okay. So something about the hawk being there
makes that brown gene dominant?
T : Yeah. Right.
SD: Okay. Ahm, so what do you think about these guys, the two brown
ones. Do you think that this has to keep happening over and over to get
more brown ones? You know, like it happened.
T : It happened here, but then if these two ah
SD: She's pointing to the brown ones.
T : Yeah the two brown ones have offspring they’re more likely to be
brown.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : So, do yeah, it does have to happen a few more times to the white
ones. But once there are a few more brown ones
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : They'll produce offspring which will most likely be brown. And then
they'll just naturally happen. (C 77-79)
This passage represents Tyler's first use of the concept of mutation in an explanation of
evolutionary change. She also suggested crossbreeding, which she understood to be a
type of hybridization, as a source o f variation. Tyler used these possibilities, mutation
and cross breeding, because they satisfied the genetic requirements she recognized as
necessary to make her explanation plausible. This requirem ent was not met by any of
her previously suggested mechanisms. Each o f the two conceptions, mutation and
crossbreeding, were then encorporated intoTyler's previously existing framework for
evolutionary change.
Also o f interest is Tyler's incorporation of this genetic change into her Mendelian
understanding of inheritance of discrete traits. She understood changes to "become
dominant" in a population and that dominance to be passed down to the next
generation. Like Stephanie, Tyler has equated genetic dominance with ecological

dominance. This new conception was again encorportated in her pre-existing
conceptual structure.
O ther biological knowledge.
As dem onstrated in the previous passage, Tyler had a firm understanding o f the
genetic basis of inherited traits, and she used a M endelian conception of genetic
inheritance. But like the students in the study by (Clough & W ood-Robinson, 1985a),
Tyler's firm M endelian conception wavered under certain conditions as shown in the
prediction interview (PI-2, initial):
SD: [Two rats who have recently lost their tails meet and breed. W hat
will their offspring look like?]
T : I think their offspring will have a long tail. I don't see how cutting
off a tail has anything to do with the genes they had originally. . . .
SD: If they were very young when this happened, like they were just
bom and something cut off their tails, would that change your answer?
T : Gosh, probably so. 'Cause they would have to grow up. [Pause]
Ah it's kind o f contradicting myself, but they would have to grow up
without a tail. And it's just like they were bom without a tail pretty
m u c h .. . .Gosh, but it it did come from the gene, then their offspring
probably would have long tail. I don't know. (C 124-125)
O ther conceptions Tyler used in understanding evolution were involved with her
understanding of the origin o f traits. She understood organisms to be capable of
conscious decisions, not only in behavioral modifications (running faster) but also in
physiological processes (immunity to DDT). In part, these naive conceptions may be
attributed to Tyler's aesthetic view of nature. As mentioned previously, Tyler had
never considered possible explanations for adaptations, so when pressed, she
responded with simple, somewhat anthropomorphic responses.
Human evolution.
Tyler was m ost aware o f the differences between the scientific conception and
her personal understanding in the group o f conceptions for human evolution. Tyler
understood the scientific conception of evolution to explain that humans have evolved
from "animals, monkeys, and apes and stuff." This view o f evolution as directed
toward human evolution was supported in Tyler's interview about instances (IAI-1,

217
initial). When shown a graphic with three species of bears, she discussed the specific
characteristics of each o f the bears. But when shown a graphic depicting a gorilla, a
chimpanzee, and a human, she smiled and responded, "evolution." (C 93)
Tyler's understanding o f the scientific conception o f evolution differed from her
personal explanation that humans were "just put on the earth" by God and all other
species have evolved. (C 27) However, by the second interview, she began to
question the validity o f her personal understanding, "How can I believe that just man
was put on the earth?" (C 27) This question remained unresolved through the initial
interview period.
SD: What would you like to know if you could have any piece o f
knowledge that would help you understand evolution?
T : [Pause 1 I would like to know. [Pause] I would like to know how, I
would like to know how humans were developed. I don't, I don't, I
don't know. (C 28)
Related to this, Tyler was ambivalent about the relationship between humans,
primates, and other animals.
T : I just don't, I don't consider m yself related to an ape.
[Both laugh]
T : I don't know. 'Cause they just, they do seem kind o f crude. And I
don't know.
SD: So, ah, do you think we are related to anything?
T : I think we are related to them.
SD: You do? . . .
T : Oh, I think we are related to them. Yeah.
SD: Yeah?
T : I guess I shouldn't.
SD: W ould you have said that before this year?
T : Ahm, not like four or five years ago, but in the last two or three
years, yes.
SD: Okay. What do you think made that change?
T : Well just seeing, actually hearing a l o t .. . And it seems like I went
to ahm the Smithsonian in Washington.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : And saw all that stuff about ev o lu tio n .. . . And I don't know, just
different things that I've seen. And just looking at the apes this year.
SD: Yeah?
T : Has made me think that they are more human like than I once
thought. (C 9 7 )
The issue o f human relationships is one which depicts the process through which
students make theoretical choices. Tyler's ambivalence is evident in this passage.
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Personally she did not like the implications of a human/ape relationship, but factors
continue to suggest that this is more plausible than she once thought. Notably, Tyler
explained that this change began before this year and was catalyzed by a trip to a
natural history museum and Ms. Hurston's unit on animal behavior. It is interesting to
note that Tyler's hesitancy in accepting a human/ape relationship does not extend to a
human/animal relationship:
SD: So do you have trouble classifying us as animals? W hat do you
think about that statement?
T: No because I've always thought we're mammals.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : And animals are mammals.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : So that doesn't bother me.
SD: So we could be animals or we could be mammals. That's
understood. But we've gone beyond primate?. W e're something else
now?
T: Not totally.
SD: Oh, okay. W here do you, can you expand on the not totally?
T: Yeah because we still have a lot o f the same characteristics.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : That are the same but we are different obviously. (C 112)
Evolutionary relationships.
Tyler's species concept was not entirely typological or entirely a neo-Darwinian
population conception. She recognizes a species as a group o f organism s that shared
"some qualities" and are "related to one another." (C 90-91) This is a recognition o f a
species in a typological manner, a common alternative conception. However, she also
recognized the presents o f considerable variation o f characters within one species, a
m ajor feature o f populational thinking and a feature o f the Darwinian species concept.
However, she made no mention o f the ability to breed within a species and instead
stressed a common core o f characteristics as a sign o f a species.
Evidence for evolution.
As an authority seeker, evidence supporting or refuting the theory o f evolution
was not a major feature o f Tyler's conceptual framework. Tyler understood the
"development" she perceived in natural organisms as a form o f evidence for evolution.
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But this was a vague conception, "I don't know, things have progressed, and they've
just become more developed." (C 26) Related to this vague conception of
development, Tyler explained that human anatomical similarities to other organisms is
a persuasive form of evidence supporting evolution. Not surprisingly, Tyler
understood the most important evidence refuting evolutionary theory as also focused
on humans:
SD: How about some evidence that doesn't support [evolution], that
refutes it? . . .
T: Goah! Ahm, we talk. And nothing else does. . . .
SD: So you think that, that kind of separates us from the other animals?
T: Right. Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: And you think that biology needs to explain that somehow?
T: Uh, uh. (Yes) Yeah, because no other animal has a language like
ours. (C 149)
Broad evolutionary theories.
As was reflected in her conceptions of human evolution, Tyler recognized the
theory of evolution in terms o f a theory of human evolution.
SD: Okay, so evolution produced man?
T: Right. That's what I've always thought what evolution meant. (C
50)
The theory o f the creation o f the earth never em erged as an important aspect of Tyler's
understanding o f evolution; instead she understood evolution's importance to be
fundamentally concerned with the creation and changes within humans. She did not
view the theory o f evolution to be an integral part o f biology.
Tyler's semester exam taken at the end o f the initial interview period
demonstrates that she had a conception of broad evolutionary theories such as the
extinction o f dinosaurs. In this exam she gave a thorough explanation of the major,
competing extinction theories and identified the one she found to be the most
reasonable explanation. However, unlike Stephanie and Brian, these broad
evolutionary theories did not appear in Tyler's interviews. She did not use these
theories in her everyday understanding of evolution. Because this evidence is found in
an exam (Artifact-3), it is probable that Tyler acquired this knowledge shortly before
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the exam, and so it did not play a major role in her conceptual framework for
evolution.
Natural history.
Like Stephanie, Tyler dem onstrated a very shallow knowledge o f the natural
history of historical or recent organisms. While Tyler was interested in nature,
signified by her attitude in class when discussing organismal biology and her love of
nature programs, she retained very little information regarding natural history. As has
been discussed, she did not view organisms in mechanistic terms, and this view may
have limited her construction of knowledge in this area. Coupled with the lack of
natural history knowledge, Tyler demonstrated a sound understanding o f taxonomy.
While she was not familiar with many of the organisms discussed in the interviews
about instances (LAI-1, initial), she could accurately categorize these animals and cite
the reasons for this classification. She explained that she learned much of this material
in her sixth grade biology class. Despite this taxonomic knowledge, Tyler had no
conception of the evolutionary relationships o f large taxa o f organisms.
History o f evolutionary theory.
Tyler made no mention of the history o f evolutionary theory within the first
segment o f interviews. This does not indicate that she did not have these conceptions
as part o f her conceptual framework, but it does indicate that this was not a facet of her
framework that she frequently used and applied. Tyler seemed to compartmentalize
her knowledge. As shown in the previous passages related to Tyler's belief in
evolution, she did not synthesize different conceptions as she was asked to do. Based
on this, it is plausible that Tyler's conceptual framework contained historical
conceptions, but, because the interviews did not overtly question this topic, she did not
draw on his knowledge.
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Belief system.
As has been outlined, Tyler's belief in evolutionary theory was undergoing a
change in this initial period, a change that had begun some time before this class.
Tyler understood the scientific explanation o f evolution to describe the creation and
changes o f the human lineage. H er own initial beliefs described evolutionary changes
for all other groups o f organism s except humans, who were an isolated creation of
God. But toward the end o f the initial interviews, Tyler began to accept the scientific
view o f human relationships and their implication for human origins:
[Tyler looks over a graphic which shows a human boy, a gorilla, and a
chimpanzee]
T: You have two m onkeys and a little boy. [Laughs]
SD: [Laughs] So what do you think about that? You're laughing.
T: I don't k n o w .. . . Ahm, it's kind of like he's [the boy] just another
ape. [Laughsl
SD: So what do you think about that? You’re laughing as you say it.
T : Ahm, well, I guess they're all in the same big family.
SD: Uh, uh. [Yes] Do you think that really?
T : Yeah.
SD: You're frowning a little bit.
T : Well we've talked about that.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: Yeah, I think they are. [Pause] Even though they don't look too
much alike. [Small laugh] . . .
SD: So ahm, do you think humans can be classified the same way
animals can be classified? . . .
T: Yeah.
SD: Okay, so we could be. So you don't have any problems calling us
primates? . . .
T: Well I guess not, if I think about it that way. I mean I just like to
call us humans, I wouldn't say.
SD: But can you say or are you comfortable saying that humans are
primates? I sense some discomfort with that, like Yeeeeah. Like
maybe?
T: Yeah. Well what I think is maybe ahm, a long time ago we were
more primates. [Small laugh]
SD: Okay, so really you, you would be more comfortable saying our
ancestors were primates?
T : Right, it's like we've developed into something a little bit different
than primates. (C 112)
The tenor of this exchange was slightly different than the meaning taken from a
reading. While Tyler could recognize the plausibility o f the scientific explanation, she
was still very hesitant in accepting a human/ape relationship. This reluctance could be
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based on the implications that such a relationship would have for her religious beliefs.
In any case, the conceptual change for this issue remained a tentative one at the end of
the initial interviews.
See Figure 16 for a summary o f Tyler's initial conceptual framework.
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Figure 16
Summary o f Tyler's initial conceptual framework o f evolution
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M id-year framework
Beliefs.
The most prominent changes which occurred in Tyler's conceptual framework
for evolution during the mid-year period may actually represent a change in her
conceptual ecology. At the beginning o f this mid-year interview period, Tyler
dem onstrated a construction o f a science/religion dichotomy that was not previously
present:
[A homework question]: Explain the difference in the types o f answer
you should expect when asking these two questions:
(a) How did Homo sapiens come to inhabit the Earth?
(b) W hy did Homo sapiens come to inhabit the Earth?
[Tyler's written response]
T: For question a, a scientific answer would be given, evolution
explains how. But why is explained by something
other than science—religion. God wanted us to be here on earth.
(Artifact 4)
This new conception was also reflected in her interviews:
T: I think science can prove that we have evolved.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) W ould that mean anything to you? If we, if we did
prove that we have evolved?
T: Yeah. (C 212)
T : Science just tells you how it works. It just explains how things are. .
. . But religion you believe in. I mean, you have to learn what religion
is, but it's just belief 'cause there is nothing there, I mean you can't put
your hand on something in religion like you can scien ce.. . . I guess
both of them could be right they just explain different things. (C 197)
T : So the answer to creationism is just faith.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : I don't, there is never gonna’ be any physical evidence to prove that
one. (C 212)
Although Tyler had begun to establish a dichotomy between scientific and religious
knowledge, she did recognize that there were points of overlap between the two ways
of knowing. The use of this dichotomy allowed Tyler to be more explicit about the
differences she perceived in her own, personal understandings o f evolution and those
of science. These differences will be discussed in the following sections.
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Nature o f evolutionary changes.
Tyler explained her personal understanding of evolutionary change to include
small changes within a group. W hen shown three graphics depicting different
phylogenetic trees, (a) evolution shown as a change o f color within a group o f
butterflies, (b) evolution as a change leading to the creation of many vertebrate groups,
and (c) evolution as a set of vertical changes within a group o f armadillos, Tyler picked
the vertical changes shown in (c) (IAI-2, midyear).
T : I would say this, the one with the armadillo.
SD: The one with the armadillo. Why?
T : Because they're basically a lik e .. . .
T: I like this because it's a simpler change. That's ju st what 1 think is
evolution.
SD: Okay, like a simple change?
T : Maybe it's not simple it you take it from the very beginning to the
very e n d .. . . But all the stages in between are pretty simple. (C 167)
Her personal understanding o f evolutionary change described limited changes:
T : I think they [organisms] do change inside a group a lot
but I don't think a whole new creature can come from one other
thing. (C 177)
Tyler also became more explicit about her rejection o f part o f the scientific
conceptions:
SD: How do you think the process o f evolution works? . . .
T : Well, I still don't believe some of the things we learned about it
[evolution],
SD: Okay, you don't?
T : No, not like the skipping. I don't rem em ber the terms.
SD: Saltation?
T : Y e a h .. . . Gradualism, that's what I guess. . . . I think that's
believable. (C 205)
Tyler understood gradual evolutionary changes as a process that increased the
complexity of organisms, as shown in her concept map constructed m id-year (CM-2,
mid-year). She did not understand complexity to be equivalent with perfection.
Instead she understood com plexity as a closer "fit" o f an organism to its environm ent
(C 210), as in "An am oeba m ight be perfect in his little world." (C 164) But Tyler
continued to view the most complex organism s to be humans.
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Tyler also understood evolutionary changes to be ordered, but without a direct
design. Instead, she understood the order as a pathway toward "development" of
complexity. (C 224) Related to this understanding o f order, Tyler rejected randomness
in her personal conception o f evolutionary change.
T: Chance. I don't know. 'Cause I don't under. I don't know. Yeah,
chance because things are made by c h a n c e .. . . In evolution.
SD: Okay.
T : But I don't believe all this skipping. You know what I'm talking
about?
SD: The saltation stuff?
T : Yeah. [C 221]
Tyler understood random and chance to causing large, drastic changes. While she
understood this to be an aspect of the scientific conception o f evolutionary change, she
could not reconcile these characteristics to her personal conceptions.
During the mid-year, Tyler began to understand all evolutionary changes as a
form of adaptation:
T : Evolution is a change in the population.
SD: Ah, and where does the change come from?
T : [Pause] Changes come from, comes from, come from living in the
environment. It comes from
SD: Okay.
T : Adapting. (C 2 1 4 )
This conception o f evolution is congruent with Tyler's rejection o f the random aspect
of evolutionary changes. Instead, Tyler understood evolutionary changes as largely
determined by the organism 's environment.
Despite her conceptions o f evolution as being slow, subtle, and ordered, Tyler
explained that evolutionary changes could never be predicted. But Tyler understood
the unpredictability to be caused by an ever changing earth and not through the
inclusion of mutations.
T : The world just don't stay in one state. It's never gonna' be the same.
(C 161)
T: [Evolutionary changes] will never be the same because the earth is
not gonna' be all the s a m e .. . . I don't know, funky things happen. (C
162)
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M echanism .
As suggested by her understanding o f evolutionary changes as adaptations,
Tyler's conception of the mechanism o f evolutionary change revolved around need.
SD: So what causes mutations? Do you know?
T : When something changes outside . . . that effects them . . . and they
have to change to adapt to that.
SD: Okay, ahm, so if an organism has like a need to adapt to the
en v ironm ent,. . . , a mutation will happen?
T : Yeah. (C 226)
Tyler retained the use of need in her conception, but the conception o f mutation as a
source o f variation was introduced into her pre-existing explanation for the mechanism
of evolutionary change.
Tyler's understanding o f need as an integral conception in an explanation of
mechanism was also signified by her response to the interview about instances which
tested her understanding of harmful and beneficial mutations (PI-1, mid-year). Tyler
recognized only beneficial mutations as possibilities for mutation. This choice is
congruent with her need-based conception of the process o f evolutionary changes along
with her rejection o f randomness and chance as characteristics of evolutionary change.
As is suggested by this conceptual framework, during the mid-year period, Tyler had
no conception o f genetic drift as a mechanism of evolutionary change.
Shown in her concept map constructed in response to the request, "map your
understanding o f the process of evolution," Tyler's understanding o f mechanism
became much more complex and differentiated during the mid-year period (CM-2,
mid-year). (See Appendix G for this concept map.) She used eight concepts for this
map which described the process as a result of natural selection operating in a
population. W hile the basis o f this conception was not a great deal different from her
initial framework, she was capable of using conceptions o f natural selection in a much
more direct and explicit manner.
A lthough Tyler understood natural selection to be the most important aspect of
the mechanism o f evolution, she did understand mutations to be a component o f the
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overall process. But she did not view them as an essential aspect. H er concept map of
process did not include mutation as a conception. When asked to construct a map of
her understanding of the process using seed concepts (CM-3, mid-year), Tyler included
mutation only at the bottom o f the map. Tyler incorporated mutation in a superficial
manner by placing it within the confines of a pre-existing conceptual framework of
operation o f natural selection. This was also demonstrated in Tyler's response to the
DNA card on the sorting task (ST, mid-year):
T : The mutation [that produced the brown trait] may have happened
more so because o f the hawk. The rabbits needed to change. (C 217)
Using natural selection, Tyler maintained her conception o f the im portance of variation
in a population, but she rem ained unable to account for the original production of that
variation.
Human evolution.
While Tyler resolved much of the conflict which had existed between science
and religion, she continued to be perplexed by the question o f human evolution during
the mid-year period. Personally, she believed that humans were created by God.
However, she understood the scientific conception to include the evolution o f humans
from an ancestral species. W hile it appeared that Tyler had established a strict
dichotomy to allow her use o f both of these conceptions, there were signs that the
conflict remained, explaining "It seems like there should be an answer for both." (C
211)

Natural history.
SD: How old do you think the earth is? . . .
T : Billions o f years.
SD: Billions? Why do you say that?
T : W ell, we've been on it for tons of years. But then all the dinosaurs.
I mean I don't know if they were millions or billions but.
SD: Can you differentiate between those two?
T : No.
SD: No?
T: Because something could have happened before dinosaurs, I don't
know. . . .
SD: So now you're thinking that dinosaurs were the first things to live?
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T: Uh, uh. (Yes) but the earth could have existed a long time before
that. (C 157-158)
This passage demonstrates Tyler's conceptions of:
(a) the extreme age o f the earth as well as her inability to distinguish between
large magnitudes,
(b) dinosaurs and humans being the only notable life forms,
(c) dinosaurs as the initial life forms.
The inability to distinguish large amounts o f time was also docum ented in Stephanie
case study as well as in a study by Renner et al. (1981). Despite her recognition of a
changing earth, the other aspects o f this portion o f her conceptual framework suggest a
naivete about the historical record o f organisms. H er recognition o f humans and
dinosaurs as the only major groups o f organisms suggests that Tyler was not interested
in this aspect of natural history.
Evolutionary relationships.
Tyler's conceptions o f evolutionary relationships rem ained largely unchanged
in this mid-year period. However, her species concept did undergo a subtle alteration.
While she continued to use a largely typological species concept, she introduced the
ability to successfully reproduce as another characteristic of a species. This is not yet a
scientific species concept, but it does represent a change toward the construction of a
scientific conception.
O ther biological know ledge.
W hile Tyler's conceptual framework for the other aspects of related biological
knowledge remained largely unchanged, one aspect was highlighted during the mid
year period. During the initial interviews, Tyler referred to the ability o f organisms to
learn behaviors. During the mid-year period, this conception was further displayed
when Tyler discussed the ability of plants to bend toward a light source:
SD: Okay, ah, think about a plant. You know they move to the light?
A fter a couple of days their stems will turn around and orient toward the
light.
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T : Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: Do you think that is a learned thing or an automatic sort o f thing?
T: I would say it's learned.
SD: Learned?
T: Yeah.
SD: How does a plant leam to do something?
T : Well it wouldn't ah, it ju st knows what it has to do to survive.
SD: Okay.
T : It wouldn't be there . . . if it didn't learn to do those things. I don't
think a plant is made. Well I guess they are. But I don't think a plant is
made to automatically turning toward the sun. (C 191)
Once again Tyler's understanding o f learning provides evidence that students can be
very anthropomorphic in their understanding of biological organisms. W hile this
passage reflects Tyler's anthropomorphic conceptions o f biological processes, it
remains to be determined if the mode of communication simply reflects this conception
or if it actually creates or changes a conception.
The other groups o f conceptions, including the historical aspect of the theory,
the use o f broad evolutionary theories, and Tyler's choice o f evolutionary evidence,
were retained unchanged during the mid-year period.
See Figure 17 for a summary o f Tyler's mid-year conceptual framework for
evolution.
Year-end framework
Belief system .
By the end of the school year, Tyler had resolved the conflict between her
personal beliefs and what she understood as the scientific conception of evolution.
When shown the graphic depicting the gorilla, the chimpanzee, and the human child,
Tyler commented:
T: They're all related.
SD: Are they, really? You know you can talk to me.
T: I know.
[Both laugh]
T: Yeah, somehow they are. Well obviously these two are. [She points
the picture o f the chimpanzee and gorilla]
SD: Why obviously those two? Because they look kind o f different? .
T: Cause ahm, they're the same animal. They, they're just the same, the
same, basically the same.
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Figure 17
Summary of Tyler's mid-year conceptual framework for evolution
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: They're both sitting on their behinds with their long arms. All
brown and hair all over them. And he's not the same animal. [Pointing
to the human boy] . . . But
SD: But what?
T: But somehow he traces back to th e se .. . . I think it could be
explained scientifically somehow.
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SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) So are you still uncomfortable with it?
T: [Pause] No. (C 239)
This resolution resulted in Tyler's use of a gradual creationist conception o f human and
biological diversity, a conception which explains that God put the original "creatures"
on the earth, and evolution occurred within those creatures (Nelson, 1986).
Nature o f evolutionary changes.
During the mid-year period, Tyler rejected the possibility o f large scale
evolutionary changes, but the concept map drawn at the end o f the study indicates that
this conception had changed by the year-end. At this point, she understood
evolutionary changes as being both "radical and minor." (See Appendix G for CM-2,
year-end.)
Tyler also expanded her conception o f evolution to include changes in both
humans and other organisms. This conception is demonstrated in her answers to the
posttest question "What is your personal opinion of the theory o f evolution?":
T : [Written answer] Evolution is a change in a species over a long
period of time. Evolution began when the earth was created, but it still
is happening today. Not only did evolution occur in humans, but it can
occur in any species alive. (Posttest #9)
Despite these expanded conceptions, Tyler continued to view evolutionary
changes as leading toward "complexity" which she understood as greater "detail" and
"advancement." (C 287) W hile Tyler continued to understand humans as the most
complex of all biological organisms, by year-end, she understood evolution to
described the change o f all organisms.
The final area of change within Tyler’s conceptual framework for the nature of
evolutionary changes was in her conception of adaptations. In the mid-year period,
Tyler understood adaptations as including any changes in an organism in response to
their environment. By the year-end period, Tyler had streamlined this broad
conception:
SD: You used the word adaptation, like they adapt to their
environment. W hat does that mean?
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T : Learn to survive in it. Ah.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : It's like getting used to . . . something.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T : It's not like, no. It’s not like you can teach it to a . . . It's just from
being there you leam what things are like.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) So it's kind of a thing you gain from experience?
T: Yeah.
SD: Okay, so what causes adaptation?
T: When something changes. W hen the environm ent c h a n g e s.. . .
SD: Okay. Do you know if adaptations are linked at all to mutation?
T: Ah, I don't know. (C 242-243)
As demonstrated here, Tyler used adaptations in their proximal sense of a rapid change
in an individual in response to a change in the environment. Unlike Brian and
Stephanie, Tyler failed to recognize the multiple meanings of biological adaptation
(Lucas, 1971). This narrow conception o f adaptation is interesting when it is
considered that Tyler understood all evolutionary changes to occur through
adaptations. As has described by Cummins and Remsen (1992), Tyler demonstrated a
difficulty in distinguishing proximate and ultimate changes. This difficulty is
particularly prominent in Tyler's inability to recognize the linkage o f mutations and
adaptations.
M echanism .
Tyler dem onstrated use of a more integrated conception o f the role o f mutations
in the mechanism o f evolution by year-end. As reflected in her concept map (CM-2,
year-end), Tyler understood the role o f mutation as being essential to the actions of
natural selection. This conception was also seen in her response to the sorting task
(ST, year-end) in which she explained that both mutations and natural selection must
occur in order for an evolutionary change to com e about.
While Tyler began to understand mutation as being a necessity in the process of
evolution, her conceptions o f mutations continued to be very different from the
scientific conception. As dem onstrated in her response to the bear mutation graphic
(PI-1, year-end), Tyler understood mutations as occurring largely because they are
beneficial to a population:

233

SD: So you don’t think a mutation to [lose all body hair] would
happen?
T : I mean, well it doesn't seem logical to me.
SD: It doesn't seem logical. Do you think it would, it could happen?
T: I'm sure it could, it seems like anything could happen now. [Small
laugh] . . . I’m sure it could but I don't think it would. (C 269)
But the conception Tyler applied differed from her more formally expressed
conception o f mutations:
SD: Do you think that the majority o f mutations that happen in a group
are beneficial?
T: Ah, the majority yes, all no. (C 269)
In the same interview session in which Tyler defined mutations as random
events, she also explained that only beneficial mutations were probable. When the
logical inconsistency of these two explanations was brought to Tyler's attention, she
recognized no need to change her answers saying "I have no problem with that."
(C 229) As mentioned in the descriptive section, Tyler often compartmentalized her
knowledge and, unlike Stephanie or Brian, she was not typically driven to reconcile
conflicting knowledge claims. Tyler was capable of providing a rote description of
mutation, but the conception she used and applied was very different. Using the
definition of meaningful learning provided by Smith et al. (1993), Tyler did not
understand the conception o f mutation in a meaningful manner.
Not surprisingly, Tyler did not often apply any conception of mutation,
scientific or alternative, toward understanding an evolutionary event. In the posttest,
Tyler did not use mutation in her explanation of the evolution of speed in cheetahs and
she used it in a very tentative answer in the question referring to the evolution of
blindness in cave salamanders:
T: [Written answer] Either a mutation could have happened that caused
their blindness
or
since they have no use for their eyes, their vision could have gotten
worse and worse. Eventually they lost all sight. (Posttest #8)
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This answer indicates that while Tyler recognized the applicability of the conception of
mutation, she continued to judge it to be a less plausible response than the use/disuse
explanation for the origin of a trait.
Tyler's posttest responses taken with her response to the class final exam
provide some insight into her alternative conception of mutation. W hen asked to the
comment on the evolutionary implications of a cartoon depicting the morphological
change in a stick figure, Tyler responded:
T : A mutation definitely occurred in the beginning o f the evolutionary
process. This creature went from having no limbs to having four limbs
in one step. . . . (Artifact 7, #4)
Tyler's conception of mutation was as a source of drastic change, such as a sudden
occurrence of "having four limbs." In other instances, such as what she perceived as
the gradual evolution of speed in cheetahs or blindness in salamanders or immunity in
mosquitoes, she understood her pre-existing, alternative conceptions to be more
applicable. While she constructed a conception for mutation, this conception was one
of such severe change that she found few instances where itcould be successfully
applied.
Tyler used a conception o f evolutionary events as gradual changes or drastic
changes:
T : Evolution is a change through natural selection and mutation over
time in a species.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: Ahm, [pause], species, they can it's like they can totally change or
they can change to fit their environment. . . .
SD: You put down here that change can be radical or it can be minor.
T: Yeah. (C 286)
This acceptance of radical change was a recent phenomena, as described in the
preceding section, and obviously was one which Tyler had yet to become comfortable.
While she recognized that sudden changes could occur through mutations, she did not
recognize this type o f evolution as being very common. Instead, Tyler understood
most evolutionary changes to occur through the gradual change in the quality of a trait
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which was quietly magnified in each generation, "It just seemed like that when [a
species is evolving] that each generation would get a little bit more [of a trait]. (C 289)
Human evolution.
As was discussed in the section on beliefs, by the end o f the school year, Tyler
had begun to understand humans to be the result of evolution from an ancestral
primate.
T: [W ritten answer] Studying evolution this year has really made me
reconsider what I have always believed about our origin. Actually, the
knowledge confused me a lot because I was tom between what to
believe. I was always set on creationism because I have never known
anything else. But after learning much about evolution this year I
realize the facts and discoveries made cannot be disputed. Evolution
occurred and is still occurring today. I can answer many questions that
would have not been answered other wise. The knowledge I gained in
our anthropology unit has further supported my belief in evolution. The
idea that we descended from gorillas is fascinating and quite important.
And studying the skulls of the first creatures found million o f years ago
through the skulls o f today, it is obvious to me that we do stem from one
common origin. . . . (Artifact 7, # 1)
The latter portions o f this passage indicate that Tyler used the alternative
conception that humans stemmed from a currently existing species o f primates ("we
descended from gorillas"). Despite its obvious logical limitations, she continued to
accept the plausibility of this conception. Her acceptance was due more to what she
perceived as the theory's scientific authority than to its logical coherence.
Natural history.
Most aspects of Tyler's conceptual framework for natural history were retained
at year-end. However, these interviews demonstrated that Tyler had begun to apply her
knowledge of evolution to understand variation within organisms. Looking at a
graphic of three species of bears, she commented:
T: They're very different [because] they live in different places.
SD: Yeah?
T : And they had to [pause] adapt to those places you know, and that
changes them I'm sure. (C 238)
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While this passage demonstrates that Tyler was capable o f a more mechanistic
approach to understanding nature, she continued to use a largely aesthetic view of the
natural world:
SD: Do you see [nature] as competitive?
T : Competitive? It's never been a word I've thought of.
SD: No? Okay.
T: No.
SD: So how would you characterize it?
T : Nature? I just think o f nature as being ju st wonderful.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
T: Just so peaceful. (C 266)
Broad evolutionary theories.
Although most aspects o f Tyler's conceptual fram ework for broad evolutionary
theories were retained, subtle differences were seen. One difference was in her
perception of the scope of the evolutionary theory.
T: I used to think o f evolution as just when we came to be. . . . I think
it is now the change in a species. . . . And I think it's going on all the
time.
SD: Okay, so it [evolution] would include both the creation o f life and
T: Change now. (C 267)
Even though she recognized the production of life as an aspect o f evolutionary
theory, Tyler never discussed the strength or weaknesses o f the scientific explanation
of this event. Judging from her comments, Tyler understood the most important
question in the theory o f evolution to be "Are humans related to primates?" The
question o f the original creation of life was less influential.
In the final exam Tyler wrote:
T : The most important theory we have learned about this year is the
theory of evolution. This explains our origin and why we are what we
are today. . . . (Artifact 7, #1)
Once again, while it can be argued that a student’s response to an exam may reflect
only her/his scientific conceptions, it is im portant to recognize that Tyler's scientific
conceptual framework for biology placed so much emphasis on evolutionary theory.
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The other groups o f conceptions, the historical aspect of evolutionary theory,
her choice o f evolutionary evidence, and her related biological knowledge were
retained unchanged at year-end.
See Figure 18 for a summary of Tyler's year-end conceptual framework for
evolution.
Summary of year long conceptual change
Tyler's case study provides valuable insight into the influences o f a learner's
conceptual ecology when it is compared with Stephanie's. Like Stephanie, Tyler could
be considered to be a gradual creationist. But, unlike Stephanie, Tyler displayed
extreme personal discom fort when discussing topics in which scientific knowledge and
religious belief differed. Tyler understood the most im portant issue of this conflict to
be the question of human speciation. Because Tyler approached biology as an
authority seeker, she often attempted to resolve scientific and religious conflict through
eliciting outside advice. Tyler, as the authority seeker, achieved a resolution o f her
perceived conflict. This resolution took the form of Tyler's acceptance o f her
conception of human speciation and a personal rejection o f the special creation of
humans. Accompanying this shift in Tyler's conceptual ecology, she also experienced
conceptual change toward the scientific explanations of evolutionary change. The
most important of these changes was her construction of the random aspects of
evolution as introduced through mutation and a simultaneous rejection of need as the
driving mechanism for evolutionary change. Despite these changes, at the end of the
school year, Tyler was still involved in the process o f learning evolution. She
continued to apply her previous existing conceptions o f evolutionary change in
addition to her newly constructed conceptions.
While Tyler's conceptions for the process o f evolutionary change underwent
substantial change, it could be argued that these changes were based on an uninformed
acceptance of a partial scientific framework. Uninformed is used here because
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H um an Evolution

Characteristics o f Evolutionary
Changes

Broad Evolutionary T heories

H um ans are anim als*

Evolution includes large scale
and subtle changes

Evolution includes creation o f
first life and subsequent changes
in hum ans and anim als *

H um ans are prim ates*

Evolution is a progression to
m ore advanced (complex)
organisms*

Evolution includes only
changes within taxa otherthan
humans*

H um ans are a pro d u ct o f evolution*

Evolutionary changes are ordered
but not predictable*
Evolutionary changes are based
on need*
A daptations include proxim al in
response to environmental
conditions

H istorical A spects o f T heory

E vidence for Evolution
D evelopm ent o f organisms*

M echanism
Sm all scale variation caused by
concious decision, use/disuse
and need

Natural H istory
O rganism s exam ined in term s o f
adaptations

Sim ilarities o f hum ans to other
organism s*

Large scale variation caused by
m utation
A ll mutations are beneficial
M ost important com ponent o f
process is natural selection
Evolving populations are
variable*
N atural selection works through
death of unfit individuals*

Earth is continually changing*

R elated B iological K now ledge
M endelian genetics*
A nthropom orphic approach to
production o f variation*

D inosaurs were initial life form*
N ature is not com petitive
Scientific conception o f
taxonom y*____________________

Collage conception o f fitness*

E volutionary R elationships

Evolution includes an increase in
the quality of a trait*

Species concept based on
characters and ability to breed*

Note. Italics indicate instances of conceptual change.
* indicates retention o f conception from previous description.
Shaded block indicates conceptions based on belief.
Solid block indicates academ ic conception.

Figure 18
Summary o f Tyler's year-end conceptual framework for evolution
important aspects of a fundamental understanding o f evolutionary change were not
present in Tyler's conceptual framework. She had no conception o f the com petitive
aspects o f natural systems. Likewise, she had an alternative view o f the process of
speciation, as was dem onstrated in her explanation o f human speciation.
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Despite these missing components, Tyler was becoming more mechanistic in her
approach to biological problems. Her aesthetic orientation was undergoing a shift
toward a more scientific one.
Meredith: Biologist as Pragmatist
Meredith was selected for participation in the interview process for a variety of
reasons: (a) she used several alternative conceptions o f evolutionary theory as
demonstrated in her answers to the Bishop and Anderson (1985) exam, (b) she
considered herself to be religious, but she had constructed a science/religion dichotomy
before the outset of the course, and (c) she was not overly interested in biology. These
characteristics made Meredith distinctly different from each o f the other three students,
and it was judged that her participation would contribute toward an understanding of
the process o f conceptual change.
Meredith was a senior girl who sat toward the front of Hurston's Biology II
class. Like Tyler, Meredith seldom offered an answ er in the whole class discussions
unless she was directly called upon by the teacher. A lso like Tyler, once the large
group fractured into the typical small, working groups, Meredith was very vocal and
she often asked questions of her co-workers and the teacher. I had a comfortable
relationship with Meredith from the outset, and in laboratory situations she would often
ask for my guidance so I worked with her small group frequently. Because of our close
classroom relationship, the interviews with Meredith were very congenial. But unlike
Tyler, Meredith's answers were direct and succinct; she followed very few tangents in
conversation. While M eredith always appeared to be engaged in our talks, she seldom
mused over her answers; once given, Meredith would not alter her answers or refer
back to earlier questions during an interview.
1 understood M eredith to approach to biology in a very pragmatic fashion, as
shown in the following passage:
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M : And, ahm, what I'm talking about creationism is that Genesis in the
Bible is just saying ahm why, why everything was created and not how.
And, I think a lot o f people don't realize that that's what it's saying. . ..
SD: Have you always thought this or is this something you've worked
out for yourself later on?
M : Ahm, no, I mean, what, what do you mean?
SD: You know, that, that the thing that Genesis is the why and the
science is the how? Is that
M : Oh. . . . Yeah, that, ah, that's something I, I've not thought all my
life. I mean,
SD: Uh hum.
M : Once I started reading the Bible more, that's what I realized.
SD: Uh hum. So that's something that you've
M: I've never read
SD: worked out for yourself?
M: Yeah, I never really thought much about it before.
SD: Uh uh. (Yes)
M: I used to not, I very rarely think about it [laughter] to tell you the
truth. (A 29)
Unlike Brian and Stephanie, M eredith did not commonly attempt to relate one theory
to another. Instead, she understood a topic only in its application to her schoolwork.
While Meredith worked hard in the biology class, she wasn't interested in biology as
much as she was interested in doing well in school:
SD: Ahm do you think biology is real useful to you out o f the
classroom? W hat you learn in biology, do you use it more than just in
school? . . .
M : No, I mean, not too much. . . . It's not something that I use
ev ery d ay .. . . I've never really been benefited by it other than tests and
things like that. But, ahm, I mean it's just, you need to know that kind
of thing just to
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: to be educated. (A 150-151)
Perhaps the pragmatism that characterized Meredith's approach to biology was
forced on her by her demands of school. Talks with Meredith were constantly
peppered with comments of exams, assignments, and grades. Both Meredith and her
parents explained that her time away from school was spent com pleting homework
assignments and college applications. Because o f this, she watched little television and
enjoyed no leisure reading. "I only have time to read what's required." [S #7]
However, she made time for the track team and in past years had played basketball.
While Meredith worked diligently on her school work, this seemed to take a form of
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socialization for her. She was a member of a small group of senior girls who
completed assignments together after school hours.
During classroom observations, I repeatedly observed Meredith consulting her
oversized calendar which contained all her school assignments. Despite her diligence,
Meredith was often forced to finish assignments during her classes. She was struggling
to achieve the grades necessary for a college scholarship, and because of this struggle
the quality of both her personal and intellectual life was sacrificed. While Meredith did
not reflect on her biological knowledge, she participated in little reflection on any
academic topic.
M eredith's father explained, "I don't know that she has a great academic interest
in anything." (A 330) Despite her concentration, no single subject captured her
attention. Her favorite subjects were mathematics and English, because both of these
"came easy" for her. (A 48) However, during the year o f the study Meredith
particularly enjoyed her W orld History class because of the teacher's intriguing
lectures.
At the outset of the study, Meredith had planned to become a medical doctor.
During two previous summers she volunteered in hospitals and found that she enjoyed
working in health care. Meredith enrolled in the Biology II course because she knew
that she would need many science courses in college in order to pursue her career. But
during the course of the study, Meredith decided to study nursing. She explained she
made this change because nursing requires a short time of preparation, and the schools
are not extremely competitive. This career choice was also selected because of the
many scholarships available to nursing students. She understood that nursing would
allow her to work in health-care in the role o f a caretaker. Keeping in mind later
family plans, Meredith understood the lower salary of nursing to be outweighed by the
life-style benefits of this career.
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M eredith's Conceptual Ecology
The most striking aspect of Meredith's conceptual ecology was found in the
intersection o f her scientific epistemology and religious orientation. While both
science and religion were very meaningful to her, she understood them to be
completely separate in their goals and methods:
M : [Science] allows us to see how thing are working. How the world
around us is you know
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : Operating and all those thing. It doesn't necessarily tell us why.
SD: W hat does? . . .
M : Religion, it's more the, the why's.
SD: Do you see science and religion has having some am ount of
overlap? Or, do you see them as completely separate? In your mind.
M : Ahm, well, I think that they're separate in that ahm one o f 'em you
know is explaining how things are happening and the other one is telling
why. But, ahm, there’s overlap in that these are dealing sometimes with
the, dealing with the same th in g .. . .
SD: So how do you separate the two? . . .
M: Well, ahm, the way well religion is you know a faith that you have.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : And ah, you can say, you know, the the earth was created through
faith, but not ahm. The way I separate it, I think, is that in science I
have you know facts just to base evolution on.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : And all that kind o f thing you know. [Science] is more hard facts.
But religion is more, it's more o f a belief through faith.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) And faith being? How would you describe what
faith is?
M : Ahm it's hard to explain. But it's a belief that you have not it's not,
it can't necessarily always ahm be based on tangible th in g .. . .
SD: So you think things are
M: Yeah, I think they are pretty separate. (A 203-205)
Before the study began, Meredith applied this dichotomy to the area o f evolution and
resolved any o f the conflicts that m ight have occurred:
M: [Reading her answ er to the pretest questions regarding her opinion
of the theory o f evolution.] I do believe that animals had evolved from
their forefathers while I believe in creationism also. I feel we have a lot
o f proof for evolution that I think comes into play. W hat, what I wasn't
really clear with my answ er here.
SD: Okay.
M: Ah, I mean, evolution is, I mean, I definitely believe in evolution.
And I think we just have too much evidence for someone not to believe
it.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
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M : W hat I'm talking about creationism is that Genesis in the Bible is
ju st saying ahm why, why everything was created and not how.
Evolution is how everything was created. (A 27-28)
From the outset o f the course, M eredith used a theistic understanding of
evolution in which evolution is understood as the mechanism through which a creator
operates (Nelson, 1986). M eredith accepted evolution as a valid biological process
producing a firm historical record, and she understood that the study of this process and
its record as being a scientific endeavor. However, the existence o f God was not
something Meredith recognized as requiring tangible support, because she understood
religious and scientific knowledge as being distinctly separate.
Meredith described herself as a religious person; she and her family regularly
attended a Presbyterian church in the city. While it was evident in our conversations
that M eredith did ponder religious matters, religion did not appear to be a focal point of
M eredith's energies. Recently her church related activities had been drastically
curtailed by her school responsibilities. She explained, "I ju st don't have time for that
anymore." (A 142) Congruent with her understanding of the limits of religious belief,
Meredith used a metaphysical or religious world view only in regard to human
activities. While she understood human life to have a fundamental meaning and plan,
this understanding did not extend toward the natural world.
Although Meredith did not have a strong religious orientation, neither she did
have a strong scientific orientation. Meredith enrolled in this science class because she
felt she learned very little biology in her previous biology class, and she realized that
this discipline was needed in college. Her father explained that Meredith was "not so
much interested science as she is interested in nursing." (A 330) For Meredith,
science was a means to an end. She enjoyed Ms. Hurston's class, but this was not her
favorite class or favorite subject. As was discussed in her description, Meredith did not
feel biology was a subject that she applied in her life, instead it was a subject to master
in order to "be educated." (A 151)
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While M eredith did not have a strong scientific orientation, she was typically
very rational in her consideration o f natural topics. Like Brian, Stephanie, and Tyler,
Meredith was not interested in pseudoscientific topics. She dismissed these topics as
"National Inquirer sorts o f things." (A 52) When she considered the natural world, she
used a naturalistic world view, understanding natural phenomena in terms o f cause and
effects and looking for the mechanisms behind occurrences (Cobem, 1993).
Meredith used a realist epistemology of scientific knowledge, but she
understood scientific knowledge to have a tentative, contextual nature.
M : Aspects of science can change.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: Like ahm you know, like through more ahm study and
experimentation, maybe new things will be ah found and discovered . . .
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : that would change what was once believed. And I mean, that's how
it could change. (A 79)
While M eredith was a realist, she was not a naive realist.
M eredith also had a scientific conception o f the relative importance of facts,
hypotheses, and theories in science.
M: [An] hypothesis would be what you ah expect to happen. You really
haven't ahm you know, you've done some research and everything, but
you kinda' think this is what's gonna' happen.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: I think a theory more comes out o f ahm, testing your hypothesis.
SD: Okay, so how about the difference between a scientific theory and
scientific facts?
M: A hm I’d say t h a t . . . theory, you know, it can be changed through
more study and everything. But, facts, I mean, they're not gonna'
change. It's either it's true or it's not true.
SD: So which one, you know, which one do you think has more weight
in science? Has more importance?
M: Ahm, well, probably ahm like I would say maybe the theory
because ahm, no you can’t, if all you have was [sic] facts, there wouldn't
be anything to work with. (A 78)
While her parents described Meredith as a student who was not very interested
in biology, it became evident during our discussions that Meredith had a knowledge of
biology that was gained from outside the classroom. When discussing the organisms in
the interviews about instances, Meredith would augment her explanations with
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examples taken from local natural flora and fauna. For instance, she knew that the
local oak trees included several different species, and she could recite many o f their
common names. W hen questioned about this knowledge, she explained that her father
is a "nature nut." Because o f this, family vacations centered around hiking in state
parks and trips to natural history museums. While Meredith seemed mildly interested
in this sort of knowledge, nature did not hold the attraction for her as it did her father.
M 's fath er: She's receptive to that sort of thing, but she w on't initiate it,
and she probably won't pursue i t . . . . She's not one to go wandering
outside, looking at things. (A 333)
Although Meredith was not keenly interested in nature, the influence of
families activities was reflected in her scope o f knowledge. Toward the end o f the
semester, we discussed her views on human population. She felt that humans should
be limited to two children per couple because of the stress overpopulation places on
natural systems. This view was one she shared with her parents, and this topic was
often discussed at her dinner table.
Her parents, particularly her father, were very instrumental in shaping
Meredith's negotiation between science and religion. When the conflict between the
scientific conception of evolution and the religious explanation o f creation became an
important issue in her World History course, she discussed her conflicting
understandings with her father:
M 's fath er: I tried to get her to see that people make a big mistake when they
try to get science out of the bible. (A 337)
By the time we first broached this issue, Meredith seemed to have fully incorporated
her father's use of the dichotomy between scientific knowledge and religious
knowledge.
Aside from the actual declarative knowledge, Meredith gained from her
family's activities and discussions, it is possible that her mechanistic outlook, her use
of the scientific habit o f seeking mechanisms and causality in natural systems, was
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gained at home. While it is difficult to establish what determined M eredith's view of
nature and biology, the influence of her home activities cannot be discounted.
M eredith's Conceptual Framework for Evolution
Initial framework
Based upon M eredith's use o f a strict science/religion dichotomy, there was
little interaction between her personal religious beliefs and her conceptions of the
scientific explanation for evolutionary changes. M eredith, unlike Stephanie and Tyler,
continually used what she understood as the scientific conception for evolution as her
own, personal explanation.
M eredith's conceptual framework of evolution used at the outset o f the study is
dem onstrated well by her first concept map. (See Appendix G for Meredith's C M -1,
initial.) M eredith's understanding o f evolution emphasized the nature of evolutionary
changes. She did not refer to the history o f evolutionary theory, the scope of the
theory, to possible religious conflicts, or the process through which evolutionary
changes occur. As discussed for the other participants, M eredith's omission o f these
topics from her map does not indicate that these topics were not a feature o f her
conceptual framework for evolution; instead they were not important aspects.
The omission of possible religious conflict is not surprising, as explained by
M eredith's use of a strict dichotomy between science and religion. The omission of the
process o f evolutionary changes is more perplexing, however. Like Brian, Meredith
understood nature in terms o f cause and effect. It might be expected that this
mechanistic world view would promote construction of a conception for process. But
when M eredith was questioned directly, "How do evolutionary changes happen?," she
responded, "I don't know." (A 49)
Nature of evolutionary change.
As expressed in M eredith's concept map shown above (CM-1, initial), her
conceptions o f the nature o f evolution changes included evolution as (a) a change in
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the features o f an organism, (b) a change in a group o f organism s, (c) a change
requiring a very long time period, and (d) a change increasing the group's ability to
survive.
The only one of the four conceptions that requires further discussion is her
understanding that evolution is a change which increases the group's ability to survive.
Meredith understood all evolutionary changes to be directional in order to satisfy the
needs of an organism:
M: [Written response in reference to the evolution o f blindness in cave
salamanders] Cave salamanders, living in a dark environment, did not
need to see. O ver the years they evolved to lose this unnecessary
function. (Pretest # 8)
Her description o f all evolutionary changes as the acquisition o f beneficial traits
or the loss of non-beneficial traits provides no evidence that M eredith recognized the
random aspect o f evolutionary change. She understood evolution to be a directional,
gradual change toward a beneficial trait needed by an organism. However, Meredith's
conception of beneficial changed over the course of the initial interviews. In the
second interview, she explained that evolution is a species becoming "more advanced."
[A 30] While advanced could be used in a vague manner, Meredith understood this
term to signify a much more specific meaning:
M: What I mean by more advanced is that ahm, [they become] more
suitable for where they live. (A 30)
In later interviews, Meredith used more biologically appropriate term inology to express
her understanding of the direction of evolutionary change:
SD: W hat happens when things evolve?
M: Producing a change to a more fit sp ecies.. . .
SD: And what is that?
M: Most able to survive. I guess, you ahm you can ju st kinda' say the
strongest in a sense. . . .
SD: Okay, and is strength and survival, is that related in any way?
M: Yes.
SD: Ahm, how? . . .
M : Strength enables survival and ahm fit increases survival. (A 64-66)
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The change in terminology from advanced (suitable) to fittest may be explained by our
discussion o f the pretest. The pretest contained an exercise in which the student had to
select the fittest lion (in biological terms). It appears that this term, fitness, was
appropriated by M eredith for use in describing the directionality o f evolutionary
change. This appropriation occurred in the two weeks that passed between the second
and third interviews, and the term was appropriated into M eredith's preexisting
conception. However, as the last passage indicates, M eredith used the alternative
conception of fitness as being strength.
M echanism.
As mentioned previously, an understanding of the mechanism o f evolutionary
change was not a major feature of M eredith's conceptual framework. W hen asked
specifically to map her understanding of the process o f evolutionary change, Meredith's
map closely resembled her first map which described the nature o f evolutionary
changes. [See Appendix G for the concept map (CM-2, initial.)] M eredith recognized
the gap in her understanding:
SD: Could you concept map how evolution works?
M: That's what I don't know. [Laughter] (A 63)
This lack o f knowledge was also shown on M eredith's first hesitant attempts in the
sorting task (ST, initial).
W hile M eredith explained that she had no knowledge o f the process of
evolution, this was not the case. Structured and open-ended interviews with Meredith
revealed her use of several conceptions linked to the process of evolutionary change,
but these conceptions differed dramatically from comparable scientific conceptions.
Some of these alternative conceptions include: (a) need as causal agent in the origin of
variation, (b) the lack o f recognition of the importance of variation in a population, (c)
natural selection as operating only through the death o f unfit individuals, (d) the
strength conception o f fitness, and (e) the vague conception o f the unit o f evolutionary
change.
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The most striking o f these alternative conceptions and one which underwent a
change in the initial interview period was the conception o f need. As demonstrated by
her answers to the pretest questions, Meredith understood that new variations were
produced in a population because of a need for a beneficial change:
M: [Written response in reference to the evolution of speed in
cheetahs] Obviously, cheetahs needed to run faster. Perhaps, it was
necessary for them to catch their prey and to survive. This occurred
because o f a need for adaptation. (Pretest # 7)
M eredith's rejection o f mutation further signifies the prominence o f need in her
conceptual framework:
M: [Discussing the evolution of webbed feet in ducks] Well, ahm,
webbed feet allows, I mean, ah, better, for better swimming. Ah, it was
something that ahm, it was an evolved trait wasn't it?
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: And, it’s not a chance mutation. It was something that was
necessary.
SD: Okay, so ahm, so how do things evolve?
M: Well, ahm, it's mainly as far as when they need to ah adapt to
certain conditions. (A 19)
M eredith's use o f need as the factor responsible for the production of variation excludes
the random aspect of mutation.
But in later questions, Meredith introduced the term "mutation" into her
explanation for the production of variation:
M: [Reading her answer to a pretest question about the formation of
webbed feet in ducks] Ahm, number 4. The population o f ducks
evolved webbed feet because, [pause] Okay. I, I didn't answer this
question. I, I put something in to explain. I said the population of
ducks evolved webbed feet because o f the need to change to fit the
environment. I mean, thus a mutation o ccu rred .. ..
SD: So what is a mutation? How does that fit into all this?
M: It's, it's the change that, ahm, ah , an organism or you can call it an
organism goes though to ahm become more suited for the environment
that they live in.
SD: Ah, ahm, how did, how did that happen? How do mutations
happen?
M: Ahm, I'm not too sure. (A 21)
Mutation was incorporated into M eredith's pre-existing conception, but this
introduction occurred without an understanding o f the term. This introduction was
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made necessary as M eredith recognized need to be an inappropriate causal mechanism
for the production o f variation.
M: [Reading her answer to the pretest questions about the evolution of
speed in cheetahs] I said that ah, they needed to run faster perhaps it was
necessary for them to catch their prey to survive. Ahm, it occurred
because of the need for an adaptation. Ahm, I'm really, I'm not sure
about that.
SD: Okay, So, like this, try to think out loud. How do you think it
would happen? . . .
M : Ahm, I don't know. I mean, this is that, obviously, I mean, it was
necessar—. It needed to run faster, but I don't know how this happens. I
mean.
SD: Yeah.
M: That's kinda' what you’re asking, is how, what causes it and how it
happens and I don’t know that.
SD: Okay. You don’t know.
M: I know it happens. I know it's one answer or something, but I don't
know that it is. [Laughter] (A 24-25)
Meredith continued to use need as the ultimate driving force of evolution, but she
began to recognize its inability to serve as a mechanism for that change.
Two weeks later, M eredith reflected on the question of the origin o f variation
(ST, initial):
SD: So how did those rabbits get like that [a brown color]?
M: Ahm, I guess it's some kind o f genetic change. I mean, I guess it's
[she points to the card depicting DNA].
SD: If you don’t, if you don't want to use that card, you don't have to.
M: Oh, yeah, I don't want to use it. (A 69)
This passage demonstrates that Meredith began to recognize that the production o f new
variation in a population must have a genetic basis. But it is difficult to gauge whether
her recognition was something which occurred before the interview, during our
discussion, or if it was triggered by the presence of the card depicting a strand of DNA.
In any case, this was a relatively new recognition, and at this point Meredith was
hesitant in fully incorporating this feature in her explanation of the evolutionary event
represented by the sorting task.
Meredith had a conception of natural selection, although she did not use this
term to refer to her explanation. During the pretest, Meredith explained that if
organisms "aren't well suited for the conditions they live in, they won't make it." (A

251
20) Natural selection was not a strong com ponent o f her understanding of the process
of evolutionary change. Her tentative usage o f this conception is also signified by her
failure to recognize the importance of variation in a population. Meredith
demonstrated this alternative conception during the interviews about instances showing
a graphic o f a litter of kittens (IAI-1, initial):
SD: Is it a bad thing to have variation in a litter? O r in a population?
M : Yeah, I think it's a good thing, for ahm, nothing to do with. It's
something that we like as h u m an s.. . . I think, I think it's good to have
variations. But I can't think o f what, why I think that.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : But that we should have it there. (A 94)
As discussed in the previous section, the nature of evolutionary changes,
Meredith's conceptions o f fitness underwent change during the initial interview period.
At the outset, M eredith used a collage conception o f fitness:
M: [Reading her pretest explanation of the fittest lion] Spot fathered a
large number of cubs with a large percentage of them surviving to
adulthood. Spot is adaptable, as shown by his ability to support himself
and move to another location.
SD: So what is fitness? What does it mean?
M : It's ahm it's being ah, [pause] well-suited for where you live. Being
able to you know, provide offspring and be successful in raising young
and all that kind of thing. (A 24)
This explanation changed to a more refined and focused conception as shown in the
interview one week later:
SD: W hat does fit measure?
M: Ability to survive. (A 49)
And this conception again changed in the following week:
M: Evolution is a change occurring in a species becoming more fit,
resulting in strength.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: And strength enables survival and ah, fit increases survival. (A 66)
The changes described above should not be taken as instances of conceptual
change, as M eredith did not appear to be seriously comparing conceptions. Instead,
she was searching for a plausible alternative to use in the explanation she was
constructing. But the narrowing o f scope o f the conception is notable. A t the outset,
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M eredith used all the information at her disposal to determine fitness. In later
instances, Meredith equated fitness with survivability, and in the last instance strength
was a factor which increased survivability.
The final conception o f interest in this group was M eredith's recognition of the
unit of evolutionary change. She explained that evolution occurs in a group or
organism as opposed to an individual. But it is unclear whether Meredith understood
evolutionary changes to include a gradual change in the quality o f a trait in an entire
population or a gradual change in the percentage o f the population with a distinct trait:
SD: So what do you think evolution is?
M: Ahm. [Pause] I just, I think it's just ahm, you know, I don't know
much about it. But I just think that it's a change ahm over eons of time
that ahm allows ahm a species, usually they become more advanced,
you know.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: Like in the ape, you know, the man-like ape evolving into man and
all that kind o f thing. It's just the species becomes more advanced, ahm,
more suitable, ahm, that's about all I know about it. (A 30)
All M eredith's explanations o f evolutionary changes took this form, so it is difficult to
ascertain her conceptions of the unit o f evolutionary change. But with need as the most
fundamental agent in the production o f variation, Meredith had no constraints upon the
unit she could select. If need caused variation, entire populations could change
incrementally each generation. Another possibility is that at this point, Meredith had
not yet considered the appropriate unit, and so this conception did not appear in her
interview data.
Human evolution.
It is notable that, unlike the other interview participants, M eredith did not
include humans in her answer to the question "What is your personal opinion of the
theory of evolution?"
M: Ah, I mean, evolution is, I mean, I definitely believe in evolution.
And I think we just have too much evidence for someone not to believe
it.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
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M: W hat I'm talking about creationism is that Genesis in the Bible is
just saying ahm why, why everything was created and not how.
Evolution is how everything was created. (A 27-28)
The omission o f humans in her answer may reflect Meredith's personal resolution of
the issue of human evolution. From the outset o f the study, M eredith understood
humans to be the product of evolutionary change. The evidence she recognized as
supporting human evolution was found in the similarities between humans and other
primates:
M: [In a discussion o f gorillas] They have a lot o f characteristics of
humans. (A 54)
Meredith understood humans to be evolutionarily related to primates, a conception that
she felt was strongly reinforced by the animal behavior unit. Despite this recognition,
Meredith rejected the classification o f humans as primates (LAI-1, initial):
[When shown a graphic of a human boy, a gorilla, and a chimpanzee]
M: All right, two primates and a little boy
SD: Okay, two prim ates and a little boy. Is the boy a primate?
M: Ahm, no.
SD: No.
M: No. [Laughter]
SD: [Laughter] [Said to tape recorder.] Her face is really screwed up.
[Said to M.] You think that's a pretty obvious question? With a pretty
obvious answer about primates? Are they animals?
M: Ahm, no.
SD: No.
M: I mean, what, no, we're, we're not animals. (A 116)
Meredith went on to explain that humans were related to animals and related to
primates, but "it's such a distant thing" that we could no longer be taxonomically
classified in the same m anner as primates and animals. (A 117) It should be pointed
out that Meredith understood this to be the scientific conception o f the classification of
humans.
Evolutionary relationships.
Other than human/primate and human/animal relationships, the only other
evolutionary lineage that surfaced during the initial interviews was that of
dinosaurs/birds. In the interview about instances, when shown a graphic o f a heron.

254
Meredith com m ented on the recent research that was discussed in class suggesting
dinosaurs as the ancestors o f birds:
M: I could see, I mean there were some pretty convincing research
done on it, b u t. . . you know, I don't think I know enough yet to. . . . I
mean, I can see how that would, I mean it's very possible. (A 83)
Like Brian and Stephanie, M eredith had begun to apply some o f the ideas she had
learned in class to her understanding o f biological organisms. But unlike the other two,
M eredith's com ments remained very tentative and noncommittal, as if she were just
beginning to investigate the im plications and possibilities o f this theory.
Species concepts were not an integral feature of M eredith's conception of
evolutionary change. While she responded that evolution occurs in groups o f
organism s, her com ments remained very unclear as to the boundaries o f this group.
When directly asked about species during the interview about instances, M eredith
replied with a very informal definition (LAI-1, initial):
| In response to a graphic depicting three different species o f bears] SD:
So what does it mean to be o f a different species?
M : Ahm it's like ahm a different ahm, if. How can I put this into
words? Ahm, like ahm, you, they, they produce certain offspring but
they're all within the bear, whatever the name o f their family is. (A 96)
When questioned further, M eredith explained that each o f the three species o f bears
could successfully interbreed if their ranges overlapped. Her explanations were so
unclear that it was difficult to identify the species concept she applied. Meredith's
recognition of variation in a species was identified in the earlier section on process, but
she failed to recognize the significance o f this variation.
Natural history.
Meredith understood animals in terms of their evolutionary adaptations perhaps
more strongly than any of the other three participants, as shown in this passage from an
interview about instances (IAI-1, initial):
[When shown a graphic depicting an octopus ]
M : Okay, we have an octopus.
SD: W hat can you tell me about o cto p u s-es? . . .
M : Ahm, well, they, ahm, you know they live in the ocean.
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SD: Ah, ah. (Yes)
M : 1 don't know a whole lot about them.
SD: Do you know what they eat?
M : Probably algae and plankton and. Although that's kind o f small. I
don't know what they do e a t .. . .
SD: I think they eat crabs and stuff. W hat else can you tell me?
M : Ahm, well obviously there is ahm this ahm enables them to ahm
best capture you know ah their meal. [She points to the tentacles.]
SD: Uh, uh. (Y e s ). . . You say best catch?
M : W ell, it makes them more fitted. I mean, if you if maybe they've
ahm you know didn't do st-- Ahm you know, like I said a couple of
interviews before, I think an organism will die unless they, ahm can be
ah a successful predator.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : And, ahm, maybe these, ahm if it wasn't like ah you know made up
like this. If it didn't have the the legs like this and not the legs but the
ahm the ahm it couldn't catch its meal.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : I mean.
SD: So you think they're well, pretty well
M : Pretty well adapted.
SD: Yeah.
M: And well suited for, I would think so, I mean it wouldn't be around
if it wasn't. (A 87)
This understanding also was evident in M eredith's reaction to the flower graphic. Here
she responded in terms of the reproductive function o f the flower as well as the
energetic expense of the structure. M ost similar to Brian, M eredith was easily capable
o f reacting to biological organism s in terms o f the function and evolutionary adaptation
o f various structures.
Meredith was also notable in terms o f her biological vocabulary. She typically
used terms such as herbivore, nocturnal, predator, and cross pollination in her
responses to the interviews about instances (IAI-1, initial). Like her mechanistic
explanations o f biological phenomena, the use of such a biological vocabulary may not
signify a deeper understanding o f the content of biology, but this may be a reflection of
her ease in using the forms of discourse accepted in biology classrooms. Meredith may
not have known more science than Tyler and Stephanie, but she was familiar with
talking science.
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Broad evolutionary theories.
Meredith's understanding of the scope of evolutionary theory is not clearly
described in her interview data. However, this passage provides some insight into her
conceptions:
M: There's [sic] some people who ahm believe that creationism is how
the world was created. And so they ahm, they don't believe. Like some,
I think there are a lot of, people that they want to believe that, that's
what Genesis was explaining, how everything was created. They
wouldn't believe in evolution. (A 28)
M eredith understood scientific evolutionary theory to encompass the explanation for
the creation of the earth as well as subsequent changes in species. It is notable,
however, that Meredith never broached this topic in our open-ended interviews. This
may be a reflection of Meredith's approach to biology. Meredith the pragmatist dealt
only with issues of immediate concern (i.e., issues I introduced). She seldom identified
areas o f difficulty herself.
As described previously, Meredith applied very little o f her biological
knowledge outside o f the classroom. Because o f this, she understood the importance of
evolution to be limited to the theoretical considerations of biological topics. But within
this realm, Meredith was articulate about the applications of evolutionary knowledge:
M: I think that when you're, that when you're doing, running
experiments, and you're you know concerned with animals and plans
and all
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : that kind o f thing, that you, you have to consider evolution. But
that it's not n ecess-I wouldn't say that it's necessarily more or less
important [than some other biological theory],
SD: Okay.
M: I think it's just something, it's off to itself and it's something that
needs to be considered when doing
SD: Okay.
M: things. It's an additional bit of inform ation that you consider when
you look at plants or animals. (A 154-154)
Meredith understood evolution to be a common thread running throughout biology
which provided additional information about any biological phenomenon. However,
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she did not recognize the relative importance o f the theory. A t this point in the year,
Meredith understood evolution to be informative but unimportant:
M: I mean, I think it helps you, that you understand evolution, but not
everything that you do in biology requires that you have an
understanding. (A 156)
Evidence for evolution.
Evidence supporting or refuting evolutionary theory was not a prominent aspect
o f Meredith's conceptual framework for evolution. Like each o f the other participants,
M eredith recognized fossil evidence as the most important form o f evidence supporting
evolution. Meredith also cited similarities between humans and primates as another
importance piece o f evidence supporting the theory o f evolution. However, M eredith’s
acceptance o f evolution theory was so complete that she could not identify any type of
evidence that contradicted evolution.
O ther biological know ledge.
Like each o f the other interview participants, Meredith was familiar with the
genetic basis of inherited traits. This conception was first revealed in the sorting task
(ST, initial) and was further elaborated on during the prediction interviews. In the
prediction interviews, M eredith was found to consistently apply the M endelian
conception o f independently assorting traits. She also introduced the conception of
sexual dim orphism into her predictions. She used the conception o f sexual dimorphism
to predict the inheritance o f color in a clutch o f ducks, and she accompanied her
explanation for this prediction with an example from nature:
M: Ahm, well, I think that, that if the, the ahm, if the male is gonna1be
black like this one and the female will be like this one [she points to the
white duck on the card).
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : If they meet. I don't think it's gonna' be a blend of the two o f them
you know. It's gonna', if it's a male it will grow the black, dark feathers.
And
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: And the female will grow the white feathers. It's kin d a'lik e the you
know, the cardinal. The same kind of thing.
SD: Do you think ahm. Okay. Let's see. Tell me about cardinals.
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M : The males are the bright vibrant color and the female is kinda' dull
looking. I think, you know, I think they're the same species and
everything. K inda'like the ducks. (A 135)
Other aspects of M eredith's biological knowledge included her familiarity with
animal taxonomy. She often applied this knowledge in the interviews about instances
(IAI-1, initial). Like each of the other interview participants, M eredith was able to
categorize animals into their appropriate higher level taxa, although often she was not
able to provide a justification for this classification.
[In response to a graphic depicting a young sea turtle on sand ]
SD: Can you tell me anything about turtles? [Pause]
SD: Any neat things about them. W hat do you know about them?
M : Ahm. [Laughter]
SD: Are they amphibians? Are they reptiles? Are they mammals?
Birds?
M : No. [Laughter] Ahm, do they fall under reptiles?
SD: Yeah.
M : That's what I thought. Okay.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) D o you th in k ,. . ., what makes you think it's a
reptile? Why we would put it into the reptile?
M : It has something to do with, you know, I don't know what the
different, the reasons why
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: I can just, generally if you know if I see something that I can say
you know.
SD: Okay.
M: I can't necessarily tell you all the things that make it. (A 110-111)
The final aspect o f M eredith's biological knowledge was her understanding o f a
competitive natural world. When shown a graphic o f an elephant reaching into a tree
in order to eat from the branches, she remarked (IAI-1, initial):
M: The, ahm those elephants are competing for food.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : and the, one some of 'em, of course they won't, probably won't,
might not survive. (A 89)
Historical aspects of the theory.
During the initial interviews, Meredith made no mention of the history of the
development of evolutionary theory. As has been mentioned previously, this omission
should not be taken as a lack o f knowledge, but should be understood to signify the
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relative lack of importance Meredith placed on this aspect o f her conceptual framework
for evolution.
See Figure 19 for a summary o f M eredith's initial conceptual framework for
evolution.

Evolutionary M etatheories

Humans evolve
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C hanges
Long time is required

Humans are separate from primates
and other animals

Evolution is a gradual drive
toward a beneficial trait

Evolution is not essential in
biology

E vidence for Evolution
Fossil are supporting evidence

E volutionary R elationships
Populational and typological
species concept____________

H istorical A spects o f Theory

Related Biological K nowledge

M echanism

N atural History
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variation in a species
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history o f animals
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H um an Evolution
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Note. Italics indicate instances o f conceptual change.
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Figure 19
Summary of M eredith's initial conceptual framework for evolution
M id-year framework
Nature of evolutionary changes.
While some aspects o f M eredith's conception o f the nature o f evolutionary
changes remained intact during the mid-year period, other aspects were first
documented during this period, and still others underwent conceptual change.
Conceptions which remained intact included evolution as (a) a change in the features of

260
an organism, (b) a change occurring in a group o f organisms, and (c) a change
requiring a very long period o f time.
Several different conceptions surfaced during this mid-year period. This group of
conceptions do not represent a conceptual change from the initial period, instead these
conceptions could have been a pre-existing feature of M eredith's conceptual framework
which were not measured in the initial period. The first of this group is Meredith's
conception of evolution as a continuous process. During an open-ended interview,
Meredith explained that evolution occurs at all times within all groups o f organisms,
including humans.
During this period it also became evident that M eredith understood evolution as
a series o f gradually occurring, subtle changes that cause vertical alterations within a
single group of organisms. When she was shown three graphics depicting different
phylogenetic trees, (a) evolution shown as a change o f color within a group of
butterflies, (b) evolution as a change leading to the creation of several vertebrate
groups, and (c) evolution as a set of vertical changes within a group o f armadillos,
Meredith picked the vertical changes shown in (c) as best representing the process of
evolution. (IAI-2, mid-year). This selection was based on M eredith's rejection of
evolution as change resulting in differentiation within a species, as she understood to
be represented by the color change in the butterflies. She also rejected the
characterization of evolution as a series o f wide, drastic changes which produced
radically different taxa, as she explained was represented by the graphic depicting
several vertebrate groups. Instead, Meredith explained that evolution:
M: It's not a drastic process. It's more o f a subtle thing. So you don't
really notice what's going on. It takes so many, you know, eons o f time.
(A 243)
The mid-year interviews also revealed that Meredith understood evolution to be
a basically unplanned process that results in changes, "It's always occurring but it's
nothing that's planned to happen this way." (A 183) While she denied that evolution
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was planned, she used the conception that the process was predictable. W hen she
explained that given constant environmental conditions, the changes that result from
evolution could be predicted, M eredith signified her conception of evolution as process
bound by environmental conditions. At this point, Meredith seemed to have no
recognition of the random aspect of evolution.
M eredith's conception o f evolution as a fundamentally predictable process
underwent a subtle change as reflected in an interview just one week later:
M : I think every--A lot of things have a something, you know a random
com ponent to 'em.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: and it’s not necessarily always one way. And no—nothing is gonna'
occur the same way each time. . . .
SD: So do you see change as being a big part o f evolution through
natural selection?
M : Well, I guess chance in the sense that ahm, you know, depends on
what the, kinda' what the environm ent is like and . . . and some of those
things I guess can happen by chance.
SD: Okay.
M: Not planned out that this is gonna' happen that way. (A 194-195)
Meredith continued to understand evolution was inextricable from environmental
changes, but she now explained that these environmental factors were a source of
randomness and unpredictability for the process. In an interview conducted three
weeks later, Meredith's conception o f randomness changed again. This change is seen
in the following passage, as M eredith explained her selection o f the term random in the
word sort (WS, mid-year):
M: Yeah, keep random [on the evolution side o f the sorting table].
Because you have ahm, I guess it refers, referring to the ahm mutations
or whatever or the, the changes that occur. That you know, that cause
evolution.
SD: Okay.
M: And it's not something ordered. It's not planned to be that way. (A
243)
Later she placed the term chance beside random :
M: C h an ce.. . . I'd probably just, I'd probably leave that because it's
ahm you know, it's by chance that these ahm mutations occur. (A 244)
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Initially, M eredith understood evolution to be a directed, predictable process.
But in this mid-year period, Meredith began to recognize the random aspect of
evolutionary changes. This recognition was first introduced through the
unpredictability o f environmental conditions which she understood to control the
direction o f evolutionary change. In this last interview for this m id-year period,
Meredith m aintained this recognition, but she understood the random com ponent to
stem from mutations and not environmental factors.
It is notable that Meredith first recognized the random aspect of evolution
during the same interval that she first rejected need as a controlling com ponent of
evolutionary change. She was not outspoken concerning the rationale behind this
rejection, simply commenting, "Need. I don't know. I really don't see how that fits in
(to evolution)." (A 244) Again, it is difficult to determine the causality behind these
changes. But it is noteworthy that the two logically com peting conceptions of
evolution, need driven and random based, underwent diametrically opposed changes
during the same time period. Meredith's tentative recognition of the random aspect of
evolution was also accompanied by a change in her understanding o f evolutionary
mechanisms which will be described in the next section.
Another conception that underwent subtle changes included M eredith's
understanding of the end product of evolution. W hile previously she understood
evolution to be a directional change toward a beneficial trait, during the mid-year
period Meredith explained that evolution was driven toward the "specialization" of a
group of organisms. (A 180) However, she continued to understand the overall result
o f any evolutionary change to increase the success o f a species. H er conception of
success continued to be defined by the group's ability to survive over a long period of
time.
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M echanism.
The most remarkable instances o f conceptual change that occurred in the mid
year period were found in the group of conceptions describing the mechanism of
evolutionary change. At the outset o f the study, Meredith's conceptions in this group
were a muted aspect of her conceptual framework. This situation radically altered
during the mid-year period. Toward the end o f this interval, M eredith easily applied
many scientific explanations for the process through which evolution operates. Not
surprisingly, this conceptual restructuring accompanied her changing conceptions of
the nature of evolutionary modifications. But some aspects o f her conceptual
framework for this group o f conceptions were retained. These more static conceptions
included her lack of recognition o f the importance of the variation in a population and
her strength conception of fitness.
The most striking exam ple o f conceptual change was found in Meredith's
understanding of the origin o f variation. This conception changed tentatively as she
began to recognize that need could not be a viable mechanism of evolutionary change.
After this initial recognition, she referred to mutations as the origin o f variation, but
this was a tentative usage of the conception as she had no actual understanding of
mutations. Her responses for the sorting task conducted at the end o f this interview
period signified her incorporation o f this conception as she discussed that the origin of
variation must have included some sort o f genetic change.
Related to her changing conception o f need, M eredith's conception o f mutation
also underwent a significant change. She began to use mutation as a central component
of her understanding of the process of evolution. Her concept map constructed during
this period features mutations on the second row of the hierarchy (CM-2, mid-year).
During our discussion of this map, she explained:
SD: Do you see mutation as an important part of evolution?
M: Yeah.
SD: Why?
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M : Because it's the whole thing that, that ahm, I mean you couldn't
have evolution if you didn't have a mutation that produced the variation.
(A 229)
She also used this conception in her explanation o f the evolutionary change shown in
her journal entry for artifact 5 and in the sorting task (ST, mid-year):
SD: How did those rabbits get there? These brown ones?
M: There was a mutation. (A 233)
(See Appendix G for CM-2, mid-year.)
As this conception was being more firmly incorporated into her framework for
the process o f evolutionary change, Meredith's conception o f mutation became more
differentiated. During this period, she described mutations as genetic changes that
could be both harmful and beneficial.
SD: Do you know what caused those mutations?
M : It's just ahm, I think, by change that happens. (A 230)
In the word sort conducted in the mid-year period, she explained (ST, mid-year):
M : Change? Ahm, I'd probably just, I'd probably leave that because it's
ahm, you know, it's by chance that these ahm mutations occur. (A 244)
However, while she could explain the random component o f mutations in response to
direct questions, Meredith had difficulty applying this conception to a biological
phenomena. When discussing the bear mutations graphic, Meredith explained that the
only possible mutation was that providing longer hair length (PI-1, mid-year).
M : Well since the, the ahm, the temperatures are becoming colder it is
not ahm you're not gonna' have something losing, losing its hair. That
would not be a beneficial mutation. (A 245)
While Meredith could describe mutations as random events, she also explained that
only beneficial mutations were probable. This conflict signifies that conceptual change
was not yet complete. W hile she had made some connections, she had not yet begun to
apply this changing conception.
Accompanying her construction o f a random process for the origin o f variation,
Meredith had begun to separate the actions o f natural selection from the origin of
variation.
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M : Natural selection increases the individuals o f a population with a
trait. (A 228)
This passage also dem onstrates that Meredith used the scientific conception of the unit
of evolutionary change to be the percentage o f the population with a trait.
As has been shown, M eredith's conceptual system for the process of
evolutionary change underwent radical changes toward a scientific understanding. It is
important to note that this change accompanied very similar changes in her conception
o f the nature of evolutionary change. Such conceptual change would be expected due
to Meredith's mechanistic approach to scientific knowledge. M eredith recognized the
gains she made during this period and we discussed this:
SD: Where did you learn all this?
M : [Laughter] I don't know.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : I love it. Ahm, a lot o f it, a lot of stuff I knew. But for me to have to
sit down and then rattle it all out,
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: I don't do very well.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: It's ahm sometimes it takes me, I have to stop and think about it, you
know? I don't know. W e really haven't, all we've done on it is read that
article.
SD: The article, that one on the new svnthesis-that article?
M : Uh, uh. (Yes) (A 228)
Natural history.
In our discussions of the geological history o f the earth, M eredith described a
very old, changing earth. She explained that the earth was "billions o f years old," and
that life was created long after the first creation o f the earth. (A 170) After that time,
the continents had drifted, the climates had changed, and species underwent evolution.
She understood humans to have been present only in the last 7,000 years. In the time
line she drew depicting the history o f life on earth, Meredith included, in this order, the
origins of: (a) the earth, (b) "microorganisms such as bacteria and protozoa," (c)
shellfish, (d) amphibians, (e) mammals, and (e) humans. A fter she drew the time line,
Meredith laughingly explained, "I've got some gaps in my knowledge here." (A 189)
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Like Brian in her understandings o f natural history, Meredith did not focus solely on
the creation o f humans. Instead, she recognized that many events occurred before
humans evolved.
O ther biological know ledge.
In our discussions o f intentionality in nature, M eredith was explicit in her
rejection of anthropomorphic explanations for the actions o f organisms and natural
processes. However, she used a sophisticated understanding o f this conception in
which she did not reject the possibly o f thought in any organism. When more
advanced vertebrates were discussed, she explained that these organism were capable
of thought and planning. She explained that a beaver was "probably intentional" when
building a lodge and a prairie dog could learn to open a nut. (A 195)
Another conception which was revealed in the m id-year period had to do with
M eredith’s conception of the process of the inheritance of physical traits. Like her
previous conceptions of the nature of the evolutionary process, she viewed inheritance
as fundamentally a very ordered process. She dem onstrated no recognition o f the
randomness of the process o f meiosis and the subsequent variation it introduced.
O ther aspects of M eredith's conceptual framework for evolution, including her
conceptions o f human evolution, evidence for evolution, evolutionary relationships,
broad evolutionary theories, and the historical aspects o f evolutionary theory
underwent no changes in the m id-year period.
See Figure 20 for a summary o f M eredith's m id-year conceptual framework.
Year-end framework
By the last interview it became evident to both o f us that M eredith had learned
a great deal about evolutionary theory during the school year. We discussed the
possible reasons for this:
M : Like whenever we've talked about it in class I probably paid more
attention than you know ahm, I’ve paid careful attention because you
know, it's something that we're talking about each week.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)

267
M : And, you know, it's something that I'm interested in, you know?
W ondering, wondering why and how and whatever. I
think that maybe if we hadn't been doing this I wouldn't have been, you
know, trying to find out or whatever. Just tune into it in class. (A 316)
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Figure 20
Summary o f M eredith's mid-year conceptual framework for evolution
M echanism .
The greatest gains made by M eredith were found in her conceptions o f the
process o f evolutionary change as signified by M eredith's last concept map. (See
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knowledge of the nature of evolutionary change, this map revolved around her
understanding o f the process o f evolutionary change. During the year, Meredith
constructed a system of conceptions for evolution which were largely scientific,
although several minor alternative conceptions did remain. Conceptions for her
understanding o f process that were retained include: (a) mutations as the source of
variation, (b) a separation of the action of natural selection and the origin of variation,
and (c) a lack o f recognition o f the importance o f variation in a population.
There were some interesting components o f M eredith’s conception o f mutation.
As was seen during the m id-year period, Meredith had an unresolved understanding of
the nature o f mutations. While she could formally describe mutations as random
events, this understanding was not applied in the interviews about instances about a
mutation event in a hypothetical population o f bears. W hen her conflicting answers
were brought to her attention, Meredith was unable to recognize the conflict:
SD: W hen you first saw [the mutation graphic], you said, okay, he
could become hairy because o f a gene mutation. Ah, the burrowing,
thought, is probably explained
M : W ell, I said you couldn't do that because o f ice. You can't
SD: Yeah?
M : Burrow in that.
SD: Okay, and you said [losing hair] is a mutation that wouldn't
happen.
M: Right. Because that wouldn't be beneficial.
SD: Okay. Ahm, I'm gonna ask you something to see ahm if you
recognize anything. Earlier the same time, the same day, we had talked
about how mutations are random events.
M: Uh, uh. (Yes)
SD: And you described them that way. Do you see any conflicts
between your answer on this bear question and the idea that mutations
are random events?
M: No. I, I don't see why that would be, why that couldn't, why this
[pointing to the long hair mutation] couldn't be random. (A 252)
Faced with logically conflicting responses, Meredith could not recognize the
inconsistency.
The discussion shown above occurred during the initial interview of the yearend period. In an interview two weeks later, Meredith explicitly discussed the varied
nature of m utations during the construction of her concept map:
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M: Well I want to say that ah, ah, beneficial ah, you know, you have
both non beneficial and beneficial mutations. But it's the ones that are
beneficial that will be successful. (A 298)
This passage signifies that her the random aspect o f mutation was further incorporated
into her understanding o f the process o f evolution.
Meredith's incorporation o f mutation into her understanding o f the process of
evolutionary changes is also signified by her understanding of the production of
adaptation through mutations:
SD: How does that happen, that birds' beaks are kinda suited to their,
what food they eat?
M: It's just that ahm, mutation once a g a in .. . .
SD: So what is an adaptation?
M : It's just ahm when an animal becomes ahm, changes to be most
suited for its environment.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes) And ahm, how is that related ahm to mutation?
M : Because ahm, mutations are changes and ahm those changes will
reproduce to produce animals that are, that are better suited for their
environment, better adapted. (A 264)
While M eredith used many scientific conceptions in her understanding of
evolutionary change, she retained some alternative conceptions. On the posttest,
Meredith explained that evolutionary changes include a small increase in the quality of
a trait but only within a percentage o f the population. This conception represents a
blend of scientific and alternative conceptions. While she understood that mutations
would occur and be passed down through an increase in the proportion of the
population, she also understood evolutionary changes to be an accretion o f small
mutation events.
Another alternative conception used by Meredith at the conclusion of the study
involved her conception o f fitness. While this conception had been undergoing slight
changes throughout the study, at year-end, Meredith used the common alternative
conception o f fitness to involve "adaptability:"
M: I think Spot is ah, the fittest because ah, he's, he's able to ah, you
know, he seems pretty adaptable. (A 314)
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The final important aspect o f M eredith's conceptual framework for evolutionary
processes was seen in her written answers for the posttest. While her use of a largely
scientific understanding o f evolution change was evident in our interviews, this
conceptual framework was not dem onstrated in her written answers:
M: [A written response regarding the evolution o f speed in cheetahs] Well I
guess it was necessary for the cheetahs to run this fast in order to catch their
prey. At 20mph, they were not successful at this. (Posttest #7)
M : [A written response regarding the evolution o f blindness in cave
salamanders] After living in a cave for a period of time, eyes would serve no
function any longer. These salamanders evolved in such as way to "get rid of"
this nonfunctional feature. (Posttest 8)
In our interview about this test, she expanded a great deal on the salamander question:
M: You know, you'd have a mutation but after you you ah live in a cave
for a period o f time and ahm ah eyes don't serve any function.
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M : They're no longer needed and so if there is a mutation that produces
blindness in the salamanders then that's, you know, that certainly, you
know, isn't necessary. It, it would do away with the function that's not
needed and so it doesn't hurt the salamanders
SD: Uh, uh. (Yes)
M: That have that mutation. (A 315)
It is evident that M eredith’s written answers do not reflect what she knew of the process
of evolutionary change. The difference between students' conceptions and their written
statements has been docum ented in past research in this area (Brumby, 1984; Hallden,
1988).
Nature of evolutionary change.
All aspects of M eredith's conceptual system for the nature of evolutionary
changes were retained. However, there was growth in her knowledge o f adaptations.
As was discussed in the preceding section, Meredith had begun to successfully link the
process o f mutation to the production o f adaptations in an organism. She began to
understand adaptation as a means of becoming "better suited" for a particular
environment. (A 264) She further explained that a long time span is required for an
adaptation to become firmly lodged in a population. While she did make significant
changes in her conception of adaptation, M eredith's conception o f adaptation remained
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very broad in its scope. She linked adaptations to mutations, but she did not recognize
all adaptations as having a genetic basis, instead referring to any changes by an
organism to fit its environm ent as being adaptations. She could not differentiate
between the fundamentally different processes o f behavioral changes, physiological
changes, and evolutionary changes within a population.
Evolutionary relationships.
M eredith's undefined species concept was retained through the end of the year.
This species conception is congruent with her continued failure to recognize the
importance of variation in a population:
SD: So ah, do you think it's good or bad for litters like these kitties to be
different colors and sizes like that?
M : Ahm.
SD: Could there be any benefits or any ahm
M : I can't think o f any offhand. I just know that it’s good to have
variation but I don't know why. (A 262)
H er conception o f variation in a species is difficult to align with her conception
o f a species as a group with sim ilar characteristics. This recognition of the presence of
variation precludes her species concept from being labeled typological, but her failure
to understand the importance o f variation precludes her species concept from being
labeled as populational in its origins. Instead her species concept remained as an
alternative am algam o f these two conceptions.
Broad evolutionary theories.
Meredith summed up her understanding of the application o f this evolutionary
theory on her final exam:
M : Evolution is also considered a major theory in Biology. It is a
powerful one that seeks to explain why organisms have the particular
traits that they have. This theory is a reasonable one as to how life has
changed over geological time. (Artifact 7, #1)
This answer reflects two aspects o f her knowledge of the broad applications of
evolution. The first is that she considered evolution as a means for understanding
organisms' adaptations, a conception that she had held throughout the study. The
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second concerned her conception of the scope of this theory. A t year end, she
understood evolution to involve only the changes that occur within organisms and not
the initial creation of the earth or life.
Other aspects o f her conceptual ecology, including her knowledge of natural
history, human evolution, historical aspects o f evolutionary theory, other biological
knowledge, and the evidence she accepted for evolution theory, were retained
unchanged during the year-end interview period.
See Figure 21 for a summary o f M eredith's year-end conceptual framework.
Summary of year long conceptual change
Meredith had achieved what Tyler strived for, establishment of a useful
separation o f scientific and religious knowledge. Because o f this, the issue of
evolution was not an em otional topic for Meredith. In this regard Meredith was similar
to Brian, although she did not value scientific knowledge to the same degree. It is
significant to note that Meredith accepted the plausibility o f evolutionary theory long
before she understood it. Like the students described by Lawson and W eser (1990),
and similar to Tyler, M eredith had judged the theory based on sociological
considerations and not logical coherence. Despite this difficult beginning, Meredith
experienced profound conceptual change toward a scientific conceptual framework for
evolution during the course o f the study. M ost significant o f these changes is her
knowledge of the nature and process o f evolutionary changes.
Summary o f the Four Participants' Conceptual Change in Evolution
The following section will summarize the participants' conceptual
frameworks as well the conceptual change they experienced in relation to their
personal characteristics. The applications these findings have for the conceptual
change theory will be further described in Chapter 7.
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Culture, Conceptual Ecologies, and Conceptual Change
From the outset of the study, Hurston and I selected specific student
participants in order to provide the maximum variation in personal characteristics in
Human Evolution

Characteristics of Evolutionary
Changes

Evolutionary Metatheories

Humans evolve*

Evolution is a continuous process
o f small changes within a group

Evolution includes creation of life
and changes since primordial
soup*

Humans separate from primates and
other animals*

Long time is required*

Evolution is not essential in
biology*

Evolution is a gradual drive
tow ard a specialitation

Evidence for Evolution

Random aspect o f evolution
Evolution is unplanned but
predictable_________

Historical Aspects of Theory

Fossil are supporting evidence*
Similarities between humans and
primates are supporting evidence*

Evolutionary Relationships

Natural History

Populational and typological
species concept*___________

Much knowlege of recent natural
history o f animals*
Old, changing earth*

Nature is competitive*

Mechanism

Knowledge o f animal taxonomy
for larger taxa*

Genetic inheritance is a ordered
process

M utations as origin o f genetic
variation
N o importance placed on
variation in a species*

Related Biological Knowledge
Mendelian genetics*

Rejection of anthropomorphism

Vague conception o f unit of
evolutionary change*
N atural selection operates
through differential reproduction
Strength concept for fitness*

Note. Italics indicate instances of conceptual change.
* indicates retention o f conception from previous description.
Solid block indicates academic conception.

Figure 21
Summary of M eredith's year-end conceptual framework for evolution
an effort to better understand the process o f conceptual change. However, the four
participants were shaped by the culture of the biology class and so they shared some
important personal characteristics. Each o f the four participants accepted the
im portance o f academic knowledge and expected that this knowlege would be
meaningful. This disposition to the formal knowledge o f school was also reflected in
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the culture of the classroom as evidenced by the theme o f Talking Academ ic. A
favorable academic orientation may have played a very significant role in the
conceptual change which occurred, although this study's design prohibited pursuit of
this line of investigation (as will be further discussed in Chapter 7).
The conceptual ecologies o f the four interview participants differed markedly
in terms of their conceptual frameworks, epistemological commitments, scientific
and religious orientations, and acceptance o f evolution theory. Because of these
differences, the conceptual change experienced by these four participants offers
insight into the actions o f a learner's conceptual ecology on the process of knowledge
restructuring.
B rian-B iologist as Scientific Theorist
Brian's approach to biology can best be expressed as "Biologist as Scientific
Theorist." This label is used to signify his deeply held, favorable scientific
orientation and his realist epistemological approach to scientific knowledge.
Typically, Brian searched for an overview o f what was being discussed soon after he
constructed a basic understanding of the physical phenomenon. His consideration of
any natural phenomena took that pattern o f searching for any possible theory to
describe the physical causality, understanding the operation o f the mechanism,
logical assessm ent of rival theories and their applications, and logical selection of the
single most probable explanation. While Brian did not interpret his personal life or
knowledge through a religious framework, neither did he reject the existence of a
"greater being." He explained that conflicts that resulted from the overlap of
scientific and religious knowledge were necessary for the advancement of the
boundaries of what scientists understand. From the outset of our study, Brian
understood that scientific truths must be independent o f religious assumptions and he
used a non-theistic approach to evolution (Nelson, 1986). From the beginning of the
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study Brian displayed no conflicts in what he understood about evolutionary theory
and what he believed.
Brian’s scientific orientation is evidenced in his early conceptual framework
for evolution. In the beginning of the study, a scientific understanding o f the
mechanism o f evolutionary change was central to his framework. As the study
progressed, this basic scientific understanding was refined and in his last few
interviews he used a sophisticated understanding o f biological adaptation, the view of
the random aspect of mutations operating within biological controls, and the
differential reproduction aspect o f natural selection. He approached evolution as he
did many topics and his foundational understanding evidenced at the beginning
changed into a more holistic view of evolution as he considered the mechanisms, the
patterns form ed by these mechanisms, and the various theories which explicate facets
of this theoretical framework.
At the close of the study, Brian used the most scientifically appropriate
framework for evolution o f any of the four participants. The foundation of much of
this framework was in place from the beginning. However, Brian's strong scientific
orientation negated many of the conflicts the other participants experienced. This
orientation allowed him to focus on select areas of conceptual difficulties. Brian was
not attempting to determine all the possible theoretical alternatives for a
phenomenon; instead he was looking for the most scientifically appropriate
alternative. Because Brian’s epistemology followed traditional scientific lines, his
conceptual change was linear, logical, and predictable.
Stephanie—Biologist as M ultidisciplinary Realist
Stephanie's approach to biology can best be expressed as "Biologist as
Multidisciplinary Realist." With an appreciation for many disciplines such as
literature, philosophy, science, and world religions, she often changed the context
through which she understood natural phenomena. Multiple interviews and interview
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techniques indicated that Stephanie could use an assortment o f approaches to
understand any biological topic. One week she would explain evolutionary theory
from a social-cultural perspective. The next week she could approach the same
material with a scientific, mechanistic approach. However, Stephanie rejected using
a relativist label to describe herself because she continually referred to the natural
world for confirmation o f her conceptions. Based on this, I refer to Stephanie as a
multidisciplinary realist because she needed to use the knowledge o f many
disciplines and ways o f knowing in order to construct her understanding o f reality.
The strength of Stephanie's religious orientation is another important feature
of her conceptual ecology. She understood life to have a fundamental theistic
component. At the outset of the study, Stephanie's rejection o f the existence of widescale evolution was in part based on her theistic beliefs and in part based on her
perception of the implausibility o f the mechanism. Instead, she understood evolution
in progressive creationist terms and she understood only slight changes to occur
within groups of organisms. This situation became more com plex as we consider
Stephanie's strong interest in anthropology that made her keenly interested in such
questions. Based upon these diverse interests, Stephanie experienced a great deal of
conflict in trying to negotiate the intersection of her religious beliefs and her
scientific knowledge. However, one characteristic o f her fluid episteomological
stance was that it allowed her to recognize attributes of theories that she did not
personally accept. Coupled with this, Stephanie enjoyed the exercise of intellectual
debate, and so she enjoyed the inherent ambiguity o f her episteomological position.
At the outset of the study, Stephanie used many alternative conceptions in her
understanding of the evolutionary change accepted by science. She understood
science to describe drastic wholesale changes between groups of organism s driven by
Lamarckian forces. She personally rejected these conceptions. Stephanie's strong
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religious and anthropological interest formed the basis o f her early frameworks and
these were the lenses she most frequently used to understand evolutionary issues.
During the scope o f the study, Stephanie’s understanding o f evolutionary
mechanisms underwent drastic changes and she was capable o f applying
sophisticated scientific explanations for the mechanisms and im plications of
evolutionary theory, much like Brian, by the end of the study. W hile she continued
to accept the existence o f only small-scale changes within groups even at the end of
the study, what she took to be "small scale" and "within a group" underwent drastic
changes. By the end of the study, Stephanie accepted as fact many many instances of
biological evolution. However, her interest in human evolution and the religious
implications o f such changes remained a focal point o f her conceptual framework.
Stephanie's conceptual change is of particular interest because of her lack of a
wholesale scientific focus. In Stephanie we can see pattern for the resolution of
conflicts caused by opposing knowledge frameworks. While Stephanie was largely
successful in constructing a scientific framework for the mechanism of evolutionary
change, this change was accomplished without a corresponding change in belief.
Thus, under specific conditions, it is clear a student can learn topics which she ^ e
does not believe using a religious framework. However, aspects o f Stephanie's
conceptual ecology may have had her uniquely suited to this situation. Her
multidisciplinary perspective made her keenly interested in many knowledge claims.
With Stephanie, we also see other aspects o f a learner's conceptual ecology in play.
For Stephanie, portions of evolutionary theory had to be validated because o f her
strong anthropological interest. Stephanie's case demonstrates that conceptual
change does not always follow traditional logical patterns, but can remain within the
bounds of rationality.
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Tvler—Biologist as Authority Seeker
Tyler's approach to all academic topics, including biology, can best be termed
"authority seeker." This label reflects the end result of many o f her academic
endeavors. Tyler often com partmentalized her knowledge. When this
compartmentalization broke down, such as during the process o f classroom activities,
discussions, or simple conversations, Tyler was thrown into conflict as she attempted
to reconcile competing knowledge claims. Tyler then would seek knowledge from
an authority figure in order to negotiate this conflict. This situation was complicated
by her epistemological understanding of science as a body o f static, sure knowledge.
Taken together these chracteristics made Tyler the most unsure of all the participants.
Tyler’s religious oreintation coupled with her personal insecurity created a great deal
o f anxiety for Tyler during the scope of the study. While she articulated a partial
resolution o f science-religion conflict regarding evolution and used a theistic
understanding o f the process o f gradual creation, she continued to be uncomfortable
with this tension (Nelson, 1986).
Tyler was interested in science but she did not use a mechanistic
understanding o f the natural world. Instead, she understood the natural world in
terms of aesthetics. Tyler's aesthetic view o f the natural world is reflected in her
conceptual framework at the outset o f the study. She did not view organisms in
mechanistic terms but in terms of aesthetic qualities such as beauty, order, and
symmetry. Her early conceptual framework for evolution was dom inated by a vague
description of the patterns o f evolutionary changes and revolved around the issue of
human evolution. Within her aesthetic approach to the topic, Tyler used many
alternative conceptions to describe evolutionary patterns. When pressed, she
hesitantly offered several alternative conceptions of the mechanisms o f such a
change. So while Tyler was capable of mechanistic thought, this was not her first
approach to a biological topic.
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Tyler's case study provides valuable insight as it is com pared to Stephanie's.
Like Stephanie, Tyler entered the study as using a progressive creationist approach to
evolution, although for Tyler this was an issue filled with anxiety as her own
understandings conflicted with those o f science. During the course o f the study,
Tyler constructed a partial resolution o f this perceived conflict through an acceptance
of human speciation and a personal rejection o f the special creation of humans.
Thus, during the study, Tyler shifted from a progressive creationist approach to a
tentative application of theistic evolution. However, her focal point o f human
speciation was retained throughout the school year.
A ccompanying the shift in her conceptual ecology, Tyler also experienced
conceptual change toward the scientific explanation o f evolutionary change.
However, Tyler's year-end conceptual framework could not be considered completely
scientific. Unlike Brian, Tyler was not searching for the single m ost plausible
answer and she continued to use dual constructions to explain a single phenomenon.
Additionally, Tyler had little understanding o f the competitive aspects o f natural
systems and many of her scientific conceptions for the mechanism o f evolutionary
change had little logical basis. Due to Tyler's aesthetic orientation and unquestioning
reliance on authority, much o f her conceptual change was fragmentary,
discontinuant, and extra-logical.
M eredith—Biologist as Pragmatist
M eredith's approach to biology can best be expressed as "Biologist as
Pragmatist." This label signifies M eredith's tendency to value only topics that she
understood as having a practical importance in her education. She valued knowledge
for "education sake" but understood much o f her classroom knowledge to have little
personal importance. Unlike Brian and Stephanie, Meredith related to knowledge
only as it was presented in the classroom and she did not attempt to relate one theory
to another on her own. Although she was religious, M eredith had pragmatically

achieved a successful negotiation o f the science-religion conflict through the
consistent use of a strict dichotomy separating the two forms o f knowledge. Using
this dichotomy, she accepted evolutionary theory. Meredith used a theistic
understanding in which evolution was understood as the mechanism through which a
creator operates. Thus, Meredith, unlike Tyler and M eredith, continually used what
she understood as the scientific explanation of evolutionary change as her own
personal explanation.
Unlike Tyler, M eredith's early interviews were nearly devoid o f religious
reference. This omission may reflect M eredith's early separation of science and
religion. Meredith's initial conceptual framework emphasized the nature of
evolutionary changes and consisted of many alternative conceptions for the process
o f evolutionary change, much like Tyler's early conceptions. As the study
progressed, many o f Meredith's alternative conceptions were replaced with their
scientific counterparts. Pragmatically, she became conversant with enough
evolutionary theory to be at ease during our conversations. However, her conceptual
framework stopped at this level o f application. Evolutionary metatheories never
formed a significant portion o f Meredith's framework. At the close of the study,
Meredith had a basic, scientific conceptual framework for evolutionary theory in
which the nature and process o f evolutionary changes were stressed. M eredith, like
Brian, was notable in the lack o f conflict these new constructions caused. Her case
study is also notable in that Meredith believed in evolution long before she had a
scientific framework for this topic. Like the students described by Lawson and
W eser (1990), M eredith's early acceptance was based more on sociological
considerations than the logical coherence o f the theory. While the construction of
individual conceptions followed a linear, logical pattern for M eredith, when the
whole of the framework is taken into account, much of M eredith's conceptual change
was initiated by extra-logical factors.
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Conceptual Frameworks for Evolution
While each interview participant entered the study with differing conceptual
frameworks, there were some commonalties in their conceptual frameworks.
Conceptions reported in this category include only alternative conceptions about
scientific topics. Nonscientific beliefs, "conceptions that cannot be accepted or
rejected on the basis o f scientific evidence," are not addressed in this section (Smith &
Siegel, 1993, p. 599). Many alternative conceptions used by the four interview
participants had been documented previously in the science education literature. These
common alternative conceptions and an example o f the literature which describes them
can be found in Table 7. O ther alternative conceptions were documented in this study
but have not been previously described in the science education literature. These are
discussed in Chapter 7.
Need. Anthropomorphism, and Teleology
Three of the alternative conceptions found in Table 7 warrant further discussion.
Students' use o f need as the origin o f variation and their reliance on teleology and
anthropomorphism for explanations o f evolutionary events have been well described in
the literature. It has been discussed that these three conceptions may be an artifact of
verbal and written communication ( Clough & W ood-Robinson, 1985b; Hallden, 1988;
Jungwirth, 1975b). The data reported in this study only partially support this assertion.
M eredith's final exam responses demonstrate that students can rely on the
uncomplicated response of need as a means of expressing a far more complex
conceptual framework for an evolutionary event. In contrast, as was seen in the early
interviews with Tyler, high school students can also understand need to be the
mechanism that is responsible for the production o f variation and subsequent changes
in a population.

In Tyler's case, the use of need was not an artifact o f communication,

instead it was an accurate reflection o f her conception for the origin o f variation.
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These findings support Brumby's (1984) assertion that students' "intuitive
Lamarckism" is a real conception which must be addressed by science educators.
The situation is similar to students' use of anthropomorphism in their
explanations o f evolutionary events. As was made clear by Tyler's interviews and
other students' in-class questions, many students are capable o f understanding
organisms to be able to complete physiological changes and subsequent evolutionary
events through conscious means. This demonstrates that anthropomorphism is not
used solely as a means to ease
Table 7
Alternative conceptions used by the interview participants
and some of the literature which describes them

Alternative Conception

Reference

Species Concept
Typological species concept

Bishop & Anderson, 1990;
Greene, 1990; Settlage, in press

Unit of evolutionary change
All individuals in a population undergo an
evolutionary change
A single individual in a population
undergoes an evolutionary change

Bishop & Anderson, 1990
Demastes & Good, 1993
Demastes & Good, 1993

Origin of variation
Need*
Conscious decision*
Use/disuse
Teleological explanations*
Origin o f variation blended with natural
selection

Deadman & Kelly, 1978;
Demastes & Good, 1993;
Jimenez, 1992
Demastes & Good, 1993:
Hallden, 1988
Brumby, 1984
Tam ir & Zohar, 1991
Bishop & Anderson, 1990;
Demastes & Good, 1993

Other categories
No distinction between adaptations
Genetic dominance equated with
phenotypic characters
Anthropomorphism*

Brumby, 1984; Lucas, 1971;
Kargobo et al., 1980
Clough & Wood-Robinson,
1985b
Hallden, 1988

*Note. Conceptions marked with an asterisk will be further discussed in the text.

com munication or as a heuristic device as was suggested by several researchers
(Hallden, 1988; Jungwirth, 1975b). Instead, like need, anthropomorphic responses can
be an accurate reflection o f a student's conceptions.
Unfortunately, these findings do not simplify the researcher's labors. As was
seen in M eredith's and Stephanie's verbal explanations o f their exam responses, need
and anthropom orphism can also be used as a heuristic device as has been tentatively
suggested in the literature. Given only written expressions o f conceptions of need and
anthropomorphism, it is very difficult to determine the conditions of the student's use
of these conceptions. As has been suggested by White and Gunstone (1992), mode
validity of research findings are of great importance in such questions and multiple
means of data collection are necessary to ensure this validity.
Teleological responses are difficult to address given the data from this study.
While Stephanie was teleological in her initial conceptions o f patterns of evolutionary
change, this conception became far less prominent in her later interviews. During this
same time period, Stephanie was undergoing significant conceptual change regarding
the process o f evolutionary events. W hile generalizations becom e less meaningful
when such limited data are available, these data do suggest that teleological expressions
can be replaced by more mechanistic conceptions.
W hat is not answered by these data is the issue of the influence o f the use of
need, anthropomorphism, and teleology. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest that the
use o f common metaphors and analogies serve to shape conceptions, instead o f acting
as simple expressions o f conceptions. Do students use need, anthropomorphism, and
teleology as a means of expressing their pre-existing conceptions? Or, does the early
use o f such responses act to shape and further embed these conceptions? This study
cannot answer the question o f the influence o f these metaphors.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND IM PLICATIONS
I learned several things from this research, such as the real importance o f the
mode validity of findings o f educational research, the ways in which the tone and
structure o f interviews m ust change over time, and the insight students can have in
their own reasoning and learning processes. However, the knowledge I m ost value
concerns my understanding o f the process of conceptual change.
At the outset, the conceptual change theory attracted my attention because it
included an understandable and historically based mechanism to model learning. This
model em phasized the im portance of students' conceptual frameworks in the learning
process. Because of this em phasis, interest in students' prior knowledge became a
legitimate avenue of research. Something many science educators always felt was
important now assumed a central role in learning theory.
As it was originally proposed, the conceptual change as described by Posner et
al. (1982) has some very specific characteristics, some o f which are absolute
requirements of the theory and others which are implied by the theory's mechanism.
W hether overtly or tacitly, these characteristics have shaped science educators'
conceptions o f science learning. But based on my research findings, my understanding
of the process of conceptual change has undergone a series o f meaningful changes.
In order to better frame my current description o f the process of conceptual
change in evolution, I will first illustrate my former interpretation of the conceptual
change theory. As described by Posner et al. (1982), the conceptual change theory
requires that four conditions must be met in order for a learner to undergo large scale
accommodation of a pre-existing conceptual framework. These four conditions
include:
1. The prior conception must be judged to be incapable of solving current
anomalies (learner dissatisfaction),
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2. The new conception must be found to be intelligible by the learner,
3. The new conception must be found to be plausible by the learner (that is, the
new conception m ust solve all the problems the pre-existing conception
could not answer), and
4. The new conception must be found to be fruitful (that is, the new conception
must open other avenues for research).
Along with these four conditions for conceptual change, a learner's conceptual
ecology is understood to control the change which can occur. As discussed previously
in Chapter 2, this ecology is said to include the learner's epistemological commitments,
metaphysical beliefs, the criteria a learner uses to control the recognition of anomalous
data and knowledge taken from outside the field.
Based on this brief description, I understood the conceptual change described
by Posner et al. (1982) to have several specific characteristics and/or limitations.
These included:
1. The conceptual change theory was useful in describing the change of major,
organizing conceptions. It was not meant to describe the change o f small or
minor conceptions.
2. Conceptual change was understood to be wholesale, so that the prior
conception was com pletely discarded in favor of the new conception.
3. Conceptual change was a rational process in which evidence is logically
analyzed and com peting conceptions are compared on rational grounds.
Based on this characteristic, I expected conceptual change to proceed in a
linear, orderly fashion.
4. Stemming from the influence of the learner's conceptual ecology, belief was
understood to influence the conceptual change which occurs.
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Implicit in this description is that conceptual change, as described by Posner et
al. (1982), is fundamentally a scientifically rational process in which conceptions are
judged using logical evaluation o f available evidence. In this description, the terms
scientific and rational become important signifiers to the current conception of
learning. For many, the term scientific implies the familiar image of wholesale
disproof, objective and precise observations, and a simplicity and elegance of
explanations derived through deductive logic. Using this understanding, a scientific
framework would include a set o f linear explanations which are not exclusive nor
reduntant. A learner using a scientific framework would search for the single most
valid and widely applicable explanation for a natural phenomenon. The term rational
also carries with it a host of im plied meanings. Rational judgments are understood to
be solely within the cognitive realm. Traditionally, rational judgm ents (and so
conceptual change) are said to be conscious decisions which exclude the influence of
affective or motivational concerns.
The data for this research conflict with the traditional interpretation o f learning
using the conceptual change theory, as I will outline in the following chapter. While I
support limiting use of the term conceptual change to describe the change of major
organizing conceptions, I now understand the process o f conceptual change in
evolution in much broader terms than those outlined by Posner et al. (1982). Ways in
which my description differs from the initial theory include:
1. The conceptual change described in this study included the wholesale
pathway predicted by Posner et al. (1982); however, two other pathways o f
conceptual change were also identified in my study. These patterns
illustrate that the change of major conceptions is not always holistic.
2. Despite directed instruction, conceptual change is not always along a
pathway leading toward the construction o f a more scientific framework.
Conceptual change must include any restructuring o f a learner's conceptual
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framework (as evidenced by the pre- and posttest data from the entire
class).
3. The conceptual change experienced by the four participants was often
driven by extra-logical factors (rational factors, but not within traditional
notions of rationality). Thus, the patterns o f conceptual change were
neither com pletely linear nor orderly.
4. Data from this study suggest that the role o f a learner's conceptual ecology
is far more im portant and intricate than suggested in the original conceptual
change theory.
Based on these factors, I now understand conceptual change in evolution to include
wholesale, fragmented, and dual constructions patterns which are controlled by both
rational (both logical and extra-logical) and extra-rational com ponents (motivational
and affective concerns). The following chapter will further detail these and other
conclusions and highlight the most salient aspects of this research.
Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from the data and discussion included in the
previous three chapters. The most important of these include: (a) alternative
conceptions unique to this study, (b) further description o f the process o f conceptual
change and suggested refinements o f the theory, (c) factors influencing conceptual
change, (d) a description of the degree of biological literacy of the four student
participants, and (d) the question o f student participation and its influence on
conceptual change.
Conceptions Unique to This Study
While the majority o f alternative conceptions docum ented in this study have
been described in previous science education research, a number are new or were
docum ented previously in a superficial manner. These new conceptions include:
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Conceptions of species
1. Hybridization between animal species is a natural source o f variation,
2. The term species is a completely artificial category,
3. The species construct is dependent on several criteria (amalgam species
concept),*

Conceptions of evolutionary process
4. All mutations are beneficial,
5. Collage conception o f fitness,*
6. Evolution is an incremental change in the quality of a trait caused by
mutation within the entire population,*

Other related conceptions
7. The theory of evolution should account for the origin o f the earth, initial
production o f life and subsequent changes in natural populations,
8. Humans are not primates nor animals, and
9 Evolutionary events are predictable.
O f these nine conceptions, the three designated by an asterisk are particularly
meaningful. The three conceptions indicate that learners often blend their pre-existing
alternative conceptions with scientific conceptions in an effort to construct useful
explanations for natural phenomena. This new, broad conception is then applied and
further modified. This fragmented process o f blending and subsequently modifying
conceptions conflicts with the wholesale conceptual change described by Posner et al.
(1992).
The conflict between the conceptual change docum ented in these three
instances and that described by the conceptual change theory serves to reinforce the
intended scope of the conceptual change theory. As was suggested in the original
paper, the conceptual change theory should be applied to only major, organizing
conceptions which is not the case in the three (*) conceptions discussed here (Posner et
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al., 1982). However, other science education researchers have strained to apply
conceptual change theory to alm ost all instances of learning and have thus ignored the
intended constraints. While this over-application mirrors the growth o f almost all
scientific theories (Duschl, 1990), these data indicate that researchers must remember
the intended scope o f this theory.
Conceptual Change
The data can be used to address four broad areas describing the process of
conceptual change for biological evolution. These include:
1. The im pact o f the learner's conceptual ecology on the process o f conceptual
change.
2. The importance of threshold questions on the process of conceptual change.
3. The patterns of conceptual change.
4. Actions of com peting conceptions.
Conceptual Ecology and Conceptual Change
Tyler, M eredith, Stephanie, and Brian were not only participants in this study;
they were students in a specific classroom, situated in a unique educational setting and
influenced by a myriad of factors. An important aspect of the understanding that I
have constructed in this study revolves around my interpretation of their school and
classroom culture. To understand how the conceptual frameworks o f the participants
changed is, in part, to understand the influence o f culture on this process.
At the outset of this section, it must be noted that each of the four interview
participants had one important characteristic in common--each had a very favorable
attitude toward almost all academic work. In this regard, these participants were not
radically different from their classmates. An important feature of the classroom
culture was a positive orientation toward academic knowledge and academic
achievement. Dreyfus, Jungwirth, and Eliovitch (1990) describe this level of
engagem ent as one o f the most im portant considerations for conceptual change. Strike
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and Posner (1992), too, have recently described the potential influence o f learners'
motives and goals on the process o f conceptual change. The results o f a conceptual
change study by Lee and Anderson (1993) demonstrates the interactions o f students'
motivational and affective orientations and their knowledge and achievement.
Unfortunately, a positive orientation to classroom science is not commonly found in
our nation's students. The influence o f this unusual characteristic may be one of the
most fundamental factors controlling the conceptual change docum ented in this study;
however, no com parison is possible as it is a characteristic that each interview
participant shared.
Features o f the participants' conceptual ecologies found to play important roles
in the conceptual change which occurred included the learner's orientation toward
science, other sources o f academic knowledge, and religion. As was particularly
stressed in the multidisciplinary realist’s case study (Stephanie), a learner's
epistemology and goals for the learning process can also play a major role in
controlling the conceptual change that can occur.
Overall, the data support Posner et al.'s (1982) assertion of the importance of
the learner's conceptual ecology on the process o f conceptual change. However, the
most significant finding within this category was the docum entation o f significant
conceptual change in the absence o f a corresponding change in belief. As was seen in
Stephanie's case study, a learner who personally rejects the truthfulness o f evolution
can experience considerable change toward a scientific conceptual framework for this
topic.
The docum entation o f a disjunction between academic understanding and
personal belief conflicts with the common perception o f some evolution educators
(Nelson, 1986). However, these data support the quantitative findings o f Bishop and
Anderson (1990) and Dem astes et al. (in press) who failed to docum ent a strong
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association o f students' beliefs and their ability to apply a scientific conception for an
issue o f evolutionary theory.
It could be argued that Stephanie was able to construct a largely scientific
conceptual framework for the process o f evolution despite her disbelief because o f her
m ultidisciplinary epistemological approach. Unlike many students who use a
creationist view, Stephanie was able to appreciate the value o f evolutionary theory
regardless o f her belief in the topic. While she did not regard this theory as true, she
did consider it to be worthy o f academic consideration. This may have placed
Stephanie in a unique position allowing learning to occur under typically adverse
circumstances.
Stephanie's case study becomes more informative as it is compared to Tyler's.
Tyler was not as adam ant in her rejection of evolutionary theory as Stephanie, yet her
discom fort and confusion were often obvious. It may not be coincidental that the
student (Tyler) who had the most difficulty in constructing scientific conceptions for
evolutionary mechanisms was also the student involved in the greatest amount of
personal turm oil regarding this topic. The resolution o f the teacher’s and learner's
anxieties in regard to evolutionary theory has been addressed in a systematic research
program (Scharmann & Harris, 1992). The comparison of Stephanie and Tyler
suggests that the most influential factor inhibiting scientific conceptual change is not
belief, but the learner's feelings of disturbance and conflict as learning occurs.
In contrast to Stephanie's case study, Meredith accepted evolutionary theory
long before she had a scientific conception for the process of this theory. This is not an
unusual situation. In a survey reported by Lord and Marino (1992), while 75% o f the
college students polled reported that they believed evolution, most failed to understand
the process. Like Tyler and the students in Lawson and W eser (1990), M eredith's
acceptance was based on her perception o f the academic authority o f this theory and
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the persons teaching this theory instead of the intrinsic intelligibility, plausibility, or
fruitfulness of the theory itself.
It could also be argued that the learning documented in Stephanie’s case study
is not a typical example of conceptual change. Using the criteria of Posner et al.
(1982), because she did not reject her existing conceptual framework for this topic,
Stephanie could be said to have undergone only the initial process of finding the theory
intelligible and plausible. However, portions of Stephanie's larger conceptual
framework did undergo a definite change away from her initial conceptions.
A learner's conceptual ecology also includes the student's approach to scientific
topics. A comparison the authority seeker's (Tyler) case studies to the other cases of
the other three participants reveals that the learner's overall approach to understanding
natural phenomena (her/his world view) can play an important role in aiding or
hindering the construction o f a scientific conceptual framework. Brian, Meredith, and
Stephanie, were capable o f a very mechanistic, naturalistic approach to scientific
topics. Each o f these three made considerable gains toward the construction of a
scientific conceptual framework for evolution. However, Tyler who used a more
aesthetic approach to understanding natural phenomena retained the use of many of her
prior alternative conceptions for much of evolutionary theory at the end of the study
(Cobern, 1993). Unfortunately, Tyler's additional reliance on academic authorities and
her personal turmoil complicate this analysis.
When the conceptual frameworks and conceptual change of the participants' are
analyzed, areas of difficulties emerge which reflect the particular cultural context of
these learners. These sites o f struggle may reflect basic assumptions of western culture
which must be overcome in order to construct a scientific conceptual framework for
evolution. These three sites include (a) humans as separate from nature, (b) the
Aristotelian notion of a ladder of life, and (c) the inherent predictability of physical
mechanisms. These issues proved to be very important features of the learner's

conceptual ecologies and took the form o f barriers to be overcom e in the conceptual
change of Meredith, Tyler, and to a lesser degree Stephanie.
Students' Threshold Questions about Evolutionary Theory
The original description o f conceptual change theory outlined the importance of a
theory's (a) intelligibility, (b) plausibility, and (c) fruitfulness. Related to this, the data
from this study support the prominent role o f particular issues, which can be called
threshold questions, in the process o f conceptual change in evolution. The term
threshold questions was selected because it describes the actions of such information.
If the learner obtained the correct answer to such a question, she/he could proceed with
the construction and acceptance of the new conception. If the learner could not obtain
this information, further learning was blocked.
This sequence of events is demonstrated as Stephanie's case is followed. When
she entered the class, she had the alternative conception o f "interbreeding for
dominance" as being the only source of new variation. However, this explanation was
not often applied and it was clear this conception was not central to her conception of
the process of evolutionary change.
(When asked about the origin of variation)
S T : I have a hard time forming opinions about this. I really don't think we can
form something just because we need it.
[D 15]
After she learned that mutations are the source o f variation, an entire sequence of
changes were made possible for her understanding of the process of evolutionary
change. This conception made the explanation of the process o f evolutionary change
plausible for Stephanie. The subsequent conceptual changes can be found in the
description of her mid-year conceptions.
O ther threshold questions documented in this study include:
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Threshold Questions of Intelligibility:
1. How could two different species stem from one original?
2. Why haven't all species evolved into a similar, better organism? (Or, why
does evolution stop?)
3. How does evolution explain the creation of the earth?

Threshold Questions of Plausibility:
1. Have humans evolved?
2. W hat is the origin o f variation in a population?

Threshold Questions of Fruitfulness:
1. Can evolution explain similarities and differences between organisms?
2. Can evolution be used to explained structural peculiarities between
organisms?
As these questions are reviewed, it should be remembered that the actions of
such knowledge vary from learner to learner. It is also important to note that these
threshold questions do not have to be answered in a logical manner. As emphasized by
Tyler's case study, the most important question which allowed evolution to become
plausible was the issue o f human evolution. Having answered that, she never raised
questions concerning the patterns or modes of speciation.
Evidence Needed for Conceptual Change
Closely related to the idea o f threshold questions is the evidence required by
learners for conceptual change. As recalled in the discussion of conceptual change
teaching provided by Duschl and Gitom er (1991, p. 847), "what counts [as evidence] is
affected by what knowledge we choose to embrace." The participants in this study did
not always select evidence based only on rational, logical reasons. Instead,
idiosyncratic, measures were often used. An example o f this was seen in Stephanie's
case study. She understood and constructed a conception o f small scale evolutionary
changes because o f her interests in anthropology. For Stephanie, the process o f small
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scale evolutionary events needed to become plausible to justify her affective concerns
and her extensive prior knowledge in anthropology. A similar example was seen in
Tyler, who understood the world to have a very long history only because of her
perception o f the existence o f dinosaurs. For Tyler, the world was old, not because of
an array of supporting evidence, but because it had to be old in order for dinosaurs to
have existed.
The understanding that all conceptual change in a learner is not logically driven
is not in conflict with the description o f conceptual change in science as provided by
Lakatos (1970), Toulmin (1972), and Kuhn (1970). Toulmin (1972) describes the
rationality driving theoretical change in science as often being outside the boundaries
o f formal logic and instead being a systematic analysis of the practical considerations
o f the function and adaptation o f the new theory. It should not be surprising that much
o f the conceptual change docum ented in this study was not driven by logical
considerations but was still based on a rational evaluation o f the function and
implications of the new conception.
Patterns o f Conceptual Change
Change in one conception
As seen many times in the data o f this study, the initial stages of the change of
a single conception were characterized by the student's use o f a new term within a
previously constructed explanation. Often, the initial use was not accompanied by a
full, scientific understanding, but instead an almost rote mimic of an earlier use. This
process was seen in Meredith's initial use of mutation in her explanation o f the process
o f evolutionary change. She first mentioned the term after reading it on a pretest. It
was clear that Meredith did not understand what this term signified, but instead used it
to fill a gap in her previous understanding of evolutionary change. In later interviews
Meredith began to apply this term in more of her explanations that gradually narrowed
the scope o f mutation's actions as she more closely defined the term. It was not until
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the m id-year and year-end interview periods that M eredith constructed a scientific
conception o f the process o f mutations and its actions. However, this conception came
long after her initial use o f this conception in response to her own dissatisfaction.
Another trend seen in a single instance of conceptual change was the change in
the students’ use of a conception. As was seen in all four interview participants,
students' initial applications o f a conception were often tentative and took the form of
rapid but unsure responses to interview questions. Later applications o f the new
conception were made with more assurance as the students began to link the new
conception with other aspects of their knowledge. Links between conceptions were
reflected in students' concept maps (as the new conceptions were placed higher in the
map's hierarchy) and in their frequent use o f such responses in interview responses.
Tentative beginnings characterized conceptions constructed in response to learner
dissatisfaction with current conceptions.
Change in related conceptions
Often the change of one conception allowed a sequence of conceptual changes
to occur. An example o f this was dem onstrated in Stephanie's and M eredith's use of
need as the origin of variation. W hile this alternative conception remained in place,
other associated conceptions also remained in an alternative state. But a change in the
controlling conception allowed for a cascade o f associated changes. A tentative
sequence o f this cascade was as follows:
1. Need was replaced by mutation as the origin of variation.
2. The conception of patterns of evolution as tied to the environm ent was
replaced by a conception of evolutionary patterns has having a more
random component.
3. The conception o f an inextricable action of natural selection and production
of variation was replaced with a conception of the separate actions of these
two processes.
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4. The conception o f the unit of evolutionary change as being the entire
population was replaced by a percentage o f the entire population.
It is difficult to determine the exact sequence o f each of these conceptual
changes because the cascade always occurred over a short time span. More work is
required to tease out the actual controlling conception. However, previous work
indicates need as the controlling conception o f this cascade (Demastes & Good, 1993).
Aside from identification o f the controlling conception, documentation o f this series of
changes is insightful. M illar (1989) suggests that a model o f knowledge fragments
instead of conceptual frameworks may be a more fruitful model for students'
understandings. The data collected in this study lend partial support to this model.
Students' conceptions o f the many facets under a broad theoretical base can change
with little alterations of the other portions o f the framework. For example, Stephanie's
knowledge o f the mechanism o f evolution changed while her historical knowledge was
retained intact. However, some o f the data conflict with M illar's model. The
conceptions which describe related biological phenomena often change in a very
interconnected fashion, as is described by the cascade of changes.

Based on this

study, Millar's model of knowledge fragments is only applicable within specific
instances in evolution education.
Conceptual change versus change in formal knowledge statements
Another characteristic of most instances of conceptual change was that the
actual conceptions applied by the learner would undergo an alteration, but their
overarching, descriptive explanation would be retained unchanged. Stephanie's case
study best demonstrates this characteristic. At the outset o f the study, Stephanie
recognized "subtle changes within a group" o f organisms as the only plausible
description of evolutionary change. Using this conception, she rejected all large scale
examples o f speciation. However, during the latter stages o f the study, Stephanie
accepted and applied evolutionary theory to account for changes "within" a group
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encompassing dinosaurs and birds and reptiles. She retained the use of the formal
definition of evolutionary change, but the meaning she attributed to this statement
varied.
Documentation o f such subtle conceptual change calls into question the
wholesale change described by Posner et al. (1982). Stephanie's understanding o f the
scope o f evolutionary changes is a large, organizing conception. Yet, in the instances
described above, Stephanie was not consciously selecting one conception over another
based on issues o f intelligibility, plausibility, and fruitfulness. Instead, her previous
conception was undergoing a series of subtle changes in order to envelop the new
information she was learning. Such piecemeal and gradual conceptual change is
similar to the pattern described by Nussbaum (1989, p. 538):
[Conceptual change] forms a pattern in which the student maintains substantial
elements o f the old conception w'hile gradually incorporating individual
elements from the new ones.
Gradual conceptual change has also been documented by Metz (1991) in her study of
change in students' physics knowledge. In this study she described both wholesale
conceptual change and an incremental pattern. W ithin the incremental pattern,
students' pre-existing conceptions are transformed and serve as the basis for new
conceptions.
Recognition of conceptual change
Within the conceptual change theory, a learner compares two competing
conceptions and elects to use one conception based upon the criteria described
previously. If such com parison is common, a researcher might expect to see signs of a
learner's recognition of the process of conceptual change. This prediction is supported
by many of the data o f this study. Particularly true in Stephanie's and M eredith's case
studies, they recognized and could propose reasons for the conceptual change that
occurred during this study.
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The trend of recognition o f conceptual change did not hold true for all
conceptual change, however. As demonstrated by Stephanie's changing conception of
evolution as "subtle changes within a group,” learners often are not consciously aware
of the conceptual changes which occur. Just as a recognition o f this process supports
Posner et al.’s (1982) description, the lack o f recognition calls into question the limits
o f this theory. As was suggested in the previous section, change of an organizing
conception is not always through the overt process of comparison and rejection.
Instead, as has been recently suggested by Strike and Posner (1992), conceptual change
is often a more fragmented, extra-logical process that is guided by the learner's prior
knowledge and affective considerations of this knowledge.
Actions o f Competing Conceptions
During two instances in the study, students failed to recognize their application
of two logically incompatible conceptions. This was seen in M eredith's and Tyler's
recognition of the random aspect of mutation combined with their application of only
beneficial mutations. After the initial documentation o f this event, I took measures to
ensure that these two students were applying these conceptions and not simply stating
a rote answer. Once this was established, I questioned them as to this inconsistency.
Neither participant was able to recognize the incompatibility o f these responses.
Additionally, it is important to note that each one o f the conflicting responses was
elicited by a different interview question. Inconsistent knowledge frameworks are well
known in science education literature (Carey, 1985; Clough & Driver, 1986; Gilbert,
Watts, & Osborne, 1982), and have been previously described for students'
conceptions o f evolution (Lawson & Thompson, 1988). The data from this study and
the literature suggest that occasionally conceptual change can include the construction
of a second equivalent but competing conception.
Lawson and Thompson (1988) suggest that students fail to recognize the
inconsistency of the competing conceptions and fail to experience wholesale
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conceptual change in these instances because they do not have the required reasoning
skills. Other authors have noted these dual constructions are elicited through different
activities (Carey, 1985; Clough & Driver, 1986). In any case, based on these data, the
dual construction and application is a common event in the process o f conceptual
change. Holland et al. (1986) use the default hierarchy model of cognition to explain
learners' selection of one conception to use from a dual construction. However, the
extra-logical pattern of concept selection used by M eredith, Tyler, and Stephanie
makes the use o f this com puter metaphor problematic.
Summary of Patterns of Conceptual Change
Currently, two metaphors for conceptual change are com monly accepted. One
describes that a learner's conception can undergo subtle changes in the form of
assimilation and the second describes the process of whole sale accommodation as
conflicting information is encountered. The conceptual change theory of Posner et al.
(1982) was designed to address only instances o f accommodation for major, organizing
conceptions. The data from this study conflict with this narrow description. These
data describe three patterns o f change for major conceptions: (a) wholesale, as
suggested by Posner et al. (1982), (b) fragmented and gradual, as suggested by
Nussbaum (1989) and Metz (1991), and (c) dual, as the discussion shown above
illustrates.
Factors Influencing Conceptual Change
A Comparison
When the conceptual change of the interview participants is compared with that
experienced by the entire class, a considerable discrepancy emerges. Not surprisingly,
a comparison o f the pre- and posttest responses o f the participants and their classmates
reveals that the participants learned a great deal more evolutionary theory than their
classmates. This difference could be attributed to several factors stemming from the
interview process. The interview participants were involved in a conversation
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regarding evolutionary theory on a weekly basis. The sheer frequency of our
discussions could have been responsible for the greater degree o f learning found in the
interview participants. Also due to these conversations, evolution gained an
importance for the participants that was lacking in the larger class. As Meredith
explained:
M : Like whenever we've talked about it [evolution] in class I probably paid
more attention than you know ahm, I've paid careful attention because you
know, it's something that we're talking about each week. (A 313)
Dole and N iederhauser (1990, p. 309) suggest that a learner's "personal need to
know" plays a very large role in initiating and guiding the process of conceptual
change. They suggest that the interest an issue holds for a student increases the
possibility of conceptual change. This view is supported by W est and Pines (1983)
who argue that affective considerations o f learning should not be excluded in the
research o f conceptual change. Certainly, the four interview participants learned to
care about the theory o f evolution because "it's something that w e’re talking about each
week," and that interest enhanced the learning that occurred.
Additionally, the interview process clearly demonstrated the gaps in a
participant's explanation of an evolutionary event. Such explicit knowledge allowed
for learner dissatisfaction and caused the participant to search for other more suitable
answers both in class and in our later interviews. Related to the issue of
dissatisfaction, the structured interview activities provided a means through which the
participants could explore the implications of their current conceptions. Jimenez
(1992) dem onstrates that such explanation is an essential aspect o f conceptual change.
Again, this opportunity for dissatisfaction was not afforded the larger class of students.
Based on the comparison o f data from the whole class with the interview participants,
it is evident that the interviews served as a learning medium.
The other source of discrepancy between the conceptual change documented in
the interview participants and the larger class lies in the means o f data collection used
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for whole class. Like previous studies, whole class conceptual change was studied
using written data for pre- and posttesting. As was demonstrated in the posttest data in
both M eredith's and Tyler’s case studies, written explanations often do not adequately
reflect the learner's true conceptual framework. It is possible that the conceptions used
by the whole class were different than those expressed in their pre- and posttest
responses. To clearly isolate differences between interview participants and the whole
class, another means o f data collection must be used.
Classroom Activities Affecting Conceptual Change
Many of the classroom activities employed by Ms. Hurston were instrumental
in triggering the process of conceptual change. The most influential activities/units
can be found in Table 8.
Table 8
M ost influential teaching activities/units for targeted evolutionary conceptions

Activity /U nit

Targeted Conception

Animal behavior

Human and primate relationships

Anthropology

Humans and primate relationships

Dinosaurs

Applications o f evolution

Science 82 reading

Scope and process o f evolution

Exams questions

Extinction/human and primate
relationships

O f the activities or instructional units listed in Table 8, it is surprising that the
activity with the greatest amount of influence on the interview participants was the
Science 82 reading. Entitled, "Evolution since Darwin" (Rensberger, 1982), this brief
article addressed basic tenants with Darwin's theory of evolution, provided a historical
overview o f the theory, discussed current controversies, and described various theories
of the scientists working within this framework. After reading the article for
homework, each o f the interview participants applied the concepts described in the

article during research sessions. Some of these concepts remained em bedded in the
participants' frameworks o f evolution throughout the rem ainder o f the course. Perhaps
such an application would have occurred after a simple reading, but Hurston lead a
vigorous discussion of the article during a later class session. It should also be noted
that the participants were aware o f the deficiencies in their explanation before reading
the article. This recognition may have been the factor responsible for m aking the
article a particularly powerful teaching tool.
Classroom Discussions and Conceptual Change
Implicit in Hurston's teaching habits and my own observations and descriptions
of her classroom is our expectation that overt participation in discussions encourage
students' conceptual change. This view of conceptual change is shared by other
researchers in the field who stress the importance of discussion in the assessm ent of
rival conceptions (Duschl & Gitomer, 1991). However, it is not only within the
conceptual change theory that discussions are valued. The current constructivist view
o f learning relies heavily on Vygotsky's work in his emphasis of the importance of
social interaction in a learner's construction o f knowledge (Rogoff, 1990). Similar to
Hurston and tp my own interpretation, it is clear from many of the current studies that
Vygotsky's social interaction has been interpreted as an active, vocal participation in
conversations. The AAUW (1992) quantified the relative amount o f time boys and
girls, as well as majority and minority students, overtly participated in classroom
discussions. Researchers concerned with male "domination" o f science classrooms
often quantify the amount of time a student talks in class or overtly participates in
classroom demonstrations (Tobin & Garnett, 1987).
During my classroom observations, I was concerned that so few o f the girls in
Hurston's class chose to participate in the frequent discussion Hurston often relied on
for teaching. Given my interpretation of the conceptual change theory, I understood
overt participation to be an essential component of a learner's consideration and
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eventual change o f conceptions. Based on my assumption, I predicted that the female
members of the classroom and other silent class participants would experience less
conceptual change than those members who took part in classroom discussions. Like
other researchers, I expected the silent learner to experience less conceptual change.
Unfortunately, based on the methods of my study, the influence of gender and
participation on conceptual change could not be investigated. As explained in the
preceding section, my study constituted an intervention in which weekly discussions
with my more silent participants, (Meredith, Tyler, and Stephanie), provided these
learners an opportunity to assess their conceptions. O ther girls in the study did not
have this avenue, and using current interpretations o f the conceptual change theory we
might expect them to have experienced a lesser degree of conceptual change than the
boys in the classroom.
However, the prediction that less vocal participation would result in lower
degrees of conceptual change is not as indisputable as it first appears. In our
conversations, Stephanie explained that she often learned through listen to class
discussions. Her observations are supported by Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and
Tarule (1986) who suggest that often women do not participate in group discussions
because they learn best through observation and listening. These individuals learn
through "hearing themselves think" (p. 85). This seemingly less participatory learning
style allows women to compare their own thoughts with those being expressed in the
classroom. W hile the description o f women's modes of communication and learning
described by Belenky et al. (1986) are far too lengthy to describe here, Stephanie's
comments made throughout the study lend support to this description of active, yet
silent learning. Stephanie frequently commented that she "was learning" during a
discussion in which she made no comment.
As educators, we should not make the mistake o f assuming that all students
learn science the same way. Perhaps science educators should be less concerned with
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"enlisting" the overt participation of the girls and more concerned with ensuring that
such discussions become a valued and meaningful aspect o f teaching and learning.
Biological Literacy
Regardless o f the effects o f the research process and instructional activities
listed in Table 8, the influence of Hurston's integrated approach to teaching evolution
cannot be discounted. As reflected in Appendix F, Hurston touched on the
evolutionary concepts throughout the biology II course. Evolutionary theory grounded
her teaching, and this foundation is reflected in her selection of instructional units and
in her examinations. While m ost students in her class as a whole did not demonstrate
significant conceptual change regarding the process of evolution, they made
noteworthy gains in learning to apply this theory to biological data. The research of
Cummins et al. (in press) also suggests that Hurston's teaching was particularly
successful in developing students' abilities and tendencies toward application o f this
theory. While Hurston's style of questioning and discussion does not closely adhere to
the conceptual change teaching environm ent described by Smith et al. (1993), these
very characteristics may be largely responsibility for her success in eliciting student
participation in the learning process, a participation which allowed for student driven
developm ent and application o f theories. Students in Hurston's class were encouraged
to weave together the various aspects of evolutionary theory into a coherent mental
model, which could then be used to understand the ultimate actions of evolution
(Anderson, 1984). In this m anner her teaching does resemble the conceptual change
teaching environm ent described by Duschl and Gitom er (1991). Additionally, these
activities could be described has moving students toward a multidimensional degree of
biological literacy because of Hurston's emphasis o f the application of diverse
knowledge to real-world problem solving.
It is perplexing that most students in the class developed an ability to apply a
concept of evolution without developing a fundamentally scientific understanding of
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the process. Students in Hurston's class could use the theory to explain biological
situations, but they did not understand the process through which evolution operates.
This situation was not reflected in my interview participants. These students
experienced an increasingly scientific understanding of the mechanism of evolution
combined with a changing conceptual ecologies. These changes were accompanied by
more acute expectations that such a theory could and would explain biological data.
Implications
The findings of this study have several implications, both for science teaching
and other science education research. These include (a) students' abilities to learn
aspects of evolutionary theory, (b) patterns of and influences on the processes of
conceptual change in evolution, (c) unanswered questions concerning students' use of
teleology and anthropomorphism in the content area o f evolution, and (d)
methodological implications o f the study's reflexivity.
Students' Abilities to Learn Evolutionary Theory
The first implication o f the research is illuminated by a comparison of the
students' knowledge upon entering the course and their knowledge as the course ended.
In their groundbreaking study linking conceptual change theory with the learning of
evolution, Bishop and Anderson (1990) noted that learning this topic is a very difficult
process. The findings of the present study support this assertion. As W andersee et al.
(1993) suggest, a change in a learner's conceptual framework becomes even more
difficult when that framework has many links to other aspects of a learner's prior
knowledge, that is, their alternative conceptions. This difficulty is demonstrated in the
whole class performance on pre- and posttesting. Despite the concentrated,
mechanistic, and integrated instruction of evolution the juniors were exposed to in a
previous course, many o f these same students retained use o f prominent alternative
conceptions for the mechanism o f evolutionary change.
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The intrinsic difficulty of learning in evolution was also dem onstrated by the
m odest-to-negative changes seen in students' pre- and posttest performance. However,
echoing the findings of Settlage (in press) and Jimenez (1992), this study demonstrates
that high school students can be successful in the construction o f scientific conceptions
for facets of evolutionary theory. As was seen in two students in this study, high
school students can achieve multidimensional biological literacy for this biological
concept. Clearly, the content of evolutionary theory is not beyond students' reasoning
abilities. However, as was seen with the interview participants, the instructional means
used to nurture such conceptual change must be intensive, engaging, and of long
duradon.
Patterns o f and Influences on Conceptual Change
Patterns for M inor Conceptions
This research also has theoretical implications for the conceptual change theory
as it is applied to science learning. As was dem onstrated by the participants' changing
conceptions regarding subtle aspects of evolutionary theory (i.e., species concept,
fitness, unit of evolutionary change), conceptual restructuring o f minor conceptions
does not follow the wholesale pattern described by the conceptual change theory of
Posner et al. (1982). Instead, these examples serve to confirm and emphasize the
limitations of this theory as a description of the restructuring o f major, organizing
conceptions.
Patterns for Maior Conceptions
Even within major, organizing conceptions, the findings o f this research
suggest a need to change the current model o f conceptual restructuring described by
the conceptual change theory. While the pattern described by the Posner et al. (1982)
model was identified in the conceptions of the interview participants, other patterns of
conceptual change were also seen. The patterns of conceptual change for major,
organizing conceptions o f evolutionary theory identified in this study include (a)
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wholesale, as suggested by Posner et al. (1982), (b) fragmented and gradual, as
suggested by Nussbaum (1989) and Metz (1991), and (c) dual, as competing
conceptions are constructed and use o f the prior conception is partially retained. The
presence o f these three patterns illustrate a need to broaden the description o f the actual
patterns of conceptual change and to narrow the applications o f the present conceptual
change theory to describe only instances of holistic conceptual change.
Further research is needed to investigate the patterns o f conceptual
restructuring within other theoretical frameworks both in biology and other science
disciplines. Are the three patterns described in this research exhaustive of all
conceptual restructuring of major, organizing conceptions? Are the patterns o f change
identical for both minor and m ajor conceptions?
The patterns of conceptual change have implications for the classroom teacher.
Because a student's conceptual framework can undergo the construction of dual
conception, the role of the science teacher can be understood to take two paths. A
teacher may need to teach the reasoning strategies necessary to select the scientifically
appropriate conception, or the teacher's role may be to establish classroom activities
that consistently and frequently use cues (classroom situations) that are successful in
eliciting the scientific conception. Further work is required to further investigate the
presence o f the dual constructions and their classroom implications.
Patterns o f Related Conceptions
The data from this study reflect the complexity needed for a useful description
of conceptual change within a conceptual framework as broad as biological evolution.
The conceptual change described in this study can simultaneously be referred to as
interwoven and independent. As suggested by Millar (1989), in some cases,
conceptual change can occur in a very independent fashion, with change in one
conception having no effect on another conception within the same framework.
However, for related conceptions, change was seen to occur in a cascade, with one
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conception having direct implications for another as suggested by Nussbaum (1989).
The first of these two possibilities is liberating for the classroom teacher. In this case,
teaching does not need to be tightly orchestrated or sequential. However, in the latter
case, teaching should follow a planned sequence, allowing for a built-in pattern of
related, gradual change. Further w ork is required to identify both related and
independent conceptions in order to devise the most appropriate means o f instruction.
Conceptual Ecology
Perhaps the most im portant theoretical finding o f this work is that the actions
and structure of a learner's conceptual ecology vary with each individual. Strike and
Posner (1992) describe the influence of conceptual ecologies as interactionist. a term
which signifies the complex, fluid relationship between ecologies and conceptual
change.
This interactive nature makes predictions of a learner's potential to construct a
scientific framework in this area difficult. For some learners, her/his epistemological
approach to science may be the strongest controlling factor. Recently, Linn, Songer,
and Lewis (1991) have discussed the growing recognition science educators have for
the influence of a learner's epistemology of science on their ability to learn science.
For others, epistemology may play a secondary role to the personal em otions a learner
has invested in the topic. As suggested by Lee and Anderson (1993), research into
conceptual change should exam ine not only cognitive factors; instead, conceptual
change research must begin to exam ine the influence o f a learner's motivational and
affective orientations in science learning. Also seen seen in this study, a learner's
world view may play the pivotal role in controlling conceptual change. Several
instances in this study dem onstrate the limitations of the use o f logical evaluation of
conceptions described by the conceptual change theory. Instead, conceptual change
was frequently less rational than the current model suggests, with the learner's
selection of a conception directed by extra-logical, affective considerations.
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This study also demonstrates that it is ill-advised to design teaching strategies
solely on the basis o f a learner's self-professed belief in evolutionary theory. As was
seen, belief does not signify or ensure understanding and, alternatively, disbelief does
not preclude or prevent understanding. Instead, many other aspects of a learner's
conceptual ecology must also be addressed.
The question of belief introduces an important issue. Should science educators
seek to change basic belief structures? O r should we seek to make academic
conceptions intelligible and plausible to the learners in such complex conceptual area
as evolution? On this point I agree with the arguments o f Smith and Siegel (1993) who
side with the latter approach and explain that science teachers should also prepare
students to critically examine biological evidence. The fate o f conflicting belief
structures should then be left to the learners.
Teleology and Anthropomorphism
O f all the research questions proposed at the outset o f the study, students' use of
anthropomorphism and teleology remains the least well understood question at the
close of the study. The data demonstrate that students' use o f need may be a
controlling factor in a cascade of changes regarding the mechanism of evolutionary
change. However, the means through which teleology and anthropomorphism
influence the constructions o f conceptions remains unclear. The broad scope o f this
study precluded an exhaustive treatment o f this topic. Further detailed research is
required to illuminate the questions of the actions of the teleology and
anthropomorphism.
M ethodological Implications o f Reflexivity
In the third chapter, I discussed the implications o f researcher-participant
reflexivity in this study. Certainly, my voice and that o f the participants played a role
in shaping the research findings as well as the methods through which the data were
collected. The actions of such reflexivity have been well documented in previous

qualitative studies (Munro, 1991; Roman, 1989; Stacy, 1988). However, the actions of
this relationship become even more marked as the conceptual change o f the research
participants is compared to that o f the students in the whole class. The four student
participants were far more successful in constructing a scientific conceptual framework
for evolution than those students enrolled in the course but not participating in the
interviews. This discrepancy suggests that the interviews themselves became
inadvertent but effective teaching instruments. This is a case in which more careful
study formed a treatment of sorts. Thus, my study is not a description o f how a typical
high school student constructs a framework for evolution as much as it is a description
of how a research participant situated an ideal learning situation constructs a
framework. As conceptual change research moves toward the detailed and intensive
study o f individual learners, the effects o f such research must be recognized.
Additionally, later studies should move on from investigations of ideal conditions to
describe the conceptual change which characterizes more typical classroom situations.
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APPENDIX A
STUDENT BACKGROUND AND BIOLOGICAL LITERACY QUESTIONNAIRE3
Student Survey

This survey is to help me become familiar with the students in the
class. Feel free to ask questions and to use extra space to provide
answ ers.
Name____________________________ Age_________ Grade___
1.

W here were you bom? How long have you lived in Baton Rouge?

2.

How long have you attended this school?

3.

W hat are your plans about your career after graduation?

4.

Why did you enroll in this biology II class?

5.

Do you watch science-related TV programs at home? (Shows like Nature, the
Discovery Channel. National G eographic.) If so, how many hours per week?

6.

Do you read about any science related topics outside of school? If so, please name
any of the titles.

7.

Do you read books or watch programs that are based on science fiction? If so,
please name some of your favorite titles.

8.

What has been your favorite subject in school? Please explain why its your
favorite.

9.

W hat are your hobbies outside o f school?

10. Does any o f your family work in science-related fields? If yes, please explain what
they do.
11.

Describe what you think a biologist does at work.

3 N ote. T h is is not the actual form , but this version includes all the questions from the
original survey.
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLES OF THE OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
B -l: Student Participants
In te rv ie w 1—School: P e rso n a l In fo rm a tio n : T e a c h in g
1. Tell me about this school.
2. How long have you been here?
3. W here did you go to school before?
4. How do you like it here?
5. W hat do your folks do?
6. Why did you come to school here?
7.
How do you get into school here?
8. W hat other extra-curricular activities do you do?
9. Where do you think you'd like to go to college?
10. How did you pick those?
11. W hat do you want to do at those schools?
12. What do you think influenced that decision?
13. Okay, so talk me through a typical day.
14. Which class is your favorite?
13. What's your idea of a good teacher?
16. What do you think your responsibilities at school are?
17. What do you think is the function of high school?
In te rv ie w 2 --E v o lu tio n : M u ta tio n : S cience/B iology
1.
W hat do you think evolutionary theory is talking about?
2. Who taught you that?
3.
So, what do you think evolution is? When we say something evolved, what does
that mean?
4.
Does that happen on an individual level or what? Like what evolved?
5. So individuals can't evolve?
6. Okay, do you know what makes evolution work?
7. Could you tell me what a science is?
8. How does biology differ from English?
9. Why did you take this biology class?
10. So what is biology about?
In te rv ie w 3 --A n im al B eh a v io r: P seu d o sc ien ce
1. Did you like that unit on animal behavior?
2. Did you learn anything that you didn't know beforehand?
3. Do you think you view primates differently now than you did before you started
the unit?
4. So, what do you think about the LockNess monster?
5. What do you think about Big Foot?
6.
7.
8.

You don't think that's true either? Why?
So, what would it take for you to believe it?
So is that, is that how you equate truth, if it's a scientific thing?

In te rv ie w 4 —W o rld V iew
1.
Science and religion, do you think of them as antagonistic, or ah, do you see them
as one helping to explain the other?
2.
When you think about how the world works, what are your ideas?
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3.
4.
5.
6.

Do things happen because there is a plan, or do things ju st happen?
So for you think things will always turn out. Well, do you extend that to other
areas, like the natural world?
Let’s say a species went extinct. Do you thing that happened because o f some
scientific reason, or some other driving force?
So these scientific reasons, do they apply to people? Do they apply only the natural
world?

In te rv ie w 5—S c ie n tific th e o rie s
1. Could you tell me what a scientific theory is?
2.
What's the difference between a theory and a hypothesis?
3.
Are theories true?
4. What would they be called if they had been proven?
5. Can you prove things right? I mean, like right all the time?
6.
Which one has more weight in science a fact or a theory?
7.
So if we prove a theory right, like 20 times, 30 times, will it ever become a fact?
8. They way we think an atom is built, with nucleus and moving electrons, do you
think that is a fact or a theory?
9.
So what do you think the job of a scientist is?
10. Could you give me instances of rival theories?
In te rv ie w 6 —H u m a n T ax o n o m y
1. Do you think humans should be classified as apes?
2.
Do you think that really?
3.
So what can you tell me about primates? What makes something a primate?
4.
So, do you think humans can be classified the same way animals can be classified?
You know, we use that taxonomic system, kingdom, phylum, class, order, you
know?
5.
Can you say, or are you comfortable saying that humans are primates?
6.
Do you have any trouble classifying us as animals?
In te rv ie w 7—H o lid a y s: R elig io n : F am ily H a b its
1. Are holidays a big event around your house?
2.
What are your plans for Thanksgiving? Christmas?
3. Do you have much homework assigned over Christmas?
4.
Will your family be here?
5. What do you usually do Christmas? Like Christmas eve and Christmas day?
6. What church do you go to?
7.
So is church a big part of your holiday?
In te rv ie w 8 —B iology: E v o lu tio n a s B iological T h e o ry :
E v id en ce fo r E v o lu tio n : A p p lic atio n fo r E v o lu tio n
1. Tell me what you think biology is.
2. All right, make that definition sound more human, like you were actually talking to
someone, explaining biology.
3. Could you give me some of the most important concepts in biology?
4. Ahm, do you use your knowledge that you get in biology class outside o f the
classroom often? I mean, can you use what you know in everyday life?
5. How? Could you give me some examples?
6. Do you have any pets?
7. Ahm, okay, do you think evolution is an important part o f biology?
8. So you think the best part of knowing evolution is just having a general
understanding of science?
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9.
10.

Can you think of evidence that supports evolution? That refutes evolution?
Do you think that the theory of evolution has any application to other areas outside
o f biology?

Interview 9—Age of Earth: Successful Species:
of Species: Predictability of Evolution
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.

Comparison

How old do you think the earth is?
Why would you say closer to 4 million?
Can you differentiate between [million and billion)? I mean, we're talking about a
lot.
Do you think they way the earth looks now has changed a lot during that time?
Do you see any other changes? I mean, can you think of any other changes that
happened?
So if you were to look at our world now, then say it is, and then you go forward
about a million years from now. W hat do you think the earth would look like?
W hat kind of changes do you see?
Where did you learn all this?
You think earth science as a whole is kind of boring? Why?
What would you say is a successful species?
So how would a species endanger itself?
Could you give me an example of that?
W ould you say that we're in danger o f messing ourselves up, I mean humans as a
species?
W hat do you think of as a failure of a species?
Do you think of extinction as a natural process?
Do you think of humans as evolving?
Do you think things are getting more perfect as they evolve?
W hat do you mean when you say a species is getting more complex? Can you give
an example?
If we could stan the world over again, I mean the whole thing, and all the same
natural events happened, and the same condition existed on this replication of the
world as there existed then, do you think that the species that result would be the
same as there are now?
What term would you use to characterize evolution, operating as an engineer or a
tinkerer?

Interview 10—Natural Selection
1.

Here's a statement, and I ju st want you to comment on it, one way or another. If
you agree with it tell me why. Or if you disagree with it, tell me why. A man made
the statement, "The probability that natural selection could build something as
complex as an eye is equal to the probability that a tornado could go through a
junkyard and build a 747."

Interview 11-Boundaries of Science, Religion, Philosophy
1. What do you think science allows you to talk about?
2. W hat do you think philosophy allows you to talk about?
3. How about religion?
4. If you had to group two o f those three thing together, science relation, and
philosophy, what two do you think are more similar? Why is that?
5. What do you think accounts for the conflict between science and religion?
6. Do you see science and religion as between distinctly separate?

5 In te rv ie w 12—B ib lical I n te r p r e ta tio n
1. So do you think that much of the bible can be treated as an analogy?
2. So, did you figure this out for yourself, or did someone help you with this?
3. When did you decide not to literally interpret the bible?
4. Do you discuss religious and scientific issues with your parents?
In te rv ie w 13—S pecies: U n d e rs ta n d in g o f E v o lu tio n
1. Can you tell me what a species is?
2. How can you tell if something is a species?
3. What does the phrase "closely related" mean?
4. Are all dogs one species?
5. How about ducks?
6. Do you think that a species is a natural kind o f construct? I mean, is it something
that exists in nature?
7. Scientifically, do you know the rules for writing a species name?
8. How is a species related to a population? To a genus?
9. Do you feel more comfortable discussing evolution now, more so than you did at
the beginning of the school year?
10. If you were at a party and a bunch of people were discussing evolutionary theory,
would you join in the discussion?
In te rv ie w 1 4 - A d a p ta tio n : M u ta tio n
1. We had talked before about adaptations. W hat do you think an adaptation is?
2. Could you give me an example o f a biological adaptation?
3. Are all adaptations genetic?
4. Is getting a chill bump an example of a genetic adaptation? Why not?
5. Where do initial genetic adaptations come from?
In te rv ie w 15—P e rso n a l C h a ra c te ris tic s : View o f R e se a rc h
P ro c e ss
1.
So, are you getting excited about the end o f school?
2.
What are you going to do this summer before college?
3.
Is college a kind o f scary thing?
4.
Have you ever thought o f not going to college?
5.
If you didn't go to college, what would you do? W hat kind o f work?
6.
Do you like your summer job?
7.
Can you give me three phrases that describe your thoughts about
U High?
8.
Do you think you’re getting a good education here?
9.
How do you think you learn the best? U nder what conditions do you learn the
most?
10. Do you parents help you much with your homework?
11. Do you know what your class position is?
12. Do you think your class position is important? Why?
13. W hat do you think about our research so far?
14. Do you mind talking about yourself?
15. Do you ever feel uncomfortable with my questions?
In te rv ie w 16—C o m p e titio n : L im its o f E v o lu tio n a ry T h e o ry :
D iffe re n tia l R e p ro d u c tio n
1. When you think about nature, do you think of it as being very competitive?
2. Can you give me an example?
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3.

Let's think about it in the context o f the ’possum you found yesterday. Could you
explain that in competitive terms?
4. W hat are things competing for? Why do organisms compete?
5. Do you consider humans as being very competitive?
6. W hen we use the word biological evolution, how do you use the term? Do you use
it just to refer to the changes that occur in a species, or does it also refer to the
original production of life?

Interview 17—Biology Class
1. So, what did you think o f the biology class?
2. Is there anything that you would like me to tell [Hurston] that could improve the
class?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

B-2: Parent Interview
Where do you work?
How long have you lived here?
How many children do you have?
What do they do?
Why did you decide to put [your child] in U High?
How does a parent go about enrolling their child in U High?
Do you think he/she likes it there?
If you could come up with three characteristics to describe U High, what would
they be?
Do you know why your child enrolled in Hurston's biology II class?
W hat do you think she/he wants to do after graduation?
How do you feel about your child's career plans?
Has she/he always been interested in biology?
What are her/his hobbies?
Does she/he enjoy school?
Do you thing her/his interest came from things you might have done as a family?
Are you two interested in biology?
Does your family what nature shows on television?
Have you discussed what [your child] and I do for my research?
What's your opinion of this activity?
What are your thoughts on the theory of evolution?

B-3: Principal and Counselor Interview
Could you describe your student population?
You've said you "stay on top of" many problems with the student body. Do you
think you can do that because your classes are a little smaller than the typical
school?
Do you know if many o f your students come from families whose parents
attended U High?
Can you tell me about the parents that send their kids to school here? Are they
very active in school activities?
How are curricular decisions made?
Do you see it as a good or bad thing that you are linked to a large central office?
What are your admission procedures?
How many students apply each year?
How many can you accept?
W ho decides which students get in?
W hat are the goals of the school?
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12.
13.
14.

W hat factors are considered when hiring teachers?
How would you describe the teachers in the science department?
W hat are your impressions of Hurston's biology classes?

APPENDIX C
MATERIALS AND SAMPLES OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS/DIRECTIONS FOR
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW
C -l: Concept Mapping
General Directions for All Maps
1. [The topic statement is given.]
2.
Write down some key concepts that you think you need to explain it, then map it.
3. I want you to tell me about those concepts as you list them.
4. I want you to keep it around no more than 10 concepts.
5. Now the next thing, I guess is sort these on you desk in some kind of hierarchy.
6. Now, you'll need linking words.
7. Read the map for me.
General Questions for All Maps
1. So are you happy with that arrangement?
2. Is that how you would best explain it?
3. So what's the difference between these branches?
•Concept mapping (CM -Indirections
W hat I want you to do today, the big thing is, is to do a concept map for me.
And I want you to do it on your understanding o f evolution to this point.
•Concept mapping (CM-2)-directions
I want you do draw a concept map about how evolution works.
•Concept mapping (CM-3)-directions
Using these five words, (evolution, mutation, change, population, natural
selection), I want you to draw a map explaining how evolution works. You
can add any terms you need.
C-2: Interview About Instances
Adaptation. Taxonomy. Speciation. Species Concept. Natural History (LAI-1)
In this set of interviews, students were shown drawings and photographs. The
students were asked to discuss anything that occurred to them as they observed the
graphics.
The
1.
2.
3.

graphics used for the first interviews about instances included:
A common egret fishing in white, choppy water.
A red octopus.
An elephant foraging from a tall tree in an otherwise empty field.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

A litter of kittens, all o f which are phenotypically different.
Three different bears: a grizzly, a brown bear, and a polar bear.
A purple wild flower.
A small, black sea turtle, walking over white sand.
A fruit eating bat feeding from a cactus.
A uniform population o f cartoon rabbits.
Three different primates: a gorilla, a chimpanzee, a human.
A phylogeny of humans including primates from gibbons to humans entitled, "A
puzzling family tree.”
12. A graphic depicting different species of Galapagos finches, their different bill
structures, and food source.
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Sample directions/questions/probing remarks included:
1.
W hat I want you to do is to look at the pictures and describe what you see and
anything that pops into your mind about the organism.
2.
Do you know anything about that kind o f bird?
3.
I think it's a common egret.
4.
Do you know how they make their living?
5.
W hat do you know about octopuses?
6. Can you think of anything else as you look at that picture?
7. Do you think those dogs are related?
8. What's it mean to be a dog? Are they both dogs? How?
9.
Do you know what the term species means?
10. Do you think that all the variation in dogs is a natural thing or something we've
done through breeding?
Evolutionary Patterns ('IAI-2')
In this set of interviews, students were shown groups o f drawings. The students
were asked to select the graphic from the group which best depicted what they thought of
as evolution and to describe their selection and the reasoning behind this choice.
The sets of graphics included:
1. A. A phylogenetic tree o f primates including gibbons, orangutans, gorillas, pigmy
chimpanzees, and humans. A member from each o f these groups is shown along
the top of the graphic with a tree below them showing phylogenetic relationships.
The branches from this tree are graphed according to the time scale when the
branching occurred.
B. A line drawing depicting all the major branches of the entire animal kingdom,
the result is a kind of bush with organisms at each of it branches. The organisms
are depicted as well as their evolutionary relationships. The organisms shown
included: ancestral protists, cnidarians, flatworms, roundworms, mollusks,
annelids, crustaceans, insects, centipedes, mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians,
fish, tunicates, echinoderms, and sponges.
2.

A. Three different butterflies, one at the bottom with an arrow leading to each of
the other two which are at the top of the page.
B. An ancestral glyptodont shown at the bottom o f the page with an arrow leading
to an armadillo.
C. A salamander shown at the bottom of the page with an arrow leading up to a
toad, which has an arrow leading up to a duck-billed platypus, which has an arrow
leading up to a raccoon.

Sample questions for each of these two sets o f graphics included:
1.
Which one do you think best demonstrates what you think biologist talk about
when they talk about evolution?
2.
Why did you select that one?
Patterns of Evolutionary Change (IAI-31
In this set of interviews, students were shown a series of line drawings shown
below. The students were asked to select which o f the four branches best depicted their
ideas of evolutionary change. The students were also requested to explain their
reasoning.
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The graphic:

Sample questions included:
1. Which tree best depicts evolutionary changes as you understand them?
2. Okay, so why did you pick that one?
3.
So what was the deciding factor for you?
C-3: Prediction Interviews
Three series of graphics were used in these structured interviews. The students
were the first graphic in the series, with an explanation the situation. Then they were
asked to make a prediction based on their observations. This prediction was written
down as well as stated verbally. Afterwards, the students were tshown the second
graphic in that series and they were asked to make observations o f the outcome o f the
situation. Finally, they were asked to explain any differences between their prediction
and the outcome of the situation.
Prediction interview for knowledge o f genetics (PI-1)
The following were the graphics used and sample questions:
1.
Here are two mice, one male and one female. Both of the mice had their tails run
over by a cart when they were very young. These two mice mate. W hat will their
offspring look like?

Here are their offspring. Notice they all have long tails. How can you explain
this?
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2.

Here are two mice, one male and one female. Notice one has a normal tail, while
the other has no tail at all. This mouse was bom without a tail. These two mice
mate. W hat will their offspring look like?

Here are their offspring. Notice that some have long tails and some have no tails
at all. How can you explain this?

3.

Here are two ducks. Notice the male is black and the female is white. These two
ducks have a clutch o f offspring. W hat will their offspring look like?

Here are their offspring. Notice that some are black and some are white. How can
you explain this?

Prediction interview for knowledge of mutation (PI-2)
The following were the graphics used and sample questions:
1.
The following is a prototypical species of bear. Notice he has short hair and is a
ground dweller. The ice age come to the place where this species lives. O f the
three possible mutations seen here (becoming a cave dweller, gaining long hair, or
losing all hair), which one or ones do you think are possible? Which one or ones
are impossible? W hy?

All three mutations are possible. How does this coincide with your predictions?
C-4: Sorting Task
For this interview, the students were randomly presented six graphics. They
were asked to use these graphics to explain an evolutionary event of color change in a
population of rabbits. The students were instructed that they may use any of the card
they wished, in any order, and that not all o f the cards had to be used. As they were
sorting, the students were reminded to talk aloud, and to voice as many of their thoughts
as were possible.
Sample questions included:
1. So you think the rabbits pass on this trait of browness? How?
2.
This genetic event, is it in any way tied to the arrival o f the hawk?
3.
Is there any other way you would like to explain this evolutionary event?
4.
When you say dominance, is that a like of genetic dominance?
The graphics were:
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In this structured interview, the students were randomly presented a group o f
cards, each which contained a word. The students were instructed to select the terms
which could be applied to evolutionary theory and those terms which could not. The
students were reminded to talk as the sorted the terms and they were asked to explain
their reasoning.
The terms used included: design, drastic, success, need, random, chance, subtle, and
order.
Sample questions included:
1.
Why?
2.
Is putting order on the outside somehow related to putting chance and random on
the inside?
C-6: Drawing
For this structured interview, the participant was asked to "draw the time line of
the history of life on earth." After drawing the time line, the participant was asked to
explain the time line. Questions were asked after the drawing was made to elicit
additional information about the participant's conception of natural history.
Sample questions included:
1.
So, what do you say? W hat do you think happened?
2. Do you think there was a big time gap like you drew?
3. Speculate for me. What do you think went on in all that time between the
beginning of the earth and the origins o f the dinosaurs?
4. So that's something you really don't care about one way or another?
5. So you would like to think there is just a gradual change from one group to
another?
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C-7: Bishop and Anderson (1985) Exam4
This exam was administered at the beginning and end of the year to all the
participants in the class. The exam was administered as published by Bishop and
Anderson (1985), except for the final questions. For this question, instead of asking
about beliefs, the participants are asked for their opinions. The interview participants
were asked to explain their pre- and posttest answers in structured interviews.
Name______________________
For the following questions, use the lettered statements listed and circle the letter
which most closely corresponds to what you understand. Provide written
explanations where your feel they are appropriate.
a--The statement on the left is the only correct statement.
b -T h e statement on the left is more correct.
c-B o th statements are equally correct
d -T h e statement on the right is more correct.
e--The statement on the right is the only correct statement.
D ucks a re a q u a tic b ird s. T h e ir feet a r e w eb b ed a n d this tr a it m ak es th em
fast sw im m e rs. B iologist believe th a t d u ck s evolved fro m la n d b ird s
w hich d id n o t have w eb b ed feet.
1. The trait o f webbed feet in ducks:
Appeared in ancestral ducks
because they lived in water
abcde
and needed to swim.
Explain:
2. W hile ducks were evolving webbed feet:

Appeared in ducks
because of a chance
mutation

With each generation, most
ducks had about the same
a b c d e
amount of webbing on their
feet as their parents

With each generation
most ducks had a tiny
bit more webbing on
their feet than their
parents

Explain:
3. If a population of ducks were forced to live in an environment where water for
swimming was not available:
Many ducks would die because
their feet were poorly
a b c d e
adapted to this environment

The ducks would
gradually develop
nonwebbed feet

Explain:
4. The population of ducks evolved webbed feet because:
The more successful ducks
adapted to their aquatic
a b c d e
environment
Explain:

The less successful
ducks died without
offspring

4 N ote. This is not the actual exam , but this includes the sam e questions in the sam e order as
that adm inistered during the research.
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5. Biologists often use the term "fitness" when speaking of evolution. Below are
descriptions o f four male lions. According to your understanding o f evolution, which
lion would biologists consider the "fittest?"

Name

"George"

"Ben"

"Spot"

"Sandy"

Size

10 feet
175 lbs

8 1/2 feet
160 lbs

9 feet
162 lbs

9 feet
160 lbs

Number of
cubs
fathered

19

25

20

20

Age of death

13 years

16 years

12 years

9 years

15

14

14

19

When the area that
Spot lived in was
destroyed by fire,
Spot was able to
move his pride to a
new area and change
his feeding habits.

Sandy was
killed by an
infection
resulting from
a cut in his
foot.

Number o f
cubs
surviving to
adulthood
Comments

George is
very large,
very healthy.
The strongest
lion.

Ben has the
greatest
number of
females in
his harem.

The "fittest" lion is:
a) George
b) Ben

c) Spot

d) Sandy

Explain your answer:
6. A number of mosquito populations are today resistant to DDT, even though those
species were not resistant to DDT when it was first introduced. Biologists believe
that DDT resistance evolved in mosquitoes because: (choose the best answer)
a. Individual mosquitoes built up an immunity to DDT after being exposed to it.
b. Mosquitoes needed to be resistant to DDT in order to survive.
c. A few mosquitoes were probably resistant to D D T before it was ever used.
d. M osquitoes learned to adapt to their environment.
e. Other, please explain._________________________________________________
7. Cheetahs (large African cats) are able to run faster than 60 miles per hour when
chasing prey. How would a biologists explain how the ability to run fast evolved in
cheetahs, assuming their ancestors could only run 20 miles per hour?
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8.

Cave salamanders are blind (they have eyes which are nonfunctional). How would
biologist explain how blind cave salamanders evolved from sighted ancestors?

9.

W hat is your personal opinion of evolution?

Sample interview questions for the Bishop and Anderson (1985) exam included:
1. Where did you learn that?
2. What does that mean?
3. So do you think a lot o f things just pop up because o f mutations?
4. What's do difficult about that question, do you know?
5.
W hat would happen if the ducks were juveniles, like real young?
6.
What's natural selection?
7.
So how does that happen?
8. Would the mutations have happened without the DDT?
9. Could that immunity be passed on to their offspring?
10. What does fittest mean?
11. W hat makes [that lion] fittest?
12. How would the cheetahs learn to run faster?
13. Would that be passed on to their offspring?
14. So how did that variation get there in the first place?

APPENDIX D
TEACHING M ATERIALS/TEACHING PRACTICES
This appendix is a list o f the most common of teaching materials and teaching
practices used by Ms. Hurston used throughout her biology II course. The categories of
teaching materials and teaching practices are listed in a descending order o f their
prevalence in Ms. Hurston's teaching. These categories include (1) laboratories, (2)
videos and associated media, (3) student readings, (4) journal writing, and (5) student
presentations. Listed with the categories are specific assignments, along with the date of
the assignment, a rough estimation of the instructional time required by the assignment
(if more than one day was commonly required for this the teaching material/practice),
and the unit to which each assignment related. Note, the designation of instructional unit
is an artificial one, because many assignments could pertain to a variety of teaching
topics.

(I) Laboratories
Date

Title

Days o f
instruction
1

Unit

8/19/92

Pipetting and weighing repetitions

8/20/92

Effects of pollution on seed
germination

3

9/4/92
9/14/92
9/22/92

Animal behavior observations
Meal worm observations
pH: The measurement o f hydrogen
ion concentrations

1
1
2

9/23/92

Observations o f a mini-pond
ecosystem

1

9/29/92
10/2/92
10/8/92
10/14/92
11/4/92

Roly-poly observations
Classroom animal observations
Animal behavior experiments
Zoo animal observations
Electrophoresis

1
1
1
1
2

11/13/92

Cloning exercise

1

11/9/92

Pig dissection-external anatomy

1

Laboratory
techniques/
Nature of science
Laboratory
techniques/
Nature of science
Animal behavior
Animal behavior
Laboratory
techniques/
Nature of science
Laboratory
techniques/
Animal behavior
Animal behavior
Animal behavior
Animal behavior
Animal behavior
Genetic
techniques
Genetic
techniques
Anatomy

11/10/92
11/11/92
11/12/92
11/13/92
11/16/92
11/17/92
11/18/93
11/30/93
12/1/92

Pig dissection-circulatory system
Pig dissection—digestive system
Pig dissection-urogenital system
Pig dissection—respiratory system
Pig dissection-review
Pig dissection--brain and review
Pig dissection-review
Pig dissection-surgery
Litter sampling

1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1

Anatomy
Anatomy
Anatomy
Anatomy
Anatomy
Anatomy
Anatomy
Anatomy
Laboratory
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Nature of science
Laboratory
techniques/
Nature o f science
Laboratory
techniques/
Anatomy/
Nature of science
Laboratory
techniques
Nature of science
Microbiology
techniques
Microbiology
techniques
Microbiology
echniques
Microbiology
techniques
Microbiology
techniques

12/2/92

Sampling

1

1/11/93

Interpreting data and stating
conclusions: Owl pellets
and plant growth

5

1/27/93

Inductive reasoning:
Chromatography and observations

3

2/11/93

M icrobiology-introduction

1

2/12/93

Microbiology—rules, microscope

1

2/15/93

M icrobiology-sterilization

2/16/93

M icrobiology-m edia

1
t
1

2/17/93

M icrobiology-sterile transfer,
asceptic techniques, agar slants,
inoculations
M icrobiology-streak plate,
techniques
Microbiology—hay infusion,
smear slides
M icrobiology-slide staining, smears

1

8

3/18/93

M icrobiology-information on
stock cultures
A model for neurotransmitter activity
in the earthworm
M icrobiology-catch up day

3/19/93
3/31/93

Visual physiology
M icrobiology-student experiments

1
2

4/1/93

M icrobiology—unknowns

5

4/8/93

Introduction to statistics

2

4/13/93

Anthropology-Anthropometry:
Standard techniques for
measuring human beings
A nthropology-Fingerprints
in humans: An aspect of variation
Anthropology-Characteristics of
evolution: Patterns of change
A nthropology-Identification of age,
sex, race and size of skull, skeleton,
and cardboard cutout
A nthropology-Prim ates:
Classification and morphology

2

Microbiology
techniques
Microbiology
techniques
Laboratory
techniques/
Nature of science
Anthropology

2

Anthropology

3

Anthropology

2

Anthropology

1

Anthropology

2/18/93
plates
2/19/93
3/1/93
3/2/93
3/15/93

4/15/93
4/19/93
4/21/93
4/27/93

1

Microbiology yeast

1

Microbiology
techniques
Microbiology
techniques
Microbiology
techniques
Neurobiology

1

3
1

Microbiology
techniques
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4/29/93

Anthropology-Characteristics of
evolution: Patterns of change
4/30/93
A nthropology-A rrangem ent of
primate skulls
Total—47 Laboratories

1

Anthropology

1

Anthropology

(2) Student reading
jDate
8/19

Student Reading
Title
Lee, Kenneth. Dinosaurs on mars.
National Inquirer.

Unit
Dinosaurs?
Nature of
Science

8/25

Mulier, Richard, A. (1985). Did comets kill
the dinosaurs? Reader’s Digest. March 24,
98-105.
Recer, Paul. Crater in Mexico adds weight to
theory of dinosaurs'death. (1992). Morning
Advocate. Friday August (8/14/92),

Dinosaurs/
Nature o f
Science

9/1

Gould, S. J. (1984). Sex, Drugs, Disasters,
and the extinction of dinosaurs. Discover.
March, 67-72.

Dinosaurs/
Nature of
Science

9/2

Dinosaurs/
Nature of
Science
Gould, S. J. (1987). The lesson o f dinosaurs: Dinosaurs?
Nature of D iscover.
Evolution didn't inevitably lead to us.
Science
March, p. 51.
Animal Rights
Loebner, Linda. (1982). Surrogate human.
Science 82. July/August, 33-39.

10/7

The excavation of Jack Homer.
Natural Acts, 61-82.

12/9

Marx, Jean, L. (1988). DNA
fingerprinting takes the witness stand.
Science. 17 June, 249, 1616-1618.

Genetic
Techniques

12/11

Hanson, Betsy. (1992). A bull's-eye in the
brain. D iscover. October, 16.

Neurophysiology

1/22

Rensberger, Boyce. (1982). Evolution
since Darwin. Science 82. April, 40-45.

Evolution

2/4

Face language: How to read it. (1979).
Family C ircle. August 7, 1979, p. 30-35.

Animal Behavior

2/8

Quannen, David. Natural Acts.
Selected Essays.

4/14

Forensic Anthropology

Anthropology

4/20

Borst, Richard, A. (1986). Bring a skeleton
to life. The Science Teacher. April, 42-46.

Anthropology
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4/22

Huyghe, Patrick. (1988). No bone unturned.
Discover. December. 204-208.

Anthropology

4/23

Witness for the prosecution: DNA
fingerprinting

Anthropology

4/29

Shreeve, James. (1992). The data game.
Discover. September. 76-83.

Anthropology

4/30

Diamond, Jared. (1989). The great leap
forward. Discover. Mav. 50-60.

Anthropology

5/2

Shipman, Pat. (1986). Baffling limb on the
familv tree. Discover. September. 87-93.

Anthropology

5/3

Chapter 4: Preliminary. Sherry Demastes

Total-20 student reading

(3) Videos and associated media
[Date

Titie's'

"

8/21/92
9/2/92
9/9/92
9/15/92
9/18/92
9/25/92
10/9/92
10/19/92

"Galapagos Islands"
"The Great Dinosaur Hunt"
"The Case o f the Flying Dinosaur"
"People o f the Forest"
"Life o f an Urban Gorilla"
"Mountain Gorillas"
"Family of Chimps"
"So Like Us"

10/21/92
10/26/92
10/27/92
11/19/92
12/7/92

"From Monkeys to A pes”
"Nature Watch"
"Wildlife Journey"
"Cats: Caressing the Tiger"
"Human Tissue Implants"

1/7/93

"The New Genetics: Rights and
Responsibilities "(film strip)
"On the Shoulders of Giants"

1/11/92
1/20/93
1/22/93
3/12/93
4/12/93

"Patterns and Processes
(video disk)
"The Shape of Things"
"Wonders of the Brain"
"The Mysteries of Mankind"

T o tal-2 0 videos/filmstrips/video disks.

Unit
Dinosaurs
Dinosaurs
Dinosaurs
Animal behavior
Animal behavior
Animal behavior
Animal behavior
Animal rights/
Animal behavior
Animal behavior
Animal rights
Animal rights
Animal behavior
Genetic
techniques
Genetic
techniques
Evolution/
Nature of science
Evolution
Evolution
Neurophysiology
Anthropology

|
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(4) Student journals
|D ate

Assignment

Sex, Drugs, Disasters, etc.
Stop. Write a journal type response to that plus
the discussion we had about the "Dinosaurs on
Mars" article.
Write down some behavioral characteristics of the
9/18/92
chimpanzees and gorilla that were
behavior
unexpected by you.
How have your attitudes about the great apes
9/21/92
changed?
Reports o f your readings.
9/30/92
What methods did they use?
How long did the study last?
Give some information about the animal
Explain what was learned by the study
(Written after an oral reading of Through a
10/12/92
W indow. J. Goodall). W hich one, nlav or war,
played a bigger role in the evolution o f man?
(Written after an oral reading of Through a
10/19/92
W indow. J. Goodall). W hat does this
window have to do with biology?
Write how the anatomy of the pig relates to other
11/18/92
animals dissected in other classes. Tell how
studying the pig anatomy will benefit
your understanding of human anatomy.
Describe the pathway or the evolutionary
12/3/92
process that lead to human having an
appendix and pigs having a cecum.
W hat does "the Shape of Things" video
1/25/93
have to do with evolution?
Summary of essay.
2/9/93
W hat is the organism it was about or what
action? W hat was the point o f the essay?
(The author's messageas it were)
What is the value of a scientific essay?
Total—10 student journal entries.

9/1/92

Unit
Nature of
Science/
Dinosaurs
Animal

Animal
behavior
Animal
behavior

Animal
behavior
Animal
behavior
Dissection

Anatomy/
Evolution
Evolution
Nature of
Science

(5) Student Presentations
Date

Topic

9/8
9/11
10/15
10/27

Reporting behavioral observations
Summaries of Journal Articles
Report of Zoo Observations
Animal Rights Debate

Single or Group
Presentation
S(Single)
S
S
G(Group)

|

12/7
12/7
1/8
2/1
2/8
4/21

Summary of Journal Articles
Explanation for Personal Checks
Moral Crisis in Genetics
Book Reports
Human Behavior Observations
Skeleton Assessment

T o ta l-10 student lead presentations of material

O oo oo Q Q oo
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APPENDIX E
LIST OF ALL EXAM QUESTIONS

First Quarter Exam
Answer the following questions (in complete sentences, with correct grammar and
spelling, of course) in 1/2 to 1 page each.
1. Describe some of the ways in which scientist study animals, and explain why
anthropomorphism is a danger to their research.
2. Read the Gould essay "The Lessons o f The Dinosaurs” and focus on the next to the
last paragraph. Discuss both the inevitability of extinction and your personal ideas
about the extinction o f dinosaurs.
3. W hat is science, and what are some things to keep in mind when planning an
experiment?
4. (Bonus) From either articles you’ve read or videos you've seen, pick one fact
about animal behavior that has given you a new outlook, perspective, or attitude
and explain how you have changed you mind and why. (1/4-1/2 pg.)

Anatomy Laboratory Practical
[This was a practical laboratory exam in which student had to identify approximately
30 structures of the fetal pig anatomy.]

First Semester Final Exam
1. There are many controversies or differences of opinion about dinosaurs and their
history. Discuss one of the controversial issues, explaining both sides and tell in
your personal stance. (1/2-1 page)
2. Describe some of the different methods o f studying animals. W hat are two
similarities and two differences between primate behavior and that o f homo sapiens
[sic]? W hat was the most useful method o f studying a primate at the zoo, and
why? W hat were the m ost interesting things you learned by your own
observations? (approx. one page.)
3. Read the attached article and write a short critique of it. (Skip the summary.) What
is the importance of this article? (1/4-1/2 page)
4. W hat is the value of the scientific article critiques you have done throughout the
semester, or do they have value to you? (1/2 page)

Second Semester Final Exam
Day One
Write on separate papers, using correct grammar and spelling. Answer each question
thoroughly.
1. W hat do you think are the most important ideas, themes, concepts, or theories in
biology and why? (This question should take 1-2 pages to answer.)
2. W hat is the importance o f measurements to biologists? We can perhaps understand
how an engineer building a bridge needs to use careful measurements, but in
biology it isn't that critical, is it? (1/4-1/2 page)
3. O f what value is an understanding o f statistics and probability to a scientist or an
ordinary citizen?
4. Look at the cartoon below and describe what real evolutionary concept are include
in it. (1/4-1/2 page)
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Day Two
Answer the questions completely on a separate piece of paper, using correct grammar
and spelling.
1. A. Give you critique o f this course, commenting on the various units and activities.
Tell your favorite and least favorite parts, as well as what you perceive to be the
strong points and weak points of the course. B. If you were going to design a
Biology II course, what would include, and why? (1-2 pages)
2. Suppose a number of U High students came down with a bacterial infection, and it
was suspected that the source of infection was at school. Tell how you would
investigate to determine possible sources of contamination, test them, and
recommend procedures to stop the spread of the infection without shutting down
the school. (1/2-1 page)
3. Our State Police Crime lab guide described forensic science as comparing
unknowns to knowns. Explain what he meant, and tell if and how this relates to
the rest of science. (1/2-1 page)

APPENDIX F
INSTRUCTIONAL EPISODE IN EVOLUTION LISTED BY ORDER OF
OCCURRENCE
L’mi

Date

Instructional Method 5

Title/subject of instruction0

8/17/92 Examination

Bishop and Anderson exam

Nature of
science

8/21/92 Video

Darwin and the Galapagos
Islands

Nature of
science
Dinosaurs

8/25/92 Discussion-loose triadic
dialogue
8/25/92 Reading

Being a scientist

Dinosaurs

8/25/92 Reading

Dinosaurs

8/31/93 Discussion-loose triadic
dialogue
9/1/92 Journal entry

Dinosaurs
Dinosaurs

9/2/92 Video

Dinosaurs

9/4/92 Discussion-loose tria d ic
dialogue & teach er
reading
9/8/92 "F a rsid e " carto o n
9/9/92 Video

Dinosaurs
Dinosaurs

Dinosaurs

9/11/93 Teacher exposition
9/14/93 W orksheet

Animal
behavior
Animal
behavior
Animal
behavior

9/17/93 "What is it?" question

Animal
behavior
Animal rights
Animal rights
Anatomy
Anatomy

Evolution

9/28/92 Discussion-loose triadic
dialogue
9/29/92 Discussion-loose triadic
dialogue
10/7/92 Exam first q u a r te r

10/12/92 Journal entry
10/19/92 Discussion-loose triadic
dialogue
10/29/92 Debate
11/18/92 Journal entry

"Did comets kill the
Dinosaurs”
"Crater in M exico adds
weight to theory of dinosaurs
death"
Extinction theories

"The lessons of the
dinosaurs: Evolution didn't
inevitably lead to us"
W ar and play and the
evolution of humans
Opinions on anim al rights

Controversies in dinosaur
theories: similarities between
humans and other primates:
effects of m edicine on human
gene pool

3 S o le . Instructional m ethod shown in bold had evolution as the focal point of instruction.
Note. Com plete references for readings can be found in A ppendix A.
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individual

Evidence for
extinction

Individual

Extinction theories

Whole

"Sex, drugs, disasters, and the Extinction theories
extinction of dinosaurs."
"The infinite voyage: The
Evolutionary
relationships of
great dinosaur hunt"
dinosaurs and birds
Jack H om er
Evolutionary rate
theories, adaptive
radiation
Primordial soup
Creation of life
"The case of the flying
Origins of
dinosaurs,
dinosaur"
evidence for
evolution
Land bridge extinction theory Adaptive radiation
Classification
Taxonomy and
evolution
Okapis
Species concept
Summaries of prim ate
behavior
W orksheet-Cause and effect

Class
parlicipatioi

Historical aspect of Whole
evolutionary
theory
Evidence for
Whole
evolution
Individual
Disaster theory

Individual
Whole

Whole

Whole
Whole

Whole
Individual
Whole

Relation of humans Whole
to other primates
Anthropomorphis
Whole
m and teleology
Non-linearity of
Individual
evolution
human evolution

relation o f humans
to other primates
Humans as animals
Animal experimentation
Relationships of
Comparison of pig anatomy
to other vertebrates
vertebrates
12/3/92 Journal entry
Comparison of pig's cecum to Function and
derivation of
human appendix
organs, humans as
animals
12/7/92 Discussion--student cross Summary of student readings Darwin's
observational
discussion
methods: Natural
selection

12/11/92 Semester exam

^

Aspect of
evolution
addressed
Natural selection

Extinction
theories: Humans
as animals:
Natural selection

Individual
Whole
Small group
Individual
Individual

Whole group

Individual
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Evolution

1/8/93 Video

"On the shoulders of giants"

Evolution

1/15/93 T e a c h e r exposition

Formation o f microfossils

Evolution

1/20/93 D iscussion-loose
tria d ic dialogue
1/20/93 D iscussion-loose
tria d ic dialogue

Fossilized remains of
dinosaur
Patterns and processes of
sediment formation

Evolution

Evolution

1/20/93 A udiovisual
p resen tatio n

Evolution

1/20/93 Q uestlons-hom ew ork
assignm ent

Evolution

1/22/93

Video

Evolution

1/22/93

S tu d e n t read in g

Evolution

1/25/93

Jo u rn a l e n try

Evolution

1/26/93

D isc u ssio n -stru c tu re d
tria d ic dialogue

Evolution

1/26/93

D iscussion-loose triadic
dialogue

Evolution

2/2/93

Discussion—loose triadic
dialogue

Evolution

2/3/03

Evolution

2/3/93

Video Disk with
discussion
Questions

Evolution

2/5/93

A nthropology

2/'10/93
4/7/93

Discussion-structured
triadic dialogue
Video & Discussion
Questions

A nthropology

4/13/93

Laboratory

A nthropology

4/21/93

A nthropology

4/22/93

Discussion-loose triadic
dialogue
Laboratory

Anthropology

4/23/93

A nthropology

4/29/93

Anthropology

4/29/93

Laboratory

Anthropology

4/29/93

Reading

Anthropology

4/30/93

D iscussion-structured
tnadic dialogue

Discussion—loose triadic
dialogue
D iscussion-loose triadic
dialogue

Historical aspect of Whole
evolutionary
theory
Fossil evidence:
Whole
Geological
changes
Evidence for evolution

Patterns formed by
strictly physical
processes
"Patterns and processes" of
Planned vs.
nature
unplanned,
function vs.
nonfunctional,
learned vs.
unlearned
"Patterns in the
Nature and limits
Environment"
of scientific
explanations
"The shape of things"
Patterns found in
nature
"Evolution since Darwin"
Rate of evolution,
evidence for
evolution
The role of natural patterns in Evolution operates
the process of evolution
under familiar
physical processes
The role of natural patterns in Evolution operates
the process of evolution
under familiar
physical processes
About "Evolution science
Rate of evolution,
Darwin"
evidence for
evolution
Evolution
Natural selection:
rale of evolution:
Lamarck: genetic
drift: species
concept:
Adaptive radiation
Adaptive radiation
and convergence
Adaptive radiation
Adaptive radiation
and convergence
Adaptive radiation questions Adaptive radiation
and convergence
Animal communications
Adaptation
"The scope o f anthropology: Humans as animals
Introduction and overview"
"Fingerprints in humans: An
aspect o f variation"

Function o f human
adaptations
Fingerprint laboratory
Evolution of
fingerprints
"Primates: Classification and Humans as
morphology
primates
Primate laboratory
Function of human
teeth
Primate laboratory
Classification and
taxonomy: Species
concept
Convergence,
"Evolution: Patterns of
change"
divergence,
adaptive radiation,
extinction
"The data game"
Theories of human
lineage
Evolution laboratory
Spcciation:
mutation:
competition:
adaptive radiation:
extinction

Whole

Whole

Individual

Whole
Individual

Individual

Whole
Whole
Whole

Whole
Individual
Whole
Whole
Individuals
Small group
W hole
Small group
Whole
Whole

Small group

Individual
Whole

"The great leap forward":
"The baffling limb on the
family tree”
Discussion of readings

A n th ropology

4/30/93

Reading

A n th ro p o lo g y

5/3/93

A n thropology

5/3/93

D iscussion-structured
triadic dialogue: Teacher
exposition
"The human past: Summary
W orksheet
and review"

Theories of hum an
lineage

Individual

Theories of hum an
lineage

Whole

Theories of hum an
lineage

Small group

APPENDIX G
PARTICIPANTS' CONCEPT MAPS
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Stephanie's Concept Maps
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Tyler's Concept Maps
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Meredith's Concept Maps
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